THE COURT OF THE GENTILES.

PART IV.

Of Reformed Philoſophie.

BOOK III.

Of Divine Predetermination:

Wherein the Nature of Divine Predetermination is fully explicated and demonſtrated, both in the general, as alſo more particularly, as to the ſubſtrate matter or entitative act of Sin.

CHAP. I.

The Explication of the Terms.

(1) *The Origine of the controverſie about Predetermination to the entitative act of Sin; with the method we procede in.* (2) *The Nature of Sin, its Origine and material conſtitution; al acts in their*

generic

generic nature indifferent: Al Morality determined by the Moral Law: Sin as to its formal reaſon a privation: Of actions modally and intrinſecally evil. (3) The Libertie of the Wil: The new-coined diſtinction of Libertie, largely and ſtrictly taken, with its abuſe: A true Idea of Libertie. (4) Moral Libertie or Free-wil to good: Neceſſitie, Impoſſibilitie, Poſſibilitie what. (5) The Wil of God, its Diſtribution into Significative and Decretive. (6) Divine Concurſe, its Immediation, Efficacitie, and Predetermination: ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργεῖν, δεῖξαι, προεῖξαι, with the Nature of Predetermination explicated.

The Origine of the Controverſie.

§. 1. THE Doctrine of *Divine Concurſe, and Creatural Dependence* has in al Ages of the Church, but more ſpecially ſince the riſe of Pelagianiſme, received vigorous aſſaults from many learned and potent Adverſaries: and indeed no wonder, ſithat corrupt Nature propagated from *Adam* has, in imitation of its firſt parent, been ever aſpiring after an equality to the Deitie; and that not only in being the *laſt End* of its Acting, but alſo the *firſt Principe* of its Dependence. This vain attemt has appeared more viſibly in ſome daring and proud ſpirits, ſuch as *Nebuchadnezar*, Dan. 4. 30. *Is not this great Babylon that I have built*, &c? But in others the Deſign and oppoſition againſt the Concurſe of God has been more refined, under a pretext of vindicating the Divine Majeſty from the blaſphemous imputation of being the *Author of ſin*. And becauſe al pious Souls have ſo great a veneration for the Bleſſed Deitie, as to abhor the very ſhadow of ſuch Blaſphemie, therefore the Adverſaries of Divine Concurſe have in al Ages pitcht on this as the moſt puiſſant argument to oppoſe the ſame, that it brings the moſt holy and bleſſed God under the black imputation of encouraging, yea impelling men to Sin. And albeit thoſe that aſſert Gods efficacious Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, do moſt vehemently deteſt in their own ſouls, and ſolemnly proteſt againſt the leaſt thought or opinion that makes God the Author of ſin, yet nevertheleſs this direful piece of blaſphemie is ſtil charged on them. Moreover, there being in this Doctrine of Efficacious Concurſe (as in al other great Myſteries of Faith) ſome intricate difficulties, which the wiſe God has left us under, to trie our faith and ſubmiſſion to divine Revelation; hence alſo many learned, and ſome pious men

men have been at a great loſs in their Inquiries, how to reconcile the Libertie of the human Wil with the Efficace of Divine Concurſe, ſo as to free the bleſſed God from the imputation of impelling men to Sin. Theſe and ſuch like conſiderations made me the more prolixe in the philoſophic metaphyſic contemplation of the *Divine Concurſe*, its *Nature*, *Origine*, and *manner of working*, particularly as to the *entitative act* of what is ſinful; together with the *creatures Dependence* thereon: which I have more fully diſcuſſed, *Court of the Gentiles*, Chap. 7, 9, 11. with deſign and endeavours, if it might be, to give the bleſſed God and his ſinful Creature both their dues, and remove thoſe extremes which men are apt to fal into.

The method of our procedure.

But theſe my ſincere deſires and endeavours have not had that ſucceſs which was deſired; which brings me under a freſh obligation to vindicate mine own Hypotheſis, touching *the efficacious concurſe of God to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of what is ſinful.* I muſt confeſs, the province before us is difficult on many accounts, but principally, becauſe whiles we endeavour to defend the Concurſe and Providence of God about the entitative act of ſin, it is ſuggeſted by ſome, and believed by others, that we make the holy God the *Author of ſin*, which is the dregs of blaſphemie, and that which every ſerious ſpirit abhors more than Hel. Yet we need no way to dout, but that, with divine aſſiſtance, we may firmly aſſert and demonſtrate the efficacitie of Divine concurſe to the material entitative act of that which is ſinful, and yet fully vindicate the Divine Majeſtie from that blaſphemous Imputation of being the Author of ſin. And for our more diſtinct and demonſtrative procedure herein, we propoſe this method or form as moſt apt for the ſubject mater before us. (1) To examine and explicate the Terms formally implied in, or virtually relating to, the ſubject in controverſie. (2) To ſhew wherein the oppoſite parties agree, and wherein they differ both among themſelves and each from other; together with the original and principal motives, grounds, and cauſes of ſuch Differences. (3) To give a Scriptural Explication and Demonſtration of our own Hypotheſis, touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful; with an anſwer to thoſe falſe gloſſes and comments, which our Adverſaries the Jeſuites, Arminians, and ſome new Methodiſts give to thoſe Scriptures for the evading the force of them. (4) To draw up a brief Hiſto-

rie or Narrative of this controverſie, and its ſtate in al periods of the Chriſtian Churches to this day. (5) To give the Demonſtration of our Hypotheſis from Reaſons grounded on Scripture, with the Vindication of thoſe Reaſons from the ungrounded invalid anſwers given to them by our opponents, *Strangius*, and others. (6) To ſolve and anſwer the Objections urged by thoſe that oppoſe our Hypotheſis, particularly *Strangius*, *Baronius*, *Le Blanc*, with others. (7) And finally, to lay down the proper Sentiments and Hypotheſes of the Orthodoxe about this ſubject, in oppoſition to thoſe falſe Opinions which their Adverſaries charge upon them: as alſo to produce the proper opinions of the adverſe party, and the dangerous conſequences that naturally and neceſſarily flow from them.

The explication of the Termes. §. 2. Our firſt and indeed principal task, in order to a clear and demonſtrative procedure in this controverſie, wil be, to explicate the termes, and diſabuſe them from thoſe ambiguities, confuſions, and falſe impoſitions, in which at preſent they are involved. And here indeed I cannot but break forth into a doleful Lamentation over the bleeding ſtate of the Churches of Chriſt, by reaſon of thoſe vexatious controverſies which rend and tear out their very bowels, and al from the ſophiſtic abuſe or Ambiguitie of termes. And I no way dout but to make it moſt manifeſt, when opportunitie is offered, that moſt of the controverſies of this Age are fomented and maintained from the obſcuritie and abuſe of termes miſapplyed by ſubtile wits, for the eſtabliſhment of their own Hypotheſes. This is moſt evident in our preſent caſe, which makes it a duty abſolutely neceſſary, before we enter on our province, to clear up the way by a diſtinct and particular explication of thoſe termes that relate thereunto.

Of Sin. The firſt Terme we are to conſider is *Sin*: wherein we are to examine its *Origne*, *Cauſes*, *Conſtitution*, both *material* and *formal*, and *Kinds*; particularly the nature of Acts *ſubſtantially* or *intrinſecally* ſinful: al which we ſhal diſcuſſe with that Brevitie and Perſpicuitie the mater wil admit. *1. Its Origine.* 1. As for the *Origine* of Sin, it came firſt into the world from the *Defectibilitie* of our firſt Parents their Free-wil, and has been ever ſince maintained and fomented by the *Vitioſitie* of human nature depraved by *Adams* ſin, as we have copioſely demonſtrated, *Court Gent. P.4. B.1. c.4. §.2.* and *Philoſ. Gen. P.1. l.3. c.3. ſect.4. §.3.*

2. Sin,

2. Sin, as to its *material conſtitution*, has for its ſubſtrate mater or ſubject ſome natural good: For al ſin being, as to its formal nature, but a *moral privation* or *relation*, it neceſſarily requires ſome natural good as its ſubſtrate mater or ſubject. The wiſe Creator and Gubernator of althings has by his Law ſo conſtituted al *moral* Beings, both Virtues and Vices, as that they cannot ſubſiſt but in ſomething *natural*: albeit ſin be, according to its formal reaſon, a mere privation, yet it requires ſome poſitive, real natural Being for its ſubject, according to the nature of al other privations. Thus *Auguſtin*: *That which is evil by reaſon of vice, is good by nature.* Again he ſaith, *That ſin is not nature, but the vice of nature.* And that trite Maxime communly received by al the Ancients, *That al evil is founded in ſome good, i.e* natural, ſufficiently demonſtrates this our aſſertion. Thus *Auguſtin*, *Enchirid.* 97. *Although therefore things ſinful, as ſinful are not good; yet not only that good things, but alſo that ſinful be, is good: i.e.* things ſinful are good, not *morally*, but *naturally*, as means utile and conducible to the promoting of Divine glorie: for albeit they oppoſe the bonitie of the creature, yet materially conſidered they oppoſe not the bonitie of the Creator; who can extract the greateſt good out of the greateſt evils. Doth it not then belong to the infinite bonitie of God, to permit ſins to be? Yea, doth not the ingreſſe of ſin into the world belong to the perfection thereof? is not then the ſubſtrate mater thereof ſome natural good? This is wel demonſtrated by *Suarez*, *Metaph. Diſput.* 11. *ſect.* 3. *p.* 252. 'Sin as ſin has a material cauſe, which is always 'ſome good. So *Auguſtin* ſaith, *That there can be no evil but in 'good, becauſe if there were pure evil it would deſtroy itſelf*: and the 'reaſon is, becauſe ſin, as to its formal cauſe, is not purely poſi-'tive, or a pure negation, but a privation of debite perfection, 'therefore it requires a ſubject unto which ſuch a perfection is 'due; which ſubject muſt be ſome good, &c. Yea, *Strangius* himſelf, our principal Adverſary in this Controverſie, grants in this particular as much as we demand, *pag.* 629. *That it is abſurd to ſay, any ſin or defect can exiſt of itſelf, ſithat there can be no ſeparate evil; but al evil is* [ſeated] *in good.* Yea, he ingenuouſly confeſſeth, *pag.* 245. *That hatred of God,* [which is an action intrinſecally evil] *as it is an Act and Being, ſo it is from God, namely as it is hatred.* For, adds he, *So hatred truly, as it is abſtracted from this or that object is a phyſic action, to which the metaphyſic bonitie of* Ens *or*

2. *Its ſubſtrate matter.*

Quod malum eſt per vitium, bonum eſt per naturam, *Aug. contra Adverſ. Leg. & Prophet. cap.* 5.

Abſurdum eſſet, ſi diceretur, ullum defectum aut peccatum, aut ullum peccatum aut defectum, poſſe per ſe exiſtere, cùm nullum detur ſeparatum malum, ſed omne malum ſit in bono, *Strang. de Volunt. l.* 3. *c.* 19. *p.* 629.

or Being agrees, and it is morally indifferent; but as it is determined to God, hence is its ἀτοπία, *Obliquitie.* This conceſſion of *Strangius*, if wel conſidered, would not only overthrow his own Antitheſis againſt our Hypotheſis, but alſo put a period to this Controverſie, as in what follows we ſhal demonſtrate, *Chap.* 6. §. 1.

3. But the principal thing to be examined in the explication of ſin is its *formal Conſtitution* or *Reaſon*, which we ſhal endeavour to manifeſt in the following Propoſitions. (1) *Al human acts conſidered in their generic phyſic Entitie or natural Being, abſtracted from their moral conſtitution, are neither good nor evil, but morally indifferent.* Al moral Beings or Acts are ſeated, ἐν ἰδίᾳ φύσει, *in proper nature*, as *Cyril*; neither can they exiſte without that proper nature whereunto they are appendent. There is no virtue or vice which has not ſomething of nature for its ſubject and ſeat: it's true, there may be nature where there is no moralitie, yet there cannot be moralitie where there is not ſome nature to ſuſtain the ſame. Now al human nature, as alſo al natural Acts conſidered in their generic natural Idea, albeit capable of virtue or vice, yet are in themſelves morally indifferent. Al thoughts, words and actions conſidered phyſically and abſtractly, without regard to their moral determination by the Wil and Law of God, are neither good nor evil. For Moralitie is a mode not phyſically or intrinſecally inherent in human acts, but appendent to them from the determination of the Divine Law: The very acts of loving and hating God, conſidered in their generic, phyſic and entitative nature, as abſtracted from the moral relation they have to their object, are morally neither good nor evil; becauſe moral Bonitie and Vitioſitie are differences of human acts merely accidental or modal, as *Suarez* and other Scholemen generally grant. Thus much *Strangius* frequently grants; as *pag.* 158. he ſaith, *That moral Bonitie and Vitioſitie are accidents of natural Actions.* So *pag.* 875. *The action conſidered apart and phyſically is morally indifferent, neither may it be leſſe ſubject to virtue than to vice.* Hence,

Al Acts in their generic nature indifferent.

(2) *Al Moralitie and moral Acts, whether good or evil, receive their Conſtitution and Determination from the moral Divine Law.* This Hypotheſis is defended by *Scotus*, and other Scholemen, and that on the higheſt reaſons: For the Divine Wil is the ſupreme meaſure and rule of al Juſtice and Sanctitie: Things are therefore juſt and good becauſe God wils them; and whatever God wils is for that very reaſon, becauſe God wils it, good and juſt. Therefore

Actio ſecundum per ſe & phyſicè conſiderata indifferens eſt moraliter, nec minùs virtuti quàm vitio ſubſterni poteſt.

Al moral conſtitution from the Divine Law.

fore that Platonic notion defended by ſome learned men, *That the reaſons of good and evil are eternal*, is of dangerous conſequence, albeit it hath ſomewhat of Truth (as other errors have) mixed with it: we grant, that in things morally good, there is a *natural condecence* or *congruitie* to human nature, even antecedent to the Divine wil and conſtitution. As on ſuppoſition of mans being created, he immediately falls under a neceſſary and eſſential obligation of loving God, hating ſin, *&c.* Theſe are duties naturally congruous, yea morally neceſſary to human nature. Whence it is, that Divines uſually determine, *That Original Righteouſneſs was natural to Adam*, i. e. moſt condecent, congruous, and morally neceſſary to his Nature. Yet all this hinders not, but that the formal Determination of al Morals ariſe from the free conſtitution of the Divine wil and Law. The Law of God is the great *Expanſum* or *firmament*, which God has ſpread over the rational world, whereby al Mankind are moderated and regulated in al their moral Acts, and by which they ſhall be at laſt day judged: whence it neceſſarily follows, that al moral conſtitution muſt procede hence, as we have more amply demonſtrated, *Court Gentiles*, *P.* 4. *B.* 1. *c.* 2. §. 1, 2. Thus alſo *Voetius*, *Diſput. Theolog.* Par. 1. *de jure & juſtit.* Probl. 10. p. 351. proves, *That the divine wil is the fountain and rule of al Goodneſs.* So much alſo *Strangius* grants us, p. 89. namely, *That, as whatever is true is therefore true, becauſe conform to the firſt Truth; ſo whatever is good, is therefore good, becauſe conform to the firſt Goodneſs: and as the Truth of God belongs to his Intellect, ſo Goodneſs to his Wil.* The like Mr. *Baxter*, *Catholick Theolog.* Part 1. p. 100. *Al created Juſtice and Holineſs is ſuch*, i. e. *good (for goodneſs is their eſſence) becauſe Gods efficient wil made them ſo.* Hence,

(3) *The formal reaſon or nature of Sin conſiſts in its being a Deordination, or Tranſgreſſion of the Divine Law.* This Propoſition is fully ſtated and demonſtrated in Sacred Philoſophie, as we have copioſely proved, *Court Gent.* P. 4. B. 1. c. 4. §. 1. and *Philoſ. General.* P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 1. ſo that it requires not further Explication or Demonſtration. Hence,

(4) *Sin as to its formal conſtitution and nature is not a poſitive real Being, but privative.* This Hypotheſis has found general aſſent to it among al the Ancients both Pagan Philoſophers and Chriſtians, excepting ſome few, *Marcion* and *Manes*, with others. It's true, the *Manichees* held *Sin to be a poſitive Being*, and they took

Sin as to its formal nature a privation.

took up principes ſuited thereto, namely, *That there were two firſt Beings or Cauſes, one of good, the other of evil:* But the ſober Philoſophers and Chriſtians abhorred ſuch ſentiments. *Simplicius* on *Epictetus*, c. 34. p. 171. has an excellent Diſcourſe to prove *that ſin is not in the nature of Beings, but* ἀγαθῦ στέρησις, *a privation of Good*, which we have largely explicated, *Philoſ. Gen.* P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. §. 4. §. 2. And this was generally aſſerted by the Greek and Latin Fathers. Thus the ſpurious *Dionyſius* aſſures us, *that Sin muſt neceſſarily be,* παρὰ τὴν φύσιν, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, *without nature, without ſubſiſtence.* So *Greg. Nyſſen.* ἀνύπαρκτόν ἐστι καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἡ κακία, *Sin is an inſubſiſtent Being*, or *privation.* And it was a general concluſion in the Greek Scholes, *that ſin reſulted,* ἀπὸ στερήσεως ἀγαθῦ, *from the abſence of good, as darkneſs from the abſence of light.* Thus alſo among the Latins, *Auguſtin* aſſerted, *that Sin was not Nature, but the evil of Nature.* Again: *the Amiſſion of Good has taken up the name of Sin.* And *Strangius*, who is our principal adverſary in this controverſie, yet *l.* 1. *c.* 13. p. 97, &c. he ſtrongly demonſtrates this Hypotheſis, *That the formal reaſon of ſin conſiſts in Privation.* This I conceive deſerves a particular remarque, becauſe ſome late Authors, and thoſe not of inferior note, make great uſe of this Antitheſis, namely, *That Sin is as to its formal nature poſitive*, as their chief engine to oppoſe our general Hypotheſis, *touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful.* They tel us, *that Sin, as to its forme, is not a mere privation, but a moral Relation, which has ſo much Realitie as a relation.* But to obviate al miſtakes and verbal conteſts, we grant, [1] That Sin may be termed a *moral privative relation*, or rather, *relative privation*, as it is a tranſgreſſion of, and ſo muſt have relation to, the Moral Law. [2] That Sin is not a *mere nothing*, but has ſome kind of *logic poſitivitie* or *notional entitie*, ſo far as to render it capable of being the terme of a Propoſition, as we have more fully ſhewen, *Philoſ. Gen.* P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. S. 4. §. 2. But, [3] We may not yield, that Sin is a moral poſitive Relation, much leſs a poſitive act or real Being, ſuch as is the term of a natural production: For ſuch a perſwaſion wil neceſſarily force men to grant, *that God is the Author of Sin*, or to hold with the Manichees, *that there are two firſt Cauſes, one of good and the other of evil.*

4. Touching the kinds of ſinful Actions, that which principally concerns our preſent controverſie is the diſtinction of ſinful Actions,

Actions, into ſuch as are *modally only*, or ſuch as are *intrinſecally evil.*

(1) By actions *modally evil* they generally underſtand ſuch as are ſubſtantially good, yet have ſome modal accidental vitioſitie or ſinfulneſs appendent to them. Such are al the ſincerely pious acts of good men in this imperfect ſtate; which have an evangelic perfection and goodneſs in them, yet mixed with much corruption and imperfection. For ſuch is the profunde myſterious wiſdom of God, that he permits a mixture of ſin even with the beſt good works on this ſide Heaven, thereby to render the methods of his Grace the more illuſtrious: ſo that the ſame Act, which is in evangelic eſtimation ſincerely good, is alſo modally ſinful and imperfect. Thus *Strangius*, l. 2. c. 9. p. 205. *Sithat al tranſgreſſion of the Law is ſin, men ſin both by doing what is forbidden, as alſo by doing what is commanded, if not in that manner as commanded: Again, both by not doing what is commanded, as alſo by abſtaining from what is forbidden, if they abſtain not in a regular manner. Thus oft it comes to paſs, that the action may be good according to the ſubſtance of the work, and yet evil as to the mode of acting. As for example; to give Almes to the poor is a work ſubſtantially good, yet if it procede not from Faith and Charitie, and reſpect to the glorie of God, it is evil as to the mode of acting.* Thus *Strangius.* But I adde, that the beſt works of Unbelievers are ſubſtantially evil, in that they have nothing of ſincere good in them; but ful of hatred of God; and the beſt works of pious ſouls in this imperfect ſtate are modally evil, becauſe they have a tincture of vitioſitie appendent to them. *Actions modally ſinful.*

(2) By Actions *intrinſecally evil*, they generally underſtand ſuch as being referred to and determined by ſuch or ſuch an object, carrie in them an intrinſec vitioſitie and malignitie; ſo that whiles under ſuch a reference and determination they can never become good. And the commun inſtance is in hatred of God, and Blaſphemie. Not that thoſe acts are in their phyſic material entitie or ſubſtance ſinful, but only in their moral conſtitution and formal determination or reference to their object. Thus much is alſo acknowledged by *Strangius*, l. 1. c. 13. p. 89. *When, according to the commun ſentence, it is ſaid, that ſome alſo are in themſelves or intrinſecally evil, the acts are not underſtood as abſtracted from their Object, but as they refer to their object, in regard of which they have their vitioſitie.*—— *It ſeems to me, that the vitioſitie, which is in the hatred of God, doth not belong to the material,* *Actions intrinſecally evil.*

but formal of Sin. Which is an ingenuous confeſſion, and wil be of much uſe to us in what follows. At preſent we ſhall only remarque; that this notion of *Acts intrinſecally evil*, if duely examined, wil be of no uſe to our Opponents, albeit they ſeem to lay the moſt ſtreſs on it. For [1] They grant, as *Strangius* here, *that the vitioſitie, which is in the hatred of God* [and ſo in all other acts intrinſecally evil] *doth not belong to the material but formal of ſin:* ſo that Gods concurſe to the material or ſubſtrate mater of ſin doth not ſuppoſe his concurſe to the formal obliquitie of ſin. [2] In acts *ſincerely* but *imperfectly good*, and *modally evil*, the ſubſtrate mater or material act, which is both good and evil, is one and the ſame: now our Adverſaries grant Predetermination to the material act as good: how then can they denie predetermination to the ſame material entitative act which is evil, though not as ſuch? But of this more hereafter, *c.* 5.

The Libertie of the Wil.

§. 3. The next terme to be diſcuſſed by us is the *Natural Freedom*, or *Libertie of the Wil*; which is indeed the hinge on which our whole controverſie turns, as our more intelligent Opponents confeſs. A reverend Divine, *Cathol. Theologie*, Part 3. *p.* 80. ſaith, *I do readily confeſs, that, as the ſum of al the controverſie is, Whether man hath truely any free-wil*, &c. I do readily concur with him in this, *That the ſum of al the controveſie muſt be reſolved into this notion of free-wil*; and therefore if we cannot make good our ground here, we muſt neceſſarily fal under the efforts of our Antagoniſts. And I muſt confeſs this conception has been deeply engraven on my thoughts, for twenty five years or more, that the whole of the Pelagian and Arminian controverſie centers in this point, touching the *Libertie of the Wil*: and he that endeavours to remove thoſe maladies, but overlooks thoſe Pelagian infuſions that lie hid in the heart of Free-will, doth act but like the unskilful Phyſician, who, to *remove an Hectick Feaver, endeavoured to cure the Itch.* What made *Durandus* drive Gods immediate Concurſe to human acts, but this perſwaſion, that it deſtroyeth the Libertie of the wil, and ſo makes God the Author of ſin? And what makes the Jeſuites denie Predetermination, but the like groundleſs perſwaſion? So alſo *Baronius*, in his *Metaphyſics*, *Sect.* 8. *Diſp.* 3. §. 79. *p.* 147. Here it was that the Pelagians of old took Sanctuarie, and under the ſhadow of this terme *Free-wil* conceled al their venimous Infuſions: here, by their ſophiſtic logic and ambiguous cloudy diſtinctions,

distinctions, they fortified themselves against the Defenders of Efficacious Grace. Thus *Jansenius*, *August. de Natur. Lapſ.* Tom. 2. l. 4. c. 24. proves largely out of *Auguſtine*, *that the principal fraud and cheat of the Pelagians lay in their philoſophic hallucination about natural free-wil, which they placed* in *Indifference*, but *Auguſtine* in *a rational ſpontaneitie*. Herein they are followed by the Jeſuites and Arminians, who indeed differ not ſcarcely one hairs breadth from the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians. Yea *Baronius*, (whom *Rutherford* rangeth among the Arminians) with confidence maintains *Bellarmines* definition of Libertie, as juſtifiable and orthodoxe, *Metaphyſ.* Sect. 12. p. 285.

The new coined diſtinction of Libertie largely and ſtrictly taken.

But other of our Antagoniſts, *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, &c. perceiving that our Reformed Divines have generally placed Natural Libertie in a *Rational Spontaneity*, and ſo preſumed, *that voluntary neceſſitie is very wel conſiſtent therewith*, hence they have found out an artificial diſtinction for the reconciling the *Calviniſts* with the *Jeſuites*, *Pelagians* and *Arminians*: They diſtinguiſh Libertie, into *that which is largely, or ſtrictly taken*: and they confeſs, (1) That Libertie taken *largely*, as it is a perfection of the Soul, ſo it has one and the ſame notion with *Rational Spontaneitie*; and ſuch is the Libertie of glorified Souls. This Libertie they make eſſential to the wil; of which ſee *Strangius*, *l.* 3. *c.* 14. *p.* 686. alſo *p.* 691, 702, 703. But, adde they, (2) There is alſo a *libertie ſtrictly* ſo termed, which conſiſts in the Indifference of the wil to this or that object, alſo to act or not to act: and this Libertie is moſt proper to this our imperfect ſtate, as *Strangius*, p. 188. 687. 689. 711. So likewiſe *Le Blanc*, p. 435. and others. There were ſome firſt lines of this diſtinction drawn by *Camero*, who makes libertie ſtrictly ſo termed to be about the *means*, not the *end*; yet his Notions about Libertie are tolerable, in that he makes Divine Predetermination conſiſtent with human Libertie. But the firſt creator of this diſtinction touching a *two-fold Libertie*, among thoſe who owned the *Synod of Dort*, was *Strangius*, who aſſerts a two-fold Libertie, one conſidered in *its own Nature*, which is eſſential to the wil, and the other as *limited to lapſed man*, which includes *Indifference*, &c. as in places above cited.

What theſe new Methodiſts mean by this new-coined diſtinction of *Libertie*, unleſs it be a gratification to the Pelagians, I cannot conjecture: Certain I am, that I never could find it

among the ancient Philoſophers, Primitive Fathers, Scholaſtic Theologues, or any other but theſe new Methodiſts or their Sectators. Do any of the Greek Philoſophers make mention of any libertie, but what is eſſential to the wil and al human acts? Can we find among the Greek Theologues any notices of this two-fold Libertie? Yea do not the very Jeſuites herein concur with us, that Liberty is eſſential to al moral acts, both in the future, as wel as the preſent ſtate of the Soul? Is not Libertie conſtituted by them and the Arminians as the foundation of al Moralitie? Doth not *Amyraldus*, *de Libero Arbitrio*, as wel as we, make Libertie properly taken eſſential to the wil and al its Acts? Of what uſe then can this diſtinction of a two-fold Libertie be? Wil it ſatisfie the Pelagians, Jeſuites or Arminians? No; becauſe they al make Libertie ſtrictly taken eſſential to al Moral Acts. Or, wil it any way relieve the Calviniſts in their conflicts both with Jeſuites and Arminians, to ſay the wil is ſometimes free and ſometimes not? If it be ſuppoſed, that Indifference be eſſential to libertie in this imperfect ſtate, wil it not then be replied by Pelagians and Arminians, that the wil is not, according to theſe new Methodiſts, free in Converſion, becauſe not indifferent? It were not difficult to demonſtrate, how invalid this new-coined diſtinction of Libertie is, and unapt to reach thoſe ends for which it was deſigned by the authors thereof.

The True Idea of Libertie.

As for the true Idea and notion of Natural Libertie, we have, with what ſtudie and diligence we could, inquired into and diſcuſſed the ſame, *Court of the Gentiles*, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. §. 11, 12. & B. 4. c. 1. §. 29--32. alſo *Philoſoph. General.* P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. & P. 2. L. 1. c. 1 S. 4. §. 2. the ſum whereof may be drawn forth in theſe following Propoſitions. (1) *Natural Libertie, as it denotes a power, has one and the ſame Idea or Nature with the Wil.* This is copioſely demonſtrated, in the forementioned places. Hence, (2) *Al acts of the Wil have libertie in the ſtricteſt notion eſſentially appendent to them.* (3) *The Dominion which a free Agent has over his own Act is not abſolute, but limited and conditionate.* (4) *The neceſſitie which ariſeth from the concurſe of God the firſt cauſe, no way diminiſheth, but eſtabliſheth the Natural Libertie of the Wil.* For nothing offers violence to the Wil, or is injurioſe to its Libertie, ſo long as the act it puts forth is voluntary: ſo long as the wil doth voluntarily elect and embrace what it is predetermined unto, the act is in its own power and free:

for

for as *Aristotle*, *Eth. l.* 5. *c.* 12. wel observes, οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, *nothing happens to such an one, but what he wils.* (5) *Actual Indifference to varietie of Objects or Acts, is no way essential to natural Libertie, but only an Accident resulting from its imperfection.* (6) *The formal, native and genuine Idea or notion of natural Libertie, both as to state and exercice, includes no more than a rational spontaneitie.* This last proposition, which is the principal, *Strangius* [f] owns; and *Le Blanc de Libr. Arbit. Thes.* 19. *p.* 405. confesseth this to be the general opinion of our Reformed Divines, even of *Amyraldus*, *Placeus*, and other new Methodists. That this also is asserted by our Judicious *Davenant*, see his Determinations, *Quæst.* 22. *That the Divine Decree takes not away Libertie.* These Propositions about natural Libertie, we have in the forecited places more amply demonstrated, because the whole Pelagian and Arminian controversie, and particularly this about *Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin* depends thereon: and he that shal undertake this Province of resolving our present Question, without a clear Explication and Demonstration of the Wils natural Libertie, doth nothing to purpose.

[f] Libertas voluntatis in genere nihil aliud esse videtur, quàm τὸ ἑκούσιον νοητικὸν, spontaneum intellectuale. *Strang. l.* 3. *c.* 14. *p.* 686.

§. 4. Next to the natural Libertie of the Wil, we are to consider *Moral Libertie* or *Free-wil*, as also what is *possible* or *impossible* to corrupt Nature. By *Moral Libertie* or *Free-wil* is generally understood the *moral potence* or *spiritual abilitie of the Soul to do good.* This moral and spiritual Libertie, our Adversaries the Pelagians, Arminians and new Methodists confound with natural Libertie, and from our denying the later in corrupt Nature, they falsely charge us with denying the former: therefore to remove this confusion of the termes, and those false imputations which are charged on those that defend efficacious concurse, the following Propositions wil be of use unto us.

Moral Libertie or free-wil to good.

1. *Natural Libertie is essential to the Wil and al its acts, but moral Libertie or free-wil to good only accidental and separable.* The Wil is not a Wil if it be not naturally free in al its acts; whatever act is voluntary, is for that very reason free; Voluntary and free being in Scriptural estimation, as also by the determination of the best Philosophers, termes synonymous and equipollent, as we have demonstrated, *Philos. General.* P. 1. L. 3. c. 3. S. 2. §. 1. But now as for *Moral Libertie* and free-wil to good, that is only *accidental* to the human Soul; it may come and go, be present and absent without the natural destruction of the Soul,

Soul, or violation to natural Libertie. It's true, that Moral Libertie, consisting in virtuose Habits, Inclinations and Exercices, is the Perfection of Man, yet so as the Essence of the Soul is not diminished or destroyed by the loss thereof.

2. *Our first Parents in their innocent state were invested not only with natural but also with moral Libertie or free-wil to good.* This is granted on both sides, and therefore needs not further demonstration.

3. *Since the sal corrupt Nature in its unregenerate state lies under a total, universal and naturally moral Impotence as to al Moral and spiritual good.* I cal this Impotence *total and universal*, as it overspreads the whole soul, and has stript it of al seeds of, or inclinations to, any spiritual or truely moral good. I terme it also *natural*, or *naturally moral*, in that, albeit the subject be moral, yet the Impotence being communicated together with corrupt Nature, connatural or congenite and proper thereto, as corrupt, and as to al natural power inseparable therefrom, it is become a *moral Nature*. I am not ignorant, that some new Methodists, together with the Arminians, stiffely contend, *that this Impotence is not natural but only moral*; but either they intend under the ambiguitie of the termes to concele some Pelagian Infusions of natural seeds of virtue and Free-wil to Moral good, or else they must wrest the termes Moral and Natural from their native sense, and what is intended by those that defend a natural impotence. For al know, that by *moral Impotence* is generally understood an *Impotence contracted* by frequent Acts of and Custom in Sin; and so on the contrary by natural Impotence is understood such as is traduced together with, and through the miserable contagion of sin inseparably appendent to corrupt nature. Of this see more *Philosoph. General. P.* 1. *L.* 3. *c.* 3. *S.* 5. §. 1. Hence,

4. *Sin in corrupt Nature becomes necessary, and the observation of Divine Precepts impossible.* This Proposition has ever been in al Ages of the Church, the great bal of contention between the Patrons of Free-wil, and the Defensors of Free-grace. The Pelagians of old as the Arminians of late have made this their main Refuge for the defense of their *Diana* of *Free-wil*. *If Sin*, say they, *be necessary, and so inevitable, then it ceaseth to be sin: if it be voluntary, then it may be avoided.* But these Pelagian Armes *Augustin* and his Sectators have stoutly refelled, by shewing,

(1) That

(1) That the Law was not originally impoſſible to mans Nature, but only is become ſo accidentally by reaſon of Sin, and the impotence of corrupt Nature. (2) That this Impotence is not leſs voluntary than neceſſary, yea the more neceſſary it is, the more voluntary: The neceſſitie of this Impotence is ſeated in and ariſeth from the Wil, and therefore moſt voluntary. Thence *Auguſtin* termes it *dura Neceſſitas, an hard Neceſſitie*, becauſe the more neceſſary this impotence is the more voluntary, and the more voluntary it is the more neceſſary. *Plato, Phileb. p.* 22. gives it the character, ἀνάγκης ἐν ἀθλίοις, *of a miſerable neceſſitie*; which he oppoſeth to that *bleſſed neceſſitie of adhering to the chiefeſt good*, of which ſee *Court Gent. Pt.* 4. *B.* 1. *c.* 4. §. 7. (3) *That albeit the avoiding of ſin and the obſervation of Divine commands be legally impoſſible to corrupt nature, yet both are Evangelicly poſſible through the habitual and actual aſſiſtances of the Spirit of Grace.* See more of the impoſſibilitie which is in corrupt nature for the obſervation of Divine precepts in *Janſenius, Aug. Tom.* 3. *l.* 3. *c.* 15, &c. *Philoſoph. General. Part.* 1. *lib.* 3. *cap.* 3. *ſect.* 5. §. 1. *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 1. *c.* 4. §. 8.

5. *Notwithſtanding the neceſſary impotence of corrupt nature as to what is morally and ſpiritually good, yet it ſtil retains a phyſic or natural faculitie and remote paſſive power capable of receiving ſpiritual good.* No one denies, but that the Soul, as a rational and voluntary ſubject, is *remotely, paſſively*, and *naturally* capacitated for the reception of gratioſe infuſions; al the Controverſie is about a *proxime* or *next, active*, and *moral power*, which we denie to remain in corrupt nature.

6. *The Neceſſitie of conſenting and Impoſſibilitie of reſiſting which attends the wil on the ſuppoſition of Divine concurſe efficaciouſly moving and applying the ſame to act, is only conſequential, hypothetic, or conditionate and voluntary, not ſimple, abſolute, and coactive or violent.* Here we are to inquire what a *ſimple* and *abſolute impoſſibilitie* is, and how it is differenced from a *conditionate* and *limited Impoſſibilitie*. A thing is ſaid to be *ſimply and abſolutely impoſſible*, when it is in no regard *poſſible*: for if it be in any reſpect poſſible, it cannot be ſaid to be *ſimply* and *abſolutely* impoſſible. Now nothing can be ſaid to be *in no regard poſſible*, or *ſimply* and *abſolutely impoſſible*, but what in its own nature implies a repugnance of exiſting: and ſurely nothing in its own nature implies a repugnance of exiſting, but what involves a contradiction: that which involves a contra- *Neceſſitie, impoſſibilitie and poſſibilitie what.*

contradiction comes not within the compass of possible, because contradictions have no passive power of being verified; for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other; the truth of the one makes the other false: But whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of existing, that *may be*; and therefore cannot be *simply* and *absolutely impossible*, of which see *Court Gent. P.4. B.2. c.5. §4.* Now that the Concurse of God predetermining the wil to the substrate mater of sinful acts cannot render the opposite act of obedience simply and absolutely impossible is evident; because (1) the opposite act of obedience implies no contradiction or repugnance of existing: For God can and doth work it in some: albeit it be in a limited sense impossible to corrupt nature, yet it is possible to Grace, as before. (2) The wil predetermined to one act has an habitual indifference or radical flexibilitie to the opposite act; and therefore the impossibilitie is only conditionate and limited. A reverend Divine supposeth, *That Gods determinative concurse to the substrate mater of sin leaves it undeniable, that the mater of al his Laws, in reference to al such actions, are a simple and most strictly natural impossibilitie.* Which I conceive to be a great mistake, and that according to the confession of our principal Adversary, *Strangius*, who *lib. 3. cap. 8. pag. 625.* speaks thus: *Therefore the Divine determination either by efficacious grace, or any other way* [which includes concurse to the entitative act of sin] *being granted, there is truly inferred a necessitie of the consequence; because that act of the wil unto which it is determined by God must necessarily follow, but it is not a necessitie of the consequent, which in its own nature remains contingent; and therefore in a composite sense the wil, when it is determined by God to act, cannot but act. Whence some Scholemen say, That in free wil there is a simultie of power to opposites, but not a power of simultie,* i.e. *a power of embracing opposites at one and the same time: whereof the reason is this, because a power to one act is not opposed to the power unto the negation of the same act, or to a contrary act, but two contraries or contradictories cannot be together in the same subject. Of which mater* Alvarez *discourseth learnedly, de Auxil. l. 9. Disp. 94. & l. 12. Disp. 115.* Note wel here, that *Strangius* in this point fals in with the Dominicans, and fully assents and consents to their mode of conciliating Divine determination with human libertie, which if the fore-mentioned reverend Brother and others would do, I should judge our Controversie very near, if not fully at an end. The sum of al is this, That the determination

In libero arbitrio est simultas potentiæ ad oppositа, sed non potentia simultatis, *Alvarez.*

termination or predetermination of Divine concurse to this or that act doth not make the negation of that act, or a contrary act *a simple* or *most strictly natural impossibilitie*, as some would persuade us, but only infers a necessitie of the consequence, the wil having stil, *in sensu diviso*, *i. e.* on supposition of the withdrawment of Divine concurse, an habitual indifference to act or not to act, though, *in sensu composito*, as predetermined by Divine concurse, it cannot but act. Or summarily thus: The wil has at that very time, when it is predetermined by God to this or that act, an habitual power or radical indifference to the negation of that act, or to the putting forth a contrary act: So that Divine predetermination excludes only a contrary act, not the radical power to that act. Thus also *Davenant*, *Animadv.* against *Hoard*, *p.* 240, 333, 341, 360, 402. proves strongly and accurately, *That absolute Election and Reprobation may stand with a possibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events.* Of which more hereafter.

§. 5. The next terme that fals under consideration is *the Wil of God*, its different Ideas and various Acceptions in the Scriptures, under which our Opponents concele themselves, and their misrepresentations of our sentiments. The ancient distinction of the *Divine wil*, (which they say *Hugo de S. Victore* first formed) was, into *voluntatem signi & voluntatem beneplaciti*, *Gods significative wil and his beneplacite wil.* (1) Gods significative wil they make to consiste of *Precepts*, *Promisses*, *Prohibitions*, *Permissions*, *Counsels*, and *Admonitions.* By *Permissions* here we must understand such as are *moral*, not *natural*, which as to sin properly belong to Gods *beneplacite* wil, as anon. This *significative Wil* of God some Divines terme his *Reveled wil*, from *Deut.* 29. 29. others terme it his *Legislative* or *Preceptive wil*: others his *Approbative wil*, whereby he declares what he approves and what he disapproves, of which see *Davenant Animadv.* against *Hoard*, *pag.* 222, 356, 391—399. Lastly learned *Chamier*, and *Daillé* out of him, terme this significative wil of God, his *wil complacency*, or *complacential wil*, whereby he declares, what is most agreable to him, and what not. Our judicious *Davenant* makes use also of this terme, as having one and the same Idea with the former notion of Gods *Approbative* wil. These several notions of Gods *significative wil*, albeit they may differ in some formalitie, yet they agree in substance and import, denoting Gods reveled wil touching mans dutie, and that which is most agreable to his holy wil and nature.

The wil of God, its distributions, &c.

(2) As for Gods *Beneplacite wil*, commonly stiled his wil *euδοκιας*, *of good pleasure*, it is that whereby he *decrees*, *effects*, or *permits al events and effects*: whence it is distributed into *effective* and *permissive*. Gods *effective beneplacite wil*, is that whereby he decrees and produceth al natural and supernatural effects: Gods *permissive beneplacite wil*, is that whereby according to his eternal Decree he efficaciously permits the existence of sin.

This distribution of the Divine wil is greatly opposed by the Pelagians, Arminians, and new Methodists. (1) The Jesuites, whom we may without breach of charitie terme Pelagians, do what they can to baffle this distinction: so *Molina*, the Head of that Faction, *in Thom. Part.* 1. *Quæst.* 19. *Art.* 12. tels us, *That these signs of the Divine wil signifie properly and formally some nolition or volition in God*; and therefore Gods significative wil cannot be contradistinguisht to his beneplacite wil. The same is urged by the Arminians. But the Orthodox both among Papists and Protestants replie, that Gods reveled significative wil is only *equivocally*, *analogically*, *figuratively* and *improperly* termed his wil, as the Edicts of Princes, and Laws of States. So *Sanderson de Obligatione Conscientiæ*, *Prælect.* 4. *sect.* 20. tels us, *That Gods beneplacite wil is that whereby God has from al Eternitie constituted with himself what he wil do: his significative wil is that whereby he has appointed unto us a Law, by signifying what he wil have done by us. Whereof the former is properly and univocally the wil of God, but this later improperly and analogically so called.* The like *Davenant*, *Animadvers. pag.* 392. It's true, Divines grant, that this significative wil of God has some Decree or Act of the beneplacite wil answering thereto: for the wise God decreed, that this or that should be mans dutie; but they denie that this reveled wil of God touching mans dutie is the same with his decretive wil touching events. (2) Our Adversaries pretend, that by this distinction of the *significative and beneplacite wil* we make two opposite wils in God, and such as clash each with other. This makes a reverend Brother to reject this distinction, as of no use in our present case. But Divines answer, that these wils are not *opposite* in God, but only *disparate* and *diverse*: the things decreed, and the things reveled and constituted by Gods significative wil may oppose each other, but the decretive and reveled wil never oppose each other. The most holy and wise God really intends whatever he commands, or approves, with an intention that it shal be mans dutie, and rewarded if performed,

formed, but not alwayes with an intention that it ſhal be effected. (3) Our Opponents, and particularly the new Methodiſts, confound Gods *Beneplacite Decretive* Wil, with his *Wil of Complacence and Approbation:* and under this confuſion endeavor to ſecure their oppoſition againſt Gods willing the Permiſſion of Sin. Thus *Strangius*, l. 3. c. 2. p. 548. *None can be ſaid to wil what he doth not approve.* Thence others make Love of complacence eſſential to al acts of the Divine Wil: and thence conclude, if God wil the permiſſion of Sin, he muſt neceſſarily take complacence therein. But the replie hereto is not difficult: we ſay, that God takes complacence in al his own Acts, but not in al the objects they refer unto: but now love of complacence is not ſo termed from the act, but object about which it is converſant; which muſt be ſome good either natural or moral. Whence it is evident, that God may wil the permiſſion of Sin, and its exiſtence as a conſequent thereto, and yet not take complacence in or approve of ſin. See more of Gods Wil and its various Diſtributions, *Court Gent.* P. 4. B. 2. c. 5. §. 3.

§. 6. The laſt terme that needs our Explication is *Divine Concurſe*, its *Immediation*, *Efficacitie* and *Predetermination*. *Strangius*, l. 1. c. 11. p. 59. diſtinguiſheth *Concurſe* from *Influxe* thus: (1) *Influxe* is more large than concurſe: for the cauſality of every efficient is termed Influxe; and therefore the Influxe of God is ſeen in many things, in which his concurſe is not, as when he acts without the concurrence of a ſecond cauſe. Thence, (2) the terme *Influxe* is abſolute, not denoting the reſpect of any other cauſe, but that of concurſe is relative. I have no mind to quarrel about termes without juſt ground, and therefore can eaſily admit this diſtinction, though it make neither for nor againſt either party. But that which more immediately concerns our preſent controverſie is, 1. To give the true Idea and Notion of *Immediate Concurſe*, as generally aſſerted and ſtated in the Scholes: which we ſhal endeavour to explicate both negatively and poſitively. *Of Divine Concurſe.* *Immediate Concurſe what.*

(1) Negatively, *Immediate concurſe to an Act conſiſtes not in the preſervation of the principe, or rendring of it apt and habile for any congenerous action.* I know a learned and pious Divine, who ſeems in termes to grant immediate Concurſe as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful actions, yet in the cloſe placeth it only in this, *That God as the firſt Mover, ſo far excite and actuate thoſe*

powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, to which they have a natural deſignation; and whereunto they are not ſinfully diſinclined. But al this, as I conceive, no way reacheth the true notion of Immediate concurſe, neither is it conſiſtent with it ſelf. For, [1] If *God as the firſt mover excite and actuate thoſe powers*, then are they neceſſarily by him drawn or applied to act, which is more than being *apt and habile for any congenerous action:* certainly to excite and actuate a power is more than to render it apt and habile for an action. [2] If the Powers by Gods *exciting* of them are rendred only *apt and habile* for any congenerous action, then where is immediate concurſe as to the Act? Did or would any terme this immediate concurſe, *ſo far to excite and actuate thoſe powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous Action?* [3] What this *Aptitude* and *Habilitie* is, which the Powers receive by being thus excited and actuated by God, I cannot divine: Are not the powers of the ſoul as powers *apt* and *habile* for natural actions, ſuch as the ſubſtrate mater of ſin is? What other *Aptitude* or *Habilitie* doth God give unto the natural faculties as to ſinful acts, but merely the faculties of acting? Need ſinners any other faculties, power, Aptitude or Habilitie to ſin, but the rational faculties depraved? It's true, God applies thoſe faculties to the entitative act of that which is ſinful, but yet doth not adde any aptitude or habilitie to ſin. [4] Doth not *Durandus* and his Sectators grant al this, and yet denie immediate concurſe as to the entitative act of ſin? The Hypotheſis of *Durandus* doth no way exclude any kind of *Aptitude* or *Habilitie*, but rather include the ſame; it only excludes the immediate application of the power to its act; which alſo is excluded by this laxe notion of Immediate concurſe. [5] Laſtly, if they who oppoſe Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of al ſinful acts, do indeed and in truth aſſert and owne an immediate concurſe to any one entitative act that is ſinful, al thoſe black and direful conſequences, which they caſt on the aſſertors of Predetermination, may with as much facilitie be retorted on them, as we ſhal demonſtrate, *chap.* 5. §. 4. Hence,

(2) Affirmatively, *Immediate concurſe as to its formal Idea not only gives an Aptitude or Habilitie to act, but alſo immediately produceth the very act it ſelf.* That this notion of immediate concurſe is univerſally received in the Scholes, is moſt evident. I ſhal deſire the Reader to conſult our Countrey-man *Compton Carleton*,

Carleton, a learned and acute Jeſuite, who had his firſt education in *Cambridge*, and is more moderate than moſt of that faction. He ſaith, *Philoſoph. Diſput.* 28. *de Cauſa prima*, Sect. 3. p. 319. *God therefore concurs with al his Creatures immediately to al their actions, not only by the Immediation of Virtue, but alſo of Suppoſite*, i. e. *that action, whereby the creature operates, doth alſo flow immediately from God himſelf, and not from any other ſubſtituted in his place.* A clear explication of Immediate concurſe, ſo far as it regards its Immediation. Whence *Diſput.* 29. Sect. 2. he determines thus, touching Gods Immediate concurſe to the act of Sin: *We muſt ſay therefore, that God doth phyſically and immediately concur to the act of ſin, together with the create Wil.* And he confirmes this Hypotheſis by Arguments out of *Aquinas*, *Suarez*, *Vaſques*, *Anſelme*, *Tanner*, *Zumel*, *Monteſinus*, *Mulderus*, *Arriaga*, and *Oviedo*. So that this notion of Immediate concurſe ſeems to have been generally entertained by al parties, both *Thomiſts*, *Scotiſts*, and *Jeſuites*, as that which is moſt rational and ſelf-evidencing.

Efficacious and predeterminant concurſe.

2. But the principal point in controverſie is touching the *Efficacitie* and *Predetermination of Divine Concurſe*; wherein the Jeſuites and Arminians oppoſe the Dominicans and Calviniſts. I muſt confeſs, when I firſt undertook the explication of Divine Concurſe, ſpecially as to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, I ſtudiofely avoided the terme *Predetermination*, (although it be frequently fathered on me) as is intimated *Court Gentiles*, P. 4. B. 2. *c.* 11. §. 7. partly to avoid needleſs conteſts about words, and partly becauſe I would not profeſſedly eſpouſe the intereſt of any one Sect, but adhere to Scriptural termes; but ſince, upon a more accurate inquiry, finding the terme expreſſely laid down in Scripture, and that as to the very mater in controverſie, touching Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, I ſee no reaſon why we may not make uſe of it, notwithſtanding the prejudices ſome endeavor to load it with. Therefore for the more ful explication of this terme I ſhal endeavor to ſhew, (1) What *efficacious concurſe notes*; and (2) *How this efficacious concurſe may be termed Predeterminative.*

Efficacious concurſe what.

1. Divine Concurſe is termed *efficacious* as it doth moſt potently and invincibly produce its effect. The Grecanic terme, whereby the *efficacitie* of Divine Concurſe is expreſſed in the Scriptures, is ἐνέργεια, *efficacitie*, or *energie*, which notes the *puiſſant force.*

Eph. 1. 19. *force of any operation.* So *Epheſ.* 1. 19. κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ, *according to the energie or efficacious working of the might of his power.* Here is, (1) *Power* or *force.* (2) *Might of power* or *moſt potent power*; and (3) The *efficacious working of this moſt potent power:* Which note the puiſſant efficacitie of divine concurſe. Thence the *Syriac* renders it מעברנותא, *accord-*

Epheſ. 3. 7. *ing to the efficace.* So *Epheſ.* 3. 7. κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς δυνάμεως, *according to the energie* or *efficace of his power.* The like, *Phil.*

Phil. 3. 21. 3. 21. κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δύνασθαι αὐτὸν καὶ ὑποτάξαι ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα, *according to the efficacious working, whereby he is able even to ſubdue althings unto himſelf.* So *Col.* 1. 29. κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐνεργουμένην ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐν δυνάμει, *according to his efficacious working, which worketh in me mightily.* In al theſe Texts we have *mighty power,* yea *omnipotence* joined with the efficace of divine Concurſe; which demonſtrates its invincible manner of working, in the production of al its effects. So that ἐνέργεια ſignifies Gods intime preſence with al ſecond Cauſes, and efficacious concurring with and actuating of them in al their operations. The like import may be applied to its conjugate ἐνεργεῖν, which notes, *to effect any thing in the moſt efficacious manner,* ſo as to overcome

1 Cor. 12. 6, 11. al reſiſtence made againſt the force of the Agent. So 1 *Cor.* 12. 6. ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα, *who efficaciouſly worketh althings.* The like *v.* 11. of which hereafter. This efficacious concurſe, as it cooperates with the ſecond cauſe is termed συνέργεια *cooperation* or *concurſe,* and συνεργεῖν, *to cooperate.* So *Mark* 16. 20. τοῦ κυρίου συνεργοῦντος, *the Lord cooperating,* or *efficaciouſly concurring.* So elſewhere, that ἐνεργεῖν as applied to God notes his *actuoſe, efficacious,* and *predeterminative concurſe* in and with althings, is evident from the uſe of the word both in ſacred and profane Authors. So with *Phavorinus* ἐνεργεῖν, is ἑτοίμως πράττειν, *to work readily.* It's rendred by the *Syriac,* ſometimes עבד, *to work,* as 1 *Cor.* 12. 6. ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν· where it notes not only an *univerſal general concurſe,* but a *particular, preſent, certain, efficacious force* or *efficacitie* of Divine Concurſe, exerting it ſelf in al individual acts

Rom. 7. 5. and effects. Again, ἐνεργεῖν is rendred by the Syriac, *Rom.* 7. 5.

2 Cor. 4. 12. and 2 *Cor.* 4. 12. by אתהפט, *to work, to act with diligence,* to

1 Cor. 12. 11. *be efficacious,* as *Boderianus.* And 1 *Cor.* 12. 11. it is rendred by סער, *to act, to work, to perform, to effect,* as *Boderianus.* Laſtly,

Eph. 1. 11. it is rendred by the Syriac, *Epheſ.* 1. 11. דכל סער, *who hath efficaciouſly wrought althings.* Which ſufficiently demonſtrates the

the predetermination of Gods concurſe, as to al ſecond cauſes and acts. Hence,

2. This efficacious Concurſe, as it determines and applies the ſecond cauſe to act, is both in ſacred Scripture and by ſcholaſtic Theologues termed *Determinative* and *Predeterminative*. We find both theſe termes in Scripture applied to Divine Concurſe. Thus ὁρίζειν, from ὅρος *a terme* or *limit*; (1) primarily and properly ſignifies *to termine, ſet bounds* or *limits to any cauſe, effect*, or *thing*. So *Acts* 17. 26. ὁρίσας προτεταγμένους καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας, *and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation: i. e.* God has determined or predetermined to every Man, Nation, and Kingdome their fixed termes of duration and life. So *Arrian, Epictet. lib.* 1. *cap.* 12. ſpeaking of God, he ſaith, ἡ φύσις σε ἔδεσε. And *Virgils* Song is remarquable: *Stat ſua cuiq; dies, Every ones day ſtands fixed* or *determined:* which *Servius* underſtands, *of the fixed determined period of human life.* So that we ſee that not only ſacred Philoſophie, but the very Pagans by their dim light, aſſerted a fixed period of Divine life, as determined by God; albeit ſome that profeſſe themſelves Chriſtians denie the ſame. Then he addes, καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας, *and the bounds*, or *the poſition of termes:* for ὁροθεσία properly ſignifies the *poſition of termes* or *limits to any cauſe, action, effect*, or *thing*. God by his eternal Decree has *predetermined* or *ſet termes* and *limits* to al ſecond cauſes, their actions, effects, and events: there is nothing ſo contingent in nature, but it is predetermined by the Divine wil. We find the Verbe ὁρίζειν applied to times and places, as wel as to cauſes and acts: So *Heb.* 4. 7. ὁρίζει ἡμέραν, *he determines* or *limits a day*. Thence in the Gloſſarie, ὡρισμένα ἡμέρα is *a ſtated* or *determined day:* and ſo ὁρίζω ἐν τόπῳ, *I termine* or *limit as to place*. Whence *Heſychius* makes ὁρίζει, *he determines*, to be the ſame with ὅρον δίδωσι, *he gives terme* or *limit*. Thence alſo ὁρίζω with the LXX. anſwers to גבר *to termine, determine*, or *conſtitute termes* to any place or thing, *Num.* 34. 6. *Joſh.* 13. 27. & 15. 11. alſo to בלה *to be bounded* or *determined*. Whence laſtly ὁρισμὸς ſignifies *a definition*, which is the terme or boundary of an eſſence, according to *Cicero*, who renders it, *the circumſcription of a thing*. (2) From this primary notion of ὁρίζειν follows a ſecondary, namely, *to decree, deſtine to a certain end, predeſtine, predetermine*. In which ſenſe it ſignifies the ſame with προορίζειν, *to predetermine:* and ſo it is transferred to *predeſtination, predetermination*, or *the decree and purpoſe*

Determinative Concurſe what.

Act. 17. 26.

Heb. 4. 7.

purpoſe of the Divine wil, even about the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin; as *Luke* 22. 22. κατὰ τὸ ὡρισμένον, *as it was determined*, or *predetermined, decreed.* Our Lord ſpeaks of his Crucifixion, which was the greateſt of ſins and intrinſecally evil, and yet lo! as to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, predetermined and decreed by God. The ſame *Acts* 2. 23. *Him, being delivered by the determinate counſel, and foreknowledge of God:* ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ, *by that defined, determined*, or *predetermined counſel:* of which more *Chap.* 3. §. 2. Hence גזר *to decree, deliberate, determine* is expounded by *Theodotion*, *Job* 22. 28. ὁρίζειν And *Heſychius* makes ὁρίζει *he determines* ſynonymous to κρίνει, διαιτᾷζει, ἵστησιν, which when applied to the Divine wil note *predefinition* and *predetermination.*

Luke 22. 22.

Acts 2. 23.

Predeterminative concurſe what in Scripture.

1 Cor. 2. 7.
Rom. 8. 29, 30.
Eph. 1. 5, 11.
Acts 4. 28.

As the ſimple ὁρίζειν, ſo alſo the compoſite προορίζειν, *to predeſtine* or *predetermine* is uſed ſix times in the N. T. (1) of *things* appertaining to ſalvation, 1 *Cor.* 2. 7. (2) of *perſons* elect, *Rom.* 8. 29, 30. *Eph.* 1. 5, 11. (3) of the *ſubſtrate mater* or *entitative* act of ſin, yea that which was intrinſecally evil. So *Act.* 4. 28. *For to do whatſoever thine hand and thy counſel determined before*, or *predetermined to be done.* For ſo προώρισεν χεὶρ may more properly be rendred. προορίζειν primarily ſignifies to *predefine, predeſtine, predetermine, to ſet limits, bounds, termes to perſons* or *things.* Thence, as to this preſent text and point, when it is ſaid here, that thoſe who crucified Chriſt *did what Gods hand and counſel predetermined to be done*, it muſt be underſtood of the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, which was predetermined by God, as in what follows, *Chap.* 3. §. 2. The Syriac verſion interprets προορίζειν by ܫܡ *to ſeal, conſtitute*, or *make firm* any thing, which is rendred by the LXX. τάττειν, διατάττειν, ἐντάττειν, *to order, diſpoſe, conſtitute, inſtitute.* The Divine Wil and Decree gives *order, conſtitution, limitation, determination*, yea *predetermination* to althings: al perſons and things, times and places, ends and means receive termes, limits, deſtination, and predetermination from the Divine Wil and Decree. Hence προορίζειν in the N. T. is made ſynonymous to προγινώσκειν, *to foreknow*, 1 *Pet.* 1. 20. to προτάττειν, *to preordain*, *Act.* 17. 26. to προτίθεσθαι, *to propoſe*, or *purpoſe*, *Rom.* 1. 13. *Eph.* 1. 9. to προετοιμάζειν, *to prepare*, *Rom.* 9. 23. 1 *Cor.* 2. 9. By al which we evidently ſee, what footſteps *predetermination*, and as to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin, has in the ſacred Scriptures.

We

We now procede to examine this notion as uſed by ſcholaſtic Theologues, and how far their ſentiments thereof are applicable to our preſent Controverſie. (1) Some diſtinguiſh between Gods *predefinition* and his *predetermination*: his *predefinition* they reſtrain to his Decrees, and his *predetermination* to his Concurſe. Others diſtinguiſh the predetermination of God into *extrinſec* and *intrinſec*: by *extrinſec predetermination* they underſtand the act of the Divine Wil or Decree, whereby the creature is predetermined to act: by *intrinſec predetermination* they mean the *previous motion* of God upon the creature, which continually moves and applies it to act. But I ſhould rather diſtinguiſh predetermination, (as Creation and al other Acts of God *ad extrà*) into *active* and *paſſive*: [1] By *active predetermination* I mean nothing elſe but the Act or Decree of the Divine wil, whereby al ſecond cauſes, perſons, acts, effects and things receive their termes, order, and limitation as to power and activitie. This is the ſame with predefinition, predeſtination, and extrinſec predetermination. That this active predetermination procedes only from the efficacious previous act of the Divine wil, without any impreſſion or actual influxe on the ſecond cauſe has been defended by *Scotus* and others of great name in the Scholes, and that on invict reaſons: for if God wil, that the ſecond cauſe, (ſuppoſe it be the human wil) act, immediately on the volition of God the action of the ſecond cauſe wil follow, not from any previous impreſſion on the ſecond cauſe, but from its natural ſubordination and as it were ſympathie with the firſt cauſe: as at the beck of the human wil every inferior faculty of man moves. See *Suarez, de Auxil. l.* 1. *c.* 5. *n.* 3. and *Court Gent. P.*4. *B.*2. *c.*7. §. 3. [2] By *paſſive predetermination* I underſtand the concurſe of God as applying the ſecond cauſe to its act, and not *really*, but *mentally* or *modally* only diſtinct therefrom: For as *active* predetermination is the ſame with the Divine wil, ſo *paſſive* predetermination is the ſame with the ſecond cauſe, its act and effect, as we have demonſtrated *Court Gent. P.*4. *B.*2. *c.*8. §. 1.

Predeterminative Concurſe active and paſſive.

(2) Predetermination is uſually diſtinguiſhed into *phyſic* or *natural*, and *ethic* or *moral*. This diſtinction dependes on that of cauſes into *phyſic*, and *moral*: a *phyſic* or *natural cauſe* is that which is truly efficient, and ſo doth really influence the act and effect, in a way of proper efficience or cauſalitie: whence an *Ethic* or *moral cauſe* is that which doth not immediately, directly, or in a way of real proper efficience produce the act and effect, but only *morally*,

Predetermination phyſic and moral.

by propoſing objects, motives, precepts, promiſſes, or the like moral means and influences, with excitements and perſuaſions. Thus proportionably we may diſtinguiſh predetermination into *phyſic* and *moral*. [1] By *phyſic predetermination* we muſt underſtand not corporal, or natural in a ſtrict notion, which is proper only to things inaminate or Brutes, but ſuch a predetermination as really applies the Agent or ſecond cauſe to its act, and really, yea immediately influenceth both act and effect. Thus *Suarez*, *Metaphyſ. Diſput.* 17. *ſect.* 2. *num.* 2. *A phyſic cauſe* [*and ſo predetermination*] *in this place is not taken for a corporal or natural cauſe, acting by corporeous and material motion; but it's taken more univerſally, for a cauſe that truly and really influenceth the effect: for as nature ſometimes ſignifies any eſſence; ſo phyſic or natural influxe is that which by true and proper cauſalitie worketh the effect: to which when a moral cauſe is oppoſed, it is to be underſtood of ſuch a cauſe which doth not of itſelf and truly act, yet it doth ſo carrie itſelf, as that the effect may be imputed to it: ſuch a cauſe is he that comforts, beſeecheth, or hinders not when he may and ought.* Hence [2] by *moral predetermination*, as it regardes Gods influence on the moral rational world, we muſt underſtand his moral influence on man as his laſt end, his ſtating mans dutie by moral precepts, inviting thereto by Evangelic promiſſes, dehorting from ſin by penal comminations, and al other moral influences. Here we are to note, that albeit phyſic and moral predetermination be comprehended under phyſic and moral cauſalitie, yet the later is more comprehenſive than the former: for phyſic predetermination properly belongs to a ſuperior cauſe as acting on an inferior, but phyſic cauſalitie to any efficient, as *Strangius* doth wel obſerve.

But to ſum up the whole, both the Dominicans and Calviniſts agree with the Jeſuites and Arminians in this, That the holy God doth not *morally* predetermine any to ſin: for he neither counſels, encourageth, commandes, or invites any one to the leaſt ſin. The Queſtion therefore muſt be underſtood of *phyſic predetermination*; which I ſhal deſcribe according to the explication of *Strangius*, *l.* 2. *c.* 4. *p.* 159. thus: 'By the phyſic predetermination of God in 'this place is underſtood the action of God, whereby he moves 'and applies the ſecond cauſe to act, and ſo antecedently to al 'operation of the creature; or in order of nature and reaſon be-'fore the creature workes, God really and efficaciouſly moves it 'to act in al its actions: *i.e.* he actes and cauſeth, that the crea-

'ture

'ture actes and cauſeth whatever it actes and cauſeth: ſo that 'without this premotion of God the creature can do nothing: and 'this premotion being given it is impoſſible, in a compoſite ſenſe, 'that the creature ſhould not act and do that, unto which it is pre-'moved by the firſt cauſe. And more particularly, though conciſely, as for Gods predetermination of the human wil, *Strangius, l. 2. c. 11. p. 244.* gives it us thus: *To predetermine the wil, as they teach, is to applie the wil to act, and to make it act.* Which deſcription of predetermination I do readily cloſe with, and ſo the Queſtion before us wil be ſummarily this,

Prædeterminare voluntatem eſt applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, *Strang.*

Whether God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even thoſe that have ſin annexed or appendent to them? Affirm.

I am not ignorant, that a reverend and learned Divine who oppoſeth our Hypotheſis, ſtates the queſtion otherwiſe, as if we held, *That God doth by an efficacious influence univerſally move and determine men to al their actions; even thoſe that are moſt wicked.* But this Hypotheſis, as propoſed and intended, I know no ſober mind but abhors: whoever ſaid, that God determines men to the moſt wicked actions as ſuch? were not this to make him the Author of ſin, which every pious ſoul deteſtes? For to determine to wicked actions as ſuch, implies alſo a determination to the wickedneſſe of thoſe actions: and this determination cannot be phyſic; becauſe ſin as ſin has no phyſic cauſe or determination: therefore it muſt be moral: and ſurely whoever determines morally to the moſt wicked actions cannot but be the moral cauſe, and Author of them: and is not this an high piece of blaſphemie? We are ſo far from aſſerting, that God determines men to the moſt wicked actions, as that we ſay, he determines men to no wicked action; no not the leaſt: Yea we adde further, that in actions ſincerely but imperfectly good, and in part ſinful, albeit God predetermines men both naturally and morally to the goodneſſe of the action, and naturally to the ſubſtrate mater or natural act, yet he predetermines not to the vitioſitie of the act, or the act as ſinful. So the ſum and whole of our Hypotheſis is this, *That God doth by an efficacious power and influence move and predetermine men unto al their natural actions, even ſuch as have ſin appendent to them.* This Hypotheſis we no way dout but to make good both by ſcriptural and rational demonſtration.

CHAP. II.

The ſtate of the Controverſie.

(1) Ten general Propoſitions wherein the New Methodiſts and Predeterminants agree. (2) The New Methodiſts differences among themſelves about Preſcience, Futurition, Divine Concurſe, and Gods permiſſion of ſin. (3) The differences of the Predeterminants from the New Methodiſts about abſolute Decrees, the Futurition, Divine Permiſſion, Preſcience, Providence, Predefinition, and Predetermination of Sin.

THE prolixitie we have uſed in explicating and ſtating our Queſtion wil render our ſubſequent work more facile and conciſe. For here that old Proverbe holds true, *A good beginning is half the work.* But before we enter on the Demonſtration of our *Hypotheſis* it wil be neceſſary to manifeſt, (1) *Wherein we and thoſe who maintain the Antitheſis do agree.* (2) *Wherein our Opponents, who maintain the Antitheſis, differ among themſelves.* (3) *Wherein we differ from them.* The explication of theſe Particulars wil not a little conduce to the more perfect ſtate and determination of our Queſtion.

Wherein we and our Opponents agree.

§. 1. *Wherein we and our Opponents, who maintain the Antitheſis, do agree.* Some there are who conceive our differences greater than they are; others on the contrary make them leſſe: our firſt work therefore wil be to ſhew, *wherein we agree*; which I ſhal endeavor to lay down in the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. *That God hath decreed althings that come to paſſe.* Herein our Adverſaries generally concord with us; albeit they differ from us, as alſo among themſelves about the manner how God decrees the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Thus *Strangius, l. 3. c. 3. p. 558.* 'But alſo we confeſſe and ſay, that God doth truly decree al-'things that happen, but not althings in one and the ſame man-'ner; but ſome things *effectively*, other things *permiſſively*: which 'is the commun opinion of Theologues, according to that famoſe 'Axiome of *Auguſtin: There is nothing done, which the Omnipotent 'doth not wil, either by permitting that it be done, or by doing of it.* Yet the ſaid *Strangius*, in what precedes, gives us a very dangerous poſition touching the Divine Decrees: 'It is not needful, ſaith 'he,

'he, that we appoint ſo many particular Decrees of God, touch-
'ing his Concurſe to be afforded, as there are actions of the crea-
'ture and particular objects of them. Sithat that one general
'Decree or Inſtitute of God may ſuffice, whereby he hath deter-
'mined to concur with al the actions of the creature, as he hath
'given them a power to act, &c. This general Decree, foiſted in to ſalve his own Hypotheſis, is moſt unworthy of the Divine Being, in that it overthrows the Preſcience of God, impoſeth imperfection on the Divine Wil, and opens an effectual dore to Pelagianiſme.

2. Prop. *That Election of ſome to Grace and Glorie is abſolute, and no way dependent on the previſion of any act of man.* This Propoſition, although it be denied by the Pelagians, Socinians, and Arminians, yet it is generally granted by our Adverſaries, the New Methodiſts, *Amyraldus*, *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, and others. For theſe, albeit they make Reprobation conditional and dependent on mans ſin, yet they grant a particular abſolute Election of ſome to Grace and Glorie: which to me ſeems very ſtrange and inconſiſtent with their Hypotheſis about Reprobation: For if the Decrees of God be abſolute as to Election, why ſhould they not be alſo eſtimed ſuch as to Reprobation? Can the Divine wil be moved by any thing but itſelf? Are not conditional Decrees inconſiſtent therewith? Doth not God in the glaſs of his own Decrees foreſee al acts and events of the human wil? Muſt they not then be al decreed abſolutely by God? See hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 3.

Volitiones purè conditionales ſunt alienæ à ſapientia & prudentia Dei, *Ruiz. de Volunt. Dei, Diſp.* 20. §. 1.

3. Prop. *That God hath a certain Science or Preſcience of ſin, as wel as of al other Events.* This Propoſition is univerſally granted by al the New Methodiſts, *Amyraldus*, *Strangius*, &c. as alſo by moſt Arminians, although it be utterly incompoſſible and inconſiſtent with the ſentiments both of the one and t'other Partie. For al the wit of man, yea I wil with confidence adde of Devils, wil never be able to explicate and demonſtrate a certain preſcience in God of things future, but what is originated in and dependent on his own Decrees. I muſt ſolemnely profeſſe, I can ſee no way left to evade the force of *Socinus*'s argument againſt the certaintie of Gods preſcience, if we reſolve it not into the free determination of his own wil decreeing al future events: of which more in what follows, *Chap.* 5. §. 2.

4. Prop. *That whatever God abſolutely predefines or predeſtines from Eternitie, he predetermines in time.* This Propoſition the New Metho-

Methodists seem generally to grant. So *Strangius*, *l.* 3. *c.* 2. *p.* 547. 'When we speak of absolute predefinition, we willingly 'grant, that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the 'Predetermination of the create wil in time mutually follow each 'other; so that whatever particular singular Act God hath ab- 'solutely predefined should be done by us, to the same he doth 'determine our wil: For whatever God hath by his Decree so 'predefined, it is necessary that he effect the same, or cause that 'it be done; because the Decree of God, seeing it is absolute and 'efficacious, must necessarily have its effect; which it cannot 'have but by efficaciously applying the create wil to the predefi- 'nite act: otherwise, if the wil should not act that which is pre- 'defined, the Predefinition and Decree of God would be frustra- 'ted, which is absurd. A good concession, which wil be of use to us in what follows, *Chap.* 5. §. 3.

5. Prop. *That God doth predetermine the human Wil to al acts and effects morally good, as also to some other commun acts and effects.* This Proposition is generally rejected by the Arminians, as also by *Baronius*, yet the New Methodists, who have chalked out a middle Way, generally entertain it. Thus *Strangius*, *l.* 3. *c.* 5. *p.* 584. 'We have shewen, that God doth not 'in al things predetermine the human Wil, namely not in acti- 'ons intrinsecally evil, and to which Vitiositie is necessarily an- 'nexed; albeit in things lawful, not only in works of Grace, but 'also in others that are commun, according to his own pleasure, 'he determines it, with the preservation of its own native li- 'bertie, sithat he can never offer any violence to the wil, but 'only moves it sweetly according to its own nature. See more on this argument in what follows, *c.* 3. §. 1. on *Prov.* 21. 1. This great concession of *Strangius* indeed cuts the nerves and sinews of al his arguments against our Hypothesis: For if God can and doth predetermine the wil to some acts, without any violence offered to its Libertie, why may he not also predetermine it to al its acts, without prejudice to its Libertie? The force of this consequence is so strong, that it forceth *Baronius* and the Arminians to denie al Predetermination. See *Chap.* 5. §. 4.

6. Prop. *That God predetermins the Wil to the substrate mater of some sinful acts, even of such as are not intrinsecally evil.* This Proposition is granted by *Strangius*, *l.* 4. *c.* 1. *p.* 766. 'But although 'in

'in the actions of wicked men, when God doth uſe them as In-'ſtruments for the execution of ſome peculiar works, it may per-'adventure be ſaid, that God doth determine their wils, yet it 'ſeems more incommode to ſay, that God moves and predeter-'mines to al other acts, as to acts of hatred of God, blaſphe-'mie, *&c.* So that he yieldeth, that God may predetermine to the mater of ſome ſinful acts: and indeed it cannot be rationally denied; ſithat Acts imperfectly good are alſo in part ſinful; and the ſubſtrate mater of the act as good and ſinful is the ſame: wherefore if God predetermine the human wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act as good, muſt he not alſo predetermine it to the ſubſtrate mater of the act as ſinful? When I ſay, that God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act as ſinful, *As* here muſt not, yea cannot be taken *Reduplicatively*, but only *Specificatively*, as it ſpecifies one and the ſame Act, and diſtributes it into its oppoſite Adjuncts of *Good* and *Evil*: So that the meaning is no more than this, *that God predetermines the wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act which is both good and evil:* and if he predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the Act which is imperfectly good, (as our Adverſaries grant) he muſt alſo neceſſarily predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act whereunto ſin is annexed: becauſe the ſubſtrate mater of the Act as good and evil is the ſame. When our Adverſaries ſhal have given us a rational and diſtinct ſolution to this argument, I ſhal confeſs they have done much for the ſubverſion of our Hypotheſis. Of this Argument, ſee *Chap.* 5. §. 4, 5.

7. Prop. *That there is no real poſitive Act or Entitie in nature, whereof God is not the efficient cauſe.* This is generally granted by al thoſe that denie ſin to be a poſitive Being. So *Strangius*, *l.* 3. *c.* 3. *p.* 557. 'There is no Entitie, and no action as it is an acti-'on or has any realitie, whereof God is not the cauſe, or which 'he hath not decreed either abſolutely or reſpectively. So *l.* 4. *c.* 11. *p.* 859. 'The entitie of the Action is reduced unto God, 'as the firſt cauſe, on whoſe concurſe and influxe it dependes. So a Reverend Divine, *Cathol. Theol. Part* 1. *Sect.* 17. *p.* 85. 'It is 'certain, that as *motus vel actio* is *quid naturale*, it is of God as 'the firſt cauſe of Nature: and ſo when a ſinner acteth, it is 'not without the firſt Univerſal Cauſe. One would think that this conceſſion, if well ſtated and proſecuted, would put an end to our controverſie: For al that we demand is, that the real poſi-

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tive act, whereunto ſin is annexed, be from God as the firſt cauſe of Nature: But yet what our Opponents grant, as limited by them wil not anſwer our expectations. For ſome hold with *Durandus*, that the action is from God, but not immediately; others, that it is immediately from God, yet not by a predeterminative concurſe. Hence,

8. Prop. *That God concurs immediately to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act whereunto ſin is annexed.* This Propoſition is not granted by ſuch as follow *Durandus* either in words or ſenſe, yet by others it is. Thus *Strangius*, *l.* 1. *c.* 10. *p.* 54. *But we muſt judge, that God doth immediately reach every action and effect of the creature, and that both by the Immediation of virtue and ſuppoſite or perſon. For as God himſelf, ſo his virtue is every where preſent and energetic.* For the proof whereof he cites *Iſa.* 26. 12. *Rom.* 11. *ult.* 1 *Cor.* 12. 6. *Act.* 17. 28. with other Scriptures. So *Ch.* 11. *p.* 61. he confeſſeth, that there is a common influxe of God unto al actions, which he cals ἐνέργειαν, *the energie and efficace of God, whereby he doth ſubordinate ſecond Cauſes to himſelf; ſo that whatever they are or do act, they eſſentially depend on him in both reſpects.* Whereby he ſeems to evince, that Gods Influxe doth not only render the ſubject habile to act, but alſo immediately reach the very act, even that has ſin annexed to it. The like he addes, *l.* 4. *c.* 1. *p.* 760. 'It may truely be ſaid, and men are wont ſo 'to ſpeak, That God is the cauſe of vitioſe actions, albeit he be 'not the cauſe of the actions as they are vitioſe. And more fully *l.* 4. *c.* 3. *p.* 783. 'From what has been ſaid, it may in ſome 'manner be underſtood, how in a ſane ſenſe God may be ſaid to 'impel or incline to ſome ſin, when yet he is void of al ſin: ſpe'cially if theſe things be obſerved. (1) That it be not under'ſtood, that God moves or inclines men to ſin in general. (2) Nei'ther that it be ſaid, that God moves to al ſin, but only to ſuch, 'in which he uſeth depraved wils as inſtruments to execute his 'good works. (3) Neither that it be underſtood, that God doth 'properly move to ſin ſimply and formally taken, or ſin as ſin; 'but only to the material of ſin, *i. e.* not to the ſin of the Action, 'but to the Action as ſubſtrate to the ſin, ſo that he be not the 'Author of the vitioſitie, which he only permits, but of the 'ſubſtrate Act, and of his own direction and ordination, which 'he exerciſeth about the vitioſe Action, *&c.* Yea in Actions intrinſecally ſinful, he ſeems to grant, that the Act, as it is a phyſic

phyſic or natural Being, is from God. So *l.* 4. *c.* 12. *p.* 876. 'That which is alſo true of Actions which are intrinſecally evil, 'ſuch as the hatred of God, perjurie, *&c.* In which alſo we muſt 'diſtinguiſh the phyſic or natural Being from the Ethic or moral 'evil.—— That God concurs to the phyſic action, but not to the moral vice of the action we have above ſhewen. There are two obſervables in theſe conceſſions of *Strangius*, which, if he were candid and uniforme in granting us, would put a period to the controverſie. [1] *That in Actions intrinſecally evil there is a phyſic or natural entitie ſeparable from the ethic or moral vitioſitie.* [2] *That the phyſic or natural entitie of al ſinful Actions, even ſuch as are intrinſecally ſinful, is immediately from God, as the firſt cauſe of Nature.* But I muſt confeſſe, I cannot find that *Strangius* is candid or uniforme in theſe his conceſſions, but elſewhere he ſeems to overthrow what he has here granted. For, [1] He ſometimes aſſerts, that the natural act of hating God is ſo intrinſecally evil, as that the vitioſitie cannot be ſeparated from it. Again, [2] albeit he ſeem frequently to grant an immediate concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts, yet when he comes to explain what he intends thereby, he doth too much verge unto, if not wholly eſpouſe *Durandus*'s mediate concurſe, as to acts intrinſecally evil. Thus alſo *Amyraldus*, as it is wel noted by *Le Blanc*, *Theſ. Conciliat. Arbitrii*, &c. *Theſ.* 48. *p.* 436.

9. Prop. *That Gods Providence is univerſally and efficaciouſly active in the directing and governing the Sins of men unto his own Glorie.* This moſt of the new Methodiſts grant, albeit ſome ſeem to denie it, at leaſt in part. Our Propoſition is granted by *Strangius*, *l.* 3. *c.* 4. *p.* 469. 'Neither doth it follow from our opinion, 'that any free act is ſubſtracted from the Providence of God, if 'man doth that which God permits, ſithat whether it be good or 'evil that man doth, God muſt foreknow, and direct and order 'it to the end appointed by himſelf. So *l.* 4. *c.* 1. *p.* 760. 'Fur-'thermore it muſt be obſerved, which we have oft mentioned, 'that God albeit he doth not wil ſin as ſin, yet he doth adviſedly 'permit, direct, and ordain it in the beſt manner, to execute his 'righteous judgements, and illuſtrate his glorie. The like *p.* 764. 'Albeit we denie that God doth ever determine the wil to ſin for-'mally taken, or to the actions unto which ſin is neceſſarily an-'nexed, yet we acknowledge, that God doth ſo rule and order

'the ſinful wils of Men and Devils, that by permitting tenta-
'tions, offering objects, ſubminiſtrating occaſions, denying Grace,
'which he owes to none, letting looſe the reins to Satan, re-
'moving impediments, or by operating in any other ſecret man-
'ner, the event which he pre-appoints infallibly follows, and
'ſpecially that that work be performed, for the effecting of which
'God uſeth their miniſterie. How much would this conceſſion conduce to put a period to this controverſie, were our Adverſaries but ingenuous in their aſſent and conſent to it? Doth he not ſay here as much as we, abating only the terme Predetermination? and yet elſewhere how doth he ſtart off from what is here granted?

10. Prop. *That God doth no way concur or predetermine the human wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of ſin ſo as to be the cauſe or author of Sin.* This Propoſition we chearfully and with our whole Souls aſſent and conſent unto; although it be the grand deſigne and unwearied endeavors of our Adverſaries, both Pelagians, Jeſuites, Arminians and new Methodiſts, to faſten the Antitheſis on us, namely, *That we make God to be the Author of ſin.* Which Imputation has been in al Ages of the Chriſtian Church faſtened on thoſe that defended Efficacious Grace and Divine Concurſe, as we ſhal ſhew in what follows, *Chap.* 4.

Wherein our Opponents differ among themſelves.

§. 2. Having laid down the general Propoſitions, wherein our Opponents generally, though not without ſome variation, concord with us, it follows, *that we ſhew briefly wherein they differ among themſelves.* Indeed, ſo great is the difference of our Adverſaries, ſpecially the New Methodiſts, *Amyraldus*, *Baronius*, *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, and others among themſelves in this point touching Gods efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, as that it is very difficult for us to forme common principes or Hypotheſes wherein they al agree. And albeit they generally agree in their oppoſing our Hypotheſis, touching Gods immediate predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of actions intrinſecally evil, yet they lay down their own Antitheſis with ſo much caution, ſuſpenſion, and heſitation of mind, as if they were afraid the contrary might prove true. *Placeus*, *Tract. de Liber. Arbit. p.* 174. cunningly waves the determination of the Queſtion, with this modeſt concelement of his mind: *Truely we, according to the reverence we have towards the infinite Majeſtie of God, dare not define what the Dependence of the ſecond cauſe on the firſt*

firſt is: It ſufficeth us, *that too much dependence cannot be aſſerted, provided that it doth not aſperſe God with any the leaſt ſpot of our ſins.* Which we readily cloſe with, renouncing al ſuch dependence as brings the holy God under the imputation of ſin. So *Baronius, Metaph. Sect.* 8. *Diſp.* 3. §. 78. *pag.* 147. having given us the mention of the *Thomiſts* previous predeterminative concurſe, namely, *that the human wil is in al its motions excited by God, and efficaciouſly,* i.e. *irreſiſtibly moved, firſt to act, and then to act this rather than that,* before he undertakes the refutation hereof he thus premoniſhes us: *In the mean while we profeſſe theſe two things: (1) That we do much againſt our wil recede from this opinion, and that becauſe we conceive ſo honourably of thoſe great men, which are Patrones thereof. (2) That we are ready, if any thing may follow from this our Doctrine againſt any article of faith, to reject it.* *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Theſ.* 55. *pag.* 438. ſeems to wave the Controverſie; yet *Theſ.* 56. he inclines to the opinion of *Strangius, That God cannot phyſically promove and predetermine free cauſes to acts intrinſecally evil, without being the Author of ſin.* But *Theſ.* 57. he confeſſeth, *That provided God be not made the Author of ſin, the dependence of the ſecond cauſes on the firſt in acting cannot be too much aſſerted,* &c. And *Theſ.* 58. he concludes, *That the force and efficace of the Divine providence even about ſinful acts, is not to be reſtrained to a certain general indifferent concurſe; but that God doth many ways procure, promove, direct, and moderate ſinful events.* So great is the heſitation of our Adverſaries. Yea, how frequently do the very ſame perſons differ from themſelves in their ſentiments about this point? Doth not the ſame perſon ſometimes ſeem to grant an univerſal concurſe immediately influencing al natural acts, and yet elſewhere denie the ſame to acts intrinſecally evil? And ſo in other points controverted by us. But the differences of our Opponents among themſelves are more palpable and viſible as to the following Particulars.

1. *They are greatly confuſed and at variance among themſelves as to Gods Preſcience of ſinful acts.* Al the New Methodiſts generally grant Gods certain preſcience of al ſinful acts, but yet they are at a great difference, yea contradiction among themſelves in the ſtating of it. (1) *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 7. *p.* 594. tels us, *That among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, that ſeems the moſt probable, which is taken from the preſence of althings in Eternitie.* Wherein he follows the Dominicans, and ſo muſt by conſequence *Their differences* 1. *about Gods Preſcience.*

reſolve the futurition of ſin into the wil of God permitting it, which overthrows his Hypotheſis. Yet *cap.* 8. *pag.* 622. he reſolves the certaintie of Gods foreknowing future events *into the mere Eſſence of God.* And *pag.* 626. he reſolves it *into the actions themſelves and their determinate cauſes.* Laſtly, *cap.* 10. *pag.* 646. he in down-right termes confeſſeth, *That the ſcience of future ſins is referred to the ſcience of Viſion.* Which is al that we contend for, and that which neceſſarily reſolves Gods preſcience of ſin, into the act of his wil permitting it. Some of our Opponents reſolve Gods certain preſcience of ſin into the *infinitude of his ſcience.* Thus *Le Blanc De Concord. Libert.* p 444. *Theſ.* 39. *As for the fourth opinion, which ſeeketh the certitude of Divine preſcience in the infinitie of the Divine Intellect, and in the determinate veritie of thoſe things which are contingently future, it layeth down nothing but what is certain and indubitate.* Yet *Theſ.* 40. he confeſſeth, *That this opinion doth not ſatisfie the Queſtion, nor take away the principal difficultie. For that which is here moſt difficult to be underſtood is, how future contingents do from Eternitie paſſe from mere poſſibles into the nature of futures, that ſo under that reaſon they may be perceived by God.* Which knot he endeavors to untie, by telling us, *that the ſame cauſes that give exiſtence to things future give them alſo their futurition.* But this is a very jejune and poor evaſion, as we ſhal hereafter ſhew, *Chap.* 5. §. 1. (3) Others refer Gods certain preſcience of ſin to the Jeſuites *middle ſcience*, whereby God foreſees, that if the wil of man come under ſuch a connexion of cauſes, circumſtances, and providential concurrences, the effect wil certainly follow, albeit in itſelf merely contingent. Thus *Lud. Crocius*, *Dyodec. Diſſert. Diſſert.* 7. where he largely but weakly defends this *middle ſcience:* which *Le Blanc*, *De Concord. Libert. pag.* 449. *Theſ.* 26, &c. makes to be the opinion of *Baronius* and others. *Le Blanc* himſelf, *pag.* 444. *Theſ.* 42. confeſſeth, *That it wants not great difficultie, how a thing which is ſuppoſed to depend on a cauſe in itſelf indeterminate ſhould be certainly knowen by the Divine Intellect: for the Divine Intellect although infinite cannot ſee what is not, nor yet change the nature of its object.* Whence he concludes, *Theſ.* 43. *That ſeing there is ſo much darkneſſe on al ſides, our ſafeſt and moſt ingenuous courſe is to confeſſe our own ignorance herein.* The like ſubterfuge *Strangius* makes uſe of, *l.* 3. *c.* 5. *p.* 576. & *c.* 6. *p.* 591. with this pretexte, *That the mode of Divine preſcience is not reveled in Scripture.* A poor refuge indeed! why then do they ſo daringly ſift

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and prie into the Divine prescience, and draw it down to the model of our corrupt reason? We easily grant, that the mode of Divine prescience is incomprehensible by poor mortals, and therefore can content our selves with scriptural descriptions thereof: but this we assert, that it is impossible the Divine prescience, which is in itself most certain, should depend on the most incertain ambulatory wil of man; and so much Scripture and Reason grounded thereon doth fully demonstrate.

2. Our Adversaries differ greatly among themselves *about the futurition of sin, and Gods predefinition thereof.* Strangius, l. 3. c. 11. holds, *That some free acts are absolutely future, and knowen of God as such, without any Decree predetermining the free causes to those acts:* and yet he denies, *that those free contingent futures can be knowen by God according to any Hypothesis, which doth not necessarily infer the determination of the create wil; and thence which doth not include an absolute Decree of their futurition.* Whence it wil follow, *that God can foreknow no contingent sinful act as absolutely future, but what he first decreed to be absolutely future*; which yet *Strangius* admits not. Herein he is opposed by *Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. pag.* 455. 2. *The futurition of sin.*

3. Our Opponents are also at variance among themselves touching *Gods concurse, its immediation, totalitie, prioritie, efficace, and predetermination as to sinful acts.* (1) How many of them incline to the sentiments of *Durandus*, denying al immediate concurse to sinful acts? And of those that grant immediate concurse in termes, how many yet denie it in realitie? Among those that grant immediate concurse both name and thing, do not many espouse such consequences as are inconsistent therewith, yea repugnant thereto? (2) Our Adversaries also differ much about Gods total *particular* concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Some grant a *total* concurse to the physic entitative act in the general, but not in particular: others grant a total concurse to the entitative act in particular, abstracting the reference it has to its object: Thus *Strangius, lib. 2. cap.* 3. who grants, *that God doth concur by a special concurse to the special effects as they are specifically distinguished not morally but physically*; which is al that we contend for: Others, on the contrary, make Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin only *partial* and *general*, asserting with *Molina, Part.* 1. *q.* 14. *a.* 3. *Disp.* 6. *That God is only a partial cause of the entitative act of sin:* So a Divine of name among us; yea he asserts, *that God never totally permits sin.* (3) Our 3. *Divine Concurse.*

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Opponents differ alſo among themſelves touching the *Prioritie* of Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Some grant Gods concurſe hereto *previous*, though not predeterminative; ſo *Strangius:* but others make it to be only *ſimultaneous*; aſſerting, that God concurs with the wil of man in the ſame moment of nature and reaſon, to the ſame act. So *Baronius*, wherein he alſo follows *Lud. Molina* and the Arminians. (4) Laſtly, the principal difference among our Adverſaries is about the *Efficacitie* and *Predetermination* of Divine concurſe as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Some make the concurſe of God to be only *general* and *indifferent*, and ſo *determinable* by the ſecond cauſe, as the influence of the Sun is by the mater it workes upon. Thus *Baronius, Metaphyſ. Sect.* 8. *Diſput.* 3. §. 73, 74, 75. *pag.* 142, &c. where he makes *Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts to be the ſame with that of the Sun concurring to the generation of a man or horſe.* Wherein he follows the Remonſtrants and Jeſuites, more particularly *Molina, Concord. Liber. Arbitr. cum Grat. donis, &c. Quæſt.* 14. *Diſput.* 26. Thus a reverend Divine of name among our ſelves openly aſſerts, *that Gods concurſe is determinable by the creature.* But *Strangius*, albeit he too far fals in with the ſentiments of *Baronius* againſt predetermination; yet he rejects this Hypotheſis of a general indifferent concurſe as too groſſe and Pelagian. So *l.* 2. *c.* 3. *p.* 154. *We ſay not therefore, that God concurs only by a general concurſe, as the Sun concurs in the ſame manner to the generation of a man, and of an horſe, and of a mouſe; but we determine, that the influxe of God is ſpecial to ſpecial effects, as they are phyſically diſtinguiſhed ſpecie, and unto al kind of entitie, but not to the reaſon of moral iniquitie, which conſiſtes in privation.* *Strangius* here ſeems to oppoſe *Baronius*'s Hypotheſis touching a general indifferent concurſe; but yet, I muſt confeſſe, upon a more accurate reſearch I cannot find that he differs materially from *Baronius* herein: for although *l.* 1. *c.* 11. *p.* 61. he cals this concurſe ~~ἐφεργικὸν~~, *efficace*, yet he makes it be but commun, and no way *determinative*, and therefore only *indifferent*. The like *l.* 2. *c.* 19. *p.* 373. And I am very poſitive in this, that no man living can rationally exemt themſelves from the imputation of the Jeſuites indifferent concurſe, and aſſert an efficacious ſpecial concurſe, but what is determinative as to the ſubject it workes on. And thence *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. part.* 3. *theſ.* 36. *p.* 434. confeſſeth, *That* Strangius's *opinion as to this point differs but little from that of* Baronius. Laſtly,

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Baronius denies al *predetermination both as to good and evil actions*; as *Metaph. Sect.* 8. *Diſput.* 3. §. 78, &c. p. 146. *Strangius* allows *predetermination to al acts morally though but imperfectly good, and to many other acts of the wil, whenſoever God pleaſeth, or need requireth*; yet he denies it *to al acts of the creatures, ſpecially to ſuch as are intrinſecally evil*, as *lib.* 2. *cap.* 4. *pag.* 162. and elſewhere. Herein he is followed by ſome Divines of note among our ſelves, who I am very confident wil never be able to maintain their ſingular Hypotheſis, but wil at laſt be driven to the opinion of *Baronius*, the Remonſtrants, and Jeſuites, or elſe ſal under the lode of al thoſe black conſequences they clog our Hypotheſis with; of which hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 4.

4. Our Adverſaries differ much among themſelves about *Gods permiſſion of ſin, its nature and efficace.* (1) A Divine of repute among our ſelves aſſerteth, *that no act of ſin, no not the active ſelling of* Joſeph, *or crucifying of Chriſt was willed by God; but only the paſſive vendition and crucifixion or effect*; yea he ſaith, *That God doth not wil ſin as a puniſhment in a proper ſenſe*: but others allow, *that God wils the acts of ſin as penal*, or *conducible to his own glorie, though not as ſinful acts.* Thus *Strangius, l.* 4. *c.* 2. *p.* 773. where having refuted that diſtinction (at firſt framed by *Bellarmine*, and of late reaſſumed by a Divine of great name among our ſelves) *of active and paſſive vendition and crucifixion*, he concludes thus: *Therefore here was not an otioſe or idle permiſſion, but an efficax operation in the ſelling of* Joſeph, which is more orthodoxe and conſiſtent with itſelf, than the former Hypotheſis which ſeems to be contradictory to itſelf, as hereafter, *Chap.* 3. §. 2. (2) Some of our Opponents aſſert, Gods permiſſion of ſin to be altogether inefficacious, yea idle and unactive: but others allow it an efficace, and energie for the limiting, directing, and ordering of ſinful acts to their proper ends; albeit not about the act itſelf; which I conceive no better than a modeſt contradiction: for how can Gods permiſſion limit, direct, and order ſinful acts, but by influencing the very act itſelf materially conſidered? See more of this, *Chap.* 5. §. 6. 4. *Gods permiſſion of ſin.*

5. Our Adverſaries alſo differ greatly among themſelves about *the Nature of ſin*, its *formal Reaſon*, &c. Some, and thoſe of no final repute among our ſelves; hold ſin, as to its *formal reaſon*, to *be a poſitive real Being*: which indeed is moſt agreable to their Hypotheſis touching *acts intrinſecally evil*, which they denie to be 5. *The nature of ſin.*

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as to their ſubſtrate mater or entitative act from God. I muſt confeſſe this opinion would carry ſomewhat of probabilitie with it, if we could with the Manichees hold two firſt Principes or Cauſes, one of *good*, the other of *evil*; but for us that aſſert but one firſt Cauſe of al create poſitive Beings, I cannot imagine how any can maintain this Hypotheſis of the *poſitivitie of ſin*, without making God the Author of ſin, or making mans corrupt wil independent, and ſo the firſt cauſe of a real poſitive act. Therefore *Strangius*, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 13. to avoid theſe black conſequences ſtrongly argues, with the Orthodoxe, *that the formal reaſon of ſin conſiſts in privation.* But withal we are here to note, that this Hypotheſis utterly overthrows his other Hypotheſis touching acts intrinſecally evil, which he denies to be from God as to their ſubſtrate mater; of which more hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 5.

There are other points of moment wherein our Antagoniſts differ among themſelves, as wel as from us; namely, touching the *natural or moral libertie of the wil*, *natural impoſſibilitie and poſſibilitie*, *Gods decretive and approbative wil*, of which before *Chap.* 1. And indeed we need no way wonder, that our Adverſaries thus differ among themſelves, ſithat their Hypotheſis is liable to ſo many inconſiſtences and contradictions: for how is it poſſible, that they ſhould agree among themſelves, when as their principal Hypotheſis is ſo diſagreeing from itſelf? But more of this when we come to the demonſtrative part, *Chap.* 5.

Wherein we differ from the new Methodiſts.

§. 3. We procede now to ſhew, *Wherein we differ from thoſe of the new method*, Strangius, Baronius, Le Blanc, *and others*, *about Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin.* Immediately on the breaking up of the Synod of *Dort*, wherein the Antitheſes and ſentiments of the Arminians were ſo ſtrongly and fully refuted, there ſprang up ſome Divines, who gave their aſſent and conſent to the Canons of the ſaid Synod, but yet contrived a new method, ſpecially as to *univerſal Grace*, *Reprobation*, and *Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin*, in order to a coalition with the Arminian partie, as we ſhal hereafter demonſtrate. And the principal Agent, who undertook the new modelling this laſt head, was *Strangius*; which he has copioſely treated of, according to the new method, in his Book, *De Voluntate & Actionibus Dei circa peccatum*: whoſe ſentiments we are to examine in what follows; but at preſent we ſhal only lay down in ſeveral Propoſitions wherein we differ from him, and thoſe who follow his method in the ſtating Gods Concurſe to the mater of ſin. We aſſert,

1. Prop.

1. Prop. *God hath an abſolute efficacious Decree about the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of al ſin.* This Propoſition *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 2. *pag.* 547. grants to be true in althings but ſin, ſpecially the firſt ſin, and ſuch acts as are intrinſecally evil: which ſufficiently proves our Propoſition; for we ſay and are ready to demonſtrate, that the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act whereto ſin is annexed, is not in itſelf or its natural entitie ſinful, but naturally good: What there is of ſin annexed to it ariſeth from its moral eſtimation and relation to the Law of God violated thereby: in which regard we peremptorily denie that it is from God. Yea *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 4. *pag.* 569. grants, *That God is the cauſe of the act, though he doth not abſolutely predeſtine or decree the ſame:* and then to that objection of *Alvarez, That the Divine preordination and eternal predefinition extendes itſelf to al thoſe things unto which the cauſalitie and efficience of God extendes*, he replies, *That God decrees althings either abſolutely or reſpectively.* But this is a very poor Pelagian evaſion: for *reſpective* or *conditional* Decrees are every way unbecoming the Divine perfections of God, as our Divines, particularly *Davenant Animadverſ.* againſt *Hoard, pag.* 226. have proved againſt the Arminians. Laſtly, *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 5. *p.* 576. denies, *That God decrees al ſins, ſpecially the firſt ſin:* which we ſhal in its place endeavor to prove, with the ſolution of his objections againſt it. Hence, 1. *As to Gods Decrees.*

2. Prop. *The Decree of God gives futurition to the ſubſtrate mater or material entitative act whereunto ſin is annexed.* The Antitheſis hereto is defended by *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 5. *pag.* 585. where he affirmes, *That it is not repugnant to the nature of God, or of the thing itſelf, that ſomething be future, which God has not predefined.* So *c.* 9. *p.* 628. he denies, *that God hath decreed al futures, namely the fal of* Adam, *or the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt.* This Propoſition is alſo violently impugned by *Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. Hum. par.* 1. *theſ.* 55, &c. *But ſpecially I can no way approve of what* Twiſſe *doth in many places aſſert, That the Decree of God and his wil is the ſole and only cauſe of the futurition of every event.* And he inſtanceth in the fal of *Adam* and the Angels. His Arguments againſt the futurition of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the Decree of God, we ſhal examine in what follows, *Chap.* 5. §. 1. 2. *The Futurition of ſin.*

3. Prop. *The permiſſive Decree of God about ſin is not idle but efficacious.* This Propoſition is oppoſed by *Strangius, l.* 3. *c.* 2. *p.* 556. *Neuher do we grant, what ſome affirme, that the permiſſive Decree of* 3. *Gods permiſſive Decree.*

God, whereby he permits al sin, is efficacious, albeit not effective. For so the fal of Adam *and al other sins should procede from the efficace of the Divine Decree: which is an hard saying. Neither is that lesse hard, which some affirme, that God hath absolutely decreed, that men do not more good than what they do, and omit not more evil than what they omit.* This Hypothesis is so far from being hard, as that I conceive *Strangius*'s opposite persuasion is most dangerous and destructive of the Divine Decrees, as we shal shew in its place. Yea *Strangius* himself, in what follows, *pag.* 557. grants what *Lombard, lib.* 1. *dist.* 47. assertes, namely, *that the wil of God is always efficacious*, &c.

4. *Gods prescitence of sin.*

4. Prop. *Gods Prescience of things future, and particularly of acts whereto sin is annexed is founded on his Decrees.* Thus *Hilarie, de Trin. lib.* 9. *What God decreed to do, those things he knows in his wil.* This sentence of *Hilarie Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 5. *pag.* 576. owns as orthodox, but yet denies, *that the absolute Decree of God is the reason of knowing al things.* So *Le Blanc, de Concord. Libert. par.* 1. *thes.* 63. *I see no reason, why we should denie unto God the knowledge of those things which are freely future under a certain condition, albeit in that condition there be not included a decree of predetermining the free cause to this or that.* But *Scotus* and his followers fully espouse our Hypothesis, asserting, *That God certainly knows al future contingents, because his Divine Essence, which is the reason of knowing, representes to the Divine Intellect the thing determinately future from the determination of his own wil.* And then as to the prescience of sin, they hold, *That albeit God doth not predefine sins as such, yet he predefines the permission of sins, in which he knows them to be future.* Which is orthodox, and that which we shal demonstrate hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 2.

5. *Divine Predetermination.*

5. Prop. *It belongs to the Perfection of Gods wil and providence to predefine and predetermine al the free acts of the wil.* This predefinition and predetermination as to gratiose acts *Strangius, lib.* 2. *c.* 8. *p.* 188. and the rest of the new Methodists, excepting *Baronius*, grant; but they denie it as to the Fal of *Adam* and other acts intrinsecally evil. So *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 4. *pag.* 568. *But if it be said, that God predefined and predetermined that* Adam *should at that very time eat, abstracting from the object which he did eat of, that cannot be.* Then he gives his reasons, why God could not predefine and predetermine *Adam* to the act of eating, abstracting it from the reference it has to its object. And then he addes: *Moreover*

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we denie, that it belongs to the Perfection of God or of Divine Providence, that he absolutely predefine al free acts, and predetermin the Wil unto them. The Arguments he urgeth for this his Antitheſis we ſhal endeavor to ſolve, and demonſtrate our own hypotheſis in its due place, *Chap.* 6. §. 1.

6. Prop. *Gods predefinition of and predetermination to the ſubſtrate matter of ſinful Acts deſtroys not their Libertie.* *Strangius* and his Sectators grant, *That Predefinition and Predetermination deſtroyes not that Libertie which is eſſential to the Wil, but only that which conſiſtes in Indifference.* So *Strangius, l.* 3. *c.* 14. *p.* 681, 682, 683, 685, 686. and *c.* 16. *p.* 711. But how frivolous this opinion is, and how unapt to ſerve the deſigne for which it was coined, we have already intimated, *c.* 1. §. 3. and intend more fully to demonſtrate, *Chap.* 6. §. 5. 6. *Human Libertie.*

7. Prop. *Predefinition in the divine Decree and Predetermination in time of thoſe entitative Acts whereunto ſin is annexed, do not make God the Author of Sin.* This is the principal point in controverſie, the Antitheſis whereof is ſtrongly urged, though weakly defended by our Opponents. Thus *Strangius, l.* 3. *c.* 2. *p.* 548. *But I judge it no way conſentaneous to the natural ſanctitie of God, that he wil and decree ſin to be, the vitioſitie to exiſt, and that he predefine ſuch acts, whereunto the vitioſitie is neceſſarily annexed; ſpecially the Fal of the evil Angels and our firſt Parents, from whence al ſins ſprang.* So *c.* 5. *p.* 579. *Whether it be ſaid from the permiſſion, or from the Decree of God permitting, or from the action of which God is the cauſe, that ſin is neceſſarily inferred, truely the neceſſity of ſinning is aſcribed to God as the Author; namely becauſe he decreed and cauſed that from which ſin neceſſarily follows.* The like *p.* 587. *Neither hath God predetermined the wil of Adam to the very act of eating the forbidden fruit, which yet as to its entitie is reduced to God as the firſt cauſe: neither was that act or its vitioſitie neceſſarily inferred from the permiſſion of God.* That this Antitheſis of *Strangius* and his Sectators is moſt falſe, and our Hypotheſis moſt true, it remains on us to demonſtrate, *Chap.* 5. 7. *God not the Author of Sin.*

Thus we have given the true and ful ſtate of our Controverſie; which by reaſon of the ſubtile evaſions and ſubterfuges of our Adverſaries lies under ſo much obſcuritie and confuſion: and indeed it is to me a deplorable caſe, and that which argues mens diffidence of the merits of their cauſe, that they contend with ſo much paſſionate vehemence for their own *Phænomena*, and yet never

never explicate the termes, or ſtate the Queſtion in controverſie. I have thereby given the Reader as wel as my ſelf the more trouble in this part of our Province, that ſo what follows may be the more facile both for him and me.

CHAP. III.

Scriptural Demonſtrations of our Hypotheſis.

Scriptural Demonſtration, (1) *That God is the firſt Cauſe of al natural Actions and Things,* Eſa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11, Pſal. 33. 15. Prov. 21. 1. Act. 17. 28. Jam. 4. 15. (2) *That God doth predetermine natural actions to which ſin is annexed.* [1] Joſeph's *vendition,* Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8. Gen. 50. 20. Acts 7. 9. [2] *The Crucifixion of Chriſt,* Mat. 26. 24. Luke 22. 22. John 19. 10, 11. Acts 2. 23. & 4. 28. *Our Adverſaries Evaſions taken off.* (3) *That God makes uſe of wicked Inſtruments to puniſh his People,* Eſa. 10. 5, 6. Jer. 16. 16. Pſal. 105. 25. Job 1. 21. (4) *God's immediate hand in the Act of Sin,* 2 Sam. 12. 11. & 16. 22. 2 Sam. 16. 10, 11. & 24. 1. 1 Kings 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24. 2 Kings 9. 3. & 10. 30. 1 Kings 22. 23. Rev. 17. 17. (5) *Gods efficacious permiſſion of Sin,* 1 Sam. 2. 25. Job 12. 16, 17, 20. (6) *Gods judicial hardening Sinners,* Pſal. 81. 12. & 69. 22—27. Rom. 11. 10. Eſa. 6. 10. & 29. 10. & 19. 11— 14. & 44. 18, 19. & 60. 2. Rom. 1. 28. 2 Theſſ. 2. 11. *The nature of Judicial Induration in ſix Propoſitions.* (7) *Gods ordering Sin for his glorie,* Exod. 9. 14—16. Rom. 9. 17, 18. Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 9. 21, 22. 1 Pet. 2. 8.

HAving explicated the termes relating to and given the genuine ſtate of our Hypotheſis, namely, *That God doth, by an efficacious power and influence, move and predetermine men to al their natural actions, even ſuch as have ſin appendent to them*; we now procede to the Demonſtration hereof. And becauſe al demonſtration muſt be grounded on ſome firſt principes, which give evidence, firmitude and force thereto; and there are no proper principes of Faith and Theologie, but what are originally in

in the Scriptures, we are therefore to begin our Demonſtration with Scriptural Arguments, which we ſhal reduce to theſe ſeven heads. (1) *Such Scriptures wherein it is univerſally affirmed, that God is the firſt Cauſe of al natural actions and things, and more particularly of al even the moſt contingent acts of mans Wil.* (2) *Such Scriptures as directly demonſtrate, That God doth predeſtine, predetermine, and foreordain ſuch natural actions whereunto ſin is neceſſarily annexed.* (3) *Such Scriptures wherein God is ſaid to make uſe of wicked Inſtruments for the puniſhment of his People, in ſuch a way wherein they could not but contract guilt.* (4) *Such Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in thoſe acts whereunto ſin is appendent.* (5) *Such Scriptures as mention Gods efficacious permiſſion of ſome to ſin.* (6) *Such Scriptures as demonſtrate Gods giving up ſome to judicial Occecation and Obduration.* (7) *Such as clearly evince Gods ordering and diſpoſing the Sins of men for his own Glorie.* *Scriptural Demonſtrations.*

§. 1. We ſhal begin our Scriptural Demonſtration with ſuch Texts as univerſally affirme, *That God is the firſt cauſe of al natural Actions and Things; and more particularly, of al even the moſt contingent acts of mans Wil.* 1. *The Scriptures that ſpeak God to be the firſt Cauſe of al natural Actions and Things,* are many and great: we ſhal mention ſome; as, *Eſa.* 26. 12. *Thou haſt wrought al our works in us,* or *for us.* This Text is urged by *Strangius*, p. 54. to prove Gods immediate concurſe to al actions of the creature, though it doth in a more peculiar manner regard the deliverance of the Church; wherein God predetermines and over-rules many actions of wicked men, which have much ſin annexed to them. Again, this univerſal prime Cauſalitie of God efficaciouſly influencing al natural Acts and Effects is apparently expreſſed *Rom.* 11. 36. *For of him, and through him, and to him are althings. Of him,* as he frames althings; *By him,* as he operates in and cooperates with althings; *and for him,* as the final cauſe of althings. Thus Gods πολυμόρφος ἐνέργεια, *multiforme energie,* as *Cyril* ſtiles it, reacheth al manner of Natural actions and effects: and if ſo, then ſurely ſuch natural entitative Actions as have ſin annexed to them. Is there any ſin ſo intrinſecally evil, which has not ſome entitative act or ſubject as the ſubſtrate mater thereof? And if althings are *of God,* and *by him,* and *for him,* muſt not alſo the entitative act of ſins intrinſecally evil be ſo? *Strangius*, p. 342. replies thus: *Al that God workes muſt tend to his Glorie: But what* *1. God the firſt Cauſe of al natural Actions and Things.* Eſa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36.

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Glorie redounds to God from those Actions of hatred of God, blasphemie? &c. A strange replie indeed for a Divine to make. (1) Was there not much Hatred of God, and Blasphemie in the crucifying of Christ? And yet was there any action more conducing to the glorie of God than this? Yea, (2) Doth not *Strangius* himself, and those of his partie grant, that God *directs, disposeth*, and *over-rules* al sinful acts, even such as are intrinsecally evil, so as that they conduce to his glorie? And how can God direct, dispose, and over-rule them, unless he concur, yea predetermine the Wil to the entitative act? Again *Strangius*, p. 561. answers to this Text thus: *None that is orthodoxe ever extended these words to sins*; as *if sins were of God, by God, and for him*, &c. [1] Neither do we extend these words to sins formally considered: [2] But must we thence necessarily conclude, that the entitative act, whereto sin is only accidentally appendent, is not from God, nor by him, nor for him? Yea, [3] May we not say with Divines, that sin formally considered, although it be not *of God and by him as an Efficient*, yet it is *for him*, i. e. conducing to his Glorie, as wisely ordered and over-ruled contrary to the intent of the sinner? Thus much *Augustin* once and again inculcates, as *De Genes. ad liter. lib. Imperfecto*, cap. 5. * *For God is not the Author of our sins, yet he is the Ordinator of them*, &c. And thus much indeed *Strangius*, p. 860. confesseth.

* Nam & vitiorum nostrorum non est auctor Deus, sed tamen ordinator est.

Another Text that evidently and invincibly demonstrates Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural Actions and Effects is, *Ephes.* 1. 11. *Who worketh al things after the counsel of his own wil.* We find three particulars in this Texte which greatly conduce to explicate and demonstrate Gods efficacious Concurse to al Actions, and particularly to the substrate mater of sinful acts. (1) We may consider the object, *althings*, i. e. whatever is clothed with the Notion and Idea of real positive entitie: *althings* must be here taken distributively into al singulars: there is no Being, that partakes of real entitie but is wrought by God. (2) Here is to be considered, the *Act*, ἐνεργοῦντος, *who worketh energetically*, or *efficaciously*: for ἐνεργεῖν signifies to work with an invincible efficace; and thence it is oft joined with words denoting infinite power and activitie, as before, *c.* 1. §. 6. It notes here Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, working in and with althings, according to their natural propensions. Thence (3) follows the original

Eph. 1. 11.

original principe of this predeterminative efficacious operation, κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ, *according to the counsel of his own wil.* Which notes, that Gods efficacious predeterminative wil is the supreme and first cause of althings: there is no executive power in God distinct from his Wil: his Concurse in regard of its active attingence is no more than his simple volition: so that divine Predetermination is the same with divine Predefinition, as we have largely demonstrated, *Court Gent. P. 4. c. 7. §. 3.* Whence also it follows, that *Gods working althings according to the counsel of his wil,* has one and the same Idea with his predetermining al actions and effects, even such as have sin appendent to them. *Strangius*, p. 560. replies to the Argument drawen from this Text thus: *From this place nothing more can be collected, than that God has decreed those things that he worketh: as it is certain, that God hath decreed nothing which he doth not execute—— not that God worketh sins,* &c. [1] This Text speaks more than what *Strangius* allows it to speake, namely, that God has not only decreed those things that he worketh, but also that he works by his Decree, or omnipotent Volition: for we owne no other executive power in God but his divine Wil, as *Scotus, Bradwardine,* and some of the greatest Scholastic Theologues demonstrate. [2] Who saith, that God worketh Sins? surely none but *Marcion* or *Manes*, or such as hold Sin to be a positive real Being. [3] But yet we do with the Orthodoxe affirme and prove from this Scripture, *that God worketh* that entitative natural Act, whereunto sin is appendent: for otherwise, how can he be said to worke althings? Is this good sense or Logic, to say, God workes althings, not only according to their generic or specific distribution, but also according to their distribution into each singular, (for so the Syncategoreme *Al* is here taken) but yet he worketh not al singular entities, namely the substrate mater of Sin? Doth this amount to less than a down-right contradiction? He workes althings, but yet doth not worke althings? What Logic or wit of man can reconcile these Notions?

2. Unto our first Head we may also reduce such Scriptures, as in a more particular manner mention Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to al human actions and effects, even such as are most contingent and dependent on the ambulatory wil of man. Thus *Psal.* 33. 15. *He fashioneth their hearts alike: he considereth* Psal. 33. 15.

sidereth al their works, היוצר, *who faſhioneth, formeth, frameth*, as the Potter doth his clay: it notes not only, yea not ſo much the firſt *Creation* of the human Soul, as its actual *figments, frames, imaginations* and *thoughts*: this is evident from the ſcope and contexture of the words: for what is the Pſalmiſts intent and undertakement, but to demonſtrate Gods infinite preſcience, and its perfect comprehenſion of al the figments, frames, thoughts, intentions, and affections of the heart, as *verſ.* 13, 14? And how doth he prove this? Why, *becauſe he faſhioneth their hearts alike*, *i.e.* puts al the firſt thoughts, inclinations, intentions and movements of the heart into what forme, frame, or faſhion he pleaſeth. There is alſo a great Emphaſe and ſignificance in that terme יחד, which we render *alike*, but may be as properly rendred *together*, as it is by the Latine *ſimul*; neither is it to be referred to the Verbe *frameth*, but to the object *Hearts*: and ſo it notes an univerſalitie diſtributive into al ſingulars, without the leaſt exception of any. And then the ſenſe wil be; who *faſhioneth, formeth*, or *frameth* the hearts of al mankind in al their very firſt motions, conceptions, imaginations, reſolutions, end, intereſts, contrivements, ebullitions, affections, proſecutions, and fruitions, or other actions whatſoever. Whence he addes, *He conſidereth al their works*: what *works* doth he mean? Surely not only the works and labors of mens hands, but alſo the workings, movements, and figments of their hearts: and how can God conſider them, if he did not forme, frame and faſhion them? Yea, there yet lies a deeper notion in the coherence of theſe parts; namely, that Gods forming, framing and faſhioning the hearts of al men is the ground and cauſe of his conſidering their works: For how God can perfectly conſider and know the works of mens hearts, unleſſe he be the *former*, *framer*, and *faſhioner* of them al, as to their real entitative acts, al the wit of man can never deviſe or make clear unto us. So that Gods *Science of Viſion*, or *Preſcience* as to the figments of mans heart ariſeth from this, that God is the framer, former, and faſhioner of mens hearts and al their natural movements; which alſo implies his predefinition and predetermination of mans heart and al its firſt motions, inclinations, and affections. So then to forme and ſum up our Argument from this Text: Doth God indeed faſhion, forme and frame the hearts of al men in al their natural motions, imaginations, and affections? And may we without apparent contradiction to the light of this

Text

Text exclude the entitative acts of any sins, though never so intrinsecally evil? What is this but to exclude the far greatest part of human acts from being formed and framed by God? Or how can the omniscient God consider al the works of mens hearts, if he be not the former and fashioner of them al, as to their natural entitie? I must confesse the validitie of this argument from Gods prescience is to me so firme and great, as that should it be baffled, I see no way left, but to turne Socinian, and so to denie the certaintie of Gods prescience as to the *contingent imaginations* of mans heart, which implies much Atheisme.

Another Text that proves Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse as to al human acts is *Prov.* 21. 1. *The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he wil.* (1) He mentions *the Kings heart*, as the measure of al other mens; because Kings generally have a greater Soverain-tie and Dominion over their own hearts, than other men: if any mens hearts may plead the privilege of exemtion from Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse, surely Kings may, specially such as *Solomon* was, who obtained from God such an amplitude of Soul, and self-Dominion: yet he grants, that *the Kings heart* was not exemted therefrom. (2) By the *Heart* we must understand, according to the Hebraic mode, the whole soul, and al its movements, imaginations, ratiocinations, contrivements, purposes, and undertakements. (3) *In the hand of the Lord: i. e.* under his efficacious predeterminative influxe or concurse. The *Hand* being the instrument of our most potent operations, it's usually put in Scripture for the energetic, potent and predeterminative Concurse of God: So *Hab.* 3. 4. *He* [*i. e.* Christ whose brightnesse was as the light] *had hornes*, [*i. e.* beams, as קרן notes] *coming out of his hands* [*i. e.* most potent wil, the spring of al his efficacious operations: whence it follows] *and there was the hiding of his power, i. e.* his most potent efficacious predeterminative concurse lay hid in the beams irradiated from his omnipotent hand or wil. So *Act.* 11. 21. *And the hand of the Lord was with them, i. e.* the efficacious predeterminative power of Divine Grace; the hand being the instrument whereby man exertes and puts forth his power. So *Solomon* saying, *That the hearts of Kings are in the hand of God*, it must be understood of Gods puissant predeterminative Concurse, whereby he applies the heart to its acts, conduceth and guideth it therein, and determineth it as he pleaseth. So it

Prov. 21. 1.

Hab. 3. 4.

Act. 11. 21.

follows, (4) *As the rivers of waters, he turneth it whithersoever he wil.* How easie is it by *Aquaducts* to turne waters this or that way as men please? And is it not infinitely more facile for the wise omnipotent God, to turne the hearts of men, and al their natural conceptions, products, and issues which way he listes? Al this may be evinced from *Strangius*'s glosse on this Text, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 9. *pag.* 50. where having given us the mention of Gods preserving and directing the wils of men even in evil actions, he addes a third and more special mode of Divine influence, *whereby God doth bend, impel, and incline human wils which way he please, not by proper compulsion, but by sweet inspiration and motion: For albeit God doth never take away that libertie which is essential to the wil, yet he doth at times, and when he please, efficaciously move and impel the wils of men: and what* Solomon *predicates of the Kings heart,* Prov. 21. 1. *that very same may, on a greater account, be affirmed of the heart of every man.* So *Augustin, de Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. cap.* 20. *If the Scripture be diligently inspected, it shews, that not only the good wils of men, but even the bad are so in the power of God, that where he wil and when he wil, he causeth them to be inclined, either to performe benefits, or to inflict punishments, by a most secret, yet just judgement.* So again *August. de Corrept. & Grat. cap.* 6. *God hath in his power the wils of men, more than they themselves; without doat having most omnipotent power to incline mens hearts where he pleaseth.* What could be said more categorically and positively to evince Gods efficacious and predeterminative Concurse to al the natural products and issues of mans heart, even such as have intrinsecal evil, as they cal it, appendent to them? Yea, *Strangius, lib.* 2. *cap.* 7. *p.* 182. grants, 'That God doth sometimes efficaciously move and pre-'determine the wils of men not only to supernatural workes, but 'also to natural and civil, as oft as it seems good to him, to per-'forme certain ends which he has preordained. So *Prov.* 16. 7. *He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him.* And how so? Surely by over-ruling their hearts even in the sinful movements. Thus he bent and determined the revengeful mind of *Esau* to embrace his brother, *Gen.* 33. So he gained the hearts of the Egyptians towards the Israelities, *Exod.* 11. 2, 3. & 12. 35, 36. Thus God determined the wil of *Cyrus* to bring back the Captivitie of the Jews, 2 *Chron.* 36. 22. *Ezra* 1. 1. Thus God bent the mind of *Darius* and *Artaxerxes* to grant the Jews libertie for the rebuilding the Temple, *Ezra* 6. 1, &c. & 7. 2. *Neh.* 2. 4. So God

dealt

dealt with *Jeremy*'s enemies, *Jer.* 15. 11. Al theſe predeterminations even in civil and natural actions are allowed by *Strangius*: whence we argue, That it is impoſſible, but that God ſhould predetermine to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful actions: for al theſe actions being exerted by wicked men, had nothing of moral or ſupernatural good in them, albeit God made uſe of them for the ſuccour of his people, yea they were ful of hatred againſt God.

To theſe Scriptures we may adde, *Act.* 17. 28. *For in him we live, and move, and have our being.* Not only *Being* in general, and *Life*, which implies more than ſimple being, but alſo al our *movements* or *motions* are from God as the prime Motor: which *Paul* demonſtrates out of one of their own Poets: *for we are alſo his offſpring.* As if he had ſaid; Do not your own Poets tel you, that we are the off-ſpring of God? Is he not then the firſt Cauſe and Motor of al our motions? Doth not *Ariſtotle, Phyſ.* 8. alſo ſtrongly demonſtrate, *That al our natural motions muſt ariſe from one firſt immobile Motor?* And to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? Muſt not then the ſubſtrate mater of al ſinful motions, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil, be reduced unto God as the prime Motor? Act. 17. 28.

I ſhal conclude this firſt Head of ſcriptural Arguments with *Jam.* 4. 15. *For that ye ought to ſay, If the Lord wil, we ſhal live, and do this or that.* There were a number of Free-willers, who proudly conceited, that they had an abſolute and plenary dominion over their own wils and actions; whom *James* rebukes, and tels them, they ought to ſay, *If the Lord wil*, &c. So that he plainly reſolves al the acts of mans wil into the wil of God, as the original Cauſe and Principe. But let us ſee how poorly *Strangius* ſhifts off the force of this Argument, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 227. he ſaith, *Who ever underſtood theſe words, if God wil*, i. e. *if God predetermine my wil to do this or that?* Then he addes his own gloſſe: *But truly nothing more can be underſtood by that condition, IF GOD WIL, than this, if God ſhal permit, or wil permit, as it is elſewhere explicated, Act.* 16. 7. & 1 *Cor.* 16. 7. I muſt confeſſe I cannot but wonder, that a perſon of ſo great reaſon, and under ſo many advantages and aſſiſtances from Divine Revelation, ſhould ſatisfie himſelf with ſo ſlender an evaſion, which not only Reaſon and Scripture, but even Pagan Philoſophemes contradict. For (1) it is moſt evident, that *James* here, (as *Luke, Act.* 16. 7. and *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 16. 7.) ſpeakes not of a mere permiſſive wil, but of an effi- Jam. 4. 15.

cacious influential concurse, arising from the wil of God, which is the alone principe and spring of Divine concurse: for al actions both natural, civil, and supernatural must be resolved into the wil of God, as their prime cause: so that *If God wil* here, is the same with σὺν Θεῷ elsewhere, *if God concur, if he assiste*, if he by his efficacious predeterminative wil, without which we can do nothing, concur. And that this is the genuine mind of this Text is most evident by the use of this phrase among the Ancients both Jews and Pagans. *Bensyra*, that ancient Hebrew, *Sent. moral. xi.* thus speakes: *Let man never say he wil do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord wil, i.e.* assiste or concur, not permit. So among Pagans, *Hom. Iliad. β. vers.* 28. Ἄικε θεοὶ γ' ἐθελῶσιν, &c. The like *Demosth.* φιλ. α. Ἂν Θεὸς θέλῃ, *If God wil.* But none speakes more fully to this point than *Plato*, *Alcibiad. pag.* 135. where *Alcibiades* demanding, *How he ought to speak touching Divine efficacious concurse, Socrates* replies, ἐὰν Θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, *If God wil:* and in his *Laches: But I wil do this and come to thee to morrow,* ἐὰν Θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, *If God wil.* Whence it's evident, that this formule of speech was ordinary even among the Heathens, as wel as Jews and Christians, noting not only a permissive or Directory, but Decretory and predeterminative wil. So the same Phrase must be understood, *Act.* 18. 21. *If God wil*, and 1 *Cor.* 4. 19. *If the Lord wil.* Is it possible that these Phrases should be understood of a mere permissive wil? Do not al mankind need an efficacious concurse and predeterminative wil to conduct them in al their affaires? Again, (2) Gods permissive wil is either *natural* or *moral*: it cannot be meant of Gods natural permissive wil, because that regardes only sin, which there is no mention of in these Textes, neither is it necessarily included. Neither can it be meant of Gods moral permissive wil, because that was already declared and manifest in the Laws of God: for al moral permission belongs to Gods Legislative wil declared in his word. It remains therefore that this phrase, *If God wil*, be understood of Gods efficacious wil, whereby al natural motions and so the entitative acts of sin are predetermined.

Si Dii volunt, volentibus Diis, *Cic. in Offic.*

Act. 18. 21. 1 Cor. 4. 19.

God doth predetermine natural actions to which sin is annexed.

§. 2. I now descend to the Second Head of Scriptural Demonstrations, namely, *That God doth predefine, predetermine, and foreordain such natural actions whereunto sin is necessarily annexed.* I shal mention only two Actions, *The Selling of Joseph; and the Crucifixion of our Lord*, whereof the former was but a Type of the later.

later. 1. I shal begin with the *Selling of Joseph*, mentioned *Gen.* 45. 5, 7, 8. *Joseph* saith *v.* 5. *Now therefore be not grieved, nor angry with your selves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life.* *Joseph* here has a double aspect on his Brothers sin; the one regards their hand in the sin, which he, out of a noble generous principe of fraternal Love, passeth by; the other regards the special hand of Divine Providence in this their Sin, which he admires and adores, in that it by an efficacious predeterminative Concurse brought so great a good out of so great an evil; which no finite power could do: men may make good use of what is in it self good, but who can bring so great good out of so great evil, but a God omniscient and omnipotent? (1) Let us remarque their Sin in selling *Joseph*, and of what a black Idea it was. [1] It sprang from Hatred, yea a deliberate rooted hatred, as *Gen.* 37. 4. *They hated him, and could not speak peaceably unto him.* Their hatred was grounded on his fathers love to him. Yea, [2] There was much Envy and Indignation joined with their hatred, as *v.* 8. *Shalt thou indeed reign over us?* &c. whence *v.* 11. *and his brethren envied him*, &c. [3] There was in like manner bloudy Cruelty, yea intended Murther in this sin, as *v.* 20, 21, 22, 24. [4] There was also notorious Lying evident in this sin, *v.* 32, 33. [5] That this sin was of a very crimson bloudy guilt is evident by their own Convictions and Confessions, when God began to awaken their Consciences, as it is conjectured about fourteen years after, *Gen.* 42. 22. *Behold his bloud is required!* [6] By al which it is most evident, that this *vendition* or selling of *Joseph* was a sin *intrinsecally evil.* For certainly if a sin of such bloudy Aggravations deserve not the name of intrinsecally evil, I know not what sin doth. Hence, (2) We are to demonstrate, *that God did predefine and predetermine Josephs Brethren to the entitative act or substrate mater of this Sin.* And this Province we no way dout but to make good out of the Texte, *Gen.* 45. 5, 7, 8. compared with other Texts. [1] *Joseph* saith, *v.* 5. 7. *God did send me before you to preserve life.* שלחני, *sent me forth*, by his efficacious predeterminative hand, which conducted me hither. The LXX. render it ἀπέστειλε, which signifies, *to send forth with a mighty hand*, as Captives into Libertie, *Luke* 4. 18. also, *to send forth with commands, autoritie and power*, Mat. 10. 16. & 11. 10. as elsewhere: again, *to send forth executioners*, Mat. 2. 16. lastly, *to direct the course of a Ship.* In al these notions Gods efficacious predeterminative

1 Arg. *from* Josephs *Vendition*, Gen. 45. 5, 7, 8.

native concurse in sending *Joseph* into *Egypt*, is necessarily included. This also appears [2] by what is added *v.* 5. *God did send me before you to preserve life.* Note here, that God certainly and absolutely foresaw the Famine and *Josephs* being sold into *Egypt*, which he intended to turne for good, even for the preservation of *Jacobs* Familie and the Elect seed in him. Now how could God foresee this absolutely and infallibly, but in the predefinition or fore-ordainment of his own Wil? And *Strangius* grants this, *that where there is Predefinition, there also follows Predetermination:* Must we not then conclude, that this Vendition of *Joseph* was both predefined and predetermined by God? Yea, [3] *Joseph* addes *v.* 8. *So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God,* &c. You see here *Joseph* makes a three-fold mention of Gods over-ruling hand in this their sin, and that for their as wel as his good: And he tels them plainly, *that it was not they that sent him, but God.* As if he had said, You indeed sent me to be a poor Vassal in *Egypt*; but did not God send me to be a Ruler over *Egypt?* You sent me to destroy me, but why did God send me, but to preserve both you and me? You sent me out of Hatred and Malice; but did not God send me out of great Love and pitie both to me and you? And what could be spoken more emphatically to illustrate and demonstrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin than this, *It was not you that sent me hither, but God?* Why doth he use this manner of speech? was it not they that sold him? Yes; but because they were but as mere passive Instruments or Midwifes to bring forth that great predeterminative Decree, and to subserve Divine Providence in the ushering into *Egypt Joseph* their temporal Savior, and the Type of our Eternal Savior, therefore the entitative action is wholly taken off from them, (albeit the moral vitiositie of it is imputable to none but them) and ascribed unto God, as the principal Agent. This manner of speech is Hebraic, and must be understood, (1) Ἑλλειπτικῶς, *it was not you,* i. e. not only you: you were but the Instruments of Divine Gubernation and Predetermination. (2) Ἐμφατικῶς, emphatically, *it was not you,* i. e. if we consider the act of selling me in its natural entitative Idea, as the substrate mater of Divine Providence, ye had the least hand in it, *it was not you, but God that sent me hither.* We find the like Hebraisme, 1 *Sam.* 8. 7. *Not thee but me,* i. e. principally and comparatively. So that it's most evident that

that *Joseph* ascribeth the whole Act considered *emitatively* and *naturally* unto Gods efficacious predeterminative and principal concurse and conduct, whereof they were but the Instruments; albeit, if we consider the act *morally*, as to its obliquitie, so it was wholly theirs, not Gods: it is not his brethrens sin morally considered, but the entitative act that he refers to God. [4] That this is the genuine mind of *Josephs* words is evident from other Scriptures. So *Gen.* 50. 20. *But as for you, ye thought evil against me, but God meant it for good*, &c. Here we have their *moral evil* separated from Gods *natural and moral good* in and by the Vendition of *Joseph*. Their Act proceding from hatred, envy, and attended with Murder, was intrinsecally evil, and designed nothing but evil against *Joseph*: but the same Act considered physically and entitatively as proceding from the efficacious predeterminative conduct of God, was *naturally good*; and as it tended to the designed exaltation of *Joseph*, and rendered him a temporal and typical Savior of *Israel*, so it was *morally good*. The aggravation of their Sin, and efficace of Gods predeterminative Concurse may be both greatly illustrated by an inspection into the native import of the Hebraic חשב, used here to note their malitiose plotted evil, and Gods plotted predeterminative concurse in and about the same act. (1) He saith, *Ye thought evil against me*, חשבתם, ye *plotted*, *contrived evil* against me. חשב properly signifies to *excogitate*, *deliberate*, *consult*, *compute*, *calculate*, *contrive*, *reason*. It is oft used to signifie *plotted*, *machinated evil*, as *Psal.* 10. 2. The same word is used to note Gods determinate counsel and wil about the entitative act of their Sin; *but God meant it unto Good*, חשבה, i. e. from al Eternitie contrived and predetermined it for good. Their plotted contrived evil, was counter-plotted and contrived by God for good: Which notes that it was not a thing casual or accidental, but fore-ordained and predetermined by God, according to the determinate counsel of his wil. The like may be deduced from *Stephens* words, *Act.* 7. 9. *And the Patriarchs moved with envy, sold Joseph into Egypt; but God was with him.* Here we have their Moral evil aggravated from its original Spring, and Gods natural and moral good in the same Act. *How was God with him?* Not only in his *passive Vendition*, or passing into *Egypt* and continuance there, as some would perswade us; but also in the very *Active Vendition*, or act of selling him to the *Ishmaelites*, considered

Non refert in Deum peccatum fratrum, sed transitum suum in Ægyptum. *Erasm.*

Gen. 50. 20.

Act. 7. 9.

dered naturally and entitatively: for God was with *Joſeph* in cauſing the *Iſhmaelites* to paſs by at that very time, in determining his brethrens wils to take him out of the pit and ſell him to the *Iſhmaelites*, and inclining or determining theſe to accept the bargain. In ſum, *God was with Joſeph* by an efficacious predeterminative conduct, determining every circumſtance of this Vendition naturally conſidered.

The Objections againſt Joſephs *Vendition anſwered.*

I am not ignorant what Reſponſes or Anſwers are framed by the Jeſuites, Arminians, and New Methodiſts againſt our Argument deduced from this Vendition of *Joſeph*: *Molina*, (the Head of the Jeſuites as to their Pelagian Dogmes) *de Concord. q.* 19. *Diſp.* 2. tels us, *that this Vendition of Joſeph is aſcribed to God, as merely permitting it.* The like *Ruiz, de Volunt. diſp.* 18. *Sect.* 2. and *Leſſius, de Efficac. Grat. Sect.* 2. and others. *Arminius, de Efficac. Provid. Diſput.* 11, 12. over and above this mere Permiſſion of the Jeſuites, addes *Gods oblation, direction, and determination of Arguments and Occaſions, yea ſome kind of concurſe in this Vendition of Joſeph*, &c. But al theſe frivolous ſubterfuges to avoid the force of this Text are incomparably wel blowen off by *Rutherford, de Divina Provident. c.* 16. *p.* 192, *&c.* I ſhal therefore only give the ſolution of ſuch as have been coined ſince by the New Methodiſts, which indeed are much the ſame with thoſe of the Jeſuites and Arminians. A Divine of name among us, gives this replie to our Argument, That the *Venditio activa, the active Vendition of Joſeph was not willed by God, but only paſſive, the paſſive, or effect and conſequents*; *which are only mentioned in the Text.* I muſt confeſs this anſwer gives me ſome amazement, but no difficultie to anſwer it. For, (1) What this Reverend Author means by his *paſſive Vendition* I cannot divine: I know that in the Ariſtotelean Scholes Action and Paſſion have been really diſtinguiſhed and ſo diſtributed into two diſtinct Predicaments; but I think this imaginary diſtinction is now generally hiſs'd out of the Scholes by al awakened Diſputants; yea, how many of thoſe, who are zeloſe Sectators of *Ariſtotle* in other points, have ſubſcribed the baniſhment of this diſtinction? So that to diſtinguiſh *active Vendition* from *paſſive*, what is it but to diſtinguiſh one and the ſame Act from it ſelf? But (2) grant there be ſuch a diſtinction in Nature, yet is it not moſt apparent, that it can have no place here? Doth not *Joſeph* aſcribe the very *active Vendition* or action of Selling him, unto God? Is it not

ſaid

ſaid *v.* 8. *So now, it was not you that ſent me hither, but God?* Can this, with any tolerable ſenſe be applied to the *paſſive Vendition*, or the effects and conſequents of the ſelling *Joſeph?* Muſt it not neceſſarily be underſtood of the very ſame active Vendition, which, conſidered in its natural entitative act, they were the Inſtruments of, but God the principal Agent and Conductor? (3) This Diſtinction of Active and Paſſive Vendition was not indeed forged by the Reverend Author before mentioned, but taken up from *Bellarmine*, who *de Amiſſ. Grat. l.* 12. *c.* 11. diſtinguiſheth the *Action* of ſelling *Joſeph* and crucifying Chriſt from the *Paſſion*, and grants, *that God willed and decreed the Paſſion, but not the Action, which inferred the Paſſion*; and becauſe the ſaid Author has ſo great an eſtime for *Strangius*, whom he generally follows in this point, I ſhal give him the anſwer which *Strangius, l.* 4. *c.* 11. *p.* 772. gives to this diſtinction of *Bellarmine*, thus: 'However it be, in the Text there are two things to be obſerved, '[1] That *Joſeph* there cannot diſtinguiſh the Action from the 'Paſſion, as if the *Paſſion* were to be aſcribed to God, not the '*Action*: for it's plainly ſaid and repeted in the Text, according to 'the Hebraic veritie, *Gen.* 45. 5, 7, 8. *that God ſent him.* [2] Thence 'c. 50. 20. he doth plainly diſtinguiſh between the good work of 'God and their evil in the ſame mater, from the diverſitie of the 'Intention: *You deſigned evil againſt me, but God deſigned that for 'good*—— Then he addes: 'Here the various operation and pro-'vident adminiſtration of God is ſeen, that he might bring to paſs 'what he had preſignified before by the dreams of *Joſeph*, &c. And *p.* 773. he ſubjoins: 'There is no incommoditie if it be ſaid, 'that God elected and alſo procured the Vendition of *Joſeph* as a 'means to the end fore-ordained by him, and that may be un-'derſtood not only of *paſſive* Vendition, but alſo of *active*, which 'truely can never be ſeparated. For if God willed that *Joſeph* 'be ſold, he willed, that ſome one ſhould ſel him, and that no 'other ſhould ſel him but his brethren. For neither was that Ven-'dition a thing in it ſelf evil, if it be conſidered apart from the 'vitioſitie and defect of the ſecond Cauſes. Then he concludes: 'The Permiſſion of God here was not otioſe, but an efficacious 'operation in the tradition of *Joſeph*, ſubminiſtration of occaſi-'ons, out of the concurſe which he made both by the direction 'of al circumſtances, and moderation of the wil of his brethren, 'that their purpoſe of killing him being changed, they might

'do no other than what God intended. And the ſame efficace 'and force of Divine providence ſhines brightly in working, diſ- 'poſing, and directing al other things that relate to this Hiſtorie. This Anſwer of *Strangius* to *Bellarmine* I have been the more prolixe in reciting, (1) becauſe the fore-mentioned Divine of ſo much repute among us makes great uſe of this diſtinction touching *active and paſſive vendition* or *crucifixion*, endeavoring thereby to ſolve al our Arguments from the vendition of *Joſeph* and crucifixion of Chriſt; whereas *Strangius*, one of his own partie, rejectes it as ſpurious and frivolous. (2) Becauſe the conceſſions of *Strangius* in this his Anſwer to *Bellarmine* do indeed give a mortal wound to his own cauſe: For if the active vendition of *Joſeph* was from Gods efficacious providence and wil decreeing the ſame, then actions intrinſecally evil are as to their entitative act or ſubſtrate mater naturally conſidered from God, albeit their moral vitioſitie is to be aſcribed to no one but the ſinner.

2. Arg. from the Crucifixion of Chriſt.

2. I now paſſe on to demonſtrate, That God doth predefine, or foreordain and predetermine ſuch natural actions whereunto ſin is neceſſarily annexed, from the *Crucifixion of Chriſt*. And the Textes that confirme this part of our demonſtration are ſo great and illuſtrious, that I cannot but greatly wonder how any Chriſtian, that aſſentes to the veracitie and authoritie of Scripture, can evade the evidence thereof, or diſſent from our Hypotheſis. (1) I

Mat. 26. 24.

ſhal take the Scriptures as they lie in order, and begin with *Mat.* 26. 24. *The Son of man goeth, as it is written of him; but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed.* [1] Note here that Chriſts death was *infallibly predicted* or *foretold:* ſo much, *as it is written of him*, neceſſarily infers. Now how could the death of Chriſt be infallibly predicted, if it were not predefined and preordained by God? Yea, if the death of Chriſt were not neceſſarily predefined and preordained by God, how could God infallibly foreknow the ſalvation of any one elect ſoul, which neceſſarily dependes on the death of Chriſt? So that it remains moſt certain, that the death of Chriſt was predefined and foreordained by God, and that in every the leaſt circumſtance thereof: the whole ſeries of intentions and actions in *Judas*'s betraying his Lord, and the Jews malitioſe and bloudy crucifying of him was predefined and preordained by God. [2] Hence alſo it follows, that al the bloudy contrivements, barbarous and cruel executions, with al the particular circumſtances in the betraying and crucifying of Chriſt

Christ were predetermined by God. Thus much reason strongly evinceth, and *Strangius* with others grant, that eternal predefinition or predestination, and predetermination in time are parallel and commensurate each to other: whatever is eternally predefined or preordained by God is predetermined by him in time. Indeed if we wil take the true Idea of Divine *Predetermination*, what is it but the eternal act of the Divine wil, whereby God predefined or preordained al persons, actions, and effects to existe in such or such a period of time? So that, to speake truth, predefinition and predetermination differ not really and originally as to their active principe; albeit we may, out of compliance with the Scholes, put this difference between them, by understanding *Predefinition*, *Preordination*, or *Predestination* of the eternal active Decree of God, and *Predetermination* of the execution of the Decree, or its *passive Attingence* in regard of the effect. But take predetermination in what sense you please, it must necessarily be applied to the Crucifixion of Christ and al the most minute circumstances thereof. And so much indeed is implied in those words, *The Son of man goeth*, ὑπάγει. Where? or to what? Surely *to die*, and how? without al peradventure, as efficaciously conducted, moved, yea predetermined by the Divine wil. There was not the least step he took to the Crosse, the least intention, action, or circumstance in the whole complexe or systeme of Christs Crucifixion, as wel active as passive, but was predetermined by God. But [3] note also hence, that this Crucifixion of Christ, although it were predefined and predetermined by God, yet this Divine predefinition and predetermination did not at al diminish the guilt of those bloudy instruments, who had their hands embrued in that immaculate blood. This is particularly specified in those words: *but wo unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Judas* neither did nor could justly plead Divine preordination or predetermination, as an excuse for his treacherie. No, his own conscience told him, that he had voluntarily, yea malitiosely betrayed innocent bloud: neither could the Jews plead the same, in as much as their own malitiose and bloudy wils were as deeply engaged in this Crucifixion, as if there had been no predetermination, which doth no way diminish the libertie of the wil. Hence, [4] it is most evident, that this Crucifixion of our Lord was *a sin intrinsecally evil*. For was there not a world of enmitie and hatred of God in it? Did there not

much blasphemie attend their wicked deeds? Is not the shedding innocent bloud, yea the *bloud of God*, as it is stiled, *Act.* 20. 28. a sin intrinsecally evil? And doth not this sufficiently demonstrate, that the substrate mater of an act intrinsecally evil is predefined and predetermined by God?

(2) Another Texte that evidently demonstrates the Crucifixion of Christ to be *predefined* and *predetermined* by God, is *Luke* 22. 22. *And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined; but wo unto that man by whom he is betrayed.* This Text is the same, and refers to the same passage with that before of *Matthew*, yet with this difference; *Matthew* saith, *As it is written of him*; but *Luke*, *As it was determined*; which puts it out of al dout, *that Christs crucifixion was determined or predetermined by God.* And for the more ful explication and demonstration hereof, we are to remarque, that *Luke* being a Physician, was most intimely versed in the Greek Tongue: for a Physician in those days was of little repute, if not wel acquainted with the Grecanic Monuments relating to medicine. And thence we find, even by the confession of some Atheistic spirits, that *Lukes* Greek both in this his Evangel, as also in the Acts of the Apostles, is most pure, elegant, and significant. And among other this notion here used gives us a specimen of his accurate skil in the Greek. For τὸ ὡρισμένον here is a philosophic notion, of much use among the Grecians to signifie *that which is defined, determined, predetermined, predestinated, decreed, constituted,* and *ordained by an unalterable Decree*, as we have more copiosely demonstrated from the genuine import of ὁρίζειν, cap. 1. §. 6. *Of determinative Concurse.* And that τὸ ὡρισμένον here may be properly rendred *predetermined*, is evident from the use of προορίζειν, *Act.* 4. 28. *To do whatsoever thine hand and thy counsil determined before to be done.* Where it is in the Greek προώρισεν, *predetermined.* And indeed *Determination* and *Predetermination* as to the Divine concurse admit not so much as any mental distinction, according to the confession of some Adversaries. The Syriac, *Luk.* 22. 22. renders it, ראחחרש, *it is defined.* פרש in the O. T. signifies *to expand, to make clear, to explicate more fully and clearly by the distribution of al parts*, &c. Whence it is rendred by the LXX. *Ezech.* 37. 12 χωρίζω, *to separate:* and *Num.* 15. 34. συγκρίνω, *to decree:* which sense agrees with the mind of our Lord, *Luk.* 22. 22. So that it is most evident, that this notion τὸ ὡρισμένον here considered in itself, and in al its synonymies, notes the

Luk. 22. 22.

Act. 4. 28.

Cruci-

Crucifixion of Christ in al its circumstances both active and passive, to be determined, predetermined, and foreordained by God. Yea, we have for this a great concession of *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 13. *pag.* 665. *But that the workes of Christ, specially his Passion and voluntary death were absolutely predetermined by God is manifest from Scripture, Luk.* 22. 22. *Act.* 2. 23. & 4. 28. Whence I argue, that if the death and crucifixion of Christ were absolutely predetermined by God, then the substrate mater of a sinful act, yea of an act intrinsecally evil was absolutely predetermined by God. How poor and evanid the evasions of *Strangius* and others are as to this Text we shal examine and lay open when we have explicated the following Texts, which demonstrate the same.

(3) I passe on to the Conference between *Pilate* and our Lord, *Joh.* 19. 10. *Then saith Pilate unto him, Knowest thou not, that I have power to crucifie thee, and have power to release thee? Pilate* having power of life and death committed to him by *Tiberius Cesar*, he threatens our Lord therewith: and what replie doth our Lord make? *vers.* 11. *Jesus answered: Thou couldest have no power at al against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin.* We find several particulars here very remarquable for the demonstration of our Hypothesis. [1] Whereas *Pilate* boasted of his *power to crucifie, or release our Lord*, he tels him plainly, *that he could have no power against him, except it were given him from above.* The *power* that *Pilate* pretendes unto was *legal Autoritie* backed with an *executive power* committed to him: so much ἐξουσία notes: our Lord doth not denie his claim of legal Autoritie, as commissionated by *Cesar*; but yet confines and restrains the execution thereof to Gods predeterminative Concurse. As if our Lord had said: I grant thy power and autoritie of life and death as *Cesars* Commissioner and Minister; yet know, thou couldest not execute this thy power on me, unlesse the providential concurrence of my Father did efficaciously move and predetermine thee thereto. [2] Observe here the double negative, οὐκ οὐδεμίαν, which among the Grecians implies a more vehement negation. As if he had said: Alas! thou hast not the least umbrage or shadow of power to execute against me, but what is dispensed forth unto thee by the efficacious predeterminative hand or providential concurse of my Father; whose wise and omnipotent hand has put in every bitter ingredient into the Cup I am to drink of. [3] Neither doth al

Joh. 19. 10, 11.

al this excuse *Judas*, the Jews, or *Pilate* as to their guilt in crucifying the Lord of Glorie: no, Gods predeterminative concurse is so far from excusing these Traitors, as that it aggravates their sin. So it follows: *Therefore he that hath delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin. Therefore*, διὰ τοῦτο, for this very reason, because my Father hath left that traiterous wretch *Judas* to be hurried, by his own avaricious lust, into this horrid Treason of betraying me, and predetermined thine execution thereof, his guilt is the greater. [4] Lastly, hence also we may argue, that this sin of crucifying our Lord was intrinsecally evil. So much that last clause, *hath the greater sin*, implies. As if he had said: Oh! what a world of treason, murder, blasphemie, hatred of God and al manner of sin is involved in the wombe of this sin?

Act. 2. 23. (4) We find the predefinition and predetermination of Christs crucifixion more expressely explicated and demonstrated, *Act.* 2. 23. *Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel, and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.* What could more plainly be said for the predefinition and predetermination of our Lords crucifixion, as to its substrate entitative act, and yet for the aggravation of their sin in acting their parts in this bloudy Tragedie? Let us examine the particulars. [1] It's said, *he was delivered by the determinate counsel*, τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ. The Greek βουλὴ primarily notes *counsel with a decree*, or *a decreed fixed counsel*, from βολὴ *the cast of an arrow*, or the like. Whence the formal act of the wil is termed βούλησις, which is but a derivation from βουλή. But *Luke*, to expresse *Peters* mind more significantly, addes, τῇ ὡρισμένῃ, *by that determinate, defined, firme, immutable, decretive, predeterminative counsel of God*, as the word importes, according to our former explication of it, on *Luk.* 22. 22. whereto this Text seems to answer. Ὁρίζειν is by Glossaries made synonymous to τάττειν, *to ordain*; προορίζειν, *to preordain*; τιθέναι, *to constitute*; ἱστάναι, *to establish*; προωρίζειν, *to predetermine*. Among the LXX. it answers to גזר, *to termine, determine, predetermine*, as *Num.* 34. 6. *Josh.* 13. 27. and elsewhere. By which it is most evident, that it is here by *Luke* used to denote Gods *efficacious, absolute, predeterminative counsel and purpose* touching the crucifixion of our Lord. [2] Then he addes: καὶ προγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ, *and foreknowlege of God.* Note here, that Gods *foreknowlege* or *Prescience* of Christs crucifixion, and so by consequence of the sin annexed thereto, follows the *predetermination* or *determined counsel* of

of his own wil: God therefore foreknew, becauſe in his determined counſel he foreordained or decreed the Paſſion of our Lord. And yet [3] this neceſſary predefinition and predetermination of Gods wil with his infallible preſcience touching the crucifixion of Chriſt, did no way leſſen their ſin: for addes *Peter*, *Him ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and ſlain.* Albeit he was predefined and predetermined by God to go (as himſelf declares, *Luk.* 22. 22.) to the Croſſe, yet they, by their wicked bloudy hands, *took* him as voluntarily, yea with as much bloud-thirſty greedineſſe, as if there had been no predefinition and predetermination of the act by God. Lo! what a plain conciliation is here of efficacious predefinition and predeterminative concurſe of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, with the voluntary and free election of the ſinner as to his part in this bloudy Tragedie. [4] Note that phraſe, διὰ χειρῶν ἀνόμων, *by wicked hands, i. e.* ſacrilegious, bloudy, God-murdering hands. Which certainly denotes their ſin to be of the firſt magnitude, and intrinſecally evil. And that this Text fully demonſtrates the predefinition of Chriſts Paſſion, *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 3. *pag.* 563. freely acknowlegeth. So *lib.* 4. *cap.* 2. *pag.* 768. he ſaith, *That it is not to be douted, but that the whole humiliation and paſſion of Chriſt flowed from the decree and wil of God; and what God from Eternitie decreed, the ſame he executes and procures in time.* But what his replie is to the force of our argument from this abſolute Decree of God we ſhal examine anon.

(5) I come now to that other parallel Text, which fully demonſtrates the predefinition and predetermination of Chriſts crucifixion by God, *Act.* 4. 28. *For to do whatſoever thine hand and thy counſel determined before to be done.* He ſpeaks of the gathering together both of Jews and Gentiles for the crucifying the Son of God, as *verſ.* 26, 27. he ſaith, *They did nothing but what Gods hand and counſel predetermined to be done.* [1] By *the counſel of God* we may here underſtand his *Decretive counſel*, or the counſel and purpoſe of his wil, whereby he predefined and predetermined the crucifixion of our Lord. Thus ſome terme Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe, *quoad attingentiam activam, as to active attingence*, which is nothing elſe but the very wil of God, according to his eternal counſel predetermining and foreordaining al future events, as *Scotus* and others aſſure us. Thus διὰ must be underſtood, *Act.* 2. 23. as before. Whence [2] by the *Hand of God*, Act. 4. 28.

God, we are to understand his *most efficacious* and *potent execution* of his decretive counsel, predetermining the whole subſtrate mater, or al entitative acts and circumſtances in the crucifixion of our Lord, which they terme his predeterminative Concurſe, *quoad actingentiam paſſivam, as to paſſive attingence.* For mans *hand* being the inſtrument of operation, whereby he puts forth his power and force, it is thence applied to God, to denote his moſt potent execution of his Decrees in predetermining and applying al ſecond cauſes to their act, as before §. 1. of this Chapter. We find a very good gloſſe hereon in *Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 2. pag. 769.* 'In 'the other place, ſaith he, *Act.* 4. 28. there is mention made not 'only *of the counſel of God*, but alſo *of the hand of God*; that *counſel* 'may be referred to the Decree, and *hand* to the execution. *To* '*decree* is preſuppoſed the wiſe *counſel* of God, and *to execute* the 'power of the Divine *right hand.* And here truly what God hath 'decreed in his counſel, he alſo by his *hand* hath executed: For 'in this whole work the hand of God hath appeared, howbeit 'many wicked hands did concur. So the *Hand* of God here is 'oppoſed to *wicked hands*, Act. 2. 23. *The hand*, I ſay, *of God* ap-'peared in *moderating, ordaining, governing*, and *directing* al the 'machinations, endeavors, ſayings and deeds of his enemies, that 'they ſhould wil and perfect that very ſame thing which he wil-'led, though with a far different counſel and purpoſe, whatever 'their malice were. Lo! what a ful teſtimonie is here? who would not think *Strangius* orthodox in this point, did he acquieſce here? But there lies a Snake in the graſſe: he elſewhere ſtarts off from what he here grants, as hereafter. Only this note, that he here, as elſewhere, ſtrongly impugnes and oppoſeth that *paſſive crucifixion* which *Bellarmine* and a reverend Divine of repute among us only aſcribe to God: for he expreſſely ſaith, *That the very act of crucifixion was executed by the hand of God*; yea al the *machinations, endeavors, ſayings*, and *deeds* of Chriſts enemies, *moderated, ordained, governed, directed* by the ſame Divine hand. What could be ſaid more for the predefinition and predetermination of the ſubſtrate mater of an act intrinſecally evil? But I paſſe on to the act of Divine predetermination expreſſed in the Text before us by προωρισεν. What the genuine import of προοριζω is, we have ſhewen, *Chap.* 1. §. 6. In the general it ſignifies *to predefine, predeſtine, predetermine:* it's applied in the N. T. both to perſons and things, and theſe both good and evil. It is here limited and confined

fined to Gods predefining, predeſtining, and predetermining the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of Chriſts crucifixion, which was a ſin of the firſt magnitude, containing in its pregnant wombe blaſphemie, hatred of God, murther, yea God-killing bloud-guiltineſſe. The Syriac turnes it by רשם, *to ſeal, conſtitute,* and *make firme any thing.* And ſurely if the bleſſed God ever *ſealed, conſtituted, made firme,* or *predetermined* any thing in the world, it was the crucifixion of his Son, on which the ſalvation of al his Elect dependes. *Auguſtin* renders προώρισεν here *prædeſtinavit, he has predeſtined.* So the old Latin renders it, 1 *Cor.* 2. 7. And *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 5. *pag.* 582. is herein (as in ſome other points) very ingenuous and free in confeſſing, 'That *Auguſtin* 'doth uſe the words *to predeſtine, predefine, determine, conſtitute, or-* 'dain, and *diſpoſe,* indifferently, ſo as they may be extended to al- 'things which God hath decreed. So that it's clear by his own confeſſion, that the crucifixion of Chriſt taken actively was *predeſtined, predefined, conſtituted, foreordained,* and *predetermined* by God. Whence by a paritie of reaſon we demonſtrate our Hypotheſis, that the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of that, whereunto intrinſecal ſin is neceſſarily annexed, is predefined and predetermined by God. The inference and concluſion to me is ſo natural and evident, that I cannot ſee how the wit of man can evade it.

Our Adverſaries evaſions examined.

But let us examine what ſubterfuges and evaſions our Opponents frame to evade the force and evidence this ſecond Head touching Chriſts *Crucifixion* gives to our Hypotheſis.

1. Evaſion touching active and paſſive Crucifixion.

1. *Bellarmine* and from him a reverend Divine of name among our ſelves replie, *That the paſſive crucifixion of Chriſt was from God, not the active: i.e.* Chriſts *Paſſion* and the *effects* of it was from God, but not the *actions* of thoſe that crucified him. (1) How poor and ſhiftleſſe this ſhift is we have already demonſtrated on the vendition of *Joſeph* from *Gen.* 45. 5,7,8. (2) But more particularly as to this Head, I cannot but wonder how any, who have not quite baniſhed Reaſon and Religion from their minds, can ſatisfie themſelves with ſuch jejune notions and evaſions: Did not the bleſſed God predefine and predetermine the very act of Chriſts crucifixion? how elſe could he certainly foreknow that he would be crucified? Or what certain preſcience could he have of the ſalvation of any one elect ſoul, which wholly dependes on the death of Chriſt? Again, what fine-ſpun nonſenſe is this, God

predetermined the *Passion* of Christs crucifixion, but not the *Action?* as if God predetermined that Christ should be kissed and so betrayed by *Judas*, but not that *Judas* should kisse and betray Christ: again, that Christ should be mocked, blaspheмed, scourged, *&c.* by the Souldiers and Jews, but that these should not mock, blaspheme, scourge, *&c.* Christ. Lastly, that the Spear should be thrust into the side of Christ, but yet not that any thrust it in. What Logic, Reason, or sense is this? Do not the very Aristoteleans grant us, *That action and passion are not really, but only modally distinct?* As the way from *Athens* to *Thebes*, and so back again from *Thebes* to *Athens*, is but one and the same way, diversified only from its relation to different termes; so the same fluxe as it procedes from the Agent is called *Action*, and as it termines on the patient, *Passion*. Is it possible then that God should predetermine or concur to the *passion* and not to the action of crucifixion? But enough of this, which is so strongly refuted by *Strangius, lib. 4. cap. 11. pag. 772.*

2. *Evasion.* 2. Another reverend Divine of estime among us for parts and pietie evades thus: [Christs crucifixion] 'was a thing which 'Gods hand and counsel had determined before to be done, *Act.* '4. 28. *i.e.* foreseeing wicked hands would be promt and ready 'for this tragic enterprise, his sovereign power and wise counsel 'concurred with his foreknowledge, so only, and not with lesse 'latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that 'malignitie, than to let it procede to this execution. And to 'deliver him up (not by any formal resignation or surrender, as 'we wel know, but permitting him) thereunto. Though the 'same phrase of *delivering him*, hath elsewhere another notion of 'assigning or appointing him to be a propitiation for the sins of 'men, by dying; which was done by mutual agreement between 'both the parties, *&c.* This replie of this learned pious Divine (so far as I can penetrate and understand it, which seems involved under much obscuritie) may be resolved into the following parts. (1) He makes Gods prescience or foreseeing the crucifixion of Christ by wicked hands, to procede or go before the concurrence and determination of Gods wise counsel or predefinition thereof. Wherein he fals in with the Jesuites *middle Science*, making Gods prescience precedent to his predefinition or decree, and so dependent only on the mutable wil of men as to the act of sin; which he elsewhere seems to intimate: whereas the Scripture, which

which he refers to, *Act.* 2. 23. makes the foreknowledge of Chriſts crucifixion ſubſequent to the predefinition of his determinate Counſel or Decree. And certainly al the wit of man ſummed up in one cannot conceive or demonſtrate, how God ſhould have a certain preſcience of Chriſts crucifixion, which dependes wholly on the contingent uncertain wil of man, and not on the determinate counſel of his own wil. (2) He makes Gods determinate counſel or hand *only to determine the bounds and limits of that malignitie*, &c. As if the bounding and limiting of the malignitie, and not the ſubſtrate mater or act itſelf entitatively conſidered were from God. Whereas the Text ſaith categorically, *That the hand and counſel of God predefined and predetermined whatever thoſe wicked hands of theirs executed.* (3) He gives us a new Gloſſe or Paraphraſe on that phraſe *delivering him*, *Act.* 2. 23. as if it implied only an *aſſigning or appointing him to be a propitiation*, &c. But how little this gloſſe wil accord with the ſenſe of theſe Texts is evident. For that aſſigning and appointing him to be a propitiation was immanent and eternal in the Divine Decrees, but the *delivering* him here is meant of his being delivered into the hands of thoſe that crucified him, and that according to the determinate counſel of God.

3. We come now to the more plauſible ſubterfuges of *Strangius*, whereby he endeavors to evade the evidence of thoſe Texts, which mention Gods predetermining the crucifixion of our Lord. He anſwers, *lib.* 3. *cap.* 4. *pag.* 573. thus: 'The occiſion and cru-'cifixion of Chriſt, alſo the kind of death were from God: and 'as they were from God, they were good and greatly glorioſe, 'and properly the means to procure our ſalvation: and God is 'deſervedly judged the Cauſe and Author of them, *Who by his 'determinate counſel and precognition delivered his Son to them, whom 'with wicked hands they killed on the croſſe*, *Act.* 2. 23. Here truly 'in the ſame work the good action of God is diſtinguiſhed from 'their evil action: therefore their wickedneſſe and malice was 'not from God; neither was it willed or predefined by God, who 'cannot be ſaid to be the Cauſe and Author of any ſin. There-'fore ſpeaking abſolutely, the occiſion of Chriſt was not ſin; (o-'therwiſe God ſhould be the Author of ſin:) as to kil a man is 'not ſin. And truly if God had commanded men to kil Chriſt, and 'they out of conſcience to that command had obeyed God, they 'had not ſinned. But to proſecute Chriſt out of hatred and il-wil is

Strangius's *Evaſions.*

'intrinſecally evil, neither can that be any way wel done, or com-
'manded by God.

Anſwer. Obſerve here (1) he grants that the crucifixion of Chriſt, with al its natural circumſtances entitatively conſidered were from God, as the God of nature, and ſo naturally good: yea, that they were morally good and greatly glorioſe as means to procure our ſalvation; and therefore *God is deſervedly judged the cauſe and author of them*, as *Act.* 2. 23. And (2) we denie with him, that the wickedneſſe and malice of thoſe acts was from God. (3) He alſo grants, *That the occiſion or killing of Chriſt conſidered abſolutely was not ſin.* Whereunto we retort, That neither the hatred of Chriſt conſidered abſolutely without relation to its object is ſin. But, (4) he concludes: *But to proſecute Chriſt out of hatred and il-wil is intrinſecally evil*, &c. Whence we argue, That the crucifying of Chriſt was a ſin intrinſecally evil, and yet as to its ſubſtrate mater and entitative acts from God. For did not the Jews proſecute Chriſt out of hatred and malice, yea malice blowen up to the ſin againſt the Holy Ghoſt in ſome of them? And was not, in this good work of crucifixion, the good action of God, and the evil action of the Jews the ſame as to the ſubſtrate mater or natural entitative act? This pincheth *Strangius* cloſely, and therefore he ſeems to make the natural entitative act of God diſtinct from the natural entitative act of the wicked Jews: For he ſaith, *Here truly in the ſame work the good action of God is diſtinguiſhed from their evil action; and therefore their wickedneſſe and malice was not from God.* Here we grant, [1] his conſequence or concluſion, *That their malice was not from God.* [2] We thus far alſo grant his Antecedent, That the good action of God, conſidered both naturally and morally, was diſtinguiſhed from their evil action conſidered *formally* and *morally:* for the malice and vitioſitie which formaliſed the action as theirs, is no way imputable to Gods act conſidered either naturally or morally. [3] But yet we ſtil avouch, and no way dout but to demonſtrate in its place, that in the crucifixion of Chriſt the act of the wicked Jews conſidered *materially*, *naturally*, and *entitatively* was one and the ſame with Gods act: So much al theſe Texts clearly evince; ſo much alſo reaſon dictates: For if there were two acts, the one primarily, yea only from the wicked inſtruments, the other from God the prime Efficient, then how could they be ſaid to be the inſtruments of Gods Efficience? Muſt we not then alſo ſuppoſe

two,

two Crucifixions, one from God, and the other from the Jews? What a world of absurdities would follow this Hypothesis, That the action of God in the Crucifixion of Christ considered *entitatively*, *materially*, and *naturally*, was really distinct from the action of the Instruments considered *entitatively*, *materially*, and *naturally*? But to conclude, we find an excellent solution to al these evasions and subterfuges in *Augustin*, Epist. 48. *ad Vincentium*, thus: *When the Father delivered his Son, and Christ his own Bodie, and Judas his Lord, why in this Tradition is God just and man guilty, but because in one and the same thing which they did, the cause was not one and the same.* A solution sufficient to satisfie any sober mind: Wherein note, (1) That the act of Tradition and so of crucifying Christ, was one and the same entitatively and physically considered both in regard of God and the sinner. (2) That the difference sprang from the Causes: God delivered his Son to Death, thereby to bring about the greatest good that Sinners could wish for, their Salvation; but *Judas* and the malitiose Jews delivered the Lord of Glorie to death, with *wicked hands*, out of an avaricious humor, malice, *&c.* Hence, (3) The Action was most just and glorious on Gods part, but most unjust and wicked on the Sinners part. This answer of *Augustin* is so great, that it might serve to answer al the objections against our Hypothesis, were not men bent to cavil against the truth.

Quum Pater tradiderit Filium, & Christus Corpus suum, & Judas Dominum, cur in hac traditione Deus est justus & homo reus, nisi quia in re una quam fecerunt, causa non est una ob quam fecerunt. *August. Epist.* 48. *ad Vinc.*

§. 3. I come now to a third Head of Scriptural Arguments, namely such, *wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing or afflicting his people in such a way, wherein the Instruments could not but contract guilt.* I shal divide this Head into two members; (1) *Such Scriptures, wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishing his sinful people.* (2) *Such as mention Gods afflicting his righteous People by sinful Instruments.*

1. We shal begin with such Scriptures *wherein God is said to make use of wicked Instruments for the punishment of his sinful people.* So *Esa.* 10. 5, 6. *O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, I will send him against an hypocritical Nation.* The *Assyrian* is sent by God as his rod to punish his sinful people; and every stroke of this rod was from God; his hand guiding, ordering, and actuating the rod in al its motions. And yet, how much sin was there committed on the *Assyrians* part in punishing *Israel*? How little did he intend

1. *Gods punishing his sinful People by wicked Instruments.* Esa. 10. 5, 6, 7.

tend to ſerve God herein? were not Pride and Ambition the main ſprings of his action? Thence it's added *v.* 7. *Howbeit he meaneth not ſo, neither doth his heart think ſo*, &c. whence *v.* 12. God threatens to puniſh him for his ſin. So that it's evident, this *ſending* of the *Aſſyrian* by God, mentioned *v.* 6. cannot be meant of any *legal permiſſion* or *commiſſion* given him by God, but of the ſecret efficacious predeterminative concurſe and Providence of God, ordering what ſhould come to paſs. So *Jer.* 16. 16. *Behold, I wil ſend for many fiſhers, ſaith the Lord, and they ſhal fiſh them, and after wil I ſend for many hunters, and they ſhal hunt them from every mountain*, &c. Note, (1) That theſe words contain not a promiſſe but threat, begun *v.* 9. This is evident from *v.* 17. (2) By *Fiſhers* and *Hunters* in the general we muſt underſtand enemies to the Jews. *To fiſh and to hunt*, is to take and deſtroy. War has a great reſſemblance with fiſhing and hunting, which is a kind of war againſt beſtes; as war is a kind of fiſhing and hunting of men: whence *Nimrod* the firſt Warrier after the Floud, is ſtiled *Gen.* 10. 9. *a mighty hunter*, i. e. of men. Ay, but more particularly, (3) Who are theſe *fiſhers?* Why, as it is ſuppoſed, the *Egyptians*, who are called *Fiſhers*, Eſa. 19. 8. (4) And who are the *Hunters?* The *Babylonians*, as it is generally ſaid: But, (5) Who is it that *ſends* for theſe Fiſhers and Hunters? It is God, *I wil ſend*, &c. (6) Why doth God ſend for them? To puniſh his ſinful People, and that by thoſe very Nations in whom they had ſo much confided, and to whom they had ſo much conformed, as is intimated *v.* 17. And what more juſt, than that Profeſſors ſhould be puniſhed by ſuch Inſtruments, as have been the ground of their confidence, and the exemplars of their ſins? (7) How doth God ſend for theſe Fiſhers and Hunters? Surely, not by any legal Act or formal Commiſſion given to them, but *providentially*, by exciting their minds, applying their wils, and drawing forth, yea determining the ſame to the ſubſtrate mater or material entitative act of afflicting the Jews, whereunto there was much malice, murder, and hatred of God and his People annexed. Yea, God did not only ſend *Nebuchadnezar* to afflict *Iſrael*, but alſo give him a reward for his ſervice; as *Jerem.* 27. 6. *And now have I given al theſe lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezar the King of Babylon, my ſervant.* God gives him the neighbor Nations as a reward for his ſervice againſt *Iſrael.* The like *Jer.* 43. 10. Multitudes of Texts might be

Jerem. 16. 16.

added

added to ſhew, how God makes uſe of wicked Inſtruments in the puniſhment of his ſinful people, and in a providential way efficaciouſly concurs to and predetermines al their actions materially and naturally conſidered, and yet is no way the Cauſe or Author of their ſin.

2. To mention one or two Scriptures, which ſpeak of Gods *uſing wicked Inſtruments in afflicting his innocent People.* So *Job* 1. God makes uſe of the *Sabeans*, and *Caldeans*, yea of Satan himſelf, to afflict *Job*; and yet he ſaith, *v.* 21. *The Lord taketh away.* He ſaw by faith Gods hand moving, yea predetermining the hearts and hands of his adverſaries to every act of theirs *materially conſidered*, albeit not to the vitioſitie. So *Pſal.* 105. 25. *He turned their heart to hate his people, to deal ſubtilely with his ſervants.* Here it's ſaid expreſſely, *that God turned*, i. e. efficaciouſly moved and predetermined the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his People *Iſrael.* God's *turning their hearts* doth expreſſely and formally denote his efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the entitative material natural act of hatred, albeit not to the vitioſitie and malignitie thereof. So much alſo the next clauſe importes, *and to deal ſubtilely with his ſervants*, i. e. al their ſubtile ſtrategems, machinations, and politic contrivements for the extirpation of *Iſrael*, by putting to death their Males, oppreſſing them with hard labors, *&c.* al theſe were, as to their ſubſtrate mater and phyſic entitative acts from God, who turned their hearts thereto: And what could be more nakedly and evidently ſaid to demonſtrate Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin?

2. *Gods afflicting his righteous Servants by wicked Inſtruments.*

Job 1. 21.

Pſal. 105. 25.

Let us now ſee what our Opponents replie to theſe Scriptures and our Arguments drawen thence. *Strangius, l. 4. c. 4. p. 791.* evades the force of this laſt Text thus: *What is ſaid* Pſal. 105. 25. *that God turned their hearts to hate his people, it muſt be underſtood, that God did it not by perverting the hearts of the Egyptians, but by doing good to his people, whence the Egyptians took occaſion of hatred.* (1) We ſay not that God perverted the hearts of the Egyptians; that's the commun odioſe conſequence which our Adverſaries impoſe on us. But, (2) We avouch, that God did more than give occaſion to the Egyptians of hating, by his doing good to his people. Is not this a ſtrange Comment, *God turned their heart to hate his people*, i. e. gave occaſion of hatred, by doing good unto his people? Doth not Gods turning the heart

heart in Scripture Phraseologie always import his efficacious predeterminative concurse in applying the wil to its act? When it's said, *Prov.* 21. 1. *God turneth the heart whithersoever he wil*, is it not meant of an efficacious concurse? Do not also the following words, *Psal.* 105. 25. *to deal subtilely with his servants*, clearly implie an efficacious act of God upon their hearts, predetermining them to their act? Certainly such Comments are very poor evasions to elude such clear Texts. As for the other Texts, *Strangius*'s general answer *p.* 774, 775. is, *That God is the Cause of the act in those sins, but not of the pravitie of the Instruments*, &c. And what do we say or desire more? But yet there lies a sting in this very concession of his: for he addes, *p.* 774. *That God hath decreed nothing by his Wil of good pleasure, but what he approves as Good.* i. e. God hath not absolutely decreed to permit sin, because he doth not approve of it. Wherein note, [1] How he doth, with the Pelagians and Arminians, confound Gods *Decretive Wil*, with his *Approbative complacential* Wil. [2] We denie not but God approves of al his own Acts; but the Question is touching *objects*, *Whether God approves of al objects which by his Decretive Wil he decrees to permit?* This we peremptorily denie, and no way dout but to make good our denial in its place.

4. *Gods immediate hand in the Acts of sin.*

§. 4. Another Head of Arguments, contains such *Scriptures as mention Gods own immediate hand in those Acts whereunto sin is appendent.* We begin with 2 *Sam.* 12. 11. where God tels *David* 2 Sam. 12. 11. by *Nathan*, that for his folie committed with *Uriah*'s wife, and murder, *Behold, I wil raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I wil take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neigh-* 2 Sam. 16. 22. *bour*, &c. This threat we find fulfilled, 2 *Sam.* 16. 22. *And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of al Israel.* What could be more plainly and distinctly expressed to demonstrate Gods immediate concurse to that entitative act of *Absalom*'s Sin? Here *Strangius*, *l.* 4. *c.* 4. *p.* 789. acknowledgeth, (1) *That Absalom's Incest in violating his fathers bed is by God owned as his own Fact.* But, (2) then he answers, *that this was acknowledged for the reason above-mentioned, namely, by reason of Gods efficacious Gubernation, Moderation, and Direction, which he afforded, according to the modes already explicated, about the sinful Wils of Absalom and Achitophel, and their actions in this wickedness*; *which fact is related* 2 Sam. 16. 20, &c. *For this is usual, that the effect, which*

which ariſeth from two cauſes, whereof the one is effective, and the other directive, be aſcribed to both, but in a different reſpect, &c. This is the commun anſwer, which he and his Sectators give to ſuch Scriptures, which ſpeake Gods immediate hand in the entitative acts of ſin; let us therefore a little examine the force of this anſwer.

(1) Take notice, that he allows Gods *Gubernation*, *Moderation* and *Direction* of the Act whereto ſin is annexed, but not the *production* of the act. This is evident by the Concluſion, wherein he makes the Sinner to be the *effective* cauſe, but God the *directive* only. But I replie, how can God *efficaciouſly Govern*, *Moderate*, and *Direct* the Act, unleſs he be alſo the effective Cauſe thereof? Take his own inſtance, the ſinful wils of *Abſalom* and *Achitophel*, how is it poſſible, that God ſhould efficaciouſly govern and direct thoſe immanent acts of their ſinful wils, but by influencing their wils, and efficaciouſly predetermining them to act? If God did, as he grants, *efficaciouſly govern*, *moderate*, and *direct* their ſinful wils in thoſe immanent acts of Luſt, certainly he muſt neceſſarily produce thoſe acts. (2) Neither wil this anſwer at al ſolve the Difficultie: for ſuppoſe we grant, that God doth only efficaciouſly govern, moderate, and direct the ſinful act, not produce the entitative mater thereof, yet this *efficacious directive* influence doth as much make God the Author of ſin, as our *effective predeterminative* concurſe. For Gods efficacious Moderation and Direction of the ſinful act, denotes his efficacious Preſervation of the act, which is as ſinful as the effection or production of the Act. But more of this hereafter, *Chap.* 5, 6.

Another Scripture which ſpeaks Gods immediate predeterminative concurſe in the entitative act of Sin, is 2 *Sam.* 16. 10. where *David* ſaith of *Shimei*, *That the Lord ſaid unto him, Curſe David.* And *v.* 11. *Let him curſe; for the Lord hath bidden him.* Now the force of this argument dependes on the explication of this *word* or *command* of God to *Shimei*, which muſt be here taken either *morally*, for a divine precept and injunction, or *phyſicly* for an efficacious Concurſe and influence. (1) That it cannot be here taken *morally* for a preceptive word, is moſt evident; becauſe had God commanded *Shimei* to curſe *David*, he had been the moral cauſe and ſo the Author of his ſin. (2) Therefore it remains, that it be here taken only *phyſicly*, for Gods efficacious Concurſe ſecretly and powerfully inclining and apply-

Shimei's *curſing* David, *how from God.* 2 Sam. 16. 10, 11.

ing *Shimei*'s wil to the entitative act of this cursing. And in this sense the *Word* of God is frequently taken in Scripture, namely, for his efficacious predeterminative concurse, in the Creation, Conservation, and Gubernation of things.

Now what doth *Strangius* replie to this? Why, *l.4. c.4. p.786.* he saith, *That Shimei's Cursings being intrinsecally evil, we may not say, that God did move or impel him thereto in a proper manner of speech, neither that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions, as they were determined to such an object; but only as directed by God to his just judgements: and that most certain direction of God, with the administration of Circumstances and Occasions was as a Precept.* In which Response note, (1) That he grants, *that Shimei his cursing was an action intrinsecally evil:* which is a great concession, and wil clearly overthrow his own Hypothesis, and prove ours, *That God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of actions intrinsecally evil.* For if *Shimei*'s Cursing was an action intrinsecally evil, then surely such also was the Vendition of *Joseph* and the Crucifixion of our Lord, which were both as to their entitative acts predetermined by God. But (2) he denies, *that Shimei was the Instrument of God in these actions, as determined to such an object.* In the last clause of this Antithesis lies the spirit and force of al his objections against predetermination to the substrate mater of sin; which we intend more fully to examine *Chap. 6. §. 1.* at present, we say, [1] That *Shimei* was not the instrument of any *moral* but *physic* influence from God: the *precept* or *bidding* here specified was not moral but *physic* and real: God did not morally command *Shimei* to curse *David*, but physicly and naturally incline him to the entitative act of Cursing him; which was as a Precept: this *Strangius* grants in the close as to Gods direction. [2] Hence if we consider *Shimei*'s cursing as *physicly* determined to such an object, it was not *morally* evil but good, and so from God: It's true, as it was morally determined by *Shimei* the moral Agent to its object *David*, so it was intrinsecally evil, but as it was physicly or naturally determined by God, for the punishment of *David*, so it was both naturally and morally good and from God. (3) He placeth the whole of Gods Influence to this act, *in directing his Actions to his just judgements*, &c. To which I answer. [1] How could God direct these actions of *Shimei*; specially, the immanent acts of his wil, (which were the worst part of his malediction) but by an effi-

cacious

cacious predeterminative influence on his wil and its acts? [2] He grants, *that this Direction of God was most certain and efficacious:* if so, then certainly predeterminative: and if the direction be predeterminative, is not Gods concurse to the sinful act considered materially and entitatively, predeterminative? [3] If Gods directive concurse be predeterminative, as *Strangius* must by his concessions grant, wil not those ugly consequences which he lodes our Hypothesis with, be al retorted on him? Did not Gods efficacious direction termine on *Shimei*'s cursing as determined to such an object, namely *David?* And was he not the Instrument of this efficacious direction?

Baronius, Metaph. S. 8. *Disp.* 3. *p.* 158. answers this Text thus: *To that malediction of Shimei it is answered, That God commanded Shimei to curse David, not by bending his wil, but by opening to him the way to this evil, and by shutting it to al other evils,* i. e. *by permitting him to act this only, whenas he was ready for many other evils.* A poor evasion indeed, and such as if admitted would make the whole Scripture but as a Nose of Waxe. (1) Doth not *David* say categoricly, *that God bid,* [i. e. not morally but physicly] *Shimei to curse?* And what can this implie, but the bending his wil to the subsstrate mater, or entitative Act? (2) Can it be imagined, that *David* could mean only a mere otiose and speculative permission, and not an active concurrence to the act it self entitatively considered? (3) Doth not *Baronius* confess, *that God opened to him the way to this evil?* And if so, must he not then open *Shimei*'s heart to the mate of it? Did not the main act of malediction arise from his wil? And if that were not opened to the entitative act, would the way to this evil have been ever opened?

Again, Gods immediate predeterminative hand in those acts, whereunto sin is necessarily appendent, may be demonstrated from 2 *Sam.* 24. 1. *And again the anger of the Lord was kindled against Israel, and he moved David against them, to say, Go number Israel and Judah.* Here it is expressely said, *that God moved David* to number the people. וַיָּסֶת, *and he moved* or *excited, i. e.* efficaciously determined and applied his wil to the subsstrate mater of this command to number the people. Hence *Strangius, pag.* 790. answers, (1) *That the* He *here must be meant of Satan, who is said,* 1 Chron. 21. 1. *to stir up David to number the people.* And he cites for this Comment *Junius* with others. But alas! what poor 2 Sam. 24. 1.

ſubterfuges wil men flie unto to avoid the force and evidence of Divine light? Doth not Grammatic conſtruction, as wel as the mind of the words utterly reject ſuch a gloſſe? The Particle *He* here is not a diſtinct Pronoun, as our Engliſh Verſion reads it, but included in the Verbe יסף which is by the Copulative ו joined to the former part, and *the anger of the Lord was kindled:* ſo that if the paſſive, *was kindled*, belongs to the Lords anger, then alſo muſt what follows, *and he moved*. Neither is this ſenſe aliene from other Scriptures: for 1 *Sam.* 26. 19. *David ſaith, That God had ſtirred up Saul againſt him, i.e.* efficaciouſly moved him to the entitative act of perſecuting *David*. Thence (2) *Strangius* fearing the ruinous downfal of this refuge flies to another, thus: *But if we follow the commun interpretation, it appears, that the ſame fact is aſcribed to God and Satan; and therefore it muſt be on a different account: and here alſo the varietie in the end and mode makes the unſpotted Juſtice of God to ſhine forth, and the malice of Satan and pravitie of man to diſcover itſelf. For* [1] *the action of numbering the people was not in itſelf evil.* [2] *Divines diſtinguiſh between tentation of probation and ſeduction.* [3] *Here the ſame things concur, which were before explicated of the ſame ſenſe, whereby God is ſaid to inclin to evil, namely the permiſſion and laxation of the reins to Satan, the oblation of occaſions and irritaments, impediments being removed, and the ſuſpenſion of Divine Grace: which things concurring with the pravitie of nature, ſin neceſſarily follows.*

1 Sam. 26. 19.

(1) We grant, that the ſame fact is aſcribed to God and Satan on different accounts: God put the thought entitatively conſidered into *Davids* heart, but Satan ſtirred up his heart to the act of numbering the people; God in judgement gave over *David* to this ſin, that it ſhould be at this time when God was angry with *Iſrael*: There is a ſpecial providence of God even in the ebullitions of luſts in the hearts of his own people. Thus alſo in the wicked; who put that thought of murder conſidered materially into the heart of *Eſau*, *When my father is dead I wil ſlay my brother Jacob?* Was it not from God? Whence came that motion into the heart of *Judas* to betray Chriſt, with all the circumſtances materially conſidered referring thereto? were they not from God? Thus here, God put the entitative thought of numbering the people into the heart of *David*, albeit Satan ſtirred it up; and God was the Orderer, albeit Satan the Abettor and in ſome ſenſe the Author of it: for God is only the prime phyſic cauſe of the natural entitie,

entitie, but Satan the moral cauſe or Author of the vitioſitie: again, the concurſe of God to the natural entitative act is immediate, efficacious, and predeterminative, but Satans concurſe only mediate, objective, and ſuaſive, though with more or leſſe degrees of moral efficacitie, as *Eph.* 2. 2. Again, (2) we grant, that the different ends and modes of operating make Gods unſpotted Juſtice and mans pravitie to ſhine forth. (3) We are glad, that *Strangius* wil grant, *the action of numbering the people not to be in itſelf evil.* Whence, by a paritie of reaſon, we argue, That no action, though never ſo intrinſecally evil, is in itſelf, *i.e.* as conſidered in its phyſic entitative act, and according to its ſubſtrate mater, ſinful: for certainly if *Davids* numbering the people, which was a ſin attended with ſo much pride, vain glorie, and confidence in an arme of fleſh, with other aggravations, which ſo greatly provoked God, were not in itſelf evil, no other ſin conſidered in its mere entitative and phyſic act is ſuch. Yea, I as yet ſee no reaſon why this ſin of *David* conſidered in its individual circumſtances and moral relation to its object and principes, may not be eſtimed a ſin intrinſecally evil, as wel as *Shimei*'s curſing *David.* But (4) *Strangius*'s ſummary concluſion, *That Gods concurſe to* Davids *ſin was only an idle permiſſion, laxation of the reins to Satan, and oblation of occaſions, with ſuſpenſion of Divine Grace,* is very contradictory both to the letter and mind of the Text, which ſaith poſitively, *that God moved,* or *excited,* and *ſtirred up the mind* of *David,* not *morally,* but *phyſicly,* to the entitative act of numbering the people. Certainly, when the Scripture ſpeakes ſo categoricly and poſitively of *Gods moving the wil to its act,* to reſtrain ſuch moving influences and cauſalitie, only to mere *idle permiſſion,* or *objective oblation of occaſions,* or *negative ſuſpenſions* of Divine Grace, what is this but to make the Scripture contradictory to itſelf, or affirmation and negation applicable to the ſame words? How eaſily might an Atheiſt hence take advantage to elude al Scripture!

But to paſſe on to other Texts, that clearly expreſſe Gods immediate predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. 1 *Kings* 11. 31. the Lord ſaith, *I wil rend the kingdome out of the hand of Solomon.* So *verſ.* 37. to *Jeroboam*, *I wil take thee and thou ſhalt reigne,* &c. Whence 1 *Kings* 12. 15. it's ſaid, that the cauſe why *Rehoboam* hearkened not unto the people, *was from the Lord, that he might performe his ſaying,* &c. So *verſ.* 24. 1 King. 11. 31, 37. & 12. 15, 24.

God

God saith expressely, *The thing* [*i. e.* the revolt of *Israel*] *is from me.* So of *Jehu*, God saith, 2 *Kings* 9. 3. *I have anointed thee King:* and *chap.* 10. 30. *Jehu* is said *to do unto the house of Ahab al that was in Gods heart.* From these Texts it's most evident, that the holy God assumes to himself the production of such entitative natural acts, which had sin necessarily appendent to them.

2 Kings 9. 3. & 10. 30.

Now let us examine what response *Strangius* gives hereto: *l.* 4. *c.* 4. *p.* 793. rejecting the answer of *Bellarmine*, (which to me is as good as his, yea not really different) he answers, *It is not unlikely but that* Jeroboam *and* Jehu, *albeit in taking the Kingdome they sinned not as to the thing itself and substance of the act, because instructed by Gods command, yet in manner of acting, as they were profane men, they variously sinned by mingling their own ambition and depraved affections with the worke of God.* Thence he concludes, *That whatever their sins were, yet the justice of God sufficiently shines forth in the whole of this Administration, because God used both the Kings and people in this worke only as instruments to execute his just judgements*, &c.

Answer. To give a brief replie hereto, it is very evident, that al that *Strangius* hath given us in answer to these Texts, doth but more confirme us in the true sense we give of them. For (1) it is manifest, that *Jeroboam* and *Jehu*, with the Revolters their Adherents, sinned not only in the *mode* or manner, but in the very *substance* of their acts: For is not High treason against a lawful King an act sinful as to its substance? And were not *Rehoboam* and *Ahab* both lawful Kings? Was not *Rehoboam Solomons* Son, whom God made King? It's true, *Jeroboam* and *Jehu* had private prophetic Instructions and Unctions, but yet those gave them no real title before the people, but only secret intimations what God would in his providence bring to passe. *David* had a promise of the Kingdom and also Divine Unction; and yet he confesseth, that God gave him no actual title to the Kingdom in the eyes of men; but he stil ownes *Saul* as his Soverain King, and the Lords Anointed: and so ought *Jeroboam* and *Jehu* their lawful Soverains, til God had given them a legal title before men. (2) But suppose *Jeroboam* and *Jehu*'s sin were only in the *manner*, not in the *substance* of the act, yet certain it is, that the peoples sin, before God had declared his soverain wil to them, was high Treason, and so substantially evil. (3) Yea further, grant that they al sinned but in the *mode*, not in the *substance* of their acts, yet whether the act be

be ſubſtantially or modally only ſinful, it comes al to one in this caſe of Divine concurſe and predetermination: For if God concur to the ſubſtrate mater of acts modally ſinful, why may he not as wel concur to the ſubſtrate mater of acts ſubſtantially ſinful? Do not our Adverſaries hereby, according to their Principes, make God the Author of *modal* ſins? Or, is not the entitative act of modal and ſubſtantial ſins the ſame as to kind, namely a real phyſic or natural good? and therefore if God concur to the one, why not alſo to the other? Aſſuredly, the moſt refined Wits wil never find out a ſufficient diſparitie between acts *modally* and *ſubſtantially* ſinful, ſo as to allow God an efficacious concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of the one, but not of the other. (4) *Strangius* grants in the cloſe, *That God uſed both theſe Kings and their mutinous Adherents as inſtruments in this worke, to execute his juſt judgements*, &c. Did he ſo indeed? Did he not then alſo make uſe of their politic contrivements, ambitioſe wils, and rebellious affections as inſtruments in this worke? And if ſo, did not God alſo move, excite, applie, yea predetermine their wils to the ſubſtrate mater of their traitorous rebellious deſignes and exploits? Do not al theſe conſequences hang together in an indiſſoluble chain of invict Reaſon? To cloſe up theſe arguments with that of *Calvin*, *Inſtitut. lib.* 1. *cap.* 18. §. 4. *pag.* 78. 'But now how it 'may be from God, and governed by his ſecret providence, which 'men wickedly undertake, we have an illuſtrious document in 'the Election of King *Jeroboam*; in which the madneſſe and te-'meritie of the people is ſeverely condemned, becauſe they per-'verted the order eſtabliſhed by God, and perfidioſely departed 'from the familie of *David*: and yet we know, that God would 'have him anointed; whence in the words of *Hoſea*, *c.* 8. 4. there 'appears a kind of repugnance; becauſe God there complains, '*That that Kingdome was erected contrary to his wil and knowlege*; 'and yet *c.* 13. 11. he declares, *That he gave Jeroboam to be King 'in his wrath*. How can theſe things agree? Thence he concludes, '*We ſee therefore that God, who nilled the perfidie or treacherie, yet, 'for another end, juſtly willed the defection*. And if God juſtly willed the defection, he alſo juſtly moved and predetermined them to the ſubſtrate mater thereof; for predetermination anſwers adequately to God predefinition or abſolute volition, as *Strangius* grants.

We adde to the fore-cited Texts, 1 *King.* 22. 23. *Now therefore* 1 Kings 22. 23.

fore behold, the Lord hath put a lying ſpirit in the mouth of al theſe thy Prophets, and the Lord hath ſpoken evil concerning thee. (1) *The Lord hath put,* נתן, *hath given forth, delivered,* or *put.* LXX. δεδωκε, *hath given.* It notes here an efficacious enthuſiaſtic infuſion, which of al kinds of predetermination is moſt prevalent and irreſiſtible. (2) Note alſo the ſin, it is a lying ſpirit, which certainly denotes an act intrinſecally evil: For is it not a ſin of the firſt magnitude to forge lying Prophecies, and impoſe them on men as the Oracles of God, thereby to delude their ſouls into Hel? Such was the caſe here: and yet, lo! it's ſaid, that this very ſin was, as to its ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, from God: can any thing be ſpoken more nakedly and clearly to evince and demonſtrate the truth of our Hypotheſis?

What doth *Strangius* replie to this? His anſwer we find, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 4. *pag.* 788. *We muſt note, that this oration from the Prophet* Micaiah *is parabolic, in which various things are ſpoken* ἀνθρωπινωτέρως, *to our capacitie; and in a Parable al things are not to be cut open to the quick, but that only muſt be regarded, which belongs to the ſcope of the Parable*—— *But in that God ſaid,* verſ. 22. *Go forth and do ſo, it muſt be underſtood of Divine permiſſion: for we uſe the Imperative Mode not only in commanding, but alſo in permitting, or giving licence. And albeit there be mention made of a Divine precept, yet that is not otherwiſe to be taken, than for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his juſt judgement, that God delivered* Ahab *and his falſe Prophets left by God to be deceived by Satan: of which Tradition afterward.*

In anſwer hereto, (1) what *Strangius* means by his parabolic Oration is not eaſie to divine. For we know, that al Parables conſiſte of two parts, the *Propoſition* and *Reddition* or *moral:* and what is there to be found of theſe in this Text or Contexture? But this ſeems moſt like to *Strangius*'s deſign, to bring this Text to a parabolic image, thereby to elude its argumentative force: for Divines grant, *That parabolic or ſymbolic Theologie is not argumentative*, further than the ſcope and mind of the Symbol reacheth. That here is ſomething ſpoken ἀνθρωπινωτέρως, or according to human capacitie I eaſily grant, but this doth not at al invalidate the argument, but rather confirme it. The wiſe God ſpeakes according to the manner of men, *inquiring, examining,* and *expecting* what the iſſue would be, thereby the more fully to demonſtrate his efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater

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of this ſinful act. (2) As for the command of God, *verſ.* 22. *Go forth and do ſo*, it can in no ſober ſenſe be underſtood of a mere permiſſion. For al permiſſion is either *moral* or *phyſic* and *natural*: it cannot be meant of a moral permiſſion, which *Strangius* ſeems to incline unto: for if God had given the lying ſpirit a licence, or legal permiſſion to deceive, how could he be vindicated from being the Author of the ſin? Is not lying a ſin intrinſecally evil? Should not the holy God then, according to this ſenſe, be the Author of a ſin intrinſecally evil? Neither can it be meant of a mere ſpeculative phyſic permiſſion, as to the ſubſtrate mater: for it's expreſſed in a terme of the moſt active import, *the Lord hath put*, נתן. This Divine precept therefore muſt denote an efficacious real influence, ſuch as predetermined thoſe lying ſpirits to the ſubſtrate mater of their ſin. Yea, (3) is there not ſo much included in the laſt clauſe of *Strangius*'s replie, wherein he grants, *This Divine precept to be taken for the efficacious direction of God, for the execution of his juſt judgement?* Now what is Gods efficacious direction, but a part of his efficacious predeterminative concurſe? And how could God efficaciouſly direct theſe lying ſpirits in *Ahabs* falſe Prophets, but by a predeterminative influence applying their minds and wils to the ſubſtrate mater of their falſe prophetic inſpirations?

I ſhal conclude this Head with *Rev.* 17. 17. where ſpeaking of the *ten Hornes*, which gave their power to the Beſte, he ſaith, *God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his wil, and to agree and give their kingdome unto the Beſte.* That phraſe ὁ Θεὸς ἔδωκεν εἰς τὰς καρδίας, is very emphatic, and notes not the infuſion of any vitioſitie, but the efficacious predetermining their wils to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, and permiſſion of the vitioſitie. Ἔδωκεν here exactly anſwers to נתן, 1 *Kings* 22. 23. which the LXX. render ἔδωκε, and here ſignifies, *to cauſe the mater effectually to be brought about*, as the ſame word ſignifies, *Mat.* 12. 39. & 16. 4. & 24. 24. *Mar.* 13. 22. *Act.* 2. 19. & 14. 3. *Rom.* 15. 5. *Rev.* 3. 4. and elſewhere. Whence it follows: ποιῆσαι τὴν γνώμην αὐτοῦ, *to fulfil his wil.* Ποιῆσαι here ſignifies, *powerfully to effect*, or *to performe with ſingular efficace*, in which ſenſe it is uſed alſo *Mat.* 7. 22. & 13. 58. or *to effect with labor and induſtrie*, as it's uſed, *Act.* 9. 39. & 19. 24. *Heb.* 8. 5. γνώμη ſignifies properly *a decree, ſentence*, or *confirmed purpoſe*; ſo here. So that the mind of this Text ſeems this: The bleſſed God paſſed an abſolute irreverſible decree or Rev. 17. 17.

purpose, that the Adherents of Antichrist should give up their Power and Kingdome to him; and thence he, by an efficacious concurse, predetermined their wils to the substrate mater of those acts, whereunto sin was annexed, for the glorifying of his Justice, on Antichrist, and his power and mercie towards his afflicted Churches.

Now let us examine the subterfuges men shelter themselves under, to avoid the force of this Text. A reverend Divine of name among us replies thus: '(1) He that readeth Dr. *Hammonds* Exposition applying this to *Alaricus* sacking *Rome*, with 'the effects, wil see that the very *subject* is so dubious and dark, as 'not fit to found such a Doctrine on. (2) It was the effect of 'sin that God willed, and not the sin. (3) He is not said to put 'the sin into their hearts,— but only *to do his pleasure, and agree 'to give up*, &c. which he could most easily do by putting many 'good and lawful thoughts into their hearts, which with their 'own sins, would have that effect, which he willed: if a thief 'have a wil to rob, God may put it into his heart to go such or 'such a way, where a wicked man to be punished wil be in his 'way. Thus that reverend Divine.

In answer hereto we say, That whatever mens Comments may be, yet certainly the subject is not so dark, but carries evidence enough with it, that it can be meant of no other than of the ten hornes, which give up their Kingdome to the Antichristian Beste. (2) Whereas he saith, *It was the effect of their sin that God willed, and not the sin*, this seems contradictory to the very letter as wel as to the mind of the words: for it's said, [1] *God hath put it into their hearts, i.e.* not only the effect, but the very material entitative act. Then [2] *to fulfil his wil*, i.e. *his decree*, so γνώμη here must note. Now God decreed the very act, and not only the effect; and therefore his predetermining concurse must also reach the very act: according to that great theologic Axiome allowed by *Strangius* and others, *That predetermination necessarily follows predefinition, or Gods absolute Decree.* Yea [3] it's said, *That God put into their hearts, not only to fulfil his wil, but also to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beste. To agree,* ποιῆσαι μίαν γνώμην, *unanimously to make one Edict or Decree, and that at a Council table.* Which clearly denotes a deliberate, firme, unanimous consent of giving up their power to the Beste. And doth not this clearly speak the act of their sin, as wel as the effect? And is not this act

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as to its entitative mater, ſaid to be put into their hearts by God? So much alſo the next Verbe *Νεύω* importes, namely their deliberate free donation of their power, wherein the formalitie of their ſin lies: and yet this very act, as to its ſubſtrate mater, is ſaid to be from God. Whence (3) whereas he ſaith, *God is not ſaid to put the ſin into their hearts,— but only to do his pleaſure and agree*, &c. I eaſily grant, [1] That God did not put the ſin formally conſidered into their heart; *for God temtes no one to ſin*; but yet he put the material entitative act of the ſin into their heart. For wherein lay the malignitie of their ſin, but in this, that they unanimouſly and peremtorily agreed or decreed to give up their power to the Beſte? And is not this very act, entitatively conſidered, ſaid to be put into them by God? And was it not alſo Gods *pleaſure* or *ſtated Decree*, that they ſhould thus agree? *&c.* And [2] whereas he ſaith, *God could make them do his pleaſure moſt eaſily, by putting many good and lawful thoughts into their hearts*, &c. is not this a very ſlender evaſion? what the leaſt mention is there of any ſuch thing in the Text? Yea, is it not expreſſely ſaid, *That God put into their hearts to agree*, &c? And did not the poiſon of their ſin lie in this maligne bloudy agreement? Albeit the holy God be ſufficiently vindicated from the leaſt imputation of any hand in this conſpiracie, in that he decreed and produced only the entitative act, not the vitioſitie. [3] His inſtance or ſimilitude from *the Thief that hath a wil to rob*, &c. is extreme lame and nothing to the purpoſe; for it's evidently ſaid in the Text, that God not only concurred to the externe acts and effects, but *that he put it into their hearts to agree*, &c. So that the very wil and conſent, entitatively conſidered, was from God.

Let us now examine what *Strangius* replies to this, who *lib.* 4. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 855. acknowlegeth this Text *Rev.* 17. 17. *to be meant of the ten hornes giving their power to the Beſte*; but yet ſo as that if we underſtand the words (1) *of Gods putting it into their minds to agree*, &c. 'then the ſenſe muſt be no other than, 2 *Theſ.* 2. '11. *Rom.* 1. 28. and like places, which ſpeak of Gods delivering 'men up to a reprobate mind, and ſending the efficace of error, 'that they might ſerve Antichriſt. And here the diſtinction 'muſt always concur, when in the ſame action ſin and puniſhment 'concur, that not mens ſins, but Gods judgements and puniſh-'ments muſt be aſcribed to God. In this ſenſe God is ſaid *to* '*excite, impel, and incline to ſin.* Before we paſſe on to *Strangius*'s

second answer, let us a little examine this. [1] He grants, that God judicially may and doth concur to sin, yea *excite, impel,* and *incline men to it.* And doth not this fully overthrow his own Hypothesis and confirme ours? For if God in judgement *impel, excite,* and *incline* men to one sin, as a punishment of another, is he not then as much the Author of sin in this way, as in ours? [2] How doth God judicially punish one sin by another, but, to use his own words, by delivering such up to a reprobate mind and the efficace of error? And if so, then must not the substrate acts of such judicial dereliction be from God? Of this hereafter, §. 6.

But (2) I passe on to his second answer, whereon he seems to lay the most weight, though indeed most feeble: 'But, saith he, 'because those words, *Rev.* 17. 17. are immediately subjoined to 'verſ. 16. and are connected therewith by the rational Particle 'γὰρ, which points out the reason of that which next follows, 'namely, that those ten Kings having changed their opinion, 'should destroy the Whore and Antichrist, it seems to me more 'commodious, if in that *verſ.* 17. there be a reason given of this 'famose change, that they who were before the friends and vas-'sals of Antichrist, should be afterwards enemies and adversaries 'to him, namely, because God hath put this into their heart. 'And the first words of *verſ.* 17. sufficiently accord to this Expo-'sition—— But what is subjoined, *That they might give their* 'Kingdome to the Beste, *until the word of God should be consummate,* 'I should think ought to be expounded negatively, *&c.* Thus *Strangius.*

A strange comment indeed! let us a little inquire into it. (1) How infirm is his argument from the rational particle γὰρ, to make what follows, *the fulfilling of Gods wil,* to refer only to the destroying of Antichrist? whereas the particle γὰρ seems rather to refer to the whole verse, and more particularly to the last clause, *until the Word of God shal be fulfilled*; and so it notes, *that God put it into their hearts to fulfil his Wil,* [1] In agreeing to give their Kingdom to the Beste, and [2] When *the words of God were fulfilled,* i. e. Antichrists reign expired, then *to hate the Whore,* &c. And this makes the whole contexture of the words natural and evident. So that *v.* 17. is not only a reason of the change, mentioned *v.* 16. but also an account of the whole series of their actions both whiles friends to, and enemies against Antichrist.

chriſt. (2) As for what is ſubjoined *v.* 17. *That they might give their Kingdome to the Beſte*, I cannot but admire with what ſhadow of reaſon *Strangius* can underſtand this *negatively*, as if they ſhould not give their Kingdom to the Beſte: certainly if ſuch gloſſes ſhould be admitted, we might eaſily find in Scripture ſubterfuges for the worſt Hereſies and Immoralities? Why may not the moſt profane debauched wretch, when he is preſſed with thoſe Commands, *Thou ſhalt not commit adulterie*, *Thou ſhalt not kill*, &c. replie, that theſe Scriptures muſt not be taken negatively but affirmatively, *Thou ſhalt commit adulterie*, &c? But *Strangius* ſaw ful wel, that the affirmative ſenſe of thoſe words, *That they might give their Kingdome to the Beſte*, would quite ſubvert his forced ſenſe of the foregoing words, and therefore he ſaw no way left, but to ſecure himſelf by reducing this later affirmative clauſe to a negative, though contrary to the expreſſe letter and mind of the words. But (3) being after al his gloſſes ſenſible of the infirmitie and invaliditie of this reſponſe, he *p.* 856. flies agai to his old refuge, telling us, 'That if any ſhal think this expoſition of 'the laſt member not ſufficient, but that beyond it there muſt 'be alſo ſignified, *that God did put it into their hearts to give their 'Kingdome to the Beſte*, I have no mind to contend about this 'mater, ſithat the ſenſe is ſufficiently ſane, which ever way the 'words be underſtood. In evil works God is not the cauſe of the 'moral evil, but of the ſubſtrate act and puniſhment, or Judge-'ment which is annected to the ſin; but in good works, not only 'of the ſubſtrate act, but alſo of the moral Bonitie, *&c.* Who of us denies this? would our Adverſaries but ſtick here, how ſoon would our Controverſie be ended? But here lies the ſting, even in this plauſible conceſſion, *Strangius* with the reſt would fain perſwade us, that there are ſome acts of ſin ſo intrinſecally evil, as that you cannot ſeparate the phyſic natural act from its moral Vitioſitie.

§. 5. We deſcend now to ſuch Scriptures as mention Gods *efficacious Permiſſion of ſin.* The former Heads regard only the *ſubſtrate mater* or *entitative act* of ſin, but this ſin in its *formal nature.* Our Adverſaries, the *Pelagians*, *Jeſuites*, *Arminians* and *Semi-Arminians* or *New Methodiſts*, al grant Gods permiſſion of Sin, but only ſuch as is *otioſe*, *ſpeculative*, *negative* and *naked*, without any efficacious active Influence for the production of its entitative act, or direction of it to its proper ends: But the ſacred *Gods efficacious Permiſſion of Sin.*

Scriptures

Scriptures ascribe to God a *positive*, *efficacious*, *directive*, and *ordinative* permission of sin, arising from his positive absolute volition to permit it. So it's said of *Eli*'s Sons, 1 *Sam.* 2. 25. *They hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them.* The conjunction כי here is *Causal*, and resolves their sin into the efficacious permissive Wil of God: The Soverain Lord had, by an absolute peremtorie decree, predetermined to leave the Sons of *Eli* to this sin of Disobedience both against their Father and God, which should prove the cause of their temporal and eternal ruine; and thence it's said, *they hearkened not, because the Lord would slay them:* the wil of God was not properly the cause of their sin or slaughter, yet their sin was a consequent of Gods Wil efficaciously permitting it to be. I am not ignorant, that some of late have endeavored to give the causal particle כי a more soft, as they phrase it, Version; and among these some make it conclusive, and so render it *ideo*, *idcirco*, *quapropter:* others render it *quamvis*, as *Turnovius*; others otherwise: But certainly our English Version, which renders it *causally*, *because*, seems much more agreeable to the mind of the Words and al the ancient Versions: So the LXX. who render the words thus, ὅτι βουλόμενος ἐβούλετο κύριος διαφθεῖραι αὐτοὺς, *because the Lord in willing willed to destroy them. In willing willed*, i. e. according to the Hebraic Idiome, *peremtorily*, *efficaciously*, *immutablely* and *absolutely willed.* Thus also the ancient *Syriac* and *Arabic* Versions, with some later, *Munster*, *Pagnine*, *Arias Montanus*, *Junius* and *Tremelius*, *Osiander*, *Piscator*, *Malvenda*, with the *Tigurine* and *Belgic* Versions; yea *Castalio* not excepted, render כי *causally*, *because*, according to our sense and interpretament.

1 Sam. 2. 25.

Let us examine now what *Strangius* returns in answer to this Text, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 6. *pag.* 809, &c. He answers, (1) *That the sons of Eli were, for their flagitiose impieties, destined and devoted by God to ruine.* (2) *That the punishment of death here mentioned, seems properly and directly to be understood of temporal, not eternal.* (3) *That however it be, as it is manifest, that sin precedes damnation and the inflicting of punishment, so it's necessary that the prescience of every sin be presupposed in the eternal purpose of God, of damning and inflicting punishment, whether temporal or eternal.* (4) *That the particle* Quia *Because, here used, doth not alwayes denote a proper cause, but a reason of consequence, which may be taken from the effect, and other arguments besides the cause*, &c.

Strangius

Strangius here raiseth a great deal of dust, to blind our eyes from beholding the Meridian light of this Text; but to answer briefly: (1) We say, that his first answer smells too rankly of Pelagianisme, in that it makes the sins of men the cause of the Divine Wil: The Sons of *Eli were not for their flagitiose Impieties destined by God to ruine*, as if their flagitiose Impieties were causative of and influential on Divine destination; but the Soverain God destined, by an absolute decree, to leave them to those flagitiose sins, and for them to destroy them. What are the dangerous consequents of such a conditional Reprobation, we intend more fully to shew hereafter, *c.* 5 §. 3. (2) That the Death here intended and inflicted was only *temporal*, is too crude a notion for a Divine instructed in the knowlege of divine wrath: Yea, *Strangius* confesseth, *that they merited eternal wrath*; and how then could they be exemted from it, who had rejected the Merits of their *Messias?* (3) What he addes, touching the prescience of every sin to be presupposed in Gods eternal purpose of damning men, has a tincture also of rank Pelagianisme: for if the prescience or prevision of actual sins, yea of final Impenitence, be that which moves the divine Wil to decree the Damnation of men, then it wil, by a paritie of reason, necessarily follow, that the prescience or prevision of mens Faith and final Perseverance is that which moves the divine Wil to elect men: for if Reprobation be conditional, Election must be so also, as our Divines on Scripture-reason strongly demonstrate. *Davenant* in his *Animadvers.* against *Hoard*, invictly proves, *p.* 226. and elsewhere, *That Decrees purely conditional are very much unbecoming the Divine Wil.* But of this more in what follows, *c.* 5. §. 3. (4) As for the Particle *Quia, Because*, [1] We grant, *that it doth not alwayes denote a proper Cause, but a reason of Consequence, and that taken sometimes from the effect.* But, [2] that it cannot denote a reason of Consequence taken from the Effect in this Text, is most evident; because Gods Wil to slay them was not the effect of their disobedience, but their disobedience was the consequent of Gods wil to slay them. [3] Take notice, that we do not say, that Gods wil was the cause of their disobedience or ruine, but only that the later was the consequent of the former: God in his most soverain wise and efficacious purpose decreed to leave the sons of *Eli* to such flagitiose sins, as should prove the cause of their ruine, both temporal and eternal:

and

and hereupon their sin and ruine followed, as Darkness is the consequent of the Suns retirement into the inferior Hemisphere.

Again, Gods efficacious permissive wil about sin may be demonstrated from *Job* 12. 16. *The deceiver and deceived are his.* לו שוגג ומשגה, *His or unto him is the deceiver and the deceived*, i. e. he doth in just judgement permit men to deceive and to be deceived, as *Vatablus* on this Text. Which *Mercer* thus more fully explicates: 'I understand this not only of false Worship, 'but also of al errors that are committed every where; although 'more speciallly in Polities and Cities to be governed, where 'God stirs up some who draw others into error, that they might 'follow their fallacious counsel, and enter on a pernicious course 'for their own dammage.—— God therefore impels and draws 'some into error: not that the Lord is the Author of Error or 'Sin, but that their sin and defection from God leads them there-'to, God not only merely permitting, but also ordaining, &c. Whence it's added, *v.* 17. *He leadeth counsellers away spoiled, and maketh the Judges fools*; *spoiled*, שולל, i. e. of their wisdom and counsel, as it follows. So it's taken, *Psal.* 76. 6. *The valiant are spoiled of their heart*, i. e. deprived of their courage. *And maketh the Judges fools*, יהולל, *infatuat*, or *ad insaniam adigit*, as *Mercer. He infatuates them.* Again, *v.* 20. *He removeth away the speech of the trusty, and taketh away the understanding of the aged.* טעם, *the Judgement, Discretion, Counsel, Prudence, Sense:* Hebr. *the savor* or *experimental taste.* So *v.* 24. *He taketh away the heart of the chief of the People of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a Wilderness where there is no way.* The like *Deut.* 28. 28. and *Esa.* 19. 11, 12, 13, 14.

Job 12. 16, 17. *h. e.* Justo judicio permittit errare & seduci, *Vatablus.*

Now let us see what answer *Strangius*, *l.* 4. *c.* 9. *p.* 836. gives hereto: 'It must be observed, saith he, that *Job* in this Chapter 'doth in an illustrious manner discourse of Gods Providence so 'ordering things, that nothing comes to pass casually or fortui-'tously, nothing without his destinated counsel, *that nothing is 'done but what he wils, either by permitting that it be done, or by 'doing of it*, as *August. Enchirid. c.* 95. so that God doth effect 'and procure whatever things are good, and also wisely fore-'knowing the future event, doth permit sins, which he directs 'to good ends ordained by him.—— Deservedly therefore *Job* 'among other things observes, that it is from Divine Providence, that

'that some erre, and draw others into error; and that both as to 'maters of Religion, and in other maters of this life; not that 'is he the Author of seduction and errors, but because God, for 'the contemt and abuse of his light, delivers them destitute there-'of into a mind void of judgement, and presenting objects and 'occasions, opens a way, wherein they wander, *&c.*

Though this Paraphrase be far short of the mind of the Text, yet there is enough in it to confirme our Hypothesis, and subvert his own Antithesis. For (1) he grants, *That nothing happens casually, without Gods destinated counsel, according to that of* Augustin, *That nothing is done but what God wils*, &c. Now certainly Gods destinated counsel or determined wil is most efficacious and irresistible: so that if the permission of sin be from Gods destinated counsel, it must be also determined by his efficacious wil. (2) He grants, that God wisely foreknows al future events, even the sins of men: and how this can be without the efficacious predetermination of his own wil to permit the same, neither *Strangius* himself, nor any of his sectators, could ever yet make out. (3) He grants also, *That God directs those aberrations and sins to good ends appointed by him.* And how can God direct the immanent aberrations of the mind, but by an efficacious predetermination of the substrate acts, and permission of the vitiositie? (4) He yet further grants, *That God delivers them unto a mind void of judgement:* and what do we say more? Doth not this evidently denote an active efficacious permission of sin? But then (5) his last clause, *presenting objects and occasions*, &c. overthrows al his former concessions: for the wise God doth not only present objects and occasions, and thereby open a way to mens infatuation, but he also predetermines the mind to the entitative act, and efficaciously permits the vitiositie, without the least finger in the sin.

There are other Scriptures which demonstratively prove Gods efficacious permission of sin; as *Esa.* 63. 17. *O Lord, why hast thou made us erre from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear? Strangius, pag.* 839. grants, that the Verbe in both Members being in *Hiphil* oft notes a *double action*, as when we say, *That one makes another to do a thing*; though he pretends, *that sometimes it only notes a permission of the action.* But it is certain, that it cannot here denote a mere naked permission, but such as procedes from the efficacious wil of God. The like *Jer.* 20. 7. *O Lord, thou hast deceived me and I was deceived.* Whereto answers, *Ezech.* 14. 9. Esa. 63. 17.

And if the Prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that Prophet. Which Texts speak certainly more than a mere idle speculative permission, namely such as resultes from the active, efficacious, directive and ordinative wil of God, as *Strangius, lib.* 4. *cap.* 9. *pag.* 840--- 844. grants. What this permission of God is, and how far it extendes, see what follows, *Chap.* 5. §. 6.

Gods judicial hardening Sinners.

§. 6. Let us now passe on to such Scriptures as mention *Gods tradition or giving up some to judicial excecation* and *induration* or *hardnesse of heart*; which wil give a more evident demonstration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater or entitative act of sin. Not to insiste on Gods hardening *Pharaohs* heart, *Exod.* 4. 21. which has been already solidly and demonstratively explicated by a judicious Divine, in his *Letter to a Friend*, &c. *pag.* 28--- 30. I shal begin with *Psal.* 81. 12. *So I gave them up to their own hearts lusts*, or *to the hardnesse of their own hearts*, as *Kimhi*. Hebr. ואשלחהו בשרירות לבם, *and I sent them away in the depraved cogitation of their heart.* LXX. render it, *Deut.* 29. 19. ἀποπλάνησιν, and *Jer.* 3. 17. ἐνθυμήματα. Whence it follows: *and they walked in their own counsels.* במועצותיהם, *in their own depraved imaginations.* It's just with God to give up men to that spirit of hardnesse which they affect: his way of hardening is mysterious and invisible: he delivers sinners up to the bent of their own lusts, and then lets them enjoy what they lust after: when men adde *acquired* hardnesse to *natural*, God justly inflicts on them *judicial* hardnesse. And oh! how righteous is it with God judicially to harden such as sinfully, yea voluntarily harden themselves! And then the heart which is an Adamant towards God and things spiritual, is as wax towards sin and Satans tentations. And what is the effect of this judicial hardnesse, but to seal up sinners from the darknesse of mind to the darknesse of Hel? Thus God, albeit he be not the Author of sin, yet is the Orderer of it, and the cause of the substrate act unto which sin is annexed.

Psal. 81. 12.

Psal. 69. 22.

The like *Psal.* 69. 22. *Let their eyes be darkened that they see not, and make their loins continually to shake. Let their eyes* [*i. e.* their minds] *be darkened.* תחשכנה, *be made so obscure and dark, as that they may not see their way:* let al true wisdome be taken from them, *and make their loins continually to shake: i. e.* take from them al force, vigor and abilitie of acting as they ought; let them stagger

ſtagger and reel like to a drunken man. The ſhaking of the loins argues imbecillitie and want of force, which is chiefly ſeated in the loins. Thus he procedes, and then *verſ.* 17. brings Divine wrath to a black concluſion: *Adde iniquitie to their iniquitie*, &c. חטה עון על עונם, which implies, that God addes the puniſhment of judicial hardneſſe to the iniquitie of their voluntary acquired hardneſſe. We find this piece of judicial hardneſſe cited by *Paul*, Rom. 11. 10. *Let their eyes be darkened that they may not* Rom. 11. 10. *ſee, and bow down their back alway.* The Heb. משח is here rendred by *Paul* συγκαμψον, *bow down*; the ſenſe being the ſame; for the bowing down of the back argues the defect of ſtrength in the loins.

To theſe Texts we may adde, *Eſa.* 6. 10. *Make the heart of this* Eſa. 6. 10. *people fat:* השמן לב *make the heart fat, or groſſe, i. e.* ſtupid and ſenſeleſſe: for the fat of animals has little ſenſe. It alludes to the heart in the animate bodie overgrowen and oppreſſed with fat. Theſe words are ſix times repeted in the N. T. Whence it follows: *and ſhut their eyes.* וישע, which is rendred by ſome, *dim them*, or *make them dim*; by others, *daub them*, as with plaiſter, or other like mater: by others, *cloſe them*: al which notes the efficacitie of error and blindneſſe, that follows on judicial hardneſſe.

The like curſe we find, *Eſa.* 29. 10. *For the Lord hath poured* Eſa. 29. 10. *out upon you the ſpirit of deep ſleep, and hath cloſed your eyes.* LXX. ὅτι κατένυξεν ὑμᾶς κύριος πνεύματι κατανύξεως. The Heb. תרדמה is rendred by *Aquila* καταφορᾶς, and by *Theodotion* ἐκστάσεως, which *Act.* 10. 11. notes *a deep ſleep* or *extaſie*: and the radix רדם ſignifies *to overwhelme with deep ſleep*; and it's rendred κατανύσσω, *Dan.* 10. 9. So that by *the ſpirit of deep ſleep*, muſt be underſtood ſuch a *ſtupor of ſpirit* as leaves men without al ſenſe. The alluſion is to ſome *ſoporiferous ſtupifying wine*, or *potion*, or *medicine*, which, being given to a man, or ſprinkled on him, caſts him into a deep ſleep. Hence the Prophet uſhers in theſe words with a direful exclamation, *verſ.* 9. *Stay your ſelves and wonder — they are drunken, but not with wine*, &c. *i. e.* the Lord hath made them drunken with a *ſoporiferous ſtupifying potion*. As for κατάνυξις it is not derived from κατανύσσω, *to pricke*, *Act.* 2. 27. but from the ancient word κατανύω. The ſimple νύω being put for νεύω, which alſo remains among the Latins, as *nuo*, *nutus*, *nutare*. Thence νύζω and νυσδζω, which ſignifies *to nod*, or *ſhake the head*, as they are wont to do who have drunk any ſtupifying potion. So that

πνεῦμα κατανύξεως here is such a *spirituose, stupifying potion* as deprives men of their senses, makes them shake the head, stagger and reel as drunken men. Thence it follows: *and hath closed your eyes.* When God judicially pours out a spirit of deep sleep, how soon is the heart stupified and made senseleſſe! This Text is cited and explicated by *Paul*, Rom. 11. 8. *According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see*, &c. The first part, *God hath given them the spirit of slumber*, notes the stupor of their minds, unto which they were judicially delivered up by God.

Rom. 11. 8.

Thus also *Esa.* 19. 11.— 14. He begins *vers.* 11. *Surely the Princes of Zoan are fools*, &c. Thence he procedes to give the reason of it *vers.* 14. *The Lord hath mingled a perverse spirit in the midst thereof*, &c. *The Lord hath mingled*, מסך, *poured out*, or *given them to drinke*. Gods judicial excecation and induration is here, as elsewhere, compared to a cup of intoxicating liquor, which being very strong and heady distempers men, and makes them to reel and stagger: so much the following phrase importeth, רוח עועים, *a spirit of perversities*. The Hebrew word, not elsewhere to be found in the O. T. is derived from a Verbe that signifies *to pervert, turne away*, or *make crooked*: it's here plural of a duplicate forme, and notes al manner of perversities both extensive and intensive. They boasted of their wisdome, *vers.* 11. but God made them drunk with a *spirit of error and perversities*. The Chaldee and LXX. render it, *with a spirit of error* or *seduction*; the Latin, *with a spirit of giddinesse*. The sense is the same.

Esa. 19. 11.— 14.

We may adde hereto, *Esa.* 44. 18. *They have not knowen nor understood; for he hath shut their eyes, that they cannot see, and their hearts, that they cannot understand. He hath shut*, Heb. טח *he has daubed*; *Shindler* renders it, *crustavit, aut obduxit parietem.* God did as it were *plaister their eyes* with a spirit of slumber: whence it follows, *vers.* 19. *and none considereth in his heart*, &c. Those profane Idolaters did shut their eyes, that they might not see, and the righteous God comes and as it were daubes or plaisters them over, that they shal not see.

Esa. 44. 18, 19.

This judicial excecation is also lively expressed, *Esa.* 60. 2. *For behold darknesse shal cover the earth, and grosse darknesse the people.* The Prophet having exhorted the elect among the Jews, *vers.* 1. *Arise and shine, for thy light is come*, &c. *i. e.* the Messias is come and shineth on thee with the glorious beams of Evangelic light;

Esa. 60. 2.

light; in this *verſ.* 2. he gives us the dreadful curſe of thoſe that ſhould wilfully ſhut their eyes againſt this light. *For behold--- thick darkneſſe.* Heb. עֲרָפֶל, which ſeems compounded of a word that ſignifies *to drop* or *deſtil*, and another that ſignifies *a miſt* or *fog*: ſo that the compound notion here properly notes *a miſt* or *fog ſo thick, that it even drops again*; ſuch as the Egyptian miſt was, that filled the earth with darkneſſe, *Exod.* 10. 22, 23. When men wilfully ſhut their eyes againſt Evangelic light, God judicially leaves them to wander up and down in the thick miſt of their own darkneſſe, ſo that they ſtumble at noon day.

Thus God dealt with the Gentiles, even the wiſeſt of them, for the abuſe of natures light, as *Rom.* 1. 28. *And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowlege, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do thoſe things that are not convenient.* They did not approve of or acknowlege God in their practic judgements or conſciences, and therefore God did not approve of or owne their practic notions, but delivered them up to a *reprobate, ſpurious, droſſie, vain, adulterine, rejectaneous* mind; ſo much ἀδόκιμος notes. A Divine of note among us ſaith to this Text, *Here is nothing at al but a penal deſertion and permiſſion*, &c. So that by this *Tradition* he underſtands only a negation of Grace, and mere permiſſion of men to ſin; but *Strangius, lib.* 4. *cap.* 7. *pag.* 813. is more ingenuous, and grants, *that this Tradition importes ſomething poſitive:* though what that poſitive is he doth not, neither indeed can by his Hypotheſis, explicate. Rom. 1. 28.

The like *Tradition* or delivering up to a reprobate mind we find foretold touching the Sons of Antichriſt, 2 *Theſ.* 2. 11. *And for this cauſe God ſhal ſend them ſtrong deluſion, that they ſhould believe a lie.* When ſecure Profeſſors wil not receive the Truth in the love thereof, that they may be ſaved, it is juſt with God to *ſend them ſtrong deluſions, that they ſhould believe a lie; that they might al be damned*, &c. as *verſ.* 12. The fore-mentioned reverend Divine anſwers to this Text thus: *Here is nothing ſignified, but* (1) *That God wil permit Magicians and falſe Teachers to vent deceits.* (2) *And permit wicked men to believe them: which is mentioned as a permitted conſequent, and not as an end intended by God. And the word ſending is mentioned, becauſe the permiſſion was penal for their ſin*, &c. But this reſponſe is too ſlender and jejune for ſo great a Text: For (1) whereas that reverend Divine makes mention of *Gods permitting Magicians*, &c. this favors too much 2 Theſ. 2. 11.

of

of a *Grotian* and *Cassandrian* spirit, which I presume, he has no kindnesse for, whereby al those prophetic predictions about Antichrist are fixed on *Simon Magus*, or some other false Teacher in the Primitive Churches: whereas it is most evident, that this *sending them strong delusion* is ascribed immediately to God, as a righteous Judge. (2) Neither is this only a mere *permitted consequent*, as he phraseth it; but the terme *sending* importes *active efficacious influence* on Gods part that sends, not on the sin formally considered, but on the substrate mater, or act entitatively considered. But *Strangius*, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 853. is here also more candid, granting, *Gods sending the efficace of error*, to be the same with Gods *pouring out a spirit of slumber*, *Esa.* 19. 14. and *Jerome* thinkes, that *Paul* took his words from *Esa.* And *pag.* 855. *Strangius* addes, 'That this sending strong delusions may be ascribed to God, as a punishment of their former sin, in not receiving the truth in the love thereof: which sufficiently proves our Hypothesis, *That the substrate mater of sin is from God*, as hereafter.

The false comments of Adversaries refuted.

But let us a little more fully examine the general solutions which our Adversaries give to these Texts touching Gods *active excecation and induration*. 1. A Divine among our selves, whom I love and honor, thinkes, that those Texts in the O. T. which speak of Gods *hardening men*, &c. might, according to the Hebrew Idiome, have a *softer sense*; so (as I suppose he must mean) as a mere permission is intended thereby. But to answer hereto in the words of *Strangius*, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 9. *pag.* 839. The Hebraic forme is oft in *Hiphil*, which denotes a double action, *to make a man to do a thing*; yea sometimes this induration is expressed by Verbes in *Piel*, of an active import, as *Exod.* 4. 21. & 9. 12. & 10. 20, 27. & 11. 10. & 14. 4, 8. *Deut.* 2. 30. *Josh.* 11. 20. Whence *Strangius* concludes, *That this phrase of Scripture oft occurring denotes much more than a mere naked permission.* Though what this should be he is at a great losse.

2. *Baronius*, *Metaphys. Sect.* 8. *Disp.* 3. §. 99. *pag.* 159, 160. answers, 'That there are four actions of God in induration; (1) He 'punisheth former sins by permitting men to fal into greater. (2) 'He offers to them an occasion of repentance, *&c.* (3) He gives 'them not grace to improve the occasion; whence they are said 'to be blinded and hardened. (4) He offers to them occasions 'of greater sins, by such things as objectively move them to sin.

But

But al this, which *Baronius* allows God in judicial execation and Induration, comes far short of what the forecited Scriptures mention. For besides the mere permission of Sin, privation of Grace, and offering occasions and objects, the Scripture mentions a *Tradition and delivering up to the very act of sin*, yea, *Gods immediate efficacious hand in the very act of sin, considered entitatively and materially.*

3. But we come to *Strangius*, who, in his concessions goes beyond the former Divines, yet comes short of the genuine mind and spirit of those Texts, which speak of Gods judicial Excecation and Induration. (1) He grants, (contrary to the sentiment of a reverend Divine among us) *that active excecation is ascribed unto God.* So *l.* 4. *c.* 8. *p.* 819. *Active excecation*, saith he, *is ascribed to God, Satan, and the Sinner himself. Satan and the Sinner in that action do greatly sin, but God actes most justly. God can as justly punish Sinners with excecation of mind, as he punished* Elymas *the sorcerer with corporal excecation*, Act. 13. 11. (2) Thence *p.* 822. he addes: *Herein the whole difficultie lies, that in this action we rightly distinguish that which is sin, and the cause of sin, whereof God is not the cause, from the punishment, which God in just judgement inflicts.* So *p.* 829. *In al vitiose action, the action substrate to the vice, or whatever there is of entitie and positive therein, must be reduced to God as the first cause, who doth concur therewith, as considered separate from the vice or defect annexed thereto; and therefore whatever entitative or positive is found in any obduration, in like manner it must be referred to God, albeit he hath no commerce with the vice of the action.* This ingenuous concession of *Strangius*, did he not overthrow it by other positions, were sufficient to period our controversie: for what do, or need we desire more than what he here grants? If whatever be *entitative* or *positive* in obduration be from God, then surely the substrate mater or entitative act of that whereto sin is annexed, is from God. But here lies the point of our Controversie with *Strangius*, he holds that there be some acts so intrinsecally evil, as that you cannot separate the entitative act from the sinful reference it has to its object. But, (3) *Strangius* addes, *p.* 831. *That in the same Induration the sin and punishment are conjunct*, &c. This indeed is a great concession, that which overthrows *Strangius*'s Antithesis; for, if in the same Act the sin and punishment be conjunct, then how can God concur to the act as a punishment, and not concur

to

to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act which has ſin annexed to it? This Knot the acuteſt of *Strangius*'s Sectators wil never untie. Again, (4) He addes, *p.* 831. *That the very Permiſſion of God is the act and effect of the wil of God.——For to wil to permit, and adviſedly to permit is alſo to act. What is done by God negatively in regard of his tranſient act, is done alſo poſitively, in regard of his interne immanent act.* Herein alſo he lays before us a pregnant Truth, which is directly contradictory to his own Hypotheſis: for, [1] If Gods permiſſive Wil as to ſin be not only *negative* but alſo *poſitive*, then it muſt be efficacious. Again, [2] If Gods permiſſion of ſin be poſitive and efficacious, then alſo his Decree of Reprobation to permit ſin muſt be poſitive and abſolute, which directly impugneth *Strangius*'s Opinion. (5) He addes, *p.* 832. *That other actions alſo concur with Gods Permiſſion, becauſe he alſo rules, moderates and ordains what he permits, and concurs to the actions ſubſtrate to the ſin it ſelf.* Is it ſo indeed? What then do we contend ſo vehemently for? what made *Strangius* write ſuch a voluminous diſcourſe, and oppoſe *Rutherford*, *Twiſſe*, and other *Calviniſts* with ſo much violence, when as here he grants whatever they contend for? But to ſpeak the truth, there yet lies a Snake under the herbe; albeit *Strangius* ſeems to grant ſo liberally Gods efficacious concurſe to the *ſubſtrate act of ſin*, yet indeed, when he comes elſe-where to ſtate this concurſe, he makes it be only a remote concurſe to the act conſidered *in genere*, in *its generic nature*, not to the individual particular act as ſo or ſo circumſtantiated. And herein he is followed by a Divine of Name among us: wherein lies the ſpirit of al their ſolutions and oppoſitions. But how inept and evanid this ſubterfuge is, wil be very evident, if we conſider the nature of al phyſic or natural acts. Is not every natural or entitative act individual or ſingular? Are not al natural Acts the effluxes of ſingular *Suppoſites* or perſons? and if the ſubject be ſingular, muſt not the Action be alſo ſingular? To talk of a natural action *in genere*, or *ſpecie*, what a wild conceit is this, that which al true Logic and Philoſophie both new and old contradicts? It's true, human acts, as to their *moral* conſideration, may be diſtinguiſhed into *generic*, *ſpecific*, or *individual*: but if we conſider human acts in their *natural entitative* Being, ſo there neither is nor can be any ſuch thing as *actio in genere*, *action in general*; but al are *ſingular* and *individual*. So that if God concur to the act of ſin, it muſt be

Gods Concurſe to the individual act which is ſinful.

be to the act in its individual singular nature, not *morally* but *physically* and *entitatively* considered; of which more hereafter, *Chap.* 6. §. 1.

How God judicially hardens men without being the cause of sin.

But to give a distinct and Theologic Idea of Gods Judicial Excecation and Induration, with the Vindication of his Sacred Majestie from being the Author of Sin, the following Distinctions and Determinations may be of use to us. (1) We are to distinguish Gods concurse in *Judicial Induration* or Hardnesse, from that of the Sinner. (2) Gods Concurse in Judicial Hardnesse may be considered either in regard of his *Decree*, or in regard of his *Providence* and *actual execution*. (3) Induration may be distinguished into *Moral* and *Natural*: or into *sinful* and *penal*. These things being premissed, the true nature of Gods judicial excecation and Induration wil appear in the following Propositions.

1. Prop. *Gods Decree is not properly the cause of mans Hardnesse of heart or Damnation, but only of the Negation or withdrawment of preventing Grace, which God is no way bound to give.* The Decree of Reprobation is not the proper *efficient* or *formal* cause of the Sinners Induration or Condemnation, but his own wilful obstinacie. This sufficiently clears the Sanctitie and Justice of God.

2. Prop. *Yet supposing the Decree of Reprobation, the sinners Induration or Hardnesse follows infallibly, and in some sense necessarily*; *i. e.* by a modal hypothetic necessitie, not brutish or coactive, such as should destroy Libertie. The holy God doth not infuse hardnesse, or by any compulsion hurrie men into it, but leaves them to the swinge of their own lusts, which violently hurrie them into such courses as necessarily harden. This also cleareth Gods Justice from the imputation of sin.

3. Prop. *Gods Providence in Judicial excecation and Induration is very efficacious and illustrious.* (1) God leaves men to the Blandishments, Allurements, and Ensnarements of an heart-bewitching world, which insensibly harden. (2) He delivers up men to the power of Satan, the God of this world, whose subjects and vassals they willingly become, 2 *Cor.* 4. 3, 4. and so *are taken alive captive at his wil*, 2 Tim. 2. 26. (3) God so disposeth and orders al his Providences, as that they do al accidentally, by reason of mens lusts, conspire to harden them: Mercies be-

come Curſes to them, *Rom.* 11. 9, 10, 11. Yea, (4) The very means of Grace, become the means of their hardening, their Food and Phyſic become Poyſon to them, 2 *Cor.* 2. 16. *Eſa.* 28. 12, 13, 14, 15. (5) Chriſt himſelf, the *chief Corner-ſtone* of ſalvation becomes to them *a ſtone of ſtumbling and offence*, Eſa. 8. 14. *a ſtone of ſtumbling*, נֶגֶף of *ſmiting*, ſuch as lying in the way the foot may ſmite againſt, and thence ſtumble and receive hurt. It anſwers to σκάνδαλον, *ſcandal* in the New Teſtament: Thence it follows, *and for a rock of offence*. Heb. מכשול, not a bare *Stumbling-ſtone*, or *block*, ſuch as a man may make a ſhift to avoid or get over, or if he ſtumble, yet recover himſelf again; but he is a *rock of offence*, which notes, [1] The Offence to be inevitable and unavoidable, as the removing of a rock: [2] The ruine to be certain, as that of a Ship falling on a rock. Whence he addes: *for a gin and for a ſnare*, ſuch as men ſhould neither by power, wit, or craft eſcape. Whence it follows, *v.* 15. *And many among them ſhal ſtumble and fal, and be broken, and be ſnared, and be taken.* The like *Rom.* 9. 33. (6) God puts a period to the day of Grace, and leaves men to the plague of their own heart, *Eſa.* 22. 14. *Surely this iniquitie ſhal not be purged from you til you die.* Hebr. אִם יְכֻפַּר, *If this iniquitie be purged.* It is the conciſe forme of an Oath, frequently uſed in Scripture, as *Chap.* 5. 18. whereby God ſweareth, that their iniquitie ſhould not be purged. So *Luke* 19. 41, 42. *Heb.* 3. 7. (7) God doth poſitively, yea efficaciouſly concur to al that is poſitive, material, entitative, and natural in judicial hardneſſe, without the leaſt hand in the obliquitie or vitioſitie.

4. Prop. *The ſuſpenſion of reſtraining Grace in Judicial excecation is not properly a privation of any Grace due to the Creature, but a negation or withdrawment of undeſerved and abuſed Grace.* For the clearing whereof we are to conſider, the difference between Man and God in this particular: No meer man may or ought to permit or deliver up another to ſin or hardneſſe, if it be in his power to hinder: (1) Becauſe al men are under a Law and obligation of ſubjection to their Creator, whereby they are obliged to promove his Glorie, and prevent ſin and rebellion againſt him the moſt they can. (2) Becauſe al men are under a communion of Natures, and therefore bound to afford aſſiſtance each to other, ſo far as they may for their natural and moral good.

good. But now the ſoverain Creator of man is under no ſuch obligation, and therefore may as he pleaſe diſpoſe of his own grace, or ſuſpend it, ſpecially when abuſed by ſinners.

5. Prop. *God doth not deliver up men to judicial hardneſſe ſimply as hardneſſe, under that reduplication, but penally, as it conduceth to the vindication of his Juſtice.* For the explication and demonſtration of this Propoſition we are to remember, that there is nothing in the world of itſelf, purely, and ſimply evil: for if there were any pure and chiefeſt evil in the world, then God, who is the chiefeſt good, could not wil it: but the greateſt evil has ſomething of good mixed with it; and this God wils. Thus in judicial hardneſſe there is a penal vindictive good, which God wils for the illuſtration of his Juſtice.

6. Prop. *In judicial hardneſſe, that which is morally evil in regard of man and his tranſgreſſion, is naturally good in regard of God and his Providence.* For albeit God doth concur with the ſinner, who is deficient as to his dutie, yet God is no way deficient. (1) Al moral evil of ſin is only ſuch to him whoſe it is, or to whom it doth belong, as the Author thereof, by virtue of ſome Law he offends againſt: But now this judicial hardneſſe or ſin doth not belong to God as the proper Owner or Author of it, but only to the ſinner; neither doth the holy God offend againſt any Law. (2) The ſpecific qualitie of an effect is not to be aſcribed to the univerſal firſt cauſe, but to the ſecond particular cauſe, from which it receives ſpecification. (3) The ſinner is only the moral cauſe of his own hardneſſe; becauſe he is the meritorious cauſe thereof, and alſo a voluntary, yea wilful Agent therein. Al his hardneſſe is voluntarily contracted, albeit judicially inflicted by God: he ſuffers his heart voluntarily to be defloured by ſinful objects: God threatens to ſuſpend his Divine influence, and the obſtinate ſinner *cries, Content:* Satan comes and blinds his eyes, and he hugges him for it. So that the whole deficience or moral cauſalitie is on the ſinners part, not on Gods. The ſinner wants Divine influence and is willing, yea glad to want it: therefore his depraved wil is the ſole *formal, vital, ſubjective* and *moral efficient cauſe* of his own hardneſſe and ſin.

§. 7. We come in the laſt place to ſuch Scriptures as mention Gods *efficacious ordering, diſpoſing, and directing the ſins of men unto his own glorie*, which evidently demonſtrates his immediate concurſe and predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act

Gods efficacious ordering mens ſins for his own glorie.

Exod. 9. 14, 15, 16.

act thereof. Thus *Exod.* 9. 14, 15, 16. God threatens *Pharaoh*, *verſ.* 14. *to ſend al his plagues on his heart*, *i. e.* in a way of judicial excecation and induration. And why? *That thou mayſt know there is none like me in al the earth*: *i. e.* that I may magnifie my vindictive Juſtice and Power on thee. Whence he addes, *v.* 15. *For now I wil ſtretch out mine hand, that I may ſmite thee, and thy people with peſtilence, and thou ſhalt be cut off from the earth.* It runs in the Hebrew in the time paſt, שלחתי את־ידי, *I ſent out mine hand*, *i. e.* by the peſtilence or murrain among the beſtes, as *v.* 3, 6. and ſo it follows: *and I had ſmitten thee*, with the ſame peſtilence; *and thou hadſt been cut off*, deſervedly; but for another cauſe (which is mentioned *verſ.* 16.) I have ſpared thee. This ſeemeth the genuine meaning, namely, that God ſpared *Pharaoh* in this plague, thereby to magnifie his vindictive Juſtice and Power the more in his final ruine. God let him alone to run on in ful career in his way of ſin, yea, concurred to the ſubſtrate mater of al his ſins, and cauſed al his plagues to meet on his heart, in order to his final obduration, thereby to render his vindictive Juſtice more illuſtrious in his ruine. And ſo *verſ.* 16. *And in very deed for this cauſe have I raiſed thee up, for to ſhew in thee my power, and that my name may be declared thorowout al the earth.* ואולם, *in very deed*, or *verily*: it notes a great aſſeveration, ſuch as with God amounts almoſt to an oath. *For this.* The Apoſtle *Paul*, *Rom.* 9. 17. addes a Pronoun of intention, εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, *for this very ſame*, *i. e.* cauſe or purpoſe, as the Greeks expound it, *for this cauſe have I raiſed thee up.* The LXX. render it, *thou haſt been preſerved or kept alive*; but *Paul* more emphaticly, *Rom.* 9. 17. ἐξήγειρά σε, *I have made thee ſtand up*, or, *have conſtituted*, or *ſet thee up*, as on a Theatre before al the world, to be a veſſel of wrath, and an exemple of Divine vengeance. The Syriac renders it thus: אקימתך, *I have made thee to ſtand up*; which emphaticly paints forth Gods abſolute wil in his Reprobation. So in the Hebraic Verbe, העמדתיך, *I have made thee ſtand up*, as a monument of vindictive Juſtice. This *making to ſtand up*, notes the conſtitution and being of a thing, as elſewhere in Scripture: the righteous God gave being and conſtitution to *Pharaoh* for this very end, to magnifie the glorie of his vindictive Juſtice on him. So it follows: בעבור הראותך, *for to ſhew*, or *that I may ſhew in thee*, or *ſhew thee*. But the LXX. adde the Particle *In*: ſo *Paul*, *Rom.* 9. 17. ὅπως ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ, *That I may give a ſpecimen*, or *demonſtration*

Vitiorum noſtrorum non eſt auctor Deus, ſed tamen ordinator, *Auguſt.*

Rom. 9. 17.

ſtration of my power in thee. Hebr. אות־כחי, *my power*, or *my force, my omnipotent ſeveritie.* Thence it follows: ולמען ספר שמי, *for to declare*, or *tel my name.* The righteous God ſuffered *Pharaoh* to run on with a vehement impetuoſitie in his ſinful rebellion, that ſo the world might ring of Gods vindictive Juſtice in his ruine. From al this the Apoſtle ſtrongly demonſtrates our concluſion, *Rom.* 9. 18. *Therefore God hath mercie on whom he wil, and whom he wil he hardeneth.* Obſerve here, (1) the Apoſtle uſhers in this inference with the concluſive note, ἄρα οὖν, *therefore.* He layeth the premiſſes in Gods judicial proceedings with *Pharaoh* for the manifeſtation of his vindictive punitive glorie in *Pharaohs* ruine: whence he infers this univerſal concluſion. *Therefore God*, &c. (2) He reſolves Gods hardening men into his abſolute wil or decree of Reprobation, which he in this regard, makes parallel to his abſolute decree of Election: for as God *hath mercie on whom he wil*, *i. e.* according to his abſolute purpoſe or decree; ſo in like manner, *he hardeneth whom he wil*, *i. e.* according to his abſolute decree of Reprobation. And it is moſt certain, according to the Scripture, no man can maintain abſolute Election, but he muſt alſo maintain abſolute Reprobation: and if Reprobation be abſolute, then alſo Gods concurſe to the entitative act of that which is ſinful muſt be efficacious and predeterminative, as hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 3. Rom. 9. 18.

There are other Texts that make expreſſe mention of Gods efficacious ordering and diſpoſing of wicked men and their ſins for his own glorie. So *Prov.* 16. 4. *The Lord hath made althings for himſelf; yea even the wicked for the day of evil.* Note here (1) the end of Gods making althings, which is *for himſelf*, למענהו, *i. e.* for the manifeſtation of his own glorie. (2) The *manner* of Gods making althings for himſelf, included in the Verbe פעל, *hath made*, which ſignifies [1] Gods *active efficience*, or his energetic, architectonic Decree, whereby althings are made. [2] Gods *paſſive creation*, or his efficience in time. [3] Gods *conſervation* of althings in their beings and wel-beings. [4] Gods *efficacious actuating* and governing althings to their ends. Thus *Pſal.* 46. 9. *Eccleſ.* 11. 5. *Eſa.* 5. 12. The LXX. generally render it by ἐργάζεσθαι, which *Joh.* 5. 17. our Lord uſeth to expreſſe Gods efficacious concurſe and predeterminative influence. And *Strangius*, *pag.* 804. grants, that whether we underſtand פעל here of Gods production in time, or of his eternal Decree to produce man, or Prov. 16. 4.

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of his ordination and constitution of man to punishment, the difference is not material. I would therefore take it in the largest notion as comprehensive of al its significates before specified. (3) Whence follows the particular object, *even the wicked*, *i.e.* considered not only in their *substance* as men, but also in al their *Modes*, *Adjuncts*, *Accidents*, and *Operations*. There is not the most minute accident or action of a wicked man but God *makes* it, *i.e.* decrees, influenceth, and orders it for himself. Whence (4) the wicked are said to be made by God, *for the day of evil*, יום רעה, *i.e.* for the day of vindictive wrath, or punishment inflicted for the illustration of Divine Justice: which includes also their being left to sin; for the forest piece of Divine vengeance is mens being given up to their own hearts lusts.

Rom. 9. 21, 22. Adde hereto *Rom.* 9. 21, 22. *Hath not the potter power over the clay*, &c? Here *Paul* refutes the proud Pelagian blasphemies by an argument taken from Gods absolute Dominion and Soverantie over his creature. As if he had said: Has not the Potter an absolute dominion over the clay, to forme it into what shape he please? and shal we not allow the great Creator of althings the same absolute dominion? Did he not make althings? and therefore may he not assume the Prerogative of ordering althings to the ends for which they were made? As he gives to every creature what shape he please, so cannot he appoint them to what end he please, and direct them infallibly to that end? Is it not an end sufficient for the being of any creature, to be the glorie of any Attribute? and therefore if God make a creature to be a vessel of wrath fitted to destruction, is there any injurie done to the creature? The Pythagoreans have an effate, *That* τὸ χεῖρον ἕνεκα τοῦ βελτίονος, *the worse is made for the service of the better*, which holds most true here of the vessels of wrath or wicked men, who are made for the better, *i.e.* their Makers glorie, as *Prov.* 16. 4. Thus *Paul* concludes, *vers.* 22. *Vessels of wrath fitted to destruction*, κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν· καταρτίζω, signifies primarily *aptly to fit*, *frame*, or *set together*: thence, *to ordain*, *decree*, or *constitute*. Whence among the LXX. it answers to כון, *to found*, as *Psal.* 8. 2. *Out of the mouths of babes he hath founded* or *ordained praise*: also to מן, *to ordain*, *decree*, *establish*, as *Psal.* 67. 10. & 73. 17. Thus it signifies here, namely Gods eternal ordination or absolute Decree of Reprobation founded on his absolute Soveraintie. Observe here the difference between the *vessels of mercie*, and *the vessels of wrath*:

wrath: of the former he ſpeakes actively, *verſ.* 23. *That he might make known the riches of his glorie on the veſſels of mercy, which he had prepared unto glorie*; but of the later he ſpeakes only paſſively, *verſ.* 22. *fitted to deſtruction*. The reaſon of this difference ſeems this: The *veſſels of mercie* are wholly from God, both as veſſels, and as veſſels of mercie; they receive from God both their *naturall good of being*, and their *moral good of grace, well-being*, and *happineſſe*: but now the *veſſels of wrath* are ſuch partly from God, and partly from themſelves: That they are veſſels, and veſſels of wrath ordained to deſtruction, they are from God; but that they are veſſels deſerving wrath, this they are from themſelves: their ſins and puniſhment *morally* conſidered are from themſelves; but conſider them *entitatively* and *penally*, and ſo they are from God. I am not ignorant of the many falſe and Pelagian gloſſes which are affixed to this Text, without ſhadow of reaſon.

Another Text that evidently demonſtrates Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe in ordering mens ſins for his own glorie is, 1 *Pet.* 2. 8. *And a ſtone of ſtumbling, and a rock of offence,* 1 Pet. 2. 8. *even to them that ſtumble at the word, being diſobedient, whereunto alſo they were appointed.* This Text is taken partly from *Eſa.* 8. 14. Here Chriſt the chief Corner-ſtone of the Church, is ſaid to be *a ſtone of ſtumbling and rock of offence* to wilful unbelievers. The Greek λίθος προσκόμματος καὶ πέτρα σκανδάλου are *ſynonymous*, and of the ſame import here; though σκάνδαλον be in its general notion more extenſive: It notes originally *any thing that may offend the foot*, or *other part*, from σκάω, *to halt*, or from σκαμβὸς, *diſtorted*: more particularly, it ſignifies (1) that *tigillum*, or *croſſe piece of wood in your traps* for Mice, Foxes, or the like: (2) a *ſharp ſtake*, whereby the foot is hurt: and ſo it is the ſame with σκῶλον, interpreted by *Heſychius* ξύλον ὀξυμμένον: and ſo σκάνδαλον is by him made to be the ſame with ἐμπόδισμὸς, *an impediment*: it was called alſo by the Greeks πάσσαλος, denoting a military inſtrument, like a ſharp ſtake, whereby they annoyed their enemies: in which ſenſe the word σκάνδαλον is uſed in that Apocryphous book, *Judith* 5. 1. καὶ ἔθηκαν ἐν τοῖς πυλῶσι σκάνδαλα. (4) *A ſtone that offends the foot*: and ſo it anſwers with the LXX. to מכשול, *Lev.* 19. 14. in which regard it is made ſynonymous to πρόσκομμα, both by *Peter*; and *Rom.* 14. 13. by *Paul*: and this they both denote here, 1 *Pet.* 2. 8. the great offence which ſinners took at Chriſt, to their own ruine. Whence it's added: *Whereunto alſo*

they

they were appointed, ἐτέθησαν. What doth this note? why take *Grotius*'s Note on this Text, who was no friend to Calviniſts: 'Unto this, ſaith he, Unbelievers were deſtined by God, that 'they might moſt grievouſly fal—— For ἐτέθησαν, which anſwers 'to שׂוּם, oft ſignifies *to ordain*, *deſtine*, or *decree*, as *Joh.* 15. 16. 'So ἔθετο εἰς ὀργὴν, 1 *Theſ.* 5. 9. The Syriac in this place ren-'ders it טִימִין, *they were deſigned*; the Arabic נצבוא, *they were con-'ſtituted*, namely by the Divine Decree. Thus *Grotius*, who here ſpeakes like a Calviniſt, though generally no friend to the ſentiments of *Calvin*. The like 2 *Pet.* 2. 11. *As natural brute beſtes, made to be taken and deſtroyed.* Is not abſolute Reprobation here, and that by the conceſſion of *Grotius*, no friend thereto, clearly and fully aſſerted? And if Reprobation be abſolute, muſt not alſo Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin be efficacious and predeterminative? The immutable connexion between abſolute Reprobation and predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful we intend to demonſtrate hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 3.

But a reverend Divine of name among us anſwers to this Text thus: *Reſp.* 1. 'This [1 *Pet.* 2. 8. *whereunto alſo they were appointed*] 'hath reſpect to *Luke* 2. 34.— And no more can be hence gathe-'red, but that God hath decreed, that as a puniſhing Judge, (1) 'he wil leave the rejecters of Chriſt to go on in their own ſinful 'way; (2) and that their oppoſition to him ſhal be their ruine: 'So that [1] he doth not ſpeak this of any but the rejecters of 'Chriſt, that deſerved it. [2] He ſpeaketh not at al as *willing* 'their ſin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace. '[3] But the thing that he is ſaid *to ordain* them to, is not ſin, 'but ruine the conſequent of their ſin: The word [*ſtumbling and* '*falling*] ſignifying their *deſtruction*. Thus that reverend Divine.

And now let us a little examine this his Reſponſe to our Argument from this Text, which wil ſerve for a replie to moſt of his ſubterfuges. (1) In anſwer to his firſt particular, we aſſert, that more may be gathered from this Text, than what he allows, namely, *That God hath decreed, that, as a puniſhing Judge, he wil leave the rejecters of Chriſt to go on in their own ſinful way.* For he himſelf grants, (which cannot be denied) *That they were appointed to ſtumble on the rock of offence:* And if ſo, then ſurely they were deſtined or appointed to the entitative act of ſin: for ſtumbling doth not only implie their *deſtruction*, as he inſinuates, but alſo their

their *ſin*. Whence, (2) there is ſomething more alſo implied, *than that their oppoſition to him ſhal be their ruine*. For it's expreſſely ſaid, *That they were appointed*, not only to their ruine, but alſo *to their ſtumbling at the word, and being diſobedient*, which notes the Decree of Reprobation to be abſolute and poſitive; yea predeterminative of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. (3) Whereas he ſaith, *That he ſpeakes not at al as willing their ſin, but only as one that penally denieth them further grace*, this ſeems alſo againſt the expreſſe mind of the Text, which ſaith, *They were appointed*, ἐτέθησαν, *i. e.* according to *Grotius*, *they were ordained, deſtined*, or *decreed to ſtumble at the word*, &c. This certainly denotes more than Gods penal denial of further grace. (4) Whereas he ſaith, *That the thing that he is ſaid to ordain them unto, is not ſin, but ruine, the conſequent of their ſin, the word* [*ſtumbling and falling*] *ſignifying their deſtruction*, it ſeems contradictory to the letter and mind of the words: for both πρόσκομμα and σκάνδαλον ſignifie, according to our precedent explication of them, primarily their ſin, and then their ruine or deſtruction, as the conſequent of their ſin. This alſo is evident from that parallel Text, *Jude* 4. *For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were of old ordained to this condemnation, ungodly men turning the grace of God into laſciviouſneſſe, and denying the only Lord God.* Theſe ungodly men are ſaid to be προγεγραμμένοι, *deſigned*, and as it were before written in the book of Gods predetermination, to be given up to *this condemnation*, *of turning the grace of God into laſciviouſneſſe*, &c. So that it is evident, that God foreordained and decreed, not only their deſtruction, but to leave them to thoſe ſins, which ſhould cauſe the ſame. Jude 4.

But to ſum up the whole of this Head, we grant, (1) That abſolute Reprobation is not the cauſe either of mens ſins, or damnation. It's true, elective Grace is the cauſe of faith and ſalvation, but the Decree of Reprobation is not the cauſe of ſin or damnation. (2) That Reprobation withdraws not any power from the perſon reprobated. Yet we denie, [1] That it is injuſt for God, by an abſolute, efficacious Decree, to reprobate ſome, for the glorifying of his own Juſtice: For albeit the Decree of Reprobation be not an act of juſtice, yet it is not injuſt for God to reprobate any. [2] We denie alſo, that there is any motive, cauſe, or condition of Reprobation, as it regards the act of the Divine wil. Whence alſo [3] we denie, that the act of Reprobation is

merely negative; but affirme, that it is *positive* and *absolute*; of which see *Davenant Dissert. de Elect. & Reprobat.* p. 113. Hence, [4] It necessarily follows, that when God predestines and preordains any unto Damnation, he predestines and preordains in like manner, by an efficacious act of his own soverain Wil, to leave men to their own sinful courses, and efficaciously to concur to the substrate mater of those sins. See more *Chap.* 5. §. 3.

CHAP. IV.

An Historic Idea of Predeterminants and Anti-predeterminants.

The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin; (1) *Fathers*, Augustin, Prosper, Fulgentius. (2) *Such as succeeded in the Roman Church*, Hugo de Sancto Victore, Aquinas, Scotus, Ariminensis, Holcot, Altisiodorensis: Bradwardine, *his Conversion, Parts, both natural and acquired, zele for Efficacious Predeterminative Concurse, particularly as to the substrate mater of Sin: How God wils Sin: How the entitative act is from Gods predeterminative Concurse: How God spontaneously impels or necessitates men to the entitative act of Sin. The* Dominicans, *and particularly* Alvarez *sentiments conforme to our Hypothesis. The concurrent perswasions of* Jansenius *and his Sectators: also of the* Tridentine *Catechisme.* (3) *The Sentiments of Reformed Divines*, Wiclef, Calvin, Zuinglius, Beza, Chamier, Lud. Crocius, *the Synod of* Dort, *and Church of* England, Davenant, Sam. Ward, *&c.* (4) *Such as denie Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin, more ancient:* Durandus, *his proper Hypothesis, and who may be accounted his Sectators*; Lud. à dola *his proper Sentiments and designe:* Arminius, *and his Adherents, the Remonstrants and Anabaptistes. The New Methodistes,* Camero, Amyraldus, Placeus, Le Blanc, Baronius, Strangius. *How these New Methodistes fel into these Sentiments, and who may be estimed such.*

The Assertors of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin.

§. 1. HAving given a Scriptural Demonstration of our Hypothesis, *touching the efficacious, predeterminative Concurse of God to the substrate mater or entitative act of that which is sinful*, we now procede to lay down the concurrent sentiments of Anti-pelagians.

pelagians in al Ages of the Church; and withal to ſhew who have in al Ages defended the Antitheſis of our Adverſaries. Firſt, among the Patrons of our Hypotheſis none deſerves a more illuſtrious name and mention than *Auguſtin*, that great Propugnator or Champion of efficacious Concurſe. I am not ignorant that ſome of our Adverſaries, as *Strangius* by name, are ſo confident as to cite *Auguſtin*'s teſtimonie in defenſe of their Antitheſis; but this is too palpable an abuſe to find place among the indifferent or impartial Sectators of *Auguſtin*; whoſe ſentiments touching this ſubject are ſufficiently evident in his Works. Thus, *de Grat. & Lib. Arbitr.* cap. 20. *If the Scripture*, ſaith he, *be diligently inſpected, it wil appear, that not only the good wils of men, but alſo the bad, are ſo in Gods power, that he can incline them where and when he wil, to performe his benefices, or to inflict his puniſhments, by his moſt ſecret, yet moſt juſt judgement.* Again, in the ſame book, he ſaith, *That God workes in the hearts of men, to incline them which way he pleaſe, either to Good, out of his Mercie, or to evil according to their deſerts, by his Judgement, ſometimes open, ſometimes ſecret, but always juſt.* So De Prædeſtinat. Sanct. c. 16. *It is* (ſaith he) *in the power of wicked men to ſin; but that by ſinning malitioſely they do this or that, is not in their power, but of God dividing the darkneſs, and ordering it; that ſo hence what they do againſt the wil of God, might not be fulfilled but by the wil of God.* Again, *De Gen. ad literam lib. imperfecto*, c. 5. *Some things*, ſaith he, *God makes and orders, other things he only orders; righteous men he makes and orders, but ſinners, as ſinners, he makes not, but only orders*, i. e. In good actions he is both the cauſe of the good, and of the action, but in ſinful acts he is not the cauſe of the ſin, but only of the act ordering it for his glorie. Again, *De Civitate Dei*, l. 13. c. 22. he ſaith, *That Sin as it is juſtly permitted by God, falls under the Eternal Law*, that is, the Divine Wil or Decree. Moreover, *Auguſtin* frequently aſſerts, *that God puniſheth one ſin by giving men up to another:* So *Contra Julian.* l. 5. c. 3. *& de Civitate Dei*, l. 15. c. 6. *& libro de Natura & Gratia*, from *cap.* 20. to the end. To theſe Teſtimonies we may adde ſeveral Hypotheſes of *Auguſtin*, which demonſtratively evince Gods Predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. As, (1) He aſſerted, *that Reprobation was the act of Gods abſolute Wil, and ſo in it ſelf poſitive and abſolute.* (2) He held, *That Excecation and Obduration is the conſequent of Reprobation:* of which ſee *Janſenius, Auguſt.* *Auguſtin.*

de Grat. Christ. l. 10. c. 3, 4. (3) He maintained, *That al sins in lapsed Nature are necessary, because punishments*, as *Jansen. de Nat. Lap.* c. 22. p. 264. Lastly, that *Augustin* held Gods Efficacious predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin, is evident from the false Imputations charged on him by the Pelagians, who imputed to him the same odiose and forged consequences, which have been ever since imputed to the Assertors of *Predeterminative Concurse*. As, [1] They falsely charged on him, *that he asserted a fatal Necessitie, and said, that God compelled men to sin.* Whereas *Augustin*, l. 1. q. 2. *ad Simpl.* answers (in the same manner as we now adays) *That God is said to harden some Sinners, in that he has not mercie on them, not that he impels them to sin*, &c. [2] The Pelagians charged on *Augustin, That he denied to sinners the Libertie of their Wil*, &c. It's true, when he discourseth of *Moral Libertie*, consisting in Adherence unto God, he denieth, that sinners have any such Libertie; but yet he fully asserts a *Natural Libertie*, that which is essential to the wil, to belong to al sinners, of which see *Jansenius, August. Tom.* 3. *l.* 7. *c.* 12. *p.* 330. To conclude, there is scarce any imputation falsely charged on those that assert predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin now a-days, but it was also imputed to *Augustin* by the Pelagians of old, and wiped off by him, as by us, which sufficiently demonstrates, that his Sentiments were as to this Hypothesis the same with ours. He that wil see more of *Augustins* mind about this mater, may consult *Rutherford, de Providentia*, cap. 30. *Chamier, Panstrat.* Tom. 2. Lib. 3. c. 8.

Si ergo servi sunt peccati, quid se jactant de libero arbitrio? *August. libr. de Spirit. & lit. c.* 30.

Next to *Augustin* follow his Sectators and Disciples, *Prosper* and *Fulgentius*, whom our Adversaries would fain make to be of their persuasion, but without shadow of Truth or Reason. As for the sentiments of *Prosper* touching our Hypothesis, they are to be seen, *ad capitula Gallorum*, where, following *Augustin*, he makes *God to wil sin as the punishment of sin.* So *Fulgentius*, l. 1. *ad Monimum*, c. 26. *God, albeit he be not the Author of evil cogitations, yet he is the Ordinator of evil Wils: neither doth he cease to work good out of the evil work of every evil man: neither in the very injust works of the Wil, doth he relinquish the just order of his own works; because this he hath in that very order, that he doth justly desert the evil Wil — and in the very injust wil of the sinner, he fulfils his own Justice*, &c. What could be said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? Is God *the Ordinator of evil Wils?* doth he not then efficaciously

Prosper and *Fulgentius.*

efficaciouſly, yea predeterminatively move and order them in their very evil acts? And *doth he not ceaſe to worke good out of their evil workes?* Muſt he not then applie their wils to the entitative act of thoſe evil workes? And what is this but to predetermine their wils to the ſubſtrate mater of thoſe evil workes? Again, if God, *in the very injuſt workes of the Wil doth not relinquiſh the juſt order of his workes*, then ſurely he muſt of neceſſitie applie and predetermine the wil of the Sinner to the entitative act of the worke, thereby to maintain his own juſt order.

Such as ſucceeded the Fathers.

§. 2. We now paſſe on to ſuch as ſucceded the Fathers, and albeit they lived in the boſome of the *Roman* Church, yet they ſtil defended the Doctrine of *Auguſtin* and our Hypotheſis, as to *Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin.* I ſhal begin with *Anſelme*, Biſhop of *Canterburie*, who flouriſhed about the year 1095, an *Italian* by Nation, Monke by profeſſion, of a moſt acute Ingenie, devotional Sanctitie, conjoined with great Prudence and Humilitie, according to the character given him by *Baronius*. This *Anſelme, de Concord. Præſcientiæ, Prædeſtinationis, Gratiæ & Liberi Arbitrii*, c. 1. thus ſpeaketh: *God worketh althings, which are wrought by a juſt or injuſt Wil*, i. e. *both good and evil workes*; *In good workes truely he cauſeth both that they are, and that they are good*; *but in evil workes he cauſeth that they are, but not that they are evil.* Herein he gives us the difference between Gods Concurſe to good and evil acts, as alſo the demonſtration of our Hypotheſis; for if God cauſeth evil acts that they are, then certainly he efficaciouſly moves and applies the wil to the act, which is al that we mean by Predetermination.

Anſelme.

Next follows *Hugo de Sancto Victore*, by Nation a *Saxon*, (and ſo allied to us,) by profeſſion a Monk, contemporary with *Bernard*, who flouriſhed about the year 1130. This *Hugo, de Sacr. Fid. l.* 1. *c.* 13. ſaith, **That God wils there ſhould be evil, and yet he doth not wil evil: He wils there ſhould be evil, becauſe it's good there ſhould be evil*; *but he wils not evil, becauſe evil it ſelf is not good.* An excellent deſcription of Gods predeterminative wil and concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, ſo as to vindicate his Sacred Majeſtie from any hand in the moral vitioſitie thereof. (1) *God wils there ſhould be evil*, i. e. he doth, by an omnipotent efficacious decree, wil the exiſtence of evil, in willing the ſubſtrate mater thereof: and yet (2) *He doth not wil evil*, i. e. he doth

Hugo de Sancto Victore.

* Malum eſſe vult Deus, & tamen malum non vult: vult eſſe malum, quia bonum eſt malum eſſe; non vult ipſum malum, quia bonum non eſt ipſum malum.

doth not with a wil of approbation or any way morally wil evil as to its moral vitiositie or formal reason. (3) *It's good there should be evil, i. e.* as it conduceth to the illustration of Gods glorie; and so God wils it. But (4) *evil itself*, [morally considered as evil] *is not good*, and therefore not willed by God as such. The same *Hugo, de Sacramentis, par. 5. cap. 29.* affirmes, *That God by presiding over evil wils, doth, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil.* What could more expressely be said for the asserting Gods efficacious predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin? Doth God indeed preside over the evil wils of men, and so, by an occult and invisible operation, temper and incline them to his own wil? how is it possible then, but that he applie and determine them to the entitative act of their sinful workes? And whereas *Hugo* foresaw many would be then, as now also, scandalised at this doctrine, touching Gods efficacious concurse to the substrate mater of sin, he addes this as the reason of the offense: *Not because that which is spoken is not wel spoken, but because that which is wel spoken is not wel understood.* I wish our Adversaries would wel consider this prophetic reflexion of *Hugo*; of which more hereafter in *Bradwardines* sentiments.

Deum malas voluntates præsidendo, occultâ & invisibili operatione ad suum arbitrium temperare & inclinare.

Aquinas. We passe on to *Thomas Aquinas*, whom some of our Adversaries would fain conjure into their Campe, and make a Patrone of their Antithesis: but this is so great an imposition on the intelligent world, that I cannot but admire at the confidence of those who make use of it. Yet this has been the attempt not only of some lesse conversant in *Aquinas*'s Workes, but even of learned *Strangius*, who is oft more candid and ingenuous than others of his persuasion. Thus *Strangius, lib. 2. cap. 14.* from *pag.* 313. to 317. endeavors to demonstrate, *That* Thomas *doth not admit that physic predetermination of God to al and singular actions of the wil:* The like a reverend Divine of estime among our selves would fain persuade us, namely, *That albeit the Dominicans are for such an universal predetermination, yet* Aquinas *is not*, &c. But let us a little examine the reason of this subterfuge: (1) Was not *Thomas Aquinas* himself a Dominican, of the Order of *Dominic?* And are not al the Dominicans sworne *Thomists?* Albeit they are in regard of their Order Dominicans, yet are they not al in regard of their Doctrine Thomists? How comes it to passe then that they should contend so hotly for physic predetermination of the wil by God in al its natural actions, even such as are sinful, and yet *Thomas*

mas their Maſter againſt it? (2) Take the character of impartial Writers, and who ever denied this to be *Aquinas*'s ſentiment? See learned and acute Dr. *Samuel Ward*, Profeſſor of Theologie at *Cambridge*, his Determinations, *pag.* 117, 118. where he proves Gods predeterminative Concurſe to al actions of the wil out of *Thomas*. But becauſe Dr. *Ward* ſeems to be our friend, we ſhal appele unto our Adverſaries for the deciſion of this Controverſie, namely to *Le Blanc* and *Baronius*. *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par.* 3. *theſ.* 10. *pag.* 430. aſſures us, *That* Thomas *and his ſectators the Dominicans, teach, for the explication of Divine Concurſe— That God doth premove and applie the very ſecond cauſes to their worke: for this the dependence of the ſecond cauſes on God their firſt Mover doth require. For, according to their mind, God is therefore ſaid to be the firſt Mover, becauſe he doth antecedently move and applie al other cauſes to their operations*, &c. What could be ſaid more evidently to explicate *Aquinas*'s mind herein? Thus alſo *Baronius*, who, in his *Metaphyſics, Sect.* 8. *Diſp.* 3. §. 78. *pag.* 146. imputes this celebrious Opinion *of Gods previous predeterminative concurſe to al actions* unto *Thomas Aquinas*, as the principal Founder thereof. So §. 79. *pag.* 147. And §. 82. *pag.* 149. he urgeth, *That from the opinion of* Thomas *it follows, that God is the Author of ſin.* The like §. 85. *pag.* 151. But (3) to let paſſe the teſtimonies of others, if we may be allowed the privilege of believing our own ſenſes, and the reflexions of our own reaſon thereon, it is to me moſt evident, that *Aquinas* has copioſely and nervoſely defended our Hypotheſis, and impugned the Antitheſis of our Adverſaries. Thus, 1. 2. *Queſt.* 79. *Art.* 2. *The act of ſin is both* Ens *and Act, and in both regards it is from God: for it's neceſſary that every* Ens *or Being be derived from the firſt Being*, &c. And whereas *Strangius* and a reverend Divine among our ſelves pretend, *that this includes immediate concurſe, but not predeterminative*, it is moſt evident, that *Aquinas* owned no concurſe but what was predeterminative: For what is *predetermination of the wil, but the application of it to its act*, as *Strangius, pag.* 244. grants? And is not this the proper notion whereby *Aquinas* deſcribeth the Concurſe of God to al acts of the wil? What more commun with him, than this grand Eſſate, *That God applies al ſecond cauſes to their act?* Thus in his ſums, *par.* 1. *Quaſt.* 105. *Art.* 5. he layes down this concluſion, *That God actes in every Agent finally, effectively, and formally, yet ſo as they alſo act.* And then in the explication hereof he

Prædeterminare voluntatem eſt applicare voluntatem ad agendum, & facere ut faciat, *Strang. l.* 2. *c.* 11. *p.* 244.

he saith, '(3) That it is to be considered, that God doth not 'only move things to work, as by applying the formes and vir- 'tues of things to their operations, (as also the Artificer applies 'the axe to cut, who yet sometimes gives not the forme to the 'axe) but also gives formes to creatures acting, and preserves 'them in being— and because the forme is in the thing,— and 'God is properly the cause of the universal Being in althings, 'which among althings is more intime, it follows, that God 'workes intimely in althings; and for this reason in sacred Scri- 'pture, the operations of nature are ascribed unto God, as work- 'ing in nature, according to that, *Job* 10. 11. *With skin and with 'flesh hast thou clothed me*, &c. What could have been said more evidently to demonstrate our Hypothesis? He saith, (1) *That God actes in every Agent, not only finally and effectively, but also formally.* (2) *That God moves things to worke, by APPLYING* (*i.e.* predetermining) *the formes and virtues of things to their operations.* Yea, (3) *That God applies the second cause to act, as the Artificer applies the instrument to worke.* Whereby he makes al second causes, the wil not excepted, but a kind of instrument of Gods principal efficience: For the wil, albeit it may be termed a principal cause of most of its acts, yet in regard of the Divine concurse, which it receives, and in virtue whereof it actes, it may safely be termed a vital Instrument. (4) *That God acting most intimely in althings, the very operations of nature are ascribed unto him*, which notes predetermination in the highest point. So also *Aquinas*, *Quæst. Disp. q.* 3. *de Potentia, art.* 7. speakes fully of this *predeterminative application of al second causes by God.* And indeed how frequently is this Hypothesis demonstrated by him? So that I cannot but wonder, that any learned man should urge *Aquinas*'s testimonie against us.

Scotus. We descend now to *Scotus*, (the Head of a Sect opposite to the Thomists, yet) who hath given evident and strong confirmation and demonstration to our Hypothesis. I am not ignorant, that a learned and pious Divine makes use also of *Scotus*'s name to patronise his Antithesis: and I shal not denie, but that *Scotus* has in many points too much favored the Pelagian interest, which has inclined the Jesuites to follow him rather than *Thomas*; yet this I no way dout but to make good, that as to our Hypothesis, *touching Gods predeterminative concurse to the substrate mater of sin, Scotus* is fully of our persuasion. This wil appear evident, (1) if we consider

conſider his notion of *Divine Preſcience* of things future, which he makes to ariſe from the Divine Decree giving futurition to them, as *Le Blanc, de Præſcient. theſ.* 33. *pag.* 443. confeſſeth. And certainly ſuch as hold Gods preſcience of ſins future to be from his own Decree efficaciouſly determining their futurition, cannot with any ſhadow of reaſon denie Gods predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. (2) *Scotus* and his ſectators generally hold, *That God efficaciouſly concurs to al ſecond cauſes and their acts, not by any influence or impreſſion on the ſecond cauſe, (which the Thomiſts aſſert) but by his abſolute and efficacious Decree applying and determining the ſecond cauſe to act.* Which we judge to be the very truth, as it hath been demonſtrated by us, *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *c.* 7. §. 3. So that the Thomiſts and Scotiſts differ not really as to the point of predetermination, but only as to its origine and principe; the Thomiſts making it to conſiſte in a phyſic intrinſec influxe impreſſed on the creature, and the Scotiſts placing the whole of it in the volition of God, without any force impreſſed on the ſecond cauſe, as our Country-man *Compt. Carleton*, in his Philoſophie, *Diſp.* 30. *Sect.* 1. *pag.* 327. has incomparably wel ſtated it. But (3) *Scotus*, in 4. *Sentent. Diſtinct.* 49. *Queſt.* 6. §. 14. *pag.* 522. (*edit.* 1620.) has theſe very words: *Eſt contra naturam ejus,* [ſcil. voluntatis] *determinari à cauſa inferiori, quia tunc ipſa non eſſet ſuperior: non eſt autem contra naturam ejus determinari à cauſa ſuperiori, quia cum hoc ſtat, quòd ſit cauſa in ſuo ordine, It's againſt its nature,* [namely the wils] *to be determined by an inferior cauſe, becauſe then it ſhould not be ſuperior; but it is not againſt its nature to be determined by a ſuperior cauſe, becauſe it is conſiſtent herewith, that it be a cauſe in its own order.* Wherein *Scotus* doth moſt acutely, though briefly, ſtate the Controverſie about *Predetermination* both negatively and poſitively. (1) Negatively, *That the wil cannot be determined,* or *predetermined, by any inferior cauſe; becauſe then it were not ſuperior:* for whatever cauſe predetermines another to act, is ſo far ſuperior to it: it being impoſſible, yea a contradiction, that the inferior ſhould predetermine the ſuperior. (2) Poſitively, *That it is not againſt the nature of the wil to be predetermined by a ſuperior cauſe, i. e.* by God the firſt cauſe, who gave it being, and therefore may without violence to its libertie determine or predetermine it in its operation: and *Scotus*'s reaſon is invincible; *becauſe to be predetermined by a ſuperior cauſe, is very wel conſiſtent with the wils being a cauſe in its own order:* Yea, we

Scotiſtæ nihil hujuſmodi phyſicum & intrinſecum creaturæ inditum eſſe volunt, ſed eam dicunt per decretum Dei extrinſecum, abſolutum, & efficax ad agendum applicari, ac determinari, *Carleton. Philoſ. Diſp.* 30. *ſect.* 1. *pag.* 327.

may raise this reason to a greater height, therefore the wil is a cause in its own order, *i. e.* a particular, proper, principal, or lesse principal cause, according to the nature of its causalitie and effect, because it is predetermined to act by God the superior first Cause: so that Gods predeterminative concurse to the actions of the wil, even such as have sin appendent to them, is, according to *Scotus*'s sentiments, so far from infringing or diminishing the wils natural order and libertie in acting, as that it corroborates and confirmes the same. (4) Lastly, *Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist. 37. q. 2.* saith expressely, 'That [albeit God determine the wil to the material act 'which is sinful, yet] the vitiositie of sin is not to be attributed to 'God, but to the create wil, because the create wil is under an 'essential obligation to give rectitude to the action; but God is 'not bound by any such obligation, *&c.* Which is the same with the sentiments of *Zuinglius* and our reformed Divines, albeit opposed by the new Methodists, as wel as Arminians and Molinists.

Gregorius Ariminensis.

Having laid down the concurrent testimonies of the two principal Heads of the Scholes, *Thomas* and *Scotus*, we now passe on to their sectators, whereof we shal give the mention but of a few more illustrious. To begin with *Gregorius Ariminensis*, who was by profession a Dominican, and great defendent of *Augustin*'s Doctrine; whom Bishop *Usher* valued as the *soundest* of the Schole-men, and Dr. *Barlow*, as the *acutest*: His invict demonstration of our Hypothesis we find, in *Sent. 2. Distinct. 34. Art. 3.* where he demonstrates Gods *immediate efficience in producing the emitative act of sin thus:* '(1) Every evil act when produced is 'conserved by God. *Ergo.* The antecedent he proves thus: be-'cause otherwise every evil act should not in its existence imme-'diately depend on God, but be independent; and so by stronger 'reason, the wil itself, which is more perfect than its act, should 'be independent. Again, if it be not repugnant to the Divine 'Bonitie to conserve the evil act, neither is it repugnant to it to 'produce the same. (2) The wil is of itself indifferent to any 'act, therefore it must be determined to every act by God. (3) 'If God be not the immediate cause of the act, which is evil, he 'is not the Maker of al Beings. (4) Al good that is not God, 'is from God as the Efficient thereof; but the act morally evil is 'yet naturally good. *Ergo.* Hence he procedes to answer the

Object. 1.

Objections of his and our Adversaries thus: '(1) *If God produce*

'*the*

'*the ſame evil act, which man produceth, then he ſins as man ſins.*
'Whereto he anſwers, by denying the conſequence, and that on
'this reaſon; becauſe man doth not therefore preciſely ſin, be-
'cauſe he doth an evil act, as it is *Ens* or *act*; but therefore he
'ſins, becauſe he doth it *evilly*, *i. e.* againſt right reaſon; [or the
'Law of God] but now God produceth the ſame act according to
'right reaſon, and therefore wel. So the ſame man borne in
'fornication, is produced by God wel, but by the fornicator evil-
'ly. But (2) it is farther objected by his Adverſaries then, as
by ours now, thus: *Thou wilt ſay, that thoſe things that are*, per *Object. 2.*
ſe, *in themſelves* [*or intrinſecally*] *evil, as the hatred of God, or the
like, can never be wel done: therefore neither by God.* 'I reſponde,
'ſaith he, (as we) that there is or can be no entitie which may
'not be wel done, albeit not by every Agent: *e.g. man envieth*;
'but God, although he produce the ſame act of envie with man,
'yet he doth not envie. For al ſuch acts, beyond the ſimple pro-
'duction or motion of ſuch or ſuch a thing, do connote ſome-
'thing on the part of the Author, who is ſo denominated, which
'agrees not to God: So *to ſteal*, beſides the ſimple tranſlation of
'the thing from place to place, connotes the thing ſtolne not to
'belong to him that tranſlated it: but God tranſlating the ſame
'thing, doth not tranſlate what is not his own; and therefore is
'not ſaid to be the thief, *&c.* But here we are to note, that
whereas *Gregorius Ariminenſis* makes God to be a *partial cauſe* of
ſin, it is not to be underſtood, as if God were the *partial* cauſe of
the entitative act, for ſo he makes God to be a *total* cauſe; but he
cals God a *partial* cauſe of ſin, as he produceth only the entitative
act, not the vitioſitie, whereof man only is the moral cauſe. Thus
alſo *Holcot*, our Country-man, *ſuper Sentent. lib. 2. Diſt. 1. q. 1.* *Holcot.*
makes God to be a *partial cauſe of ſin, yet not the Author of it:*
whereby he plainly means, as he explicates himſelf, that God is
the phyſical cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater, or entitative act only,
but man the moral cauſe of the vitioſitie alſo. This I mention,
becauſe a reverend Divine of name among us from theſe expreſſi-
ons of *Ariminenſis* and *Holcot*, would perſuade us, that they make
God the partial cauſe of the entitative act. We might adde to
theſe the teſtimonies of *Altiſſiodorenſis, in Sent. 2.* where he proves *Altiſſiodorenſis.*
by ſtrong arguments, namely from the Paſſion of Chriſt, *&c. That
the evil action is from God operating and cooperating with the human
wil*; of which more in what follows touching *Bradwardine.*

Thomas Bradwardine *his character and zele for efficacious Grace.*

I now come to *Thomas Bradwardine*, our pious, learned and profound *Bradwardine*, whom, might I be allowed my libertie, I should rather reckon among our first Reformers, than among the Sons of Antichrist; for indeed he was a zelose Patron of, and stout Champion for the fundamental points of the Reformed Religion, specially efficacious free Grace, which he with so much courage, strength of argument, and flaming zele defended against the Pelagians of those days. This *Thomas Bradwardine*, borne at *Hartfield* in *Sussex*, flourished about the year 1350. He was a person of prodigiose natural ingenie, which he greatly polisht by al manner of acquired Sciences, specially the Mathematics and scholastic Theologie. He was a great Affecter and Admirer of metaphysic Contemplations, which in his first studies he greedily drank in, even to the neglect of the holy Scriptures, because they savored not of a metaphysic style, as he himself informes us, in his Book *de Causa Dei*. *When*, saith he, *in the state of my unregeneracie, I came into the Scholes, and heard Lectures on* Pauls *Epistles of free Grace*, &c. *it did no way relish with me, quia non sapit stylum metaphysicum, because it savored not of a metaphysic style. It was with me, as it was with* Augustin *of old, nothing would please but scholastic discourses for free wil*, &c. But after his Conversion he was, as another *Augustin*, the greatest Champion for free efficacious Grace. *Balæus*, *de Script. Brit. cent.* 5. *cap.* 87. tels us, 'That 'John Baconthorp, that famose Divine and English-man, returning 'from *Paris* had a great contest with *Bradwardine* about the 'points of Gods Prescience and Predestination; to whom at 'last *Bradwardine* assents in al those points; as the same *Baconthorp* declares, *in Sent. lib.* 4. *Dist.* 1. *q.* 4. Afterwards he was called to be Confessor to King *Edward* III. and thence made Archbishop of *Canterbury*, without any desire of his own thereto. He was indeed a good Mathematician, a great Philosopher, and excellent Divine, being communly stiled *Doctor profundus*, *the profound Doctor*.

His zele for efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin.

Neither was he lesse renowned for his Pietie and Zele in the Cause of God, against the Pelagians, which he defended with great fervor, as wel as acumen of spirit; which also is greatly illustrious in his defence of *Gods efficacious Concurse and Providence about the substrate mater of sinful acts*. This he frequently inculcates in his most excellent Book *de Causa Dei*, specially *lib.* 1. *c.* 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. He demonstrates (1) *That al voluntary actions*

are

are governed by the Laws of Divine Providence, cap. 30, 31. p. 271, &c. (2) *That all things which have any natural Entitie or Being, procede from Gods Providence actually and efficaciously disposing them, and not merely permitting.* Which he demonstrates many ways: as [1] *Because there is no act simply evil and inordinate, by any inordination precedent to the divine wil.* [2] *Because otherwise the whole Universe would not be disposed in the best manner.* [3] *Because the Scriptures both of Old and New Testaments, ascribe to God in his Providence about Sin active Names.* Thus cap. 32. p. 288. (3) *That about whatever Gods Permission is, his actual Volition is also employed about the same.* And he gives this demonstrative reason hereof: *For albeit those things that are evil as evil are not good, yet it is good that there should be not only good things, but also evil. For unless it were good that evils be, the Omnipotent good would not suffer them to be*, as Cap. 33.

Hence, (4) He comes *l.* 34. to the state of the controversie, *How God wils sin, and how he wils it not.* [1] He proves, *p.* 294, 295. *That God must necessarily wil the existence of Sin, because he permits it: also God doth voluntarily provide for, yea act al the voluntary acts of the wil both good and evil, with al their positive circumstances, which necessarily import sin.* Again, 'This Proposition, '*Sin is*, is true; and therefore there must be some cause of its 'truth, which can be no other than the divine wil, from which 'al complexe beings as wel as incomplexe have their origination. Again, 'Whatever is good must procede from the first 'good: but that Sin existe, is good, according to *Augustin.* So '*Hugo* saith, *That God wils that sins existe, because this is good.* 'Moreover, he brings in *Hugo* speaking thus; (which deserves 'a great remarque) *If it be said, God wils sin, this seems harsh and 'scandalous to the ear; and therefore some pious mind doth refute 'this, not because that which is spoken, is il spoken, but because that 'which is wel spoken is il understood.* [2] Thence *Bradwardine* procedes to refute *Lombard*, who asserts, *That God wils sin as a punishment, not under this reason, as it is sin*; [*i. e.* materially or entitatively considered] which Hypothesis of *Lombard* he refutes, by shewing, '*That the punishment of sin is necessarily conjoined with 'the Sin:* so that if God wils sin as a punishment, he must ne- 'cessarily wil the existence of sin. Also whoever knows two 'things to be necessarily and inseparably conjoined, and wils that 'they should be so conjoined, and knowingly and rationally wils 'one;

How God wils Sin.

'one; the ſame perſon wils alſo the other; ſpecially if about 'both he employ an act of his wil: But now God knows and 'wils that thoſe two, *Sin* and *Puniſhment* be conjoined together, 'and rationally wils the one, namely the puniſhment of ſin, 'therefore alſo the ſin. Again, he that wils an Antecedent, wils 'alſo the Conſequent, at leaſt in an univerſal, albeit not in a par-'ticular: for he that wils a whole, wils al the parts neceſſary 'thereto. [3] Thence he procedes, *p.* 300. to ſhew, *how God wils ſin: God*, ſaith he, *doth no way wil Sin ſimply, but only in ſome limited reſpect:* 'For, to ſay that God wils ſomething ſimply, is, 'according to the commun manner of ſpeech, to ſay, that he 'loves it and approves of it as good. Yea, addes he, may it 'not be ſaid, that in the whole Univerſe there is no ſuch thing 'as Inordination, Deformitie, or Sin ſimply conſidered, but only 'Sin in ſome reſpect? Becauſe in regard of the prime and ſu-'preme Cauſe, al Beings both poſitive and privative are ſweetly 'diſpoſed with the higheſt wiſdome, beautie, and juſtice. Whence [4] He gives us the difference between Gods Concurſe to ſinful acts, and to ſuch as are good, *p.* 302. *God*, ſaith he, *is not the Author of ſin, as of that which is done wel:* 'For of this he is the 'Author ſo, as that he alone doth ſupernaturally create, and 'give to the wel-doer, Faith, Hope and Love, *&c.* But it is not ſo as to ſin. *i. e.* As to good, God produceth not only the natural act, but alſo the moral Bonitie, but as to Sin, he produceth only the natural entitative Act. [5] He thence *p.* 302. explicates, how the Apoſtle *Paul* and the Fathers denied, *that God wils Sin:* 'When, ſaith he, *Auguſtin* and the other holy men 'denie *that God wils Sin*, the cauſe of this negation ſeems this: 'Becauſe the Apoſtle and *Auguſtin*, and other holy men placed 'Predeſtination, Preſcience, and the like on Gods part, the *Pe-'lagians* and other Heretics would excuſe Sinners from their ſins, 'and retort the cauſe and blame on God, who ſo predeſtinated 'or foreknew: therefore theſe holy men would ſay, that God 'by his Predeſtination, Preſcience or ſuch like, doth not compel 'them againſt their wil to ſin, but that they ſin freely and by 'their own wil; and that God by predeſtinating, foreknowing, 'or willing ſins, doth not ſin, nor do unjuſtly, neither is he the 'firſt imputable, or culpable cauſe of ſins; but the firſt, impu-'table, and culpable cauſe is the proper wil of the Sinner. This indeed is the proper ſtate of our controverſie at this day. Then he

he addes, *pag.* 303. 'But if it yet be ſaid, that it always 'bears il with many to ſay, *That God doth any wiſe wil ſin*, it 'is certainly true, and that peradventure according to *Hugo* 'before cited, *not becauſe that which is ſaid is not wel ſaid, but* 'because that which is wel ſaid, *is not wel underſtood.* I would 'to God therefore that they would take the Salt of Divine 'wiſdome, and favor and underſtand the truth which is favo- 'ry to a ſane taſt; and that they would know, that there is 'no evil in the world, which is not for ſome great good: why 'therefore ſhould we ſubſtract from the World, and from God 'the Author of the World, this way of doing good, or of be- 'neſaction, which is ſo admirable and great? Yea it ſeems 'more miraculoſe and great, to worke good out of evils than out 'of goods, or to worke good only. And without peradventure 'it ſeemeth ſo diſguſtful to many, if it be ſaid, that God wils 'and produceth the act of Inceſt of the Father with the Daugh- 'ter, of the Son with the Mother, of Parricide, Sedition, Blaſ- 'phemie, and other like ſins: and yet not only the Saints, but 'alſo the Philoſophers ſpeak thus: For who in ſuch an inceſt pre- 'pares the ſeed, and moves, creates, and infuſeth the ſoul into 'the *fœtus*, but God? and however it may ſound, thus the Saints 'of God ſpeak, yea the Spirit of God, who ſpeaks in them. What could be ſaid more acutely, demonſtratively and divinely for the deciding our controverſie, would men but receive it?

Non quia quod dicitur non bene dicitur, ſed quia quod bene dicitur, non bene intelligitur. *Hugo.*

(5) Again, *Bradwardine*, l. 2. c. 20. *p.* 542, *&c.* proves out of *Altiſſiodorenſis*, ſuper 2. ſent. 'That the evil action is from God 'operating and cooperating with the human wil. *Altiſſiodorenſis*'s ar- 'guments are theſe, [1] From the *Paſſion of Chriſt*, which was 'good, and proceeded from a good cauſe, namely the Wil of God. '[2] From the act of Fornication, whereby an holy Prophet is 'begotten: which act is the cauſe of good, and therefore good; 'and yet it is alſo evil: and therefore an evil action as it is an 'action is good and from God. Thence he addes the Teſtimonie of *Thomas*, *in Queſt. de malo*, *q.* 19. where he demands, *Whether the act of ſin be from God?* and he anſwers thus: 'It muſt 'be ſaid, that among the Ancients there was a double opinion 'concerning this mater: ſome ſaid more anciently, *that the acti-* 'on of Sin was not from God; attending to the very Deformity of 'Sin, which is not from God: but ſome ſaid, *that the action of*

How the entitative act is from Gods Predeterminative Concurſe.

'Sin

'*Sin is from God*; attending to the very Eſſence of the Act, which 'muſt be granted to be from God, and that on a double reaſon; '[1] *Commun*, becauſe God being *Ens or Being by his own Eſſence*, 'and his very Eſſence his Being, it muſt thence neceſſarily follow, 'that whatever doth *participate* of Being, muſt be derived from 'him who is *Being* by Eſſence. [2] *Special:* for it is neceſſary 'that al motions of ſecond Cauſes be produced by the firſt Mover, 'who is God, as *p.* 554.

(6) *Bradwardine*, l. 2. c. 22. *p.* 559. riſeth higher, and proves ſtrongly, *That it implies a contradiction for any Nature to act or move without God, of himſelf, properly, actually, and ſpecially applying it to act, and moving of it.* Which he demonſtrates many wayes: as [1] Becauſe no natural virtue or forme can operate without Gods cooperating therewith. [2] Becauſe al natural things or cauſes are but as Inſtruments in regard of God the firſt Cauſe. [3] Becauſe the create wil cannot ſubſiſt of it ſelf; therefore neither can it act of it ſelf, as *c.* 24. *p.* 563. [4] Becauſe God, by reaſon of his infinite Actualitie, permits nothing but what he wils.

How God ſpontaneouſly impels men to the entitative act of Sin.

(8) *Bradwardine*, l. 3. c. 29. p. 739. aſcends yet higher, and demonſtrates, *That God, albeit he impel no man violently againſt his wil, yet he impels al mens wils ſpontaneouſly, and draws them to 'al their free acts, even ſuch as have ſin annexed to them.* 'But fur- 'ther, addes he, it may be probably ſaid, that God doth in ſome 'ſenſe neceſſitate to the very act of ſin, as to the ſubſtance of 'the act; yet it doth not thence follow that he doth neceſſitate 'to ſin, or to the deformitie of ſin, as it is ſin, or the deformitie 'of ſin: for the omnipotent God may, as it appears, ſeparate 'the very ſubſtance of the act and whatever is poſitive in it from 'the Deformitie of ſin, and can produce and conſerve ſuch an 'effect really poſitive and good, without ſuch a defect and priva- 'tive malice: Specially, ſithat Sin, Deformitie, Vitioſitie, or de- 'fect is not eſſentially the very act, nor of the eſſence of the act, 'nor neceſſarily a conſequent of the ſubſtance of the act. There- 'fore the good God acting rightly, pre-acting and in ſome ſenſe 'neceſſitating to ſuch an act, according to its ſubſtance and na- 'ture good, the vitioſitie or ſin doth not thence neceſſarily fol- 'low: whence therefore doth it follow, but from the free wil 'of the Creature freely deficient, and from the wil of the Sinner? What could be ſaid more acutely, more judiciouſly, more demonſtratively,

monſtratively, and more piouſly, to put a period to this controverſie, had not men a ſtrong impulſe to oppoſe the Truth? I have been the more prolixe in rehearſing theſe illuſtrious and demonſtrative Sentiments of *Bradwardine*, becauſe I find nothing newly ſtarted by our Adverſaries, but what I find rationally, ſolidly, and convictively ſolved by him, above three hundred years ſince. As for his ſolutions to the particular Objections made by his Opponents then, and ours now, we ſhal produce them in what follows in anſwer to the Objections againſt our Hypotheſis, *Ch.* 6. §. 1, 2.

Bishop Bradwardine

Having produced the concurrent Sentiments of the ancient Fathers and Scholemen for the confirmation of our Hypotheſis, we might now deſcend to the later Scholemen, ſpecially the *Thomiſts*; but theſe lie under the ſame criminal accuſation and imputation with our Adverſaries, as the orthodoxe *Calviniſt*; and it deſerves a particular remarque, that look as the Pelagian Jeſuites oppoſe the Dominicans in this point under the Bears skin of being *Calviniſts*; ſo the Arminians and New Methodiſts oppoſe the Calviniſts in the ſame point, under the Bears skin of being *Dominicans*: and indeed no wonder, ſithat the Dominicans and Calviniſts in this point about Gods predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin do greatly accord. And let our Adverſaries ſay what they liſt againſt the Dominicans, it's certain, that in this mater they have done great ſervice to the cauſe and intereſt of Truth: and particularly *Alvarez*, who is principally ſtruck at by the adverſe partie, deſerves great honor and diligent inſpection by thoſe who have any kindneſs for our Hypotheſis, or any part of the Doctrine of Efficacious Grace. I am not ignorant what an heavy load of Imputations, *Strangius*, and a Reverend Divine of Name among our ſelves, have laid upon him in their Oppoſitions to what he has writ in the defenſe of our Hypotheſis; but the Jeſuites themſelves, who are his moſt puiſſant Impugnators, give him a more candid and favorable treatment: For in the treaty between them and the Janſeniſts begun *Feb.* 18. 1663. the Jeſuites rejecting the Arbitrament of *Gregorie Ariminenſis* and *Eſtius*, whom they judged more ſevere, they pitcht upon *Alvarez* as the more moderate, to whom they required the Janſeniſts to conforme in thoſe points controverted, in order to an accommodement: and the reaſons they allege are of moment: 'For, ſay they, *Alvarez* having aſſiſted at the Con-

The Dominicans ſentiments.

Alvarez.

'gregations de Auxiliis, there is a grand apparence, that he and 'thoſe others who writ at the ſame time and ſince, took up this 'mode of ſpeech to ſalve Libertie, according to the movements 'and ſentiments which the Popes, *Clement* 8th, and *Paul* 5th had; 'albeit they made no Decree on this mater; of which ſee *Refutat. de Pere Ferrier*, Chap. 6. and *Idea of Janſeniſme*, p. 82. wherein remarque, (1) That the Jeſuites, *Alvarez*'s ſworne enemies, give him a more favorable character, as one, who for his moderation was employed by the Popes to aſſiſt at the Congregations *de Auxiliis*, for the compoſing the differences in thoſe points in controverſie between the Dominicans and Jeſuites about Predetermination. Yea, (2) That the Popes themſelves, *Clement* 8th, and *Paul* 5th, had the ſame ſentiments with *Alvarez*. Is it not ſtrange then, that the Jeſuites, who are profeſſed enemies to Predetermination, and the Popes themſelves, who have been generally favorers of Pelagianiſme, ſhould have a greater kindneſſe for *Alvarez*'s ſentiments about Predetermination, than Proteſtant Divines, whoſe Doctrine againſt the Pelagians and Jeſuites can never be defended but by thoſe principes on which *Alvarez* bottomes his Predetermination? For mine own part, I cannot but confeſſe, that in thoſe Notions about Efficacious Grace and Predetermination, I read *Alvarez* with al poſſible diligence and exactitude of ſpirit, and found therein ſo penetrant an acumen, ſo profound ſoliditie, and ſuch maſculine Demonſtrations, as that I never met with his equal, excepting *Bradwardine* and *Ariminenſis*. This Juſtice I conceive my ſelf under an eſſential obligation to do him, to wipe off thoſe undeſerved clamors and aſperſions which *Strangius* and another Divine of note among us, have loaded him with. His own Sentiments in the defenſe of our Hypotheſis are laid down in his excellent Diſputations *de Auxil. l.* 3. *Diſput.* 24. where he doth with a great deal of moderation and yet invincible force of argument demonſtrate, *That God doth by a previous motion, truely and efficiently, or according to the mode of a phyſical cauſe, premove free-will to the act of ſin, as it is an Act or Being*. His Arguments for the demonſtration of this Theſis are weighty and invincible, namely from the Participation, Limitation, and Dependence of every Second cauſe, *&c.* Of which hereafter, *c.* 5. Laſtly, that the Scholemen generally, beſides ſuch as are *Pelagian*, aſſert divine Predetermination to the material entitie of Sin, ſee *Twiſſe, Vind. Grat. l.* 2. *Digreſſ.* 2.

I now

I now paſſe on to *Janſenius* and his Sectators, who are brought upon the Theatre by our Adverſaries as Patrons of their Antitheſis: but this is ſo great a miſtake in mater of fact, that I cannot but admire any learned man ſhould take refuge under it. Yet thus *Strangius l. 2. c. 14. p. 318.* brings in *Janſenius* oppoſing *Auguſtin* both to the Dominicans and Jeſuites as to the point of Predetermination. The like is urged by a Reverend Divine of repute among us. But this miſtake is too obvious and great to take place among diligent and impartial Inquirers: For (1) It's evident, that *Janſenius* rejected the terme Predetermination as maintained by the *Dominicans*, not the thing it ſelf as aſſerted by *Auguſtin:* Thus in his *Auguſt. Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. pag. 77, &c.* he proves, 'That there is no manner of ſpeech among the Scholemen ſo efficacious and pregnant to expreſſe Predetermination 'by, but *Auguſtin* uſeth the ſame to illuſtrate Gods efficacious 'concurſe. And *Tom. 3. l. 8. c. 1. p. 343.* he acknowledgeth, 'That thoſe learned men the Dominicans have reached the Mar'row of Divine Adjutorie, and thence the true opinion of *Au'guſtin.* Again, *cap. 3. p. 346.* he ſaith expreſſely, *that herein Medicinal Adjutorie agrees with phyſic Predetermination, that the office of phyſically predetermining the wil doth truely belong unto it, and it may be termed by that name taken not only in the abſtract, but alſo in the concrete.* Whence in the ſame Chapter he uſeth the very terme of *phyſic Predetermination* to expreſſe efficacious Concurſe by, albeit not in the ſame manner as it is uſed by the Scholemen. So that it's evident, he was not averſe from the thing, albeit he but ſeldome uſed the terme to avoid the cavils of Scholaſtic Theologues, as alſo to confine himſelf to the termes uſed by *Auguſtin.* (2) That reverend Divine among us, who makes uſe of *Janſenius*'s name againſt phyſic Predetermination, doth yet grant, that *Janſenius* held, *the exiſtence of ſin to be neceſſary as a Puniſhment.* Wherein he oppoſeth *Janſenius*, and alſo *Auguſtin*, who held, *that ſin as a puniſhment, was willed and cauſed by God*, as before. (3) *Janſenius Auguſt. de Statu Nat. Lapſ. l. 4. c. 21. p. 264.* aſſures us, *That men in their lapſed ſtate, before Faith be introduced, are under the captivitie of luſt, and can do nothing but ſin; which captivitie is the ſame with that foreſaid neceſſitie and coaction, whereby ſins committed by unbelievers are ſaid to be neceſſary, and therefore they have no power to abſtain from ſin.* And *Tom. 3. de Grat. Chriſti, l. 10.* he ſtoutly maintains theſe following aſſerti-

The Doctrine of Janſenius *concordant with our Hypotheſis.*

C. T. *p. 3. p. 93.*

ons about Reprobation, which clearly evince Gods efficacious predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. [1] He proves, *cap.* 2. *pag.* 420. *That Gods negative Reprobation is alſo poſitive.* [2] He demonſtrates, *cap.* 4. *pag.* 423. *That the cauſe of Reprobation, according to its comparative conſideration, is the abſolute wil of God.* This is owned by reverend Mr. *Baxter*, *Cathol. Theol. part.* 3. *Sect.* 7. §. 22. *pag.* 93. in theſe words: [*Janſenius*'s Doctrine is that] *the Reprobation of men was by Gods poſitive abſolute wil, of men in original ſin, and the effect of it excecation and obduration.* This being his proper opinion, it neceſſarily follows, that he aſſerted Gods predeterminative concurſe to the entitative act of ſin: for, as it is granted by *Strangius*, and others, efficacious predetermination always follows as a neceſſary conſequent of abſolute predefinition: if God abſolutely decrees to leave men to ſin, it neceſſarily follows, that he efficaciouſly determine men to the entitative act of ſin. [3] He goes higher than moſt of our Divines dare do in this point, in aſſerting, *cap.* 5. *pag.* 424. *That damnation, excecation, obduration are the effects of Reprobation.* But yet *cap.* 7. *pag.* 427. he anſwers the objection of ſuch, that argue hence, *That God lies in wait to deſtroy ſuch as are reprobated*; aſſuring us, *that the ſinner only is the culpable criminal cauſe of his own damnation.* And *cap.* 10. *pag.* 433. he demonſtrates, *That Reprobates are not created unto damnation, i. e.* damnation as ſuch is not the end of their creation: which ſufficiently vindicates the holy God from being the cauſe of their ſin or damnation.

The Janſeniſts ſentiments.

As for the Janſeniſts, that they are of the ſame perſuaſion with the Dominicans as touching our Hypotheſis, is evident from their conceſſions to the Jeſuites in their Treatie begun *Febr.* 18. 1663. mentioned in the *Refutation of Pere Ferrier*, *Chap.* 6. alſo *Idea of Janſeniſme*, *pag.* 82. The ſum was this: The Biſhop of *Comenge*, a friend of the Janſeniſts, propoſed this as an expedient to reconcile the two Parties, *That the Janſeniſts declare, that they had no other ſentiment about this mater, but what was taught by the Thomiſts.* And becauſe ſome of the Thomiſts flie higher than others, the Jeſuites demanded, *That the Janſeniſts ſhould reduce themſelves to the forme of ſpeech uſed by* Alvarez. So that it ſeems the Janſeniſts in the point of efficacious Concurſe are looked on by the Jeſuites (as indeed they are) as thoſe that went beyond the very Dominicans. The Janſeniſts replied, 'That the doctrine of *Janſe-*
'*nius* was not different from that of the Thomiſts, albeit it was
'not

not his deſigne to render himſelf conforme to them, but to *Auguſtin.* And the true reaſon why the Janſeniſts do not maintain greater correſpondence with the Dominicans, is, not their difference in doctrine, but becauſe many of the Dominicans have by a *Spirit of Cabal*, or of Faction joined with the Jeſuites.

Laſtly, that our Hypotheſis, *touching Gods efficacious Concurſe to al actions, even to ſuch as have ſin appendent to them*, was generally owned, not only by ſingle Sects or Parties, but by the generalitie of the Roman Church, before the riſe of the Jeſuites, is evident from the Doctrine of the *Roman Catechiſme*, publiſhed by the command of the Council of *Trent*; where in the explication of the Apoſtles Creed, about the end of the firſt Article, *par.* 1. *cap.* 2. §. 20. *pag.* 23. (*edit.* 1619.) we find this great teſtimonie to confirme our Hypotheſis: *God doth not only preſerve and adminiſtrate althings that are by his providence, but alſo doth by an intime virtue, impel thoſe things that are moved and do act any thing, to motion and action; ſo that albeit he doth not impede the efficience of ſecond cauſes, yet he prevents them, in as much as his moſt ſecret force reacheth unto althings; and as the Wiſe-man teſtifies*, Wiſd. 8. 1. *He reacheth from one end to another mightily, and ſweetly doth order althings. Wherefore it is ſaid by the Apoſtle*, Act. 17. 21. *For in him we live, and move, and have our being.* What could have been ſaid more clearly and fully for the aſſerting a predeterminative Concurſe to al actions and motions of the creature, even ſuch as have ſin annexed to them? And by whom is this Doctrine taught? By the Council of *Trent*, which is the ſtandard and meaſure of the Roman Faith, and no great friend to the Doctrine of Chriſt. Is it not ſtrange then, that Reformed Divines, yea ſuch as would be accounted Calviniſts, cannot allow the efficacious Concurſe of God ſo much as *Trent*-Papiſts allow?

The Roman Catechiſme.

Non ſolùm Deus univerſa quæ ſunt providentiâ ſuâ tuetur atq; adminiſtrat, verùm etiam quæ moventur & agunt aliquid, intimâ virtute ad motum atq; actionem ita impellit, ut quamvis ſecundarum cauſarum efficientiam non impediat, præveniat tamen, cùm ejus occultiſſima vis ad ſingula pertineat, *Sapient.* 8. 1. *Act.* 17.

§. 3. We have ſeen how far the Latin Fathers and thoſe who lived in Communion with the Roman Church have openly eſpouſed our Hypotheſis; let us now deſcend to Reformed Theologues, and examine what their ſentiments have been hereof. And here indeed we have an ample field to exſpatiate in, albeit our Adverſaries the new Methodiſts would confine us to a ſmal number of Adherents. We ſhal begin with *John Wiclef*, our firſt Engliſh Apoſtolic Reformer, who following *Bradwardine* his Collegue in this, as in many other points about Grace, aſſerted, *That as God neceſſitates the futuritions of inſtants, ſo alſo he neceſſitates al the events which in*

The ſentiments of Reformed Divines.

Wiclef.

thoſe

those instants are futures, Art. Constant. damnat. 278. Again, he held, *That God necessitates al active creatures to each of their acts*; as *Walden*, *tom.* 1. *cap.* 21. *pag.* 35. & *cap.* 23. *pag.* 37. also *Wideford*, *pag.* 240, 248. Again he asserted, *That to whatever Gods permission reached, to that also his actual volition reached*; as *Walden*, *tom.* 1. *pag.* 39. which clearly demonstrates our Hypothesis.

Calvin.

But we passe on to *John Calvin*, whom some new Methodists, particularly *Strangius*, would force into their Campe. Thus *Strang. pag.* 384, 554. where he endeavors to take off *Calvin* from our Partie: but he that looks into *Calvins* Institutions, *l.* 1. *c.* 18. wil find our assertion not only nakedly owned, but fully explicated and demonstrated, and that by a multitude of scriptural instances. Particularly he proves, (1) *That God wils the existence of mens sins*; *so that things repugnant to Gods wil of precept, are yet brought about by his efficacious wil of Decree and Providence.* (2) *That Gods permission of sin is not otiose, but active and energetic.* (3) *That Gods providence moderates and orders the sins of men.* And he concludes the Chapter with this seasonable caution: 'As for those 'to whom this Doctrine of Gods judicial induration may seem 'rigid, let them but a little think, how tolerable their morositie 'may be, who reject a thing attested by such clear testimonies of 'Scripture, because it excedes their capacitie, and count it a 'crime to bring to light things, which if God did not know to be 'profitable for our knowlege, he would never have reveled them 'by his Prophets and Apostles. So in other parts of his Works, as *Resp. contra Pighium*, *de Libr. Arbitr. pag.* 225. also *Tract. de occulta Dei providentia*, he clearly asserts and demonstrates our Hypothesis. This is wel taken notice of by judicious *Davenant*, in his *Animadversions on Gods love*, &c. *p.* 322. 'It is, saith he, *Calvins* opinion, *de occult. Dei provident. resp. ad* 2. *Lapsum Ada non fortuitum esse, sed occulto Dei decreto ordinatum.* God foresaw *Adams* 'fal; he had power to have hindred it, but he would not, be- 'cause himself had decreed otherwise. This is the effect of *Cal-* '*vins* doctrine. But as for the *involving of men in sin and damna-* '*tion out of his only wil and pleasure*, these are consequents falsely 'inferred upon *Calvins* Doctrine, by himself disclaimed, *&c.*

Interdum bonâ voluntate hominem velle aliquid, quod Deus non vult. Rursus fieri posse, ut idem velit homo voluntate malâ, quod Deus vult bonâ, Calv. ex Augst.

Zuinglius.

How much *Zuinglius* favored this opinion of Gods efficacious Concurse to the entitative act of sin, is sufficiently evident from those great reproches which the Papists lode him with for it; which he wiped off with this answer, 'That the same action, 'which

which is ſinful in regard of man, is not ſo in regard of God, becauſe he is not under the ſame Law with man. Thus *Baronius*, *Metaphyſ. Sect.* 8. *Diſput.* 3. §. 87. *pag.* 152. *The third mode*, ſaith he, *is peculiar to* Zuinglius, *who teacheth, that God exciting the wil to an evil object doth not ſin, becauſe God hath no Law ſet to him, but man hath.* To which *Baronius* anſwers, *That albeit God hath no Law ſet to him by any Superior, yet he hath a Law ſet to him by his own nature, not to deal injuſtly or cruelly with men.* This replie, although borrowed from *Bellarmine*, is now become commun with our Adverſaries, yet without the leaſt ſhadow of reaſon: for they do but beg the queſtion, in ſaying, *That God hereby deals injuſtly or cruelly with his creature.* As for *Zuinglius*'s proper ſentiments about Gods exciting and applying the wils of men to the entitative acts of ſin, they are fully and clearly laid down in his Book *de Providentia Dei, cap.* 6. *tom.* 1. of his Workes, *pag.* 365. *Seeing a Law is given to man, he always ſins, when he actes againſt the Law, albeit he neither be, nor live, nor operate, but in God, and from God, and by God: But what God workes by man is turned to man for ſin, but not in like manner to God: for man is under a law, but God is free—— Therefore one and the ſame wickedneſſe, ſuppoſe adulterie or homicide, as from God the Author, Motor, and Impulſor, it is a work, not a crime; but as it is from man, ſo it is a crime and wickedneſſe: for God is not bound up by law, but man is condemned by law.* Thus he procedes to illuſtrate by many exemples, of *David*, &c. Thence, *pag.* 367. he inſtanceth in the induration of *Pharaoh*, &c. wherein note, (1) That he cals God the *Author*, *Motor*, and *Impulſor* of the act; which muſt be underſtood, not morally, but phyſically, as he excites and applies the wil to its act. (2) That he frees God from being the Author or moral cauſe of the ſin, becauſe he actes not againſt any law: a diſtinction which was valid in his time, albeit ſcoffed at now-a-days even by Reformed Divines, yea Calviniſts. Neither was this diſtinction coined by *Zuinglius*, as *Bellarmine* and others would fain perſuade, but in uſe long before *Zuinglius*, by *Scotus*, *Arimineenſis*, and other ſcholaſtic Theologues, who followed *Auguſtin* herein. Thus *Scotus*, *in Sent.* 2. *Diſt.* 37. *Queſt.* 2. ſaith, *The ſame action is ſinful in regard of the create wil, but not as to Gods concurſe, quia voluntas creata debet rectitudinem actioni tribuere, Deus autem non debet, becauſe the create wil is under an eſſential obligation or law, to give rectitude to the action, but God is not, as before.*

Unum igitur atq; idem facinus, quantum Dei eſt Authoris, Motoris, ac Impulſoris, opus eſt, crimen non eſt; quantum autem hominis eſt, crimen ac ſcelus eſt. Ille enim lege non tenetur, hic autem lege etiam damnatur, *Zuing. prov. cap.* 2. *pag.* 365.

How-

Beza. How deeply *Beza* was engaged in the defence of our Hypothesis is sufficiently evident by his Controversies in this point: as *Tract. Theolog. vol.* 1. *pag.* 313, &c. in answer to the calumnies of *Heshusius* about the Providence of God, he saith, (1) *That no event ever happens otherwise than God decrees:* which he demonstrates from the Omnipotence of God. Thence he procedes, (2) to demonstrate, *That albeit God wil, and know, and decree al things in the world, yet that he is not the Author of sin.* So *pag.* 315. (3) He proves, *That Gods permission of sin is not idle or merely negative.* This he demonstrates, *pag.* 317. from the vendition of *Joseph*; the robbing of *Job*; the ravishing of *Davids* wives by *Absolon*; *Davids* numbering the people and Gods inciting his heart thereto; *Shimei*'s cursing of *David*; the defection of the ten Tribes from *Rehoboam*, &c. (4) He procedes, *pag.* 319. to the fal of *Adam*, which he assertes to be from the decree and ordination of God, *&c.* The same Controversie he manageth against *Castellio, de æterna Dei prædestinatione*, p. 360. where he proves, *That* Adams *fal was decreed and determined by God.* The like, *pag.* 401. where he proves, *That God doth not compel men to sin, or infuse sin into them, but justly and rightly incite their wils to the entitative act which is good.* This he confirmes by the induration of *Pharaoh*, and Gods making use of wicked instruments for the punishment of men. That *Calvin* and *Beza* did fully espouse our Hypothesis is evident not only by the opposition of *Bellarmine* and his sectators, but also by that of *Arminius*, who objectes the very same things against them, as are objected against us, namely, *That God ordained that man should fal and become vitiose: by which opinion,* saith he, *God is made the Author of* Adams *fal and sin:* of which see *Strangius, lib.* 3. *cap.* 2. *pag.* 554. And indeed al the Helvetian Churches to this very day continue very orthodox and zelose against al the Arminian Dogmes, in this as in other points; which sufficiently appears by their new Articles lately added to their Confession, and signed by their Ministers and Professors, for the condemning the new method of *Amyraldus*, and others in the French Churches.

Chamiers Defence of our Hypothesis. That not only the German and Helvetian, but also the French Churches in their first Reformation fully maintained our Hypothesis, is most evident by the most elaborate, acute, and demonstrative determinations of great *Chamier*, the greatest light that ever *France* Reformed had, *Calvin* only excepted, who in his *Panstrat.*

strat. Cathol. tom. 2. lib. 3. gives us a copiose, distinct, and convictive decision of this Controversie as then agitated by the Calvinists and Jesuites; which answers exactly to our present Controversie with the new Methodists. He titles this Book, *Of the Author of sin:* and proves, *cap. 1. That the Reformed Divines do not make God the Author of sin*, albeit the Jesuites accuse *Calvin*, *Martyr*, and *Beza* therewith. Thence, *cap. 2.* he layes down the opinion of the Reformed Divines, namely, *That al actions both sinful and good are to be referred to the actuose providence of God.* Which he demonstrates by *Shimei*'s cursing *David*, *Absoloms* incest, *&c.* Whence, *cap. 3.* he passeth on to the Papists opinion touching the Providence of God about sin, which they make to be only by *speculative*, *idle permission*, as some new Methodists. *Cap. 4.* he procedes to prove, *That God wils the existence of sin.* Wherein he answers *Bellarmines* Objections against *Calvin* and *Beza* as to this point. *Cap. 5.* he passeth on to the second Argument of the Calvinists, namely, *That men are in their sinful acts the instruments of God.* Thence, *cap. 6.* he descends to their third Argument, *from Gods excecation and induration of mens hearts:* wherein he distinctly opens the Scriptures about induration. Whence, *cap. 7.* he comes to their fourth Argument, *from Gods energie in sinful acts*; which he demonstrates both rationally and scripturally. And thence, *cap. 8.* he gives us *Augustins* opinion consonant to *Calvins* herein. Whence in the following Chapters, 9, 10, 11, 12. he answers the Objections and Arguments of the Papists, whereby they endeavor to prove, *That the Calvinists make God the Author of sin:* which imputations are stil fastened on us by the Arminians and new Methodists.

The Testimonie of Lud. Crocius.

We may adde hereto the sentiments of *Ludovicus Crocius*, Professor at *Breme*, and a Member of the Synod of *Dort*, who in many points, specially that of *middle Science* and *universal Grace*, follows the new method, yet in this *of Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin*, seems orthodox and concurrent to *Calvins* Doctrine. So in his *Duodecas Dissertat. Exegetic. De voluntate Dei, Dissert. 8. thes. 74. pag. 415.* where he tels us, 'That the fundamen of 'clearing God from being the Author of sin is the distinction of 'the *material* and *formal* part of sin, namely of the *action* and the 'vitiositie, which is in the action: for *that*, not *this*, he wils and 'decrees; and *this*, not *that*, he permits. And his reason is invincible: 'for otherwise there should be an action independent 'as

Illam [*scil. actionem*] non verò hanc, [*scil. malitiam*] Deus vult ac decernit: *hanc*, non *illam*, permittit.

'as to God, and the efficacious providence of God ſhould be de-'nied, which is Epicurean. And then, *theſ.* 99. *pag.* 426. he tels us, '*That as to the act of the Divine wil about ſin*, the Scriptures 'ſeem to contradict themſelves, in that ſome Scriptures aſſure us, '*that God doth not wil ſin, but hate it, with thoſe that commit it*, as '*Pſal.* 5. 5, 6, 7. *Zach.* 8. 17. and yet other Scriptures ſay, *that* '*God wils, creates, and effects ſins*, as *Eſa.* 45. 7. *Lam.* 3. 37, 38. '*Amos* 3. 6. Then he ſolves theſe ſeeming contradictions, by diſtin-'guiſhing between the *act* and the *vitioſitie* of the act: alſo be-'tween the act as it procedes from *God*, and as from the *Creature*: 'laſtly between *the decreeing wil of God*, and *the preceptive wil of* '*God*. Whence he concludes, *theſ.* 100. thus: 'For God both 'wils and produceth the act, as an act, of it ſelf indifferent to mo-'ral bonitie and evil, *&c.* And he addes, *theſ.* 101. 'That this act in itſelf eſſentially good, even as it is contaminated by the creature, God wils it as a puniſhment, and uſeth it as an ordain-ed convenient means for the beſt ends. The like *theſ.* 112. *p.* 430. where he ſhews, *how God wils ſin, not as ſin, but as a puniſhment*, &c. of which more fully hereafter, *Chap.* 5. §. 5. Theſe ſenti-ments of *Lud. Crocius* I rather chuſe to cite, becauſe he, in other points, follows the new method, and is cried up by ſome of that partie.

The Synod of Dort.

As for the Judgement of the Synod of *Dort* touching our Hy-potheſis, it is ſufficiently evident by their Determinations, as alſo by the oppoſitions the Arminians made againſt them in this point, both whiles they ſate, and afterwards. I am not igno-rant, that ſome of our Adverſaries are ſo confident as to cite the Synods teſtimonie in favor of their Antitheſis; but this is ſo falſe an imputation, as that I judge no intelligent impartial Reader can give credit to it. There needs no more to evince the Synods concurrence with us in this point, than their ſtout defence of *abſolute Reprobation*; of which ſee *Davenants Animadverſions on Gods love*, pag. 242.

The Church of England.

We might adde almoſt an infinitude of Teſtimonies from Re-formed Divines, Churches, and Synods for the confirmation of our Hypotheſis: but in what remains we ſhal confine our ſelves to the Doctrine and Teſtimonie of the Church of *England*, and thoſe renowned Profeſſors of Theologie who have maintained and vin-dicated our Hypotheſis. The Church of *England* as to Doctrine imbibed, even in her firſt Reformation, the ſentiments of

Calvin.

Calvin and the Reformed Churches in *France*, *Holland*, *Helvetia*, and *Germanie*; albeit as to Diſcipline ſhe ſtuck unto Epiſcopal Juriſdiction. This is evident by that noble deſigne of *Cranmer* and our firſt Reformers, to reduce the Doctrine of al the Reformed Churches unto one Confeſſion. I ſhal here only cul out a few Teſtimonies of ſome great Profeſſors of Theologie both in *Oxford* and *Cambridge*, who were of an Epiſcopal Judgement as to Diſcipline, yet ſtout Champions for our Hypotheſis.

We ſhal begin with *Davenant*, a great Maſter of Reaſon, and one that went as far as he could, and I think, as far as any ought, in compliance with thoſe of the New Method; yet he ſtil aſſerted, and with great ſtrength of reaſon defended *abſolute Reprobation* and *Gods predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin*. Thus in his Determinations, when Profeſſor of Theologie at *Cambridge*, *Quæſt.* 22. 'In evil acts, ſaith he, God hath decreed to 'permit the event, to concur with the Agent as an univerſal Mo- 'tor, and laſtly to order the event itſelf according to that of *Hugo*, 'de ſacr. fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. *God wils that ſin be, and yet he wils not* 'ſin, i. e. with a wil of approbation. So *Quæſt.* 25. *pag.* 118. he grants, *That Gods decree to permit ſin is efficacious, ſo as to extract good out of it*. But he ſpeakes more fully for the defenſe of our Hypotheſis, in his *Animadverſions on Gods love to mankind*, *pag.* 72. 'But thoſe who derive the evil actions of men from their own 'free wil as the proper efficient cauſe, and the exiſting or coming 'of ſuch actions *in eventum à Decreto Dei permittente & ordinante*, 'are in no error at al. But if any ſhal go about to ſet mans wil 'at libertie, and to tie up ſhort the decreeing and determining 'wil of God, as if this had not the determining ſtroke amongſt 'al poſſible evil actions or events, which ſhal infallibly be, and 'which ſhal infallibly not be, he may avoid the ſuſpicion of *Stoi-* 'ciſme and *Manicheiſme*, but he wil hardly avoid the ſuſpicion of 'Atheiſme. For the greater number of mens actions being wick- 'ed and evil, if theſe come into act without Gods determinate 'counſel and decree, human affaires are more over-ruled by mans 'wil, than by Gods. What could be ſaid more acutely and diſtinctly for the demonſtration of our Hypotheſis? He here aſſertes, (1) *That the exiſtence of evil actions is from Gods decree permitting and ordering of them.* (2) *That Gods decreeing wil doth determine* [or predetermine] *al poſſible evil actions or events, which ſhal infallibly be.* And do or need we aſſert more than this? And

Davenant.

frequently in that Book *Davenant* aſſertes and demonſtrates, *That the decree of Reprobation is abſolute, determining ſinful acts and events, yet ſo as that it leaves no man under a compulſion to ſin.* So *pag.* 253. he ſaith, *Gods decrees carrie with them a neceſſitie of infallibilitie as to the event, but not a neceſſitie of compulſion as to the manner of acting.* And elſewhere he frequently inculcates, *That let Reprobation be abſolute or conditional, it leaves the ſame poſſibilitie and the ſame libertie to the Agent.* So *pag.* 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. Yea, he proves, *That the Arminians muſt, and do grant immutable abſolute decrees, which admit the ſame objections and difficulties, as thoſe of the Antiarminians.* So *pag.* 354, 400, 418, 419. Laſtly he proves, *That infallible preſcience granted by the Arminians infers as much a neceſſitie on the wil, as abſolute Reprobation, aſſerted by the Calviniſts.* So *p* 418, 419, 442, 462.

Ward. *Davenant* was ſucceeded by *Samuel Ward*, Doctor of Divinitie, and *Margaret* Profeſſor of *Cambridge*; a perſon of great natural acumen, and deep inſight into the main points in Controverſie between us and the Papiſts, as it appears by his acute and learned Determinations and Prælections publiſhed by Dr. *Seth Ward*. With what clear lights and heats he defended our Hypotheſis is fully manifeſt by his 24. Determination, *pag.* 115, where he ſtoutly demonſtrates this Theſis, *That the concurſe of God doth not take away from things their proper mode of operation*; according to that great ſaying (though in an apocryphous Book) *Wiſd.* 8. 1. *Wiſdome* [*i. e.* the wiſe Providence of God] *reacheth from one end to the other mightily, and yet orders all things ſweetly.* He firſt ſtates the Controverſie, ſhewing how the Remonſtrants fal in with the Jeſuites, *Bellarmine*, *Molina*, *Leſſius*, &c. in aſſerting only *a ſimultaneous immediate concurſe of God with the ſecond cauſe upon its action and effect, yet ſo, that al the modification and determination of the act, ſpecially in free actions, be from the ſecond cauſe*, as *pag.* 116. Contrary whereto he aſſertes, (1) *That the concurſe of God with ſecond cauſes, even ſuch as are free, is an antecedaneous influxe upon the very ſecond cauſes themſelves, moving and applying them to their work.* This he demonſtrates both by Scripture and Reaſon. The Scriptures he cites are *Eſa.* 26. 12. 1 *Cor.* 12. 5, 6. *Eph.* 1. 11. *Rom.* 11. 36. His Reaſons are cogent, namely *from Gods prime cauſalitie, the inſtrumental concurſe of al ſecond cauſes, the dependence of the human wil*, &c. (2) He aſſertes, *pag.* 117. *That this previous concurſe of God the firſt cauſe doth, according to its mode, modifie and determine al the actions*

of

of the second causes. This, which is fully coincident with our Hypothesis, he invictly demonstrates, '[1] becauſe the Divine wil 'determines itſelf for the production of every the moſt ſpecial 'and ſingular effect; therefore it is not determinable by any in- 'ferior cauſe, as the influence of the Sun is. [2] Becauſe as mans 'free wil determines althings ſubject to it, ſo much more effica- 'ciouſly doth the Divine wil determine al create things ſubject 'to it. [3] He demonſtrates the ſame from the ſupreme Perfe- 'ction of Divine Providence, whereunto it belongs determina- 'tively to wil and predefine al and ſingular things which are 'done in time, and to deſtine the ſame to thoſe ends intended by 'itſelf, as alſo to move and applie al ſecond cauſes to their deter- 'minate effects. [4] Becauſe otherwiſe the concurſe and deter- 'mination of free-wil ſhould be exemted from the modification 'of Divine Providence; and ſo God ſhould not have a Provi- 'dence over althings in particular, but only in commun: for, as 'Thomas, *pag.* 1. *q.* 22. teacheth, *The Divine providence extendes 'on'y to thoſe things, unto which the Divine cauſalitie extendes*: where- 'fore if God doth not determine the concurſe of free-wil, he wil 'not have a providence, but only a preſcience thereof in particu- 'lar, as *pag.* 118. Thence (3) he aſſertes and demonſtrates, *That this antecedaneous concurſe of God on ſecond cauſes modifying their actions, takes not away from them their proper mode of operating.* This he addes to clear up the conciliation of efficacious predeterminative concurſe with human libertie, and he doth it with a marvellous dexteritie and ſagacitie, withal ſhewing, that the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants, with *Cicero*, *make man ſacrilegious, whiles they endeavor to make him free.*. And *Determinat.* 26. *pag.* 132. touching abſolute Reprobation he ſaith, that it is the antecedent, but not the cauſe of mens ſin. Laſtly, what his ſentiments were touching efficacious predeterminative concurſe, is to be ſeen in his moſt acute *Clerum, de Gratia diſcriminante.*

From *Cambridge* we might paſſe on to *Oxford*, and without much difficultie demonſtrate, that al the principal Profeſſors of Theologie ever ſince the Reformation have chearfully eſpouſed and ſtrongly defended our Hypotheſis againſt the Jeſuites and Remonſtrants. Our learned and famoſe *George Abbot*, in his *Quæſtio nes ſex, Prælect. &c. cap.* 6. diſcuſſeth this very Queſtion, *An Deus ſit Author peccati*, *Whether God be the Author of ſin?* And *pag.* 207. he gives us this diſtinct deciſion of the whole: 4. *In* *George Abbot.*

the

the very actions, which on mans part are vitiose, the divine finger plainly shines forth; but so that God be the motor and impulsor [marque that terme which notes the higheſt Predetermination] *of the action and worke; but not of the obliquitie or curvitie in acting: For God excites* [i. e. predetermines] *the spirits of wicked men to attemt some things*, &c. And he cites for it that great Effate of *Auguſtin*, de Prædeſt. Sanctor. *Quòd mali peccant ipſorum eſt; quod vero peccando hoc vel illud agunt, ex virtute Dei tenebras, prout viſum eſt, dividentis*, &c. What the Sentiments of pious and learned Dr. *Holland*, *Regius* Profeſſor of Divinitie, and Dr. *Prideaux* his Succeſſor, were, is ſufficiently evident by their warm zele againſt the Arminians. As for Dr. *Barlow* late *Margaret* Profeſſor, he has ſufficiently declared his aſſent and conſent to our Hypotheſis, in his *Exercitatio* 2^a^, *de Malo*, *Concluſ.* 7. *Rat.* 3. where he proves, *That it is impoſſible there ſhould be any finite create Entitie which is not from God the Author of al Entitie.* And to conclude this Head, it is very evident, that not only the Profeſſors of Theologie, but alſo the Biſhops and Convocation, together with King *James*, were greatly oppoſite to *Arminianiſme*, and ſo friends to our Hypotheſis: Yea in Biſhop *Laud*'s time, when Arminianiſme began to flouriſh, there were but five Arminian Biſhops, *Laud*, *Neale*, *Buckeridge*, *Corbet*, *Howſon*, and *Montagut*, who eſpouſed that Intereſt, as Dr. *Heylin*, in *the Life of Biſhop Laud* aſſures us. By al which it appears moſt evident, that not only *Rutherford*, *Twiſſe*, and *Dominicans*, but the main bodie of Antipelagian and Reformed Divines have given their ful aſſent and conſent to our Hypotheſis, for *God's predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin.*

Dr. *Holland*, *Prideaux*, *Barlow.*

Such as denie *Gods Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin.*

§. 4. Having examined the Teſtimonies of ancient and later Theologues that concur with us, let us now a little inquire into the origine of the Antitheſis, and who they are by whom it has been defended. The Antitheſis to our Theſis, namely, *That God concurs not to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin*, is generally aſcribed to *Durandus*, as the principal founder thereof, who denied Gods immediate concurſe to actions, under this pretext, that hereby *we make God the Author of mens Sins.* But to ſpeak the truth, this Antitheſis is much more ancient than *Durandus*. *Capreolus* in 4. *d.* 12. *q.* 1. *ad* 1. aſſerts, *That this was the Opinion of the Manichees:* and *Aquinas* in 2. *d.* 37. *q.* 2. *a.* 2. ſaith, *That it it is next to the error of the Manichees, who held two Principes, one of Good, and the other of Evil.*

And

And the reaſon why this Antitheſis is fathered on the *Manichees* is this, becauſe whoever denies God to be the cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act whereto ſin is annexed, muſt hold, *That there is ſome real poſitive entitie in ſin whereof God is not the cauſe:* whence by conſequence ſuch muſt aſſert, *That there are two firſt Cauſes, one of Good, and the other of Evil*; which was the error of *Marcion* and *Manes*, who held, there were two firſt Principes, the one ἀυτάγαθον, *the ſupreme good, who was the cauſe of al good*; the other ἀυτόκακον, *the ſupreme evil God, who was the cauſe of al evil.* And certainly, they that maintain ſin to be according to its formal reaſon ſomething poſitive or real, or that God is not the cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, wil neceſſarily fal into the ſentiments of *Marcion* and *Manes*. Again, *Hieronymus, Epiſt. ad Cteſiphontem*, makes this Antitheſis of *Durandus* to be the Doctrine of *Pelagius*, who, ſaith he, held, *That God having once conferred free-wil, it is not neceſſary that he further operate with us:* and he ſpeaks of natural operations, as of the motion of the hand, *&c.* which was *Durandus*'s opinion. Though I cannot but confeſſe, *Janſenius, Auguſt. Tom. 1. l. 5. c. 20. p. 119.* tels us, the Pelagians granted, *That God concurs to al the operations of the Wil.* But the Conciliation of theſe two oppoſite Teſtimonies is not difficult, in that the Pelagians granted Gods concurſe to al operations in termes, but denied it in effect and conſequences, as our Adverſaries now-a-days. *Compton Carleton*, in his *Philoſoph. Univerſ. Diſput. 28. Sect. 1. §. 3.* aſſures us, that the opinion of *Durandus* was aſſerted and defended before him, by *Nicolaus Bonetus, lib. 7. Theol. c. 7.* and it is not improbable but it was alſo by ſome others.

Dicebat [Pelagius] Deum, collato ſemel libero arbitrio, ulteriùs nobis ad operandum non eſſe neceſſarium. *Hieronym. ad Cteſiph.*

But yet it cannot be denied, but that the principal Author of this Antitheſis was *Durandus*; whence among the Scholaſtic Theologues it receives the Denomination of *Durandiſme*, which they cal a raſh, erroneous, dangerous error, little better than Arianiſme. *Bellarm. l. 4. de Grat. & lib. Arb.* faith, it is repugnant to the Scriptures, Teſtimonies of the Fathers, and manifeſt Reaſon. *Suarez. Metaph. Diſput. 22. Sect. 1. n. 7.* ſaith, *It is erroneous in Faith:* & *de Concurſu, l. 1.* he aſſertes, *That the opinion of Durandus is not only reprehended, but alſo rejected by al approved Theologues, as an error in Faith.* Is it not ſtrange then, that Reformed Divines, yea ſome of great vogue for Pietie and Learning ſhould eſpouſe an error ſo groſſe, and ſo much decried by Papiſts?

Durandus *againſt Gods immediate Concurſe.*

Papists themselves? But to give a convictive demonstration, that those who denie Gods Efficacious Concurse to the substrate mater of sin really fal under the Imputation of *Durandisme*, we are first to examine what *Durandus*'s opinion as to Gods Concurse is, and then who they are who may be reputed his Sectators.

Durandus proposeth his opinion, *in sentent. l. 2. Dist. 1. Q. 5.* in these words, *Utrum Deus agat immediate in omni actione Creaturæ, Whether God acts immediately in every action of the Creature?* which he denies; and the principal reasons of his negation are these: (1) *Because then God should be the author of Sin.* (2) *Because such an immediate Concurse destroyes human libertie,* in that it determines the wil, and so puts an end to its Indifference: of which see *Strangius, p.* 142. So that indeed the very same arguments, which were used by *Durandus* against immediate Concurse, are used by our Adversaries the New Methodists against predeterminative Concurse as to the substrate mater of Sin. And albeit the most of them professe a great displeasure against the Hypothesis of *Durandus*, yet, I must freely declare my mind, I cannot conceive how they can, without apparent contradiction, defend their own, but by espousing that of *Durandus*, which a reverend Divine of great name among us professedly doth; And that the most of our Adversaries, even among the New Methodists, who in profession disown it, fal under the imputation of *Durandisme*, we shal anon make evident, when we come to treat of their particular sentiments: at present take these *Criteria* or distinctive notes of *Durandisme*. (1) Al such as assert a *Divine Concurse to the principe or Subject only, and not immediate unto the Act*, fal under the imputation of Durandisme. This is wel observed by *Strangius, l. 1. c. 10. p.* 57. where he tels us, *That those who allow only a Concurse to the second Cause, moving it to act, without a continued concurse to the action, fal into the error of Durandus.* Herein *Durandus* is followed by *Aureolus*, a professed abettor of *Durandisme*. Thus also *Amyraldus*, and a Divine of name among our selves. (2) Al those who hold only *a general immediate concurse to the act, such as is determinable by the mater it workes on, as the Influence of the Sun is by its mater*, are deservedly branded with the black note of *Durandisme*. Thus *Baronius*, together with the Remonstrants and Molinists. (3) Al such as denie *every real Being or Entitie to be from God by an immediate efficience*, justly fal under the marque of Durandisme. Thus *Camero*, and our Adversaries

ſaries generally, who denie that God doth efficaciouſly concur to the ſubſtrate mater of Acts intrinſecally evil. (4) Al thoſe who affirme, *That it implies no contradiction for God to make a creature which ſhal act without immediate concurſe*, muſt neceſſarily ſymboliſe with *Durandus*. This is acknowledged by *Baronius*, *Metaph. Sect.* 8. *Diſp.* 3. S. 61. p. 131. where he brings in this as the Second argument for *Durandus*, *That God can give to the creature a power to act without his concurſe, ſithat this involves no contradiction.* To which he anſwers wel, in the Negative, that for God to make ſuch creatures as ſhould not depend on him in operation as wel as in eſſence, involves a flat contradiction, becauſe dependence in Eſſence and Operation is eſſential to the creature. This piece of Durandiſme *Strangius* and others ſeem chargeable with, as hereafter, in our account of *Strangius*.

The Jeſuites and Moliniſts.

But we deſcend to the particular Sects, who oppoſe our Theſis, with endeavors to evince how far they fal in with the Hypotheſis of *Durandus*. And we ſhal begin with the *Jeſuites*, who now generally paſſe under the name of *Moliniſts*, from *Ludov. Molina* their chief Captain, who in his *Concordia Lib. Arbitr. cum Gratiæ donis*, &c. Quæſt. 14. Diſp. 26. aſſertes, (1) *That Gods immediate concurſe terminates not on the human wil by applying it to act, but only on the act it ſelf and effect.* Whence, (2) *That this Concurſe is not antecedent or previous as to the act, but only ſimultaneous*; i. e. *That God immediately concurs together with the wil to the ſame act, and conſerves the ſame.* Thence, (3) *That this immediate concurſe of God is not predeterminative, at leaſt as to human acts, but only indifferent and determinable, like that of the Sun.* Whence, (4) *That as to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, immediate Concurſe doth no way determine the wil, or applie it to its act, but only influence the act in a general indifferent manner, ſo as the wil ſtil retains its innate indifference, and libertie of acting or not acting.* Such are the Sentiments of the Moliniſts or Jeſuites, wherein they are greatly oppoſed both by Dominicans and Janſeniſts: Thus *Janſenius*, *Auguſt. Tom.* 2. *lib.* 6. *ſingul. c.* 14. *p.* 58. where he proves, *That this ſimultaneous Concurſe confers no forces or aide to ſecond Agents, but only accommodates it ſelf to the forces of the create power*, &c. which ſufficiently demonſtrates the identitie of this opinion with Durandiſme, albeit the avouchers of it oppoſe *Durandus* with great vehemence.

Lud. à Dola *his following* Durandus.

But of late there ſtarted up *Ludovicus à Dola*, a Capucine Friar, yet learned and acute, who eſpouſed the Hypotheſis of *Durandus*, as the only Medium for the reconciling thoſe two oppoſite parties, the Dominicans and Jeſuites. His book he termes, *A Quadripartite Diſputation, touching the mode how the Concurſe of God and the Creature ſtand in conjunction for the production of free Acts, of a natural order, ſpecially ſuch as are wicked:* He bends his Diſputation both againſt the *Predeterminants*, as alſo againſt the Aſſertors of *Middle Science*. His firſt part is general, ſtating the controverſie between the Jeſuites, who aſſert a *Middle Science*, and the Dominicans, the Aſſertors of *Predetermination*; and withal explicating the origine of the Controverſie from the *preſuppoſed Immediation and real Identitie of the Divine and creatural Concurſe*. His Second Part is againſt the Jeſuites, to demonſtrate, *That a next, immediate and identific concurſe of God to al acts both good and bad cannot be defended by the artifice of their Middle Science*. In his third part he diſputes againſt the *Dominicans*, proving, *That God doth not concur with us to acts of a natural order, ſpecially ſuch as are wicked, by a phyſic Predetermination, and moreover by an identific and ſimultaneous concurſe*. In his fourth and laſt part he ſtabliſheth and demonſtrateth, (with al the force of Arguments ſuch a ruinous foundation wil admit) the Hypotheſis of *Durandus*, *That the general Concurſe of God to acts of a natural order, ſpecially ſuch as are wicked, is not proxime, immediate and identific, but remote, mediate, and really diſtinct from the act of the creature*. This Hypotheſis he defends as the only expedient for the conciliation of Divine Concurſe with human Libertie, the vindication of Gods Sacred Majeſtie from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and the putting an end to thoſe endleſs controverſies about Divine Concurſe. And I cannot but conceive my ſelf under an eſſential obligation freely to deliver my mind in this point, that it is impoſſible for our Adverſaries, the New Methodiſts, or any others, to defend their Antitheſis againſt us from apparent contradictions and inconſiſtences with it ſelf, or to free themſelves from thoſe blaſphemous Imputations they charge upon us, unleſs they betake themſelves to this ſtratageme and ſubterfuge of *Durandus* and *Lud. à Dola:* and therefore I do no way wonder, that a Divine of great name and Head of that partie among us, doth openly declare his aſſent and conſent to this Hypotheſis of *Durandus*, it being the only refuge

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to preserve him and his Adherents from self-contradiction and condemnation.

Among the Reformed Churches, the first Impugnators of our Hypothesis were the Remonstrants, commonly stiled Arminians, from *Arminius*, their first Founder, Professor of Theologie at *Leyden*, who began to diffuse his Pelagian Infusions about the year 1610. His Sentiments about Gods Concurse to the substrate mater of sinful acts he layeth down *Disput. publica, Thes.* 7. 8, 9, 10. *p.* 193. but more fully, *Thes.* 9. *de justitia & efficacia Providentiæ Dei in malo*, p. 198. where he distinguisheth Gods efficience about the act of sin from that about its vitiositie. This efficience of God about sin he makes to be both about the *beginning*, *progresse* and *consummation* of Sin. (1) As for Gods efficience about the beginning of sin he distinguisheth it into [1] *Impedition*, both *sufficient* and *efficacious*, whereby God puts an impediment to sin; and [2] *Permission*, which is contrary to *Impedition*, the suspension of al impediments, which might hinder the execution of Sin. The fundamen of this Permission he makes to be mans Libertie, and Gods infinite Wisdome and Power to bring good out of evil. (2) Gods *Efficience* about the *progresse* of Sin he placeth in *Direction* and *Determination*. [1] *Direction* of Sin he makes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God doth most wisely and potently direct sin to what end he pleaseth, *passing on from one extreme to the other mightily, and yet disposing althings sweetly*, according to that great effate of apocryphous Wisdome, *c.* 8. *v.* 1. [2] *Determination* he takes to be an act of Divine Providence, whereby God puts measures to his Permission, and termes to sin, that it run not into infinite, according to the pleasure of the creature. (3) Gods Efficience about the *consummation* and *terme* of Sin he placeth in *Punition*, and *Remission*. As for Gods Concurse *to the Act of Sin as naturally good*, he doth craftily, according to his wonted mode in such cases, wave that difficult point: Yet in his *Articles*, *De Peccati Causa Universe*, p. 779. he Scepticly urgeth the Arguments of our Antagonists, to prove, *That we make God the Author of Sin.* But to sum up *Arminius*'s Sentiments in this point, Albeit he placeth Gods Permission about Sin in a mere suspension of Impediments, which is no way influential on the Act, yet in that he allows also a providential *Direction* and *Determination* of the Act to its end and due measures, we may thence evidently demonstrate our Hy-

Arminius's Sentiments.

potheſis, that God predetermines the Wil to the entitative act of Sin, of which hereafter, *Chap.* 5.

The Remonſtrants and their Sectators.

Arminius's Sectators uſually ſtiled *Remonſtrants*, (from their Remonſtrances in the Synod of *Dort*) *Grevincovius*, *Vorſtius*, *Epiſcopius*, *Corvinus*, *&c.* who being animated by many of the Civil Magiſtrates of *Holland*, gave themſelves the confidence, but thoſe poor Churches the peſte, of divulging their Pelagian Poiſon; which, by the interpoſure of King *James*, (who was a profeſſed enemie to that faction) occaſioned the Synod of *Dort*, *An.* 1618. where Divines out of *England*, *France*, and *Germanie* reſorted, to put a period to thoſe Pelagian Dogmes. The Remonſtrants in oppoſition to that Synod, writ their *Acta & Scripta Synodalia Dordracena*, wherein they greatly impugne the Synods Determinations for *Abſolute Reprobation*, and *Gods Providence in ſinful Acts*, falſely charging on our Divines, (1) *That they held, the Reprobate were deſtined to Incredulitie, Impietie, and Sins, as the Means and Cauſes of Damnation.* (2) *That they made God the Author of Sin*, and the like, of which ſee *Acta Synodalia*, *Scripta Remonſtrantium Dogmatica*, p. 40, 41. I ſhal here only adde, what is wel remarqued by *Le Blanc*, *Conciliat Arbit. Humani*, *Theſ.* 32. p. 434. 'That theſe Arminians and Remonſtrants di-'rectly follow the Jeſuites and Moliniſts in aſſerting a general 'ſimultaneous indifferent Concurſe, ſuch as is determinable by the 'cooperation of the human wil.

The Anabaptiſts of Germanie *that fel in with the Remonſtrants.*

Theſe Remonſtrants, *from a ſpirit of Cabal*, to fortifie themſelves againſt the Calviniſts, who overpowered them in the Synod, fel into a league offenſive and defenſive with many *German* Anabaptiſts, who thereupon drank in many Pelagian and Arminian Dogmes, particularly that of *Free-wil*; which Infuſions have been ſince diffuſed throughout ſome, yea whole Churches of that Perſwaſion in *England*. I am not ignorant, that a great number not only of Profeſſors but alſo Churches, who are for Rebaptizing, do yet keep themſelves unſpotted and untainted as to theſe Arminian Notions; and with theſe I have no controverſie, but particular love and kindneſs for many of them, albeit I differ from them in the point of Pedobaptiſme. But as for thoſe of that perſuaſion, who fight under *Arminius*'s banner, they ſeemed moſt forward, after the breaking up of the Synod of *Dort*, to oppoſe the Calviniſts in their ſentiments about Gods Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin. And (that which deſerves

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a particular remarque) the very arguments that are now urged againſt us by the New Methodiſts, were urged againſt the Synod of *Dorts* determinations in this point by them, and that in the ſame forme. Which is to be ſeen in a *Dialogue of the Anabaptiſts*, intituled, *A Deſcription of what God hath predeſtinated concerning man*, &c. wherein *pag.* 16. they have this very expreſſion, which they impute to the Calviniſts, (as our Adverſaries impute the ſame to us) namely, that they ſay, *That God puniſheth man with Hel-torments for doing thoſe things, which he himſelf hath predeſtinated, ordained, decreed, determined, appointed, willed and compelled him to do; and that which a man cannot chuſe, but muſt needs do by the force and compulſion of his predeſtination.* Are not the very ſame forged calumnies charged on us now-adays? See an excellent replie hereto, as to the reſt of their falſe imputations, by pious and learned *Ainſworth* in his *Cenſure upon this Dialogue*, pag. 2, 4, 5, &c.

The New Methodiſts.

But we deſcend now to our principal Antagoniſts, ſuch as would paſſe under the name of Calviniſts, and yet are profeſſed, yea vehement oppugnators of our Hypotheſis. Thus *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. Theſ.* 34. *pag.* 434. 'But of thoſe Reformed 'Divines, which ſubſcribe to the Synod of *Dort*, ſome in this part 'agree with the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants, neither do they ac- 'knowlege any other general concurſe of God with ſecond cau- 'ſes, than what is ſimultaneous and indifferent, whereby God 'doth not influence the cauſe itſelf, but its act, *&c.* He inſtanceth in *Baronius*, *Strangius*, *Amyraldus*, &c. And what terme or title to give this new Sect of Adverſaries more proper than *New Methodiſts* I know not, this being the ſofteſt title, and that which they ſeem to recreate themſelves in: ſome terme them downright *Arminians*; and albeit I conceive their Principes directly iſſue from and tend to Ariminianiſme, yet I dare not lode them with this reprocheful ſtyle, becauſe they generally aſſert efficacious Grace. I think we might terme them without injuſtice *Semiarminians*, (as the *Semipelagians* of old, who refined Pelagianiſme) becauſe they aſſert conditionate Reprobation and al the conſequents thereof: But yet becauſe nothing more becomes an opponent than candor and ingenuitie, therefore to let paſſe al Titles that may carrie any thing of reproche, I give them only this of *New Methodiſts*, becauſe they affect and attemt to give us a *new Method* or Scheme of Predeſtination, efficacious Grace, Divine Concurſe, *&c.*

The

John Camero.

The first that opened the way to this New Method, was *John Camero*, a person of excellent naturals, and those wel improved by acquired literature, but too much addicted to innovation in the doctrine of the Gospel, which he could not dissemble, but too oft made profession thereof; as in a Letter to *Ludovicus Capellus*, where he saith, *That many things occurred to him, which neither his own mind nor the reason of the times would permit him to publish.* He too much abounded in his own sense and words, with too great contemt of such as differed from him, though more deserving than himself, as *Chamier*. There were few Theologic Questions professedly handled by him, specially such as belong to the Doctrine of Grace and Free-wil, but he divulged something of Novitie therein: among which novel opinions this was one, That he denied *every real positive Being to be from God immediately as the prime efficient cause*, as *Epist. ad Thom. Rhædam, (oper. edit. 1642.) p.* 526, and *Epist. ad Jac. Gallovæum, pag.* 528. Which sentiment of *Camero* laid the foundation, which *Baronius* and *Strangius* his Country-men afterward built their Antithesis on. *Camero* had for his intime Camrade *Milleterius*, who after his death turned Roman Catholic, and publisht many Antichristian Errors, which he professed to have received from *Camero*.

Quod negem, *omne ens est à Deo tanquam à causa efficiente immediata*, Ep. ad Jac. Gallovæum.

Moses Amyraldus.

But *Camero*'s principal Sectator was *Moses Amyraldus*, who succeded him in the profession of Theologie at *Saumur*, and indeed much out-went him in his propensions and closures with Durandisme and the Arminian Dogmes; particularly with this about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin. And that I may not be thought falsely to accuse so learned a man, one that passed under the name of a Calvinist, I shal faithfully relate the Character given him in this particular by one of his own friends and adherents, *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. Hum. par.* 3. *thes.* 48. *pag.* 436. 'There 'are not wanting, saith he, among the Doctors of the Reformed 'Schole some who touching the general Concurse of God neces- 'sary to al the acts of creatures, seem to have the same sentiments 'with *Durandus*, and *Ludovicus à Dola*, Doctors of the Roman 'Schole. For that illustrious man *Moses Amyraldus* seems not to 'acknowlege any other general Concurse of God, by which he 'concurs with al second causes, besides that continued efficace, 'whereby he doth preserve and sustain the nature of every thing, 'and the forces given by nature. Whence he gathers, that such 'a concurse belongs not to libertie. So *Amyrald. de Lib. Arbitr sect.* 4. *pag.*

pag. 246. *Make*, saith he, *nature and its abilities able to consiste without the aide of such a concurse, and they wil truly act freely. Therefore let there be granted a concurse, which performes nothing else, but that these abilities, which would otherwise flag and vanish, consiste and be preserved in their natural state, Libertie wil thence receive no detriment.* He had been speaking of Gods concurse to sinful acts, and as *Le Blanc* wel obserues, by these words sufficiently indicates, that in this part he has the same sentiments with *Durandus*. Wherein note, (1) that *Amyraldus* grants, that sometimes it is sufficient for God to preserve the subject, and render its faculties habile or capable of acting, without immediate concurse to the act: which is also the opinion of some among us. (2) That this opinion, according to *Le Blanc*, fals in with that of *Durandus*, &c. So *Thes.* 50. *pag.* 437. *Le Blanc* addes, 'That *Amyraldus* held a dou-'ble act of providence about evil acts, one *externe*, and the other 'interne: as for the externe act, he placeth it in two things, (1) 'in proposing objects, (2) in permitting Satan to set home those 'objects with efficace. The interne act of God consistes, accord-'ing to him, in that God doth of many objects inducing to evil, 'obscure, or remove the one, or cause some other object to be 'offered, which is most taking. In al which there is no violence 'offered to human libertie, nor indeed any efficacious immediate 'concurse asserted. Yea in his *Speciminis special.* p. 468. he saith in down-right termes, *That the wil of God dependes on us, not we on the wil of God:* which is rank Durandisme and Molinisme. More of his wild sentiments in this as in other Arminian points, see *Pet. Molinai, de M. Amyraldi adversus Spanhemium libro, Judicium, praefat.*

Placeus, another Salmurian Professor, albeit in other points he stiffely defendes the New Method, yea, in that of original sin is greatly Pelagian, yet in this point touching Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin, he seems pendulous and in suspense. Thus, *De libero Hom. Arbitr.* p. 174. (*edit.* 1656.) 'What the dependence 'of the second causes on the first in causing is, the Papists sharply 'dispute. It is truly confessed by al, that God doth concur with 'every cause, so as to operate conveniently with its faculties: but 'this concurse some make immediate, proxime, and altogether 'the same with the very action of second causes; but others de-'nie it— But we, according to that reverence we bear to the in-'finite Majestie of God, dare not determine how great the de-'pendence *Placeus.*

'pendence of the second cause on the first is: it sufficeth us, that, 'provided the least spot of sin be not imputed to God, too much 'cannot be ascribed unto God, *&c.*

Le Blanc. *Le Blanc* also, Professor of Theologie at *Sedan*, though he seems to affect the like suspensive modestie, *Concil. Arbitr. thes.* 55. yet *thes.* 56. *pag.* 438. he inclines to the opinion of *Strangius*, and others, *That God cannot physically premove and predetermine to acts intrinsecally evil, without being the Author of sin.* But yet *thes.* 57. he recals himself, and saith, *That provided God be not constituted the Author of sin, the dependence of the second causes on the first cannot be too much asserted.* And *thes.* 58. he addes this as most certain, *That the aide and efficace of Divine providence, even about sinful acts, may no way be restrained to a certain general indifferent concurse*, &c.

Baronius. But from the French Professors we passe on to those of *Scotland*, *Baronius* and *Strangius*, who have been stiffe and tenacious Adherents to this New Method, about Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin. As for *Baronius*, he is accused of rank Arminianisme; and that which has given just ground for such an imputation is his denying al kind of predetermination as wel to good as to evil acts. Thus in his *Metaphys. Sect.* 8. *Disput.* 3. §. 78. *pag.* 146, &c. he endeavors to prove, *That God doth not by a previous motion excite second causes to act.* And his arguments to prove his Antithesis are no other than what time out of mind have been urged by Pelagians, Jesuites, and Arminians: namely that this previous motion and predetermination (1) destroyeth human libertie, *pag.* 147. (2) That it taketh away the power of the wil to opposite acts, *pag.* 148. (3) That it maketh God the Author of sin, *pag.* 149. which he endeavors to prove many ways: [1] Because the entitative act of sin as being determined by God cannot be separated from the obliquitie, *pag.* 150. [2] Because the action then as of such a species must be from God. [3] Because this opinion makes God to be injust and cruel, as *pag.* 151. [4] That hereby God is made the Author of sin more than the sinner. Al which are but trite and thread-bare arguments, urged by Pelagians and Arminians, to which we shal answer more fully hereafter, *chap.* 6. §. 1, &c. Thence he procedes *pag.* 153. to answer our principal argument, *That the second cause doth not act, but as moved by the first*, and therein agrees with *Suarez* and other Jesuites in asserting a previous indifferent concurse. It's true, §. 58. *p.* 129. he

he argues strongly against *Durandus*, yet in fine *pag.* 153. fals in very far with him, but more fully with the Molinists and Remonstrants; which is wel observed by *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. thes.* 35. *pag.* 434. 'This at least, without al dout, is the opinion 'of *Robert Baronius*, in his Metaphysic, where touching the *Con-* 'curse of God, and so of its concord with human libertie, he pro- 'fesseth to have altogether the same sentiments with *Fonseca* and 'Suarez, namely that this concurse is of itself indifferent, and de- 'termined by the second cause to a certain species of action: nei- 'ther is it needful, that God premove second causes, but it is suf- 'ficient, that together with them he influence their actions and 'effects. And indeed *Baronius*'s own illustration, *Metaph. Sect.* 8. *Disput.* 3. *pag.* 143. sufficiently clears this to be his proper opinion; where he compares the Concurse of God to that of the Sun, which is the same in the production of perfect animals and monsters, in itself indifferent, but modified and determined by the mater it workes upon: which is the very instance given both by Jesuites and Arminians. Lastly, *pag.* 159. he gives us four actions of God in the *induration* of sinners, which are no more than what Molinists and Remonstrants acknowlege. Whence it is to me apparent, that it would not be an act of injustice, should we reckon him among the Arminians, whose sentiments and cause he has espoused; yet by reason of his nominal repute among the Calvinists, I rather incline to the more favorable censure of ranging him among the new Methodists.

But yet our principal Antagonist is *John Strangius*, Professor at *Glascow*, who (as they say) having had his spirit chafed and exasperated by the opposition of *Rutherford*, writ a great Volume in four Books, *Of Gods Wil and Actions about sin:* wherein he bends his forces principally against the Dominicans, *Twisse* and *Rutherford*, (who in his influences of the life of Grace, both Preface and Book, oft animadvertes thereon) as if these al, by asserting predetermination to the mater of sinful acts, made God the Author of sin. I must confesse, he discovers a natural acumen and a nervose vene of Reason in his Book, yet mixed with so great incongruities and self-inconsistences, yea contradictions, that I cannot but marvel how such a Master of Reason could satisfie himself with such poor subterfuges and evasions: But this I impute not to any defect in naturals, but in his cause, which admits not any solid reason for its defense. And that which yet seems more strange *Strangius.*

to me is this, that he who oppoſeth with much vehemence *Durandus*, *Molina*, *Bellarmine*, and the Remonſtrants in this point of Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, yet at long-run fals in with each of theſe parties in ſome one, if not al their ſentiments about this mater. (1) That he comes very near Durandiſme is evident, in that he holds the Concurſe of God not to be neceſſary to al acts of the creature, particularly to ſuch as are intrinſecally evil: For to ſuppoſe any real poſitive Being, that fals not under Gods efficacious concurſe, is to me no leſſe than Durandiſme. It's true, *Strangius* in words appears againſt *Durandus*, in owning an immediate Concurſe of God to al actions of the creatures, as *lib.* 2. *cap.* 5. *pag.* 163. But when he comes to explicate this immediate Concurſe as to actions intrinſecally evil, he placeth it only (as ſome now adays among us) *in Gods conſerving the nature and innate diſpoſition of natural Agents, and giving them a ſelf-determining power, whereby they are rendred apt and habile for any congenerous action*, as they now phraſe it. Thus *pag.* 164. *Ergo ſi una Dei determinatio ſufficiat, quâ Deus Agentium naturalium naturam ac indolem à ſe inſitam ac conſervatam determinavit, quid opus eſt multiplicibus imò innumeris determinationibus ad eundem effectum*, &c. So *lib.* 3. *cap.* 3. *pag.* 584. he layes down this as his Hypotheſis, *That God doth not in al things determine the wil, but ſometimes permit it a free election, to chuſe this or that, to do this or that; and therefore in ſuch acts he has not decreed, that man ſhould preciſely chuſe this or that*, &c. And he proves it by this argument, *That it is not impoſſible for God, who hath made man a free Agent, and conſerves his nature and forces, to permit ſomething to mans free-wil, ita ut per Deum non ſtet quin homo poſſit eligere alterutrum, agere aliquid, aut non agere*, &c. Wherein he proves, that it is not impoſſible for God to leave ſome things to mans indifference, without determining him to either extreme: and he proves this is not impoſſible, becauſe it implies not any contradiction; which is *Durandus*'s very argument againſt immediate Concurſe. (2) That *Strangius* conſpires with and eſpouſeth the ſentiments of the Moliniſts and Arminians about indifferent ſimultaneous Concurſe is partly acknowleged by his friend *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. Hum. theſ.* 36. *pag.* 434. having ſhewen the agreament of *Baronius* with the Moliniſts and Remonſtrants, he addes: 'Neither doth *John Strangius* ſeem to differ 'much from this opinion: for albeit he thinkes, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 11. '*That the action wherein God and the creature concur, is in order of*

'*nature*

'*nature first from God, before from the creature*; — and moreover, '*l.2.p.3.* denies, *That God concurs only by a general concurse*; as the 'Sun concurs in the same manner to the generation of a man and 'horse; but determines, *that the influxe of God is special to special* '*effects, as they are specifically distinguished, not morally but physically*; 'yet he doth by many arguments contend and prove, *that the pro-* '*motion and predetermination of God*, which the Schole of *Thomas* 'defendes, *to al and singular acts of the creature is not necessary.* Note here, that albeit *Strangius* seems to differ from the Molinists, Remonstrants, and *Baronius* in asserting Gods Concurse to be previous, particular, and special; yet in that he denies Divine predetermination to al creatural acts, *Le Blanc* makes him not to differ much from the Molinists and Remonstrants: which to me indeed is a great observation; for I am under a very strong, and I am apt to persuade my self, rational presumtion, that predetermination to good acts can never be rationally defended by these New Methodists, who denie predetermination to the substrate mater of al evil acts; as *Strangius* doth, *pag.* 167, 584. of which more hereafter, *chap.* 5. § 4, 5.

How these New Methodists fel into their new Model.

Here it were worthy of some labor to inquire *How these New Methodists fel into those novel sentiments about Divine Concurse, and on what reasons or grounds?* As it was with the Semipelagians of old, so it has befel these New Methodists or Semiarminians: when the Pelagians were by *Augustin* driven from their πρῶτον ψεῦδος, or *Diana* of *Free-wil and the potence of corrupt nature*, the Semipelagians come with fresh forces and assault him in the point of Reprobation, and pretend, that he asserted, *That God by a fatal necessitie compelled men to sin, and then damned them for what he had compelled them to:* Just so the Arminians having been suppressed by the Synod of *Dort*, these New Methodists owning absolute particular Election and efficacious Grace with the Calvinists, thought they might more securely sal in with the Arminians in the points of universal Grace, conditional Reprobation, and that of denying Predetermination as to the entitative act of sin. Thus they divide the battel between the Calvinist and Arminian. But as *Jansenius* has wel observed out of *Augustin*, *If there be the least point granted to* Pelagius, *al wil be at last granted*; so I am very apt to fear, that these New Methodists, by going so far in symbolising with the Arminians, wil at last be wholly drawen over into their Campe. Thus much I am very confident of, they can never rationally de-

fend absolute Election and efficacious Grace against Jesuites and Arminians, so long as they denie absolute Reprobation and Predetermination to the entitative act of al sins. As for the principal grounds, which induce these New Methodists to take up those sentiments, we shal endeavor to lay them down, when we come to treat of their proper Opinions and the consequents that attend them, *Chap.* 7.

Who of the new Methodists may be estimed orthodox.

But whiles we are thus characterising the Authors of this new Method, we must do such Calvinists, who incline to them in some points, that justice, as to free them from al imputation or suspicion of Arminianisme: It's wel known, that some of great worth and truly orthodox in point of Grace, have yet somewhat inclined towards the new Method in point of *universal objective Grace*, as pious and learned *Usher*, *Davenant*, and others both in our and the French Churches, who hold, *Christs death to be an universal remedie applicable to al*, but yet are far from asserting an universal subjective Grace, or any velleitie in God of saving al men, which *Amyraldus* and others assert. As for those who hold absolute and particular Election and Reprobation, Original sin in its ful extent, mens natural impotence and being dead in sin, efficacious Grace in the conversion of sinners, with Gods absolute, efficacious, immediate, total and predeterminative concurse to al natural as wel as supernatural actions, as *Davenant*, and some others, who incline to an objective universal Grace, do, I have no controversie with them, but can owne them as friends of Grace, albeit in some modes of explicating it, they differ from us.

CHAP. V.

Rational Demonstration of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin.

Arguments for Divine predetermination of the Wil to the entitative act of sin. (1) *From the Futurition of althings in the Divine Decree: the objections against this argument solved.* (2) *From the certitude of Divine Prescience; with the solution of objections.* (3) *From the Decree of Reprobation.* Davenants *Hypothesis touching absolute Reprobation and Decrees.* (4) *From Divine Concurse,* [1] *Its Principe and Origine.* [2] *Its Nature; Totalitie, Universalitie,*

litie, Particularitie, Immediation, Prioritie, and Independence. [3] *Its Efficace, as to al natural and ſupernatural Acts and Effects. Al the Arguments urged againſt Predetermination to the entitative act of ſin, ſtrike as much againſt Predetermination to what is good. (5) From the nature of ſin, its ſubſtrate mater and formal reaſon. (6) From Gods permiſſion of ſin; which is natural, negative, and poſitive. (7) From Divine providence about ſin, both conſervative, reſtrictive, gubernative. (8) From the abſolute, immediate, eſſential dependence of al creatures on God, as the firſt cauſe.*

§. 1. HAving given a ſcriptural Demonſtration, as alſo the unanimous teſtimonie of ſuch as undertook to defend efficacious Concurſe in al Ages of the Church, for the confirmation of our Hypotheſis, we now procede to demonſtrate the ſame by rational Arguments grounded on ſcriptural principes and evidence; which we ſhal reduce to the following Heads. *Arguments for Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of al ſin.*

1. Arg. *From the Futurition of al things in and by the Divine Decree*; which we thus forme: *That which dependes on the Divine Decree for its futurition, neceſſarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its exiſtence: But the ſubſtrate mater of al ſin dependes on the Divine Decree as to its futurition: therefore it neceſſarily fals under Divine predetermination as to its exiſtence.* The major is granted by our Adverſaries, particularly by *Strangius*, who oft aſſertes, *That Divine Predetermination is exactly adequate and commenſurate to Divine Predefinition*; ſo that whatever is predefined by God in his Decree, muſt neceſſarily be predetermined by him in the execution and event. And what more rational than this aſſertion? Yea, what is predetermination of the event, but predefinition in the Decree? The difference between Gods eternal predefinition in the Decree, and predetermination as to actual concurſe and execution in time differ only as *active* and *paſſive* Creation: as *active* Creation gives futurition to things, and *paſſive*, actual exiſtence; ſo *predefinition* and *predetermination*; and therefore among the Greeks one and the ſame Verbe προορίζειν ſignifies both *to predefine* and *predetermine*. So that our major ſeems ſo clear as to carrie with it its own evidence. Wherefore we paſſe on to demonſtrate the minor, which our Adverſaries principally ſtrike at, and therefore needs our ſtrongeſt forces: This we ſhal endeavor to make good in and by the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. *Nothing is or can be future in its own nature, with-* 1. *Arg. from the futurition of al things.*

without some cause of its futurition. How is it possible that any thing should passe from a state of mere possibilitie, contingence, and indifference, but by some cause? Do not possible, and future differ? and must there not be some cause of this difference? (2) Prop. *Whatever is the cause of futurition to any thing must be eternal.* This is most evident; because whatever is future was so from Eternitie; for God foreknew it to be so: otherwise, how could his knowlege be certain? Hence, (3) Prop. *Nothing can give futurition to things but God.* For is there any thing but God eternal? (4) Prop. *Nothing in God gives futurition to things but his wil.* His Essence simply considered cannot give futurition to things; because *possible* and *future* are the same as to the Divine Essence: neither doth the Prescience of God give futurition to things; for things are not future because God foreknows them, but he therefore foreknows them because future. Hence it follows, that nothing but the Divine wil can give futurition to things, as *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 11. §. 9.* whence also it necessarily follows, (5) *That the futurition of the substrate mater of al sin is from the Divine wil and decree.* For what can make sinful acts future and so the object of Divine foreknowlege, but the wil of God, which gives futurition to althings? And if Gods predefining decreeing wil give futurition to the substrate mater of sin, must not his predeterminative wil also give existence to it?

Objections against this Argument solved.

But let us examine what assaults our Adversaries make against this Argument by Responses and Objections. (1) They replie to our minor, *That the futurition of the substrate mater or entitative act of sin is not from the wil of God, but from the wil of man, that gives existence to it.* Thus *Strangius, lib. 3. cap. 5. pag. 585.* where he endeavors to prove, *That it is not repugnant that something should be future, which God hath not absolutely predefined, but left to the wil of man to effect.* So *cap. 9. pag. 628.* he peremtorily asserts, *That God hath not decreed al futures*, namely, *the Fal of* Adam, *or the sin against the Holy Ghost*, &c. So *pag. 631.* he saith, *Nothing hinders, but that there may be some cause of the futurition of a thing besides the Decree of God, namely the create wil.* The like *Le Blanc, Concord. Libert. Hum. p. 1. thes. 55--- 57.* where he endeavors to prove, *That what is the cause why things exist in time, the same is the cause of their futurition from Eternitie: but mans wil only is the cause why sin exists in time, ergo*, &c. A poor Response indeed, or rather begging of the Question! For is it possible that the

the second cause loged in time should give futurition to a thing from Eternitie? Is it not an approved Maxime in Philosophie, yea in Nature, that the cause is ever, at least in order of nature, before the effect? and is the second cause confined by time, before the eternal futurition of its effect? (2) But *Le Blanc* answers hereto, *thes.* 56. *pag.* 454. *That Futurition is nothing else but a respect of reason, and an extrinsec denomination of the thing, which is said to be future, not something really distinct from the thing future,* &c. But the vanitie of this subterfuge is most evident; for hereby it follows, that the thing is not future before it is existent: can a modal extrinsec denomination of a thing existe before the thing that gives it existence? How many absurdities would follow hereon?

But our Adversaries have one grand Objection, which they lay much weight on, against our minor, and that is this: *If the wil of God gives futurition to sin, then sin as future hath one and the same idea with the wil of God: and so the futurition of sin must be God.* This objection is urged and adorned with many Trophies by *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, and a Divine of name among us. So *Strangius*, *lib.* 3. *cap.* 9. *pag.* 631, 632. having *pag.* 626, &c. recited *Twisses* argument *from the eternal futurition of sin*, he replies thus: *Herein*, saith he, *lies the whole force of the argument, that there can be no other cause of a futurition made from Eternitie, but what is eternal.* To which he answers with a scoffe thus: *A pretty argumentation indeed! why may we not by the same reason prove, that the futurition of sin is God?* The same is urged by *Le Blanc*, *de Concord. Libert. par.* 1. *thes.* 55, 56. *pag.* 454. where he endeavors to prove against *Twisse*, *That if the futurition of sin be from the wil of God, it is God; which makes God manifestly the Author of sin.* The same is urged by a Divine of some note among us. But in answer hereto, I must confesse, I cannot but marvel at the confidence of persons so learned, and in other points judicious, on such infirme and rotten grounds: For when we speak of the futurition of sin, which is a complexe aggregate thing, we must distinguish its *material* from its *formal* part. (1) If we speak of the *material emitative part of sin*, which is in itself a natural good, so we may without the least violation of Gods sacred Majestie affirme, that its futurition is the same, or not really distinct from Gods wil the cause thereof: and why not? is not the futurition of al natural Beings good? And whence procedes al good but from the immense Ocean of good?

Yea,

Yea, was not al good from Eternitie loged in the boſome of God, and ſonot really diſtinct from him? So that indeed this objection of *Strangius* and *Le Blanc* againſt the futurition of the material entitative act of ſin from the wil of God ſtrikes at the futurition of althings, even the moſt gratioſe acts from the ſame wil: for if the futurition of any one natural act may be reſolved into the wil of man as its firſt cauſe, why may not the futurition of al grace be as wel reſolved into the ſame human wil, ſpecially in *Adams* innocent ſtate, who had then perfect free-wil? But yet (2) if we ſpeak of the futurition of ſin in regard of its *formal nature*, conſiſting in its vitioſitie and obliquitie, ſo we utterly denie, that its futurition is the ſame with God: for the futurition of ſin as to its vitioſitie is not from the effective wil of God, but permiſſive; God decrees to effect the entitative act, but only to permit the vitioſitie appendent thereto, which follows on the act, as other privations do on the abſence of their habit. To make this evident by a parallel inſtance; God decrees the diurnal motion of the Sun, and that at night it ſhal retire into the other Hemiſphere, whence darkneſſe neceſſarily follows: may we thence argue, that the futurition of darkneſſe, or darkneſſe itſelf is the ſame with God? Would not any Freſh-man in Logic hiſſe ſuch a conſequence out of the Scholes? And yet who dares denie, but that the retirement of the Sun out of this Hemiſphere into the other is from God, as alſo its futurition? The like may be inſtanced in al other privations, which have no real being, and therefore no real efficient of their exiſtence or futurition: for nothing can admit a real efficient cauſe of its futurition, but what has a real efficient cauſe of its exiſtence: what is the firſt efficient of the exiſtence of things? Is it not the wil of God? and is it not alſo the ſame Divine wil that gives futurition to things? Yea doth not the very ſame act or decree of the Divine wil that gives real Beings their futurition, give them alſo, in their appointed periods of time, their exiſtence? So that in this regard the Rule of *Strangius* and *Le Blanc* is moſt true, That the ſame cauſe that gives things their exiſtence, gives them alſo their futurition: this I ſay holds true of the firſt cauſe, but not of ſecond cauſes, as they would needs perſuade us. So that, to conclude this argument, in as much as the wil of God gives futurition to al ſin, the effective wil of God to the entitative act or ſubſtrate mater of ſin, and the permiſſive wil of God to the formal reaſon, or vitio-

ſitie

ſitie of ſin, hence it neceſſarily follows, that the predeterminative Concurſe of God, (whereby I underſtand nothing elſe but the Efficacious Divine Wil as operative) gives exiſtence to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin.

§. 2. Our ſecond Argument ſhal be taken from the *certitude of Gods Preſcience*; and we may forme it thus: *God can certainly foreknow nothing, but what he certainly decrees, predefines, and predetermines to be: But God certainly foreknows al ſin.* Ergo. The Minor is granted by our Adverſaries and denied by none, that I know, except Atheiſts and Socinians: Thus *Job* 34. 21. *For his eyes are upon the wayes of man and he ſeeth al his goings.* Our principal worke therefore wil be to make good our Major; which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propoſitions: (1) Prop. *Nothing can be certainly foreknown by God, but what has ſome certain Reaſons, Principes, and Cauſes of ſuch a foreknowledge.* Now there are three cauſes that give certitude to al Science and Preſcience: [1] *A certitude of the Object:* for if the object be uncertain, the Science can never be certain: can the Structure or Edifice be firme, if the foundation be infirme? [2] *A certain Medium*, which is the principal fundamen of al Science. [3] *A certitude of the Subject:* for be the Object and Medium never ſo certain, yet there can be no certain Science, unleſs the Subject apprehend the ſame. And doth not the Preſcience of God include al theſe degrees of Certitude? Muſt there not be a certitude of the Object, Medium, and Subject? (2) Prop. *The Divine Preſcience as to future ſins admits not any of theſe degrees of certitude, but as originated from the Divine Wil and Decree.* [1] How can Sin as the Object of Divine Preſcience be certainly future, but by the efficacious Wil of God making it ſo? [2] What certain Medium can there be of Divine Preſcience, but the divine Wil and Decree? [3] And thence, how can God have a ſubjective Certitude of ſin but in and by his own Wil? Hence, (3) Prop. *Gods certain Preſcience of Sin infers alſo a certain predefinition and predetermination of the ſubſtrate mater of Sin. That God knows nothing future but by his decree making it future*, has been the perſuaſion not only of Calviniſts, but alſo of the moſt ſober Scholemen in al Ages, *Scotus*, *Ricardus*, *Hervæus*, *Bradwardine*, *Johannes Major*, and others not a few, as *Le Blanc*, *de Concord. Libert. Par.* 3. *Theſ.* 33. *p.* 443. confeſſeth. Yea, *Strangius* himſelf grants *the futurition of Sin in Gods Preſcience*,

2 Arg. *from the Certitude of Divine Preſcience.*

ence, as *l.* 3. *c.* 9. *p.* 640. Yea, *Le Blanc*, *De Concord. Libert. Hum. Par.* 1. *Theſ.* 59. &c. *p.* 455. proves ſtrongly, *That according to Strangius's opinion, there can no contingent* [i. e. ſinful act] *be foreknown by God as abſolutely future, but what God firſt decreed to be abſolutely future.* His words are theſe: 'But ſome alſo of thoſe who 'hold ſome free acts of God to be abſolutely future, and as ſuch to 'be foreknown by God, without any Decree predetermining the 'free cauſes to thoſe acts, as Learned *Strangius*, yet denie, that free 'future contingents may be known by God according to any Hy-'potheſis, which doth not include an abſolute Decree concerning 'their futurition: as *Strang. de Volunt. l.* 3. *c.* 11. His reaſon is, be-'cauſe nothing can be certainly known, but what is certainly true: 'but nothing is certainly true, but what is neceſſary either abſo-'lutely or conditionally. Whence he collects, that future condi-'tionates cannot be the Object of divine Science, which is infallible 'and moſt certain, unleſſe there be included the condition, whence 'that which is ſaid to be future may be certainly inferred. But 'if this reaſon prevails, God can foreknow nothing contingent 'as abſolutely future, but what he before decreed as abſolutely 'future; which yet *Strangius* admits not, who confeſſeth, that 'men act many things freely to which they are not predetermin-'ed by God. Thus *Le Blanc* of *Strangius*'s ſelf-contradicting Hypotheſis. And indeed, to ſpeak the truth nakedly, there ſeems ſo much force in *Strangius*'s reaſon, whereby he proves, *That al Gods Preſcience of free future Contingents includes an abſolute Decree of their futurition*, namely from the certainty of divine Preſcience, that I no way wonder that he urgeth the ſame, albeit to the ſubverſion of his own *Phænomena*. And I am very bold, yea confident in aſſerting, and demonſtrating theſe following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. *That God can have no certain Preſcience of things future, but from his own decree, the only certain determinate cauſe of their futurition.* And therefore the Socinians denying a certain determinate Cauſe of things contingent, denie alſo Gods Preſcience to be certain, as *Le Blanc*, *De Concord. P.* 3. *Theſ.* 1. *p.* 438. and I cannot ſee how any can rationally avoid the *Socinian* objection, who do not reſolve the certitude of the divine Preſcience into the divine Decree. Hence, (2) Prop. *There is an hypothetic or conſequential neceſſitie that ariſeth from Gods certain Preſcience.* This is wel urged, though in the defenſe of an hell-bred Hypotheſis, by the Socinians, and cited by *Le Blanc* (as a knot

knot not eaſily untied) *de Concord. Par.* 3. *Theſ.* 22. pag. 441. 'There is, ſaith he, much of difficultie here, which in times paſt 'has exerciſed the ingenies of Doctors. For ſeeing it is impoſſible, 'that the Preſcience of God may be deceived, it cannot be but 'that thoſe things muſt happen, which God foreſees wil happen; 'and therefore that althings happen neceſſarily: and it is im-'poſſible, but that the very wil of man muſt produce thoſe acts, 'which God from eternity foreknew it would produce. This Objection I deſpair ever to ſee rationally anſwered by our Adverſaries without contradicting their own Hypotheſis. See more of this *Chap.* 6. §. 5. Hence (3) Prop. *The ſame arguments that are urged by our Opponents againſt Gods predetermining the Wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, may be, as they are by the Socinians, urged with as great force againſt Gods certain Preſcience of Sin.* For our Adverſaries, *Strangius*, *Le Blanc*, &c. granting the certain futurition of ſin in the eternal Preſcience of God, fal under al thoſe Imputations and black Conſequences which they charge on us, who aſſert the predefinition, futuriton, and predetermination of the ſubſtrate mater of Sin in the divine Decree. This Propoſition is incomparably wel demonſtrated by judicious *Davenant*, in his *Animadverſions on Gods Love to Mankind*, p. 418, 419, 442, 462. where he proves, That *Infallible Preſcience granted by the Arminians, infers as much neceſſitie on the Wil, as abſolute Predeſtination and Reprobation.* Of which more in our next Argument; alſo *c.* 6. §. 5.

Let us now a little inquire into the Subterfuges which our Adverſaries take Sanctuarie in to ſecure themſelves from the force of this Argument taken from Divine Preſcience. And here at what a miſerable loſſe and confuſion are they among themſelves? How few of them agree on any one Principe or Medium for the ſolving this argument? Some flie for refuge to the Moliniſts *Middle Science*, telling us, *That God foreſaw that men being placed under ſuch hypotheſes, and circumſtances, would ſin againſt him*, &c. Thus *Baronius*, *Metaphyſ. Sect.* 12. *Diſp.* 2. *n.* 55, 56. p. 326. where he profeſſedly defendes *Fonſeca's conditionate Science*, making *God to have a conditionate Science of the firſt ſin, if* Eve *ſeduced by the Serpent ſhould tempt* Adam, *&c.* Thus alſo one and another Divine of good note among us. But this ſubterfuge is greatly diſliked by the more ſober of this new Method, particularly by *Strangius*; who, *l.* 3. *c.* 11. *p.* 651. proves nervoſely, That there can be no ſuch thing as a *Middle*

or *conditionate Science in God, because its Object is not certainly Cognoscible, or Knowable*: and this he proves; *because an object cannot be certainly known, unlesse it be certainly true: which the object of this conditionate Middle Science is not.* Thus also *Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par.* 1. p. 452, &c. Others therefore perceiving the infirmitude of this evasion, have recourse to the Dominicans *real presence of things future in Eternitie*; whereby they make *God, by his Science of Vision, to behold the sins of men.* Thus *Strangius, l.* 3. *c.* 10. *p.* 646. *If it be demanded,* saith he, *to what Science Gods Knowledge of Sins must be referred, I easily grant that it is to be referred to his Science of Vision,* &c. But more fully, *l.* 3. *c.* 7. *p.* 594. *Among al the modes which are wont to be explicated, there is none more probable than that which is taken from the presence of allthings in Eternitie; because the Eternitie of God is Insuccessive and Indivisible.* The same he inculcates, *p.* 595, 596, 597. But this mode also of solving the difficultie, is greatly opposed, by some of his own party, the New Methodists, who take some pains to shew the invaliditie thereof. So *Le Blanc, De Concord. Libert. Par.* 3. *Thes.* 37. *p.* 443. *First,* saith he, *as for that real presence of futures in Eternitie, namely as they are supposed to coëxiste from eternitie to eternitie it self, it appears to be a mere figment; for that one thing coexiste to another, it is necessary that both existe,* &c. Thus also a learned and pious Divine among our selves, who has espoused *Strangius*'s Hypothesis, fals foul on the Thomists for asserting, *Allthings to be eternally present to the divine Intellect in esse reali,* &c. Lastly, others therefore to evade the fore-mentioned inconveniences, take up their refuge under *the Infinitie of Gods Prescience.* Thus *Le Blanc, De Concord.* Par. 1. Thes. 40. p. 444. *As for the fourth opinion, which seeks the certitude of the divine Prescience in the infinitie of the divine Intellect, and in the determinate truth of those things which are contingently future, it establisheth nothing but what is certain and indubitable,* &c. Yet he grants, Thes. 41. *That albeit this opinion contains in it nothing but truth, yet it doth not satisfie the Question, nor remove the main difficultie,* namely, *How things passe from a state of possibilitie to a state of futurition,* &c. Whence he concludes, Thes. 43. *Sithat there is so much darknesse on every side, there is nothing more safe than to professe our Ignorance in this particular.* And this indeed is the best refuge these New Methodists have, when they see themselves involved in so many self-contradictions, and absurdities,

to

to profeſſe their Ignorance as to the Mode of Divine Preſcience. Yea, ſome of them procede ſo far in this pretended modeſtie, as to profeſſe, *That the mode of Divine Preſcience is not determined in Scripture.* Thus *Strangius, l.* 3. *c.* 5. *p.* 576. *That God is omniſciens is put out of dout, but touching the mode and manner of Preſcience nothing is expreſſely delivered in Scripture.* The like others. But is it ſo indeed? Doth not the Scripture declare expreſſely the mode of Preſcience? Why then (1) are our Adverſaries ſo dogmatic and poſitive in their new modes and meaſures of Divine Preſcience, contrary to the received Sentiments of the Church in al Ages? How comes it to paſſe, that they contend with ſo much heat and paſſion, for that which they confeſſe is not expreſſely delivered in Scripture? Were not a modeſt ἐποχὴ or *ſuſpenſion* of aſſent more agreeable to ſuch a Confeſſion? But (2) We eaſily grant them, that the mode of Divine Preſcience is unſearchable and paſt finding out, as indeed al Divine Perfections are; but yet muſt we thence neceſſarily conclude, *that nothing* of the mode of Divine Preſcience is expreſſely delivered in Scripture? [1] Doth not the Scripture evidently declare, That the mode of Gods Preſcience is far above yea oppoſite to that of Mans ſcience, as much as Heaven is above the Earth, yea infinitely more? [2] Doth not the Scripture alſo remove from the mode of Divine Preſcience al manner of Imperfections, much more Contradictions? And is not the mode of Gods Preſcience in his own Eſſence and Decrees, much more perfect than that which makes his Infallible immutable Preſcience dependent on the mutable fallible Wil of Man? But ſee more hereof, *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *c.* 5. §. 2.

§. 3. We paſſe on to our third Argument, which ſhal be taken from *the Divine Wil and Decrees*; and more particularly from *the Decree of Reprobation.* And here we ſhal lay down this Principe, which is granted by *Strangius*, and others of the New Method, *That Divine Predetermination is adequate and commenſurate to Divine Predefinition* or *Predeſtination.* So *Strangius, l.* 3. *c.* 2. *p.* 547. *We eaſily grant*, ſaith he, *that the predefinition of God from eternitie, and the predetermination of the create wil in time, mutualy follow each other, ſo that if God doth abſolutely predefine any particular and ſingular act to be brought about by us, he muſt alſo determine our Wil to the ſame.* This he inculcates, *c.* 5. *p.* 584. Now this ingenuous Conceſſion is as much as we deſire to build our Demon-

3 Arg. *from the Decree of Reprobation.*

Demonſtration on: for we no way dout but to demonſtrate, *That God doth abſolutely predefine the material entitative act of Sin:* Which we ſhal endeavour to make good in the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. *Reprobation admits no formal motive, proper condition or cauſe.* This Propoſition is generally denyed by the New Methodiſts, who grant, *That God decrees al good abſolutely, but as for Sin,* ſay they, *God decrees that only reſpectively and conditionally.* So *Strangius,* l. 3. c. 2. p. 546—548. But we no way dout, but, before we have finiſht this Demonſtration, to make it evident, that Gods Decree of Reprobation, whereby he determines to leave men to ſin, is abſolute, as wel as the Decree of Election: Yea, it is to me a thing altogether impoſſible, to defend an abſolute Decree of Election, and yet to make the Decree of Reprobation conditional and reſpective: for if the abſolute good pleaſure of God be the only cauſe why ſome are elected, muſt it not alſo be the only cauſe why others are rejected? Doth not the Election of the one neceſſarily implie the Reprobation of the other? It's true, our Divines, that follow the Sublapſarian mode, as *Davenant,* &c. ſpeak of Sin as a commun condition belonging to the whole maſſe of corrupt nature, yet they allow not of any *diſtinctive condition* or *formal cauſe* or motive, which ſhould incline the divine wil to reprobate one rather than another: for nothing can move the divine Wil, but what is ſome way antecedent to it: Now the conſideration of al ſin is ſubſequent to ſome act of Gods Wil. (2) Prop. *The act of Reprobation is not merely negative, but poſitive and efficacious.* It's granted, that ſome of our Divines make mention of a negative act of Reprobation, which they terme *Non-election,* or *Preterition,* yet hereby they intend not a *ſuſpenſe act* of the Divine wil, but include alſo a poſitive efficacious act. Thus *Janſenius, Auguſt. de Grat. Chriſti, l.* 10. *c.* 2. *pag.* 420. proves out of *Auguſtin, That Gods negative Reprobation is poſitive.* So *Davenant, Diſſert. de Elect. & Reprob.* p. 113. *But we muſt take heed,* ſaith he, *leſt with* Scotus *we think, that the Wil of God in regard of Reprobates, which he electes not but paſſeth by, is merely negative: for in this very act, which we expreſſe by a Negation, is contained an expreſſe and affirmate Wil of God.* So in his *Determinations,* Quæſt. 25. p. 117. he tels us, *That it's moſt certain, there can be no Decree permitting ſin, to which there doth not adhere ſome efficacious Decree.* And p. 118. he inſtructs us, *That this Decree of permitting ſin is efficacious, not in a way of efficience,*

ence, but by directing and ordaining to extract good out of evil. (3) Prop. *In the mater of Reprobation God is considered as a soverain Absolute Lord, not as a Righteous Judge.* The Pelagians, Molinists, Arminians, and New Methodists confider God in the act of Reprobation as a just Judge, not as a supreme absolute Lord: whence they conclude, that it is unjust with God to reprobate any but on the prevision of their sins; not considering, that Reprobation is not an act inflicting punishment, but of denying Benefits, wherein the Libertie and Dominion of God is only to be attended; according to that of the Apostle, *Rom.* 9. 21. *Has not the Potter power over the clay,* &c? What is soverain Dominion, but an absolute right to dispose of what is our own? And shal we not allow the same Dominion to God, which is allowed to the Potter over his Clay? Is the soverain Lord tied to his Creature by any Law, more than what is in his own nature and wil? Hence it follows, (4) *That the Decree of Reprobation is most absolute and Independent as to al distinctive conditions or causes in man.* Thus *Jansenius, August. de Grat. Christi,* l. 10. c. 4. p. 423. proves out of *Augustin, That the absolute Wil of God is the alone cause of Reprobation.* And *Augustin* complains, *That it is a great injurie to God, when men search for causes of things superior to his soverain Wil: for his Wil is such a supreme Rule of Justice, as that whatever he wils is for that very reason, because he wils it, to be accounted just.* So *Bradwardine, de Causa Dei,* l. 1. c. 47. proves strongly, *That albeit God punisheth no man eternally without sin committed in time; yet he doth not eternally reprobate any for sin as a Cause antecedently moving his divine Wil.* So *Alvarez, de Auxil. Disput.* 109. 3ª Conclus. *The positive act, whereby God from eternitie would not admit some into his Kingdome, was not conditionate, but absolute, antecedent, in a moment of Reason, to the il use of Free wil. And it is proved,* [1] *Because there can be no cause of Reprobation.* [2] *Because supernatural Beatitude is not due to any upon the account of natural improvements: Therefore God could from al eternitie without any Injurie, before the Prescience of the good or il use of free wil, elect some to life eternal, and by a positive act wil not to admit others.* And our Divines generally grant, *That there can be no other cause assigned of Reprobation, than the absolute* εὐδοκία *or good pleasure of God.*

But none is more categoric and positive in this, than judicious *Davenant,* (who yet in some points came nigh the new Methodists) in *Davenant's Hypotheses about absolute Reprobation.*

in his incomparable Animadverſions *on Gods love to mankind.* Wherein he doth puiſſantly defend the following particulars greatly conducing to the eſtabliſhment of our Hypotheſis. [1] *That Gods ſecret wil of good pleaſure is very different from his reveled, preceptive, complacential wil,* as *pag.* 221, 349, 376. [2] *That Gods reveled, complacential, approbative wil is the meaſure of our dutie, but not of Gods decrees or operations,* pag. 222, 356, 391, 399. [3] *That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleaſure is only properly his wil,* pag. 392. [4] *That Gods beneplacite wil or good pleaſure is moved by nothing but itſelf,* pag. 375, 376. [5] *That the abſolute Decrees of God contradict not general conditional promiſſes of life and threats of death,* pag. 241, 332, 375, 387, 398. [6] *That God may be ſaid, according to his wil of complacence and approbation, to intend the ſalvation of ſinners, yea Reprobates, by providing the means of grace conducing thereto,* pag. 271, 376, 394. [7] *That the externe means and offers of grace muſt be meaſured and interpreted according to the knowen nature of the means, not the unknowen wil of God,* pag. 353. [8] *That God, by his approbative complacential wil unfeignedly wils what he commands,* pag. 329, 393, 394, 401. [9] *That al under the means of grace are under ſome remote conditional poſſibilitie of ſalvation,* pag. 256, 257. [10] *That Gods evangelic, providential intention of ſaving ſinners is oft fruſtrated as to its events by mans ſin, although his decretive beneplacite intention is never fruſtrated,* p. 377, 381, 387, 388, 395. [11] *That abſolute Election and Reprobation may ſtand with a poſſibilitie to contrary events, though not with contrary events,* pag. 240, 333, 341, 360, 402, 253. [12] *That abſolute Decrees oppoſe not the Juſtice of God; with its difference from that of men,* pag. 232, 321, 336, 339, 342. [13] *That abſolute Decrees oppoſe not Gods Holineſſe,* pag. 240— 272. [14] *That abſolute Decrees oppoſe not the Mercie of God,* pag. 277— 310. [15] *That mere conditional Decrees are inconſiſtent with Gods ſoverain Being and Independence,* pag. 226. [16] *That abſolute Reprobation is not repugnant to Gods Truth,* pag. 349— 362. [17] *That abſolute Reprobation takes not away the end and uſe of Gods gifts,* pag. 374— 404. [18] *That abſolute Reprobation leaves no man under an abſolute neceſſitie or compulſion to ſin,* pag. 253. [19] *Let Reprobation be abſolute or conditional it leaves the ſame poſſibilitie and libertie to the Agents,* pag. 333, 340, 341, 351, 360. [20] *That the Arminians grant an abſolute, immutable, fixed Decree of Reprobation, which admits the ſame objections that they urge againſt the Calviniſts,* p. 302, 332,

332,333,340,351, 354, 400, 418, 419. [21] *Infallible Preſcience granted by the Arminians infers as much neceſſitie on the wil, and compulſion to ſin as abſolute Reprobation*, pag. 418, 419, 442, 462. [22] Laſtly, he ſhews us, *What is the right uſe and abuſe of abſolute Decrees*, pag. 454---526. Theſe Propoſitions clearly and fully explicated by our judicious *Davenant* give great evidence and demonſtration to our Hypotheſis, as alſo diſtinct ſolution to the objections of our Opponents, of which hereafter, *Chap.* 6.

§. 4. Our next Argument ſhal be taken from *Divine Concurſe, its Principe, Nature, and Efficace*; the explication whereof wil give us a ful demonſtration of our Hypotheſis; which we ſhal endeavor to lay down in the following Particulars. 4. *Arg. from Divine Concurſe.*

1. That God predetermines the wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act of that which is ſinful, may be demonſtrated from the *Principe of al Divine Concurſe*. What is the active principe of al Divine Concurſe, but the Divine wil? Doth not ſacred Pagine expreſſely ſpeak ſo much? So *Eph.* 1. 11. *Who worketh althings after the counſel of his own wil.* And more particularly as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin it's ſaid, *Act.* 4. 28. that thoſe who crucified our Lord, *did acte but what Gods hand, or wil and counſel predetermined to be done*, of which before. And *Strangius* himſelf grants us, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 11. *pag.* 63. *That concurſe, as to its prime act is in God, and the ſame with God.* Now ſuch is the Omnipotence of the Divine wil, that althings muſt neceſſarily be done, which he wils to be done, and in that manner as he wils them, as *Aquinas* wel determines. How then is it poſſible, but that if God wil that the ſubſtrate mater of ſin exiſte, it muſt neceſſarily exiſte, and in that manner as he wils it? Can any perſon or thing reſiſte the Divine efficacious wil? And what is al active concurſe but the determination of the ſame efficacious wil? See more of Gods wil being the ſpring and principe of Divine concurſe, *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *C.* 7. §. 3. 1. *Its Principe.* Cùm voluntas Divina ſit efficaciſſima, non ſolùm ſequitur, quòd fiant ea quæ Deus fieri vult, ſed quòd eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri velit, *Aquin. part.* 1.

2. That God predetermines the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin may be demonſtrated from the nature of Divine concurſe as to its *Totalitie, Univerſalitie as to effects, Particularitie as to manner of working, Immediation, Antecedence, and ſoverain abſolute Independence.* (1) The *Totalitie* of Divine concurſe ſufficiently demonſtrates its predetermination as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. That Gods concurſe to al ſecond cauſes, acts, and effects is total we have ſufficiently demonſtrated, *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *C.* 7. *pag.* 417. 2. *Its Nature.* 1. *Totalitie.*

Adeò ut tota actio pendeat à Deo, & tota à Creatura.

Thus much is alſo granted by *Strangius*, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 55. where he aſſertes, *That the whole action dependes on God, as alſo on the creature; otherwiſe God ſhould not concur immediately:* Though I am not ignorant that a Divine of name among us, as alſo of the ſame partie with *Strangius*, denies Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin to be total; yet becauſe he is ſingular therein, and different from his own partie, I ſhal take it for granted, *that Gods concurſe is total*, and thence endeavor to prove its predetermining the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. For if God totally concur to the ſubſtrate act of ſin, muſt he not alſo concur to the wil that puts forth that act? And if God concur to the wil in the production of the act, muſt he not alſo neceſſarily determine the wil to that act? That Gods total concurſe doth not only reach the act and effect, but alſo the wil itſelf is granted by *Strangius*, *lib.*2. *cap.*6. *pag.* 171. 'Neither, ſaith he, do we ſay, that the Concurſe 'of God doth reach only the effect, but not the efficient cauſe, 'ſithat the very ἐνέργεια, *Energie* of the ſecond cauſe muſt be from 'God; and the action is not leſſe an effect than the work, *&c.*

2. *Univerſalitie.*

(2) The *Univerſalitie* of Divine concurſe as to al effects whatſoever gives us a further demonſtration of its efficacious predetermination as to the entitative act of ſin. That Divine concurſe is univerſally extenſive to al acts of the wil, as wel as to al other objects, by giving forces and aſſiſtances to faculties, exciting and appling them to their acts, and ordering them ſo as that they may in the beſt manner reach their ends, we have copioſely demonſtrated, *Court Gent. Part* 4. *Book* 2. *Chap.* 7. §. 2. *pag.* 296, 297. And doth not this ſufficiently demonſtrate Gods concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin to be predeterminative? Yea, to ſpeak properly, is there, or can there be any real efficience, influxe, or concurſe ſent forth by God as the prime univerſal cauſe of al things, which is not predeterminative? To talke of an univerſal general concurſe of God, which immediately influenceth the wil and al its natural acts, and yet doth not predetermine, *i.e.* excite and applie the wil to its act, what is it but pure non-ſenſe and virtual contradiction?

3. *Particularitie.*

(3) The *Particularitie* of Gods concurſe as to its manner of working doth alſo invictly demonſtrate its predetermination as to the entitative act of ſin. Divine concurſe, albeit it be univerſal as to the extent of its object, yet it's moſt particular and proper as to its manner of working. Our Adverſaries generally, both Pelagians,

Pelagians, Moliniſts, Arminians, and New Methodiſts talke much of a general indifferent concurſe, alike commun to al effects, and determinable by its ſubſtrate mater; as the general influence of the Sun is determinable by the mater it workes on. But, alas! how unbecoming and incongruous to the Divine perfections is ſuch a general indifferent concurſe? Doth not this make the firſt cauſe to be ſecond, becauſe dependent; and the ſecond cauſe firſt, becauſe independent? And doth it not hence alſo neceſſarily follow, that the firſt cauſe may, by the indiſpoſition of the mater or reſiſtence of ſecond Agents, be fruſtrated of its intended effect? What more expreſſely overthrows the ſoverain Dominion and univerſal Concurſe of God, than ſuch a general indifferent Concurſe? And yet is not this one of the moſt plauſible ſubterfuges our Adverſaries have to ſhelter themſelves under? They object, If God ſhould by a particular predeterminative concurſe determine the will to act in ſins intrinſecally evil, as the hatred of God, or the like, then the ſpecification of the act and moral determination of it to its particular object would be from God; and ſo God inevitably ſhould be the Author of ſin. This is their principal and indeed their only objection worth a naming againſt our Hypotheſis; to which we intend a more ful anſwer in the next Chapter, §. 1. at preſent let this ſuffice, [1] We ſay not, that God is a *particular cauſe*, but *univerſal*, working in and by a particular concurſe ſuitable to the indigence of the mater it workes on. [2] We ſay not, that this particular Concurſe of God doth *morally ſpecifie*, or determine the ſinful act to its object, but only phyſically individuate or naturally modifie the ſubſtrate mater of the ſinful act. This is incomparably wel explicated by Dr. *Samuel Ward*, that great Profeſſor of Theologie, in his Determination of Gods Concurſe, *pag.* 117. where he ſtrongly demonſtrates, *That the previous Concurſe of God, as the firſt cauſe, doth in its way modifie and determine al the actions of ſecond cauſes:* and if ſo, then ſurely the ſubſtrate entitative act of ſin, as hereafter. [3] That general indifferent concurſe, which our Adverſaries ſo warmly contend for, ſithat they grant it to be cauſative and influential on the ſinful act, doth equally infer God to be the Author of ſin, as our predeterminative concurſe. For if it be cauſative and effective of the act, then ſurely of that individual act, as determined to ſuch an object: for to talke of its concurrence to the act *in genere, in the general*, and not *in individuo*, in its individual determination

mination to its object, is ſuch an abſurditie in Philoſophie, that al awakened Philoſophers wil decrie it: for what Tyro cannot informe us, that al phyſical acts are *ſuppoſitorum, of individual ſingular ſubſtances*, and ſo without al peradventure individual and ſingular: and if ſo, then muſt not their general concurſe reach not only the action in general, but alſo individually conſidered, as relating to its object, not *morally*, but *phyſically?* And wil it not hence follow, that their general concurſe is cauſative of the entitative act, as determined to its object, and ſo makes God the Author of ſin, as much, at leaſt as wel as our predeterminative concurſe, as more fully *Chap.* 6. §. 1. Of the particularitie of Divine Concurſe ſee *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *C.* 7. §. 4.

4. *Immediation.* (4) The *Immediation* of Divine Concurſe ſtrongly demonſtrates the predetermination of the wil as to the entitative act of ſin thereby. Our Adverſaries generally, both Jeſuites, Arminians, and new Methodiſts, excepting ſome very few that adhere to *Durandus*, grant an immediate concurſe to the entitative act of ſin; which if wel followed wil neceſſarily infer predeterminative concurſe, ſpecially according to the conceſſions of the new Methodiſts, who ſay, *That this immediate concurſe reacheth not only the effect and act*, (which the Jeſuites and Arminians grant) but alſo the very wil itſelf, as the immediate efficient of the act. Touching this immediate Concurſe ſee *Strangius, lib.* 1. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 54, &c. & *lib.* 2. *cap.* 5. *pag.* 163. And among the Jeſuites none has more acutely demonſtrated this, than *Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſp.* 22. *Sect.* 1. and our Country-man *Campton Carleton*, in his *Philoſ. Univerſ. Diſp.* 28. *Sect.* 2, 3. *pag.* 318. & *Diſput.* 29. *Sect.* 1, 2. *pag.* 323, 324. where he demonſtrates ſtrongly, againſt *Lud. à Dola, That God immediately together with the creature produceth the very act of ſin.* Now hence we thus argue: If God, together with the human wil, immediately produceth the very act of ſin, then certainly he muſt of neceſſitie predetermine the wil to that entitative act: For ſuppoſe the ſinful act be *motus primò primus*, as they phraſe it, or a mere ſimple volition of the wil, how is it poſſible, that God ſhould immediately produce this act of the wil, without applying the wil to the act? Do not the very Jeſuites, *Suarez, Carleton*, with others grant, *That one and the ſame ſinful act is produced by God and the human wil?* And doth not *Strangius* with others of the New Methodiſts alſo acknowlege further, *That Gods Concurſe to this ſinful act of the wil is previous to that of the wil, not only ſimultaneous*, as

Strang.

Strang. lib. 1. *cap.* 10. *pag.* 56? Yea *Strangius* and thoſe of his perſuaſion grant yet more, *That Gods immediate concurſe reacheth not only the act and effect, but alſo the wil itſelf*, as *Strang. pag.* 171. And is it not moſt evident, from theſe ingenuous conceſſions of our Adverſaries, touching immediate concurſe, that God doth predetermine the wil to the entitative act of ſin? Can we imagine, that one and the ſame ſinful act ſhould be produced immediately by God and the human wil, and yet God not applie the wil to its act, which is al that is meant by predetermination? Yea, doth God not only concur with the wil to one and the ſame act, but alſo influence the wil in the production of that act, as *Strangius* and others grant, and yet not applie it to act? How is it poſſible, that God ſhould influence the wil in the production of any act, without actuating or drawing forth the wil to act? And if God actuate or draw forth the wil to act, doth he not applie it to the act, and ſo predetermine the ſame? Again, doth God by an immediate concurſe not only influence the wil and its act, but alſo antecedently and in a moment of reaſon and cauſalitie before the wil concurs to its own act, as *Strangius* alſo grants? and doth not this give us a more abundant demonſtration, that God predetermines the wil to that act? Can there be any previous concurſe immediately actuating and influencing the wil in its act, but what is predeterminative? Doth not the wil neceſſarily depend on the previous concurſe of the firſt cauſe? and if ſo, muſt it not be applied and predetermined to its act thereby? But more of this previous concurſe in our next Argument. Laſtly, if we allow (with the Jeſuites) unto God only an immediate concurſe to the act of the wil, al thoſe black conſequences which our Adverſaries caſt on the Aſſertors of predetermination, may with the ſame facilitie be reflected on them: for if they make God, by an immediate concurſe to concur to the act of ſin, do they not make him the cauſe and ſo the Author of ſin as wel as we? More of immediate Concurſe, ſee *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *C.* 7. § 4.

(5) The *Prioritie* and *Antecedence* of Divine Concurſe doth invictly demonſtrate its predetermining the wil as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts. We ſhal here reaſſume a Principe already eſtabliſhed, and granted by Jeſuites and New Methodiſts, namely, *That the action of the firſt cauſe concurring with the ſecond, is not, as to paſſive attingence, diſtinct from the action of the ſecond cauſe.* This is generally granted by the Moliniſts, as *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr.* 5. *Prioritie.*

Arbitr. par. 3. *theſ.* 28. *pag.* 433. and by *Janſenius*, *Auguſt. tom.* 1. *lib.* 5. *cap.* 20. *pag.* 119. It's true, the Concurſe of God the firſt cauſe is really different from that of the ſecond, as to *active attingence* or principe, becauſe Gods concurſe, actively conſidered, is the ſame with his wil; yet as to *paſſive attingence*, the action and effect produced by God differ not from the action and effect produced by the ſecond cauſe. This being premiſſed, we procede to demonſtrate Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the prioritie and antecedence of Divine concurſe, and that in and by the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. *The firſt cauſe doth in order of nature or cauſalitie concur before the ſecond.* This Propoſition is potently demonſtrated by the acute Dr. *Sam. Ward*, *Determinat. de Concurſ. Dei*, *pag.* 116, &c. And the arguments for it are invict: for [1] where there is ſubordination and dependence in cauſalitie, which is proper to every ſecond cauſe, there poſterioritie is eſſentially appendent. Again, [2] al ſecond cauſes in regard of God are but inſtruments, as *Aquinas* proves: yea the wil of man as dependent on God is but a vital inſtrument, albeit in regard of the effect it may ſometimes be termed a principal Agent: Now doth not every inſtrument ſubſerve the principal Efficient? And doth not that which is ſubſervient in order of cauſalitie move after that which is the principal Agent? But here we are to remember, that when we aſſert Gods Concurſe to be *previous* in regard of its principe and independence, we denie not, but that it is alſo *ſimultaneous* in regard of the action and effect produced by the ſecond cauſe, as *Alvarez*, *lib.* 3. *de Auxil. Diſput.* 19. *num.* 4. & *Twiſſe*, *Vind. Grat. lib.* 2. *de Criminat. part.* 3. *pag.* 56. But that which we denie is, *That Gods Concurſe is ſolely concomitant and ſimultaneous*; and that [3] becauſe this ſimultaneous concurſe makes God only a partial cauſe, and dependent on the ſecond cauſe in the production of its effect. Yea, ſome of the Jeſuites grant, That if we conſider the concurſe of God abſolutely, without reſpect to this or that ſecond cauſe, ſo it is in order of nature before the influxe of the ſecond cauſe. So *Fonſeca*, *Metaphyſ. lib.* 6. *cap.* 2. *quæſt.* 5. *ſect.* 13. The like *Strangius*, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 11. *pag.* 60, 61. Thus alſo *Burgerſdicius*, *Metaphyſ. lib.* 2. *cap.* 11. grants, Gods concurſe in ſupernaturals to be *previous*, albeit in naturals he would have it to be only *ſimultaneous*: which is moſt abſurd: for the active concurſe of God, being nothing elſe but the immanent act of his wil, muſt neceſſarily be the

the ſame in naturals as in ſupernaturals. More of the prioritie and Antecedence of the Divine Concurſe, ſee *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 416.* Hence, (2) Prop. *This previous Concurſe of God as the firſt Cauſe muſt neceſſarily move and applie every ſecond cauſe to its act and effect.* For how is it poſſible, that the ſecond cauſe ſhould act, unleſſe the firſt move and applie it to its act? Can a ſecond cauſe move it ſelf to an act, unleſſe it be firſt moved thereto by the firſt cauſe? Whence, (3) Prop. *This previous Concurſe of God in applying and moving the Wil of man to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin predetermines the ſame.* For if one and the ſame ſinful action be produced by God and the human Wil, and God concurs in order of nature before the wil, yea premove and applie it to the act, muſt he not neceſſarily predetermine the ſame? Al the wit and ſubtilitie of our Adverſaries wil never extricate themſelves or ſatisfie any awakened mind in this point, *How God doth by a previous concurſe move and actuate the Wil, and yet not predetermine it to the act.* Indeed to ſpeak the truth, the Sentiments not only of the Arminians, but alſo of the new Methodiſts, *Baronius*, *Strangius* and others about Concurſe, fal in with thoſe of the Jeſuites for a *ſimultaneous Concurſe* only, albeit ſome of them in termes diſown it.

(6) Laſtly, the *ſoverain and abſolute Independence* of Gods Concurſe gives us further demonſtration of his predetermining the wil as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. That Gods Concurſe is not *Conditionate* but *abſolute* and *independent*, we have copioſely proved, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. c. 7. §. 4. p. 412, &c.* And indeed, what more abſurd, yea impoſſible, than ſuch a conditionate Concurſe, whereby the Moliniſts and Arminians ſuppoſe Gods concurrence to depend on mans? Is there not hereby an effectual dore opened to a progreſſe into infinite? For if God concur on condition that man concur, doth God concur to that condition, or not? If not, is there not then ſome act of the creature produced without Gods concurſe? If God concur to the working of that condition, then *abſolutely*, or *conditionally*: if *abſolutely*, then his former Concurſe is not conditional: if *conditionally*, then what an infinitude of Conditions will follow hence? We take it then for granted, that Gods Concurſe is not conditional, but abſolute and independent. And hence we thus argue: If God concur abſolutely and independently to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, then he doth predetermine the wil thereto: the conſequence is rational and

6. Abſolute Independence.

and clear: For where two Agents concur totally and immediately to one and the ſame action and effect, the one muſt neceſſarily depend on the other; and that which depends on another muſt be determined by that other: for every cauſe that is dependent on another, is ſo far as it depends thereon determinable thereby. It's true, natural corporeous effects have ſome dependence on the Sun, without being determined thereby, becauſe the Sun is a limited cauſe, and has not efficace ſufficient to determine the mater is workes on, but is rather determined thereby, and ſo in that reſpect dependent thereon: But as for God the firſt cauſe whoſe wil, the principe of his concurſe, is omnipotent and moſt efficacious, it's impoſſible, that he ſhould have any dependence on, or be any way determinable in his concurſe by the mater he workes on: he being the moſt univerſal cauſe, infinitely perfect, and void of al potentialitie or paſſive power muſt neceſſarily predetermine al ſecond cauſes to their acts, but be determined by none. But more of this in what immediately follows of the efficace of Gods Concurſe.

3. The efficace of Divine Concurſe proves predetermination.

3. Having demonſtrated Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the *Principe* and *Nature* of Divine concurſe, we now procede to demonſtrate the ſame from the *Efficace* thereof. *Strangius, lib. 1. cap. 11. pag. 61.* albeit he denies Gods *general Concurſe*, whereby he concurs to the mater of ſin, to be predeterminative, yet he grants it is *efficacious*, calling it ἐνέργειαν, *the force and efficace of God, whereby he ſubordinates ſecond cauſes to himſelf; ſo that whatever they are or act, they eſſentially depend on him in both reſpects.* And this ingenuous conceſſion touching the efficace of Divine concurſe, is al that we require to build our preſent Demonſtration on, which we ſhal diſtribute into two branches, (1) Gods efficacious concurſe unto al *natural acts* and *effects.* (2) Gods efficacious concurſe to al *ſupernatural acts* and *effects.*

Nos autem eo nomine, [ſc. influxus communis] non determinationem ſeu prædeterminationem intelligimus, ſed vim, ἐνέργειαν, & efficaciam Dei, quâ cauſas ſecundas ſibi ſubordinat, &c. *Strang. l. 1. c. 11.*

1. Efficacious Concurſe as to natural acts.

1. We ſhal demonſtrate Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin from the efficacitie of Divine concurſe as to al *natural acts and effects*; which evidently appears in the following particulars. (1) *Gods concurſe to al phyſic or natural cauſes, motions, and effects is moſt efficacious.* This Propoſition the ſacred Scriptures do abundantly confirme, as *Eſa. 26. 12. Rom. 11. 36. Eph. 1. 11. Act. 17. 28.* of which before *Chap. 3. §. 1.* Thus much *Strangius* and thoſe of his perſuaſion grant us, as before, *c. 2. §. 1.*

(2) *The efficace of Divine concurſe dependes on the efficace and determination*

mination of the Divine wil. For what is efficacious concurſe, conſidered actively, but the efficacitie of the Divine wil predetermining to act ſo or ſo? To preſume that active concurſe is any thing elſe but an immanent efficacious act of the Divine wil is to croſſe the mind of ſacred Scriptures and the moſt awakened Divines, as we have copioſely demonſtrated, *Court Gent. P. 4. B. 2. C. 7. §. 3.* (3) *Gods wil being efficacious and determinate determines al ſecond cauſes to al their natural actions and effects.* Is it not impoſſible, but that the wil of God being omnipotent and determined for the production of ſuch an action of mans wil, the ſaid action or effect muſt neceſſarily follow? Is not the wil of God ſufficiently potent to determine the wil of man in al its natural acts? Is not the efficacitie of the Divine wil ſo great, that not only thoſe things are done, which God wils ſhal be done, but in that manner as he wils them? Doth not *Strangius* confeſſe ſo much *lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 55.* & *lib. 2. cap. 11. pag. 266.*? Whence if God in his own wil purpoſe and determine, that the human wil ſhould produce ſuch or ſuch an action, ſuppoſe that whereto ſin is neceſſarily annexed, is not the human wil neceſſarily in regard of the Divine wil, and yet freely in regard of its own manner of working predetermined thereto? This is moſt evident in the crucifixion of our Lord, expreſſed, *Act. 2. 23. By the determinate counſel, τῇ ὡρισμένῃ βουλῇ, i. e. by the decreed, fixed, determined wil of God.* The like *Act. 4. 28.* of which places before, *Chap. 3. §. 2.* Hence (4) *The efficacious concurſe of God modifies, and according to its mode determines al actions of ſecond cauſes, not only neceſſarily but freely.* Doth the Divine wil determine itſelf to the production of every ſingular individual effect? and may it not, yea muſt it not then determine the human wil to al its natural acts? Has mans infirme ambulatorie wil power to determine al ſuch faculties, acts and effects as are ſubject to its Empire? and has not the Divine wil, which is infinitely more efficacious, power to determine al inferior powers, acts and effects ſubject to its univerſal Dominion? And doth it not hence follow, that the ſoverain Divine wil doth by its efficacious concurſe predetermine al the free acts of the human wil, which neceſſarily fal under its Empire and modification? See this wel demonſtrated by that judicious Profeſſor *Sam. Ward, Determinat. de Concurſu Dei, pag.* 118, &c. Whence (5) *The efficacious predeterminative concurſe of God equally extendes itſelf to al natural good, even to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts.* *Strangius* and others of

Non ſolùm ſunt ea quæ Deus vult fieri, ſed etiam eo modo fiunt quo Deus vult fieri, *Strang. l. 2. c. 11. p. 266.*

Act. 2. 23.

our Opponents grant, That Gods efficacious predetermining Concurſe extendes it ſelf not only to al ſupernatural good, but alſo to al natural good, that has not ſin intrinſecally annexed to it: whence we may, by a paritie of reaſon demonſtrate divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of al actions, though never ſo intrinſecally evil: for the ſubſtrate mater of al actions though intrinſecally evil, is naturally good. Take the Hatred of God, which is reckoned to be an act moſt intrinſecally evil, and if we conſider it in its ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, ſo it is *naturally good*, and if it were exerted againſt ſin, its proper object, it would be alſo *morally good:* So that indeed the ſubſtrate mater of bad and good actions is the ſame, namely ſome natural good, and Gods Concurſe to the one and other is the ſame. Yea this indeed is acknowledged by *Strangius, l. 2. c. 3. p. 154. Al natural acts are good by the bonitie of Being*, i. e. entitatively and naturally—whence he concludes, *and ſo as to Concurſe we ſay, that God concurs in the ſame manner to generation from lawful Matrimonie and that from adulterie; becauſe the action on both ſides is phyſically of the ſame kind.* A great conceſſion indeed, which would our Adverſaries fully come up unto, how ſoon and how eaſily might we put a period to this Controverſie? For if the ſame action may be, as to its ſubſtrate mater naturally good and ſinful, and both phyſically of the ſame kind, and ſo Gods Concurſe to both the ſame, why then may not God be allowed to predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is ſinful, as wel as to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is good? Surely if the action be, as to its ſubſtrate mater, in one and t'other naturally good, and phyſically of one and the ſame kind, there can be no rational account given, why God ſhould not predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is evil, as wel as to that which is good. In ſhort, as there is no moral act ſo perfect in this imperfect ſtate, but has ſome vitioſitie adherent to it, ſo there is no natural act ſo ſinful, but it has for its ſubſtrate mater ſome natural good: and as God by predetermining the wil to the moral good is no way the Author of the vitioſitie appendent to the act; ſo by predetermining it to the natural ſubſtrate mater of the ſinful act, he is as much exemted from being the Author of the ſin. The ſubſtrate mater of the one and the other being the ſame, of which more §. 5.

Et ſic quantum ad concurſum attinet dicimus, Deum concurrere eodem modo ad generationem ex legitimo matrimonio & adulterio, quia phyſicè eadem eſt ſpecie utrobique actio. *Strang. l. 2. c. 3. p. 154.*

2. *Efficacious Concurſe as to ſupernatural Acts and Effects.*

2. We procede to demonſtrate Divine Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin from the Efficacitie of Divine Concurſe

curſe as to *ſupernatural Acts and Effects*. Our Adverſaries the New Methodiſts, *Baronius* only excepted, grant that *efficacious Concurſe as to ſupernatural good is predeterminative*; from which we no way dout, but to draw an invict Demonſtration, that Divine Concurſe is alſo predeterminative as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſinful acts, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil. This Province we ſhal endeavor to make good by ſeveral Arguments, (1) From the Principe of al *Predetermination:* what is the principe of al Predetermination, but the omnipotent efficacious wil of God? And how are al Acts and Effects predetermined by the Divine Wil, but by an immutable predeterminative Decree, termed his *Determinate Counſel*, Act. 2. 23? which is ſaid, *Act.* 4. 28. *to predetermine* the Crucifixion of Chriſt? Doth not therefore the ſame *determinate Counſel* or wil of God predetermine the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, as wel as any act morally good? Is not then predetermination as to its *active Attingence* or principe one and the ſame, both as to natural and ſupernatural good, albeit as to its *paſſive Attingence* and effect it be greatly different? For albeit there be a double Concurſe required to ſupernatural good, one to the ſubſtrate mater, which is a natural good, and the other to the moral good, which is ſupernatural, but only a ſingle concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin; yet in point of efficace the predetermination to the later is equal to the former, as to Divine efficience: For there is as much power and efficace required to predetermine or premove the wil to the ſubſtrate mater, or natural entitative act of ſin, as there is to any ſupernatural good: both are alike facile to the divine omnipotent wil: and ſurely no reaſon can be given, why predetermination is neceſſary for the production of any gracious act, and not as neceſſary for the production of the entitative act of ſin: for the Wil of Man is equally uncapable of acting at al, as of acting graciouſly without Predetermination, whatever ſome may imagine to the contrary.

(2) From the ſubſtrate mater of al *natural and ſupernatural good.* Are not al gracious acts and habits loged in human nature? What is ſupernatural good but a ray of the divine Nature irradiated into human Nature, and ſeated therein as its proper ſubject? Is not al grace a ſupernatural mode implanted in human nature? whence, if God by efficacious Grace predetermine the wil to receive any habitual infuſion, or act of Grace, muſt he not

also necessarily predetermine the wil to the natural act which is the subſtrate mater of that supernatural mode? And if God predetermine the wil to the natural act of that which is good, must he not also predetermine it to the natural act of that which is evil? What difference can there be assigned between the natural act of Crucifying our Lord, which was intrinsecally evil, and that of crucifying the Thieves, which was a piece of Justice? Did not God then as much predetermine the former as the later? Yea, to raise this Argument higher, hath not the same subſtrate mater, which is supernaturally good and gracious as to its subſtance, some modal vitiositie and obliquitie appendent thereto in this imperfect state? If then God predetermine the Wil to the subſtrate mater of that which is supernaturally good, must he not also necessarily predetermine it to the subſtrate mater of that which is also evil? I am not ignorant what is replied hereto, which we no way dout but wil prove invalid, and no better than smoke or vapor, when we come to enlarge more fully on this Argument, §. 5.

(3) We demonstrate the necessitie of Divine Predetermination to the subſtrate mater of what is sinful, from the Invaliditie yea vanitie of those reasons which are urged by our Adversaries against it, which do with as much force strike at Predetermination to what is supernaturally good. [1] One principal Objection that our Adversaries urge against predetermination to the subſtrate mater of sin, specially such sins as are intrinsecally evil, is *That it destroyes the libertie of the Wil*, &c. We shal not now attemt any answer to the Objection, but reserve it for its proper place, *Chap.* 6. §. 5. only we are to shew, that the whole of this Objection, and the reasons urged to enforce it, do with as much force strike against al Predetermination, even that which is granted to supernatural good: For doth not Predetermination to gracious acts, lay as much compulsion on the wil, and thence as much destroy its libertie, as predetermination to the subſtrate mater of sin? And is not the same objection with its reasons as much urged, and that with as great color of Reason, by the Molinists and Arminians, against al Predetermination to gracious acts? I must confesse, I could never, neither do I think any else can maintain and defend our ground against the Jesuites and Arminians, if those reasons and grounds which our Adversaries urge against Predetermination to the subſtrate mater of sin, be admitted

mitted as valid. [2] The like may be ſaid of that other objection or reaſon, why our Adverſaries reject Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, namely, *That it makes al Gods Laws naturally and abſolutely impoſſible*, &c. Is not this very objection, and the reaſon urged to enforce it, as much urged by Moliniſts and Arminians, againſt al Predetermination even to gracious Acts? And are not the reaſons as valid on the later as on the former ſide? What reaſon do the new Methodiſts give, that Predetermination to the entitative act of ſin makes Gods Laws impoſſible, but that it takes away the Wils Indifference, and deſtroys the natural power that the wil is inveſted with to act or not to act? And doth not Predetermination to good as much deſtroy the wils indifference, and its power to act or not to act? [3] Our Adverſaries urge, *That this Predetermination takes away the uſe of Promiſes, Invitations, and al evangelic offers of Grace, and ſuppoſeth God not to deal ſincerely with Sinners, in making offers of Grace, and yet irreſiſtibly determining their Wils againſt the acceptance of theſe offers?* Is not this very objection, with its reaſon urged, and that with as much force of reaſon by Jeſuites and Arminians againſt Predetermination to gracious Acts? For if no man can entertain thoſe offers of Grace by his own free-wil, without a predeterminative Concurſe, are not al gracious Promiſes, Invitations, and offers of Grace to Sinners, who fal not under this Predetermination, vain and uſeleſſe? Our Adverſaries the new Methodiſts generally, (ſome few excepted) denie any ſufficient Grace or Free-wil in corrupt Nature for the reception of evangelic offers and Grace: and is not then the vitious wil of corrupt Nature as wel determined by its own vitioſitie againſt the offers of Grace, as by the predeterminative Concurſe of God? [4] Our Adverſaries object, *That this Predetermination to the entitative act of ſin, ſuppoſeth God to compel and force men to ſin, and ſo makes him to be the real Author of Sin, yea more than the Sinner that is under a violent compulſion*, &c. and is not this very argument urged by Jeſuites and Arminians againſt al Predetermination even to what is good, and that with as much color of reaſon? For ſay they, If God predetermine the wil to what is good, then he compels and forceth the wil to be good; ſo that the wil being under a compulſion cannot be ſaid to be the Author of its own act, but is as a Stock or Stone in the exercice of that act, which deſtroyeth al moral good, *&c.* Which objection

ction is as valid as that of our Adverſaries, and can never be ſolidly anſwered if their objection be good; though according to our Principes neither the one or the other objection has any force in it, as we ſhal demonſtrate, *c.* 6. §. 5. To conclude this argument, I am very confident, our Opponents the new Methodiſts wil never be able to defend an efficacious determinative Concurſe to what is morally or ſupernaturally good, ſo long as they denie the ſame to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, which is naturally good: for al, or at leaſt the moſt of thoſe arguments they urge againſt the later, may, and are urged by the Moliniſts and Arminians againſt the former, and that with equal force. And this *Baronius* did by his natural acumen foreſee, and therefore he took a courſe more ſeemingly rational according to his Principes, though leſſe friendly to divine Concurſe, to denie al Predetermination as wel to ſupernatural as natural good; of which ſee his *Metaph. Sect.* 8. *Diſput.* 3. *n.* 66. &c. *p.* 136.

5. *Arg. from the Nature of Sin.*

1. *Its mater.*

§. 5. Our fifth Argument ſhal be taken *from the Nature of Sin, its ſubſtrate mater and formal reaſon.* 1. As to the general Idea and ſubſtrate mater of ſin, we have demonſtrated, *Ch.* 1. §. 2. (1) *That al human acts conſidered in their natural entitie, abſtracted from their moral conſtitution, are neither good nor evil.* (2) *That al moral acts whether good or evil receive their formal Conſtitution and Determination from the Moral Law.* (3) *That no human Act conſidered phyſically, or according to its natural entitative ſubſtance, is intrinſecally evil, but only morally, in regard of its moral ſpecification or determination to ſuch or ſuch an object.* Hence, (4) *That ſin has for its ſubſtrate mater ſome natural good.* Now theſe Propoſitions being laid as ſo many Principes, we hence argue, *That God muſt neceſſarily concur to, yea predetermine the ſubſtrate mater of actions intrinſecally evil:* For, if al ſinful acts, even ſuch as are intrinſecally evil *morally*, are, according to their ſubſtrate mater *phyſically* good, doth it not neceſſarily follow, that God the firſt cauſe muſt concur thereto, yea predetermine the ſame? Muſt not every ſecond Cauſe as ſuch be actuated and ſo determined by its firſt Cauſe and his efficacious Concurſe? Doth not the ſubordination of the ſecond Cauſe to the firſt, neceſſarily demonſtrate, not only its dependence on, but alſo Predetermination by the ſame in al its natural operations and effects? Is not every *Being by participation* neceſſarily limited, defined, and predetermined in al its natural entitative motions by the firſt Being, which

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is ſuch by Eſſence? May not this alſo be demonſtrated from the very conceſſions of our Adverſaries, who grant, that vitioſitie follows not any Act as a natural Act? So *Strangius*, *l. 2. c. 11. p.* 243. *We confeſſe*, ſaith he, *that Vitioſitie doth not follow the act of ſin as an act; for then every act would be ſin; alſo that it doth not follow, as the act procedes from God, for then every act that procedes from God, would have ſin.* Now if ſin follows not the act of ſin as an act, what reaſon can there be why God ſhould not efficaciouſly concur to, yea predetermine the entitative act of Sin? This is wel explicated by *Lud. Crocius*, (that *Breme* Profeſſor, who was a member of the Synod of *Dort*, and there began the New Method) *Duodecas, Diſſert. de Volunt. Dei*, Diſſert. 8. Theſ. 99. p. 426. 'As to the Act, ſaith he, *of the Divine Wil* 'about ſin, the effates of Scripture ſeem to contradict themſelves, 'whiles that ſome expreſſely affirm, *That God nils and hates ſins*, 'and thoſe that commit them, *Pſal.* 5. 5, 6, 7. *Zach.* 8. 17. but 'others ſeem to ſay, *That God wils, creates, effectes them*, *Eſa.* 45. '7. *Lam.* 3. 37, 38. *Amos* 3. 6. But theſe things do wel agree, 'if the diſtinction be rightly obſerved, (1) Between the Act, and 'the Vitioſitie of the Act. (2) Between the Act as it is from 'God, and as it is from the Creature. (3) Between the wil of 'God decreeing, and the wil of God commanding. Whence he concludes, *Theſ.* 100. *p.* 427. 'For God wils and produceth, 'by the Creature as the firſt Cauſe by the ſecond, the Act, as an 'Act, of it ſelf indifferent to moral Bonitie, and Vitioſitie; and 'wils and effectes the ſame, albeit depraved by the Creature, as 'inveſted with his moral rectitude, becauſe he produceth it by 'his own power, from his immaculate Sanctitie and Juſtice, 'which can never be made crooked or corrupted by any ſecond 'Cauſe. Whence he addes, *Theſ.* 101. 'And this act eſſentially 'good, even as defiled by the Creature, God juſtly and holily 'uſeth either as an Inſtrument of puniſhment, or of explorati-'on or exercice, and as an ordinate convenient Medium, accord-'ing to his Juſtice for the beſt ends. *Theſ.* 102. In this ſenſe 'God is ſaid, *To create evil, to produce it out of his mouth, to ſend* Jo-'ſeph *into* Egypt *by the Vendition of his Brethren, to rob* Job *of his* 'goods, *to command* Shimei *to curſe* David, *to uſe* Abſolon *for the* 'defiling his Fathers Concubines, *to deliver Chriſt into the hands of* 'Jews and Gentiles. Theſ. 103. For God decreed to produce 'thoſe acts, as acts, and to permit the depravation of them by 'the

Fatemur quidem, malitiam non ſequi actum peccati ut eſt actus, alioqui omnis actus eſſet peccatum, *&c. Strang.*

'the Sinners, and to use them albeit depraved, wisely and justly 'to ends holily ordained by him.

2. From the formal reason of sin.

2. Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin may be also demonstrated from the *formal nature* of Sin, which consistes in the privation of that moral rectitude due to actions, as *Ch.* 1. §. 2. we have more fully explicated. Whence we thus argue: If every deflexion from the Law of God be sin, then certainly God necessarily predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins: and if of some, why not of al, even such as are intrinsecally evil? That God predetermines to the substrate mater of some sins is evident, and that from the concessions of our Adversaries, who grant, *That God doth predetermine the Wil to actions imperfectly good, which also, according to their own confessions are modally sinful:* Whence we thus argue; The substrate mater of the same action as good and as sinful is the same: wherefore, if God predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as good, must he not also predetermine it to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful? When we say, *That God predetermines to the substrate mater of the same action as sinful, As* here, may not be taken *reduplicatively*, but only *specificatively*, i. e. as it *specifies* and *distributes* the same action into *good*, and *sinful*; which are different modes of one and the same substrate mater or entitative act: so that our Opponents granting, that God doth predetermine the wil to the substrate mater of the action as imperfectly good, how can they possibly denie, that God predetermines it also to the same substrate mater which is modally sinful? When I can see a rational solution given to this argument, (which I despair of) I shal think our Adversaries have done much service to their Cause. But they replie, *If God concur by determinative influence to imperfectly good actions, it doth not thence follow, that he concurs to actions intrinsecally, and in the substance of them evil.* But I conceive this evasion wil soon vanish into smoke and vapor, if we consider wel, (1) That the least sin may not be imputed unto God as the Author of it, any more than the greatest: the difference between sins modally and intrinsecally evil finds no place here: dare our Adversaries say, that God is the Author of that modal sin which adheres to actions imperfectly good, but not of that intrinsecal evil which is in the hatred of God, or the like? Whence, (2) The force of our Argument ariseth from this paritie of reason, If God doth concur,

concur, yea predetermine the wil to an act only modally ſinful, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of ſin, why may he not alſo predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is intrinſecally evil, without the like imputation? Albeit there be a diſparitie in the ſins, yet is not the paritie of reaſon for the one and the other the ſame? Ought we not to be as cautelous in exemting the Sacred Majeſtie of God from having any hand in the leaſt ſin, as in the greateſt? And if we allow our ſelves the libertie of making him the author of the leaſt ſin, wil not that open a wide gate for atheiſtic blaſphemous wits to impute to him the greateſt ſins? Whence, if we can prove, what our Adverſaries wil never be able to diſprove, yea what they approve of, namely, that God doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act, which is imperfectly good, but modally ſinful, it thence follows by neceſſary conſequence and inevitable paritie of reaſon, that he can and doth predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of that which is intrinſecally evil, without the leaſt imputation of being the Author of ſin annexed thereto. I would fain have our Opponents weigh impartially the force of this Argument.

§. 6. Our next Argument for Gods Predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin ſhal be drawen from his *Permiſſion of Sin.* And to make way to this demonſtration we muſt diſtinguiſh of Permiſſion; which is either *legal* or *natural: Natural* Permiſſion is either *divine* or *human*; and both either *negative* or *poſitive.* (1) *God gives no legal Permiſſion or Indulgence to ſin,* but on the contrary ſeverely prohibites it, and that on pain of death. (2) *Gods natural Permiſſion as Rector of the World is not of ſin ſimply as ſin, but as conducible to the principal ends of his divine Gubernation.* It's true, Divine Permiſſion regardes not only the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, but alſo ſin formally conſidered, and ſo ſin under that reduplication, *as ſin,* yet not ſimply conſidered, but as it has a tendence or conducibilitie to the advance of Divine Glorie: and ſo much is confeſſed by *Strangius, l. 2. c. 22. p. 399. If the Reduplication be joined to the terme ſin, it's true, that ſin as ſin is permitted by God, phyſically not morally.* Yet I adde, not *ſimply, but reſpectively,* as conducible to Gods ſupreme ends of Government. And *Lud. Crocius, Duodec. Diſſert. 8. Theſ. 74. pag. 415.* aſſertes, *That God, albeit he wils and decrees only the material of ſin,* 6. *Arg. from Gods Permiſſion of Sin.*

yet he permits the formal of ſin, not as ſin, but as the puniſhment of ſin, as he explicates himſelf, *pag.* 430. (3) *There is a vaſt difference between Gods natural permiſſion of ſin, and mans:* al mankind being by their near cognation and mutual dependences each on other, as alſo by the allegeance they owe to God, under an eſſential obligation to impede and hinder ſin to the utmoſt of their power, in themſelves and in each other, hence it follows, that they cannot permit ſin, without being partakers in the ſin they voluntarily permit: they are bound by the Law of their Maker and by their communion in human nature to hinder the egreſſes of ſin what they may. But is the ſoverain God under any ſuch eſſential obligation to man? Do not al men depend on him, but he on no man? Is he under any obligation, more than what the rectitude of his own nature and wil dictates to him, to hinder ſin or give grace? May he not as Rector of the Univerſe, not only ſuſpend his own influences, but alſo efficaciouſly and actively permit his mutable creature to fal into ſin, for the advance of his own glorie? Hence (4) *Divine permiſſion is not only negative, but alſo poſitive and efficacious.* [1] Gods *negative permiſſion* of ſin is by withdrawing the *quid prohibens*, the bridle of reſtraining and preventing Grace, both habitual and actual; which is not properly a *privation* of any grace due from God, but only a *negation* of undeſerved, and peradventure abuſed grace. This permiſſion we terme *negative*, not in regard of the principe or ſubject, as if Gods wil were negative, and not efficacious; but only in regard of the terme that follows, namely ſin, which is the conſequent, albeit not an effect of this negative permiſſion. [2] By Gods *poſitive and efficacious permiſſion* we underſtand his wiſe and providential *Diſpoſition*, *Limitation*, *Regulation*, and *Direction* of al ſin, ſo as it ends and determines in the advance of his own glorie, either in a way of vindictive juſtice, or triumphant mercie.

Theſe things being premiſſed, our demonſtration naturally and with much facilitie reſultes thus: *That which God doth, by the determinate abſolute counſel of his omnipotent wil, voluntarily and efficaciouſly permit, that as to its ſubſtrate mater muſt neceſſarily be predetermined by him: But now God doth, by the determinate abſolute counſel of his own wil, voluntarily and efficaciouſly permit ſin: Ergo,* &c. The major dependes on, and receives ſufficient evidence from that approved Maxime granted by *Strangius* and others, namely, that *Divine predetermination is adequate to Divine predefinition or predeſtination*;

ſtination; ſo that whatever is abſolutely predefined or decreed by God, is alſo predetermined by him: whence whatever God doth by the abſolute determinate counſel of his wil determine or decree to permit, that muſt be predetermined by him, as before, §. 3. So that our main work wil be to make good our minor; which we dout not but to performe in and by the following Propoſitions. (1) Prop. *Divine permiſſion of ſin is not merely negative, otioſe, or contemplative.* To make Gods permiſſion of ſin to be an idle or naked contemplation or looking on, with a ſuſpenſion of Divine aſſiſtances, was the proper ſentiment of *Epicurus*, and is moſt agreable to Epicurean practices, but moſt oppoſite to Chriſtianitie. It's true, man oft permits things, becauſe they are indifferent, or becauſe he is ignorant of their vitioſitie, or at leaſt wants power to impede and hinder them: but may any of theſe defects be imputed to the ſoverain moſt wiſe Rector of the Univerſe? Is he capable of any ignorance? are any things indifferent to him? Do not althings ſome way conduce to his glorie? or wants he power to hinder men in their ſinful courſes? (2) *Divine permiſſion of ſin is by the determinate abſolute counſel of the Divine wil.* For doth not God wil or decree the exiſtence of ſin? otherwiſe how comes it to paſſe? Can any thing be, but what God hath decreed ſhal be? Doth not God alſo order, limit, diſpoſe, and direct al ſin to his own ſupreme ends? And doth not God order althings according to the efficacious, determinate, abſolute counſel of his own wil? What is providence but the omniſcient ſoverain diſpoſition of the Divine wil? May we imagine that ſin comes into the world againſt or beſide the Divine omnipotent wil? This is wel explicated by *Lud. Crocius*, (who generally follows the new Method) *Duodecas Diſſertat. de Voluntate Dei*, *Diſſert.* 8. *Theſ.* 74. *pag.* 415. *God wils and decrees the material of ſin not the formal, and he permits the formal not the material.* Yea, *Strangius* himſelf, *l.* 4. *c.* 8. *p.* 832. grants us, *That whatever is done by God permitting it, as alſo whatever is ſaid to be done by a negative action of God, in regard of the externe tranſient action, is yet always underſtood to be done by a poſitive action, in regard of the interne immanent action, namely of Gods wil.* Hence, (3) *Divine permiſſion of ſin is moſt active and efficacious.* For what more active and efficacious than the Divine wil, which is the fountain of Divine permiſſion? What is Gods permiſſion or not willing to hinder ſin, but his actual volition or willing not to hinder it? and doth not

Deus vult ac decernit materiale peccati non formale, & permittit formale non materiale, *Croc.*

this ſpeak his efficacious ordering and directing of ſin to his own glorie? Doth not the ſacred Pagine generally expreſſe Gods permiſſion of ſin in the moſt active and emphatic notions? What Verbes among the Hebrews note more energie and efficacitie, than ſuch as are in *Hiphil* and *Piel?* And yet are not theſe frequently uſed to expreſſe Gods permiſſion of ſin, as *Strangius, pag.* 839? Whence (4) *May we not conclude, that Divine permiſſion of ſin neceſſarily preſuppoſeth Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin?* Surely if God doth by the determinate abſolute counſel of his wil efficaciouſly permit ſin, he can with as much facilitie and efficace hinder it if he pleaſe: But how can he efficaciouſly hinder ſin, unleſſe he predetermine the wil to the ſuſpenſion of the entitative act? And if God predetermine the wil to the ſuſpenſion of the entitative act, may he not as wel predetermine it to the production of the ſame act? See more of this Argument from Gods permiſſion of ſin, *Rhetor. de Provident. cap.* 6. *pag.* 67.

7. Arg. from Divine Providence about ſin.

§. 7. Another Argument to demonſtrate Divine predetermination to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin may be taken from the *Providence of God*, which ſeems greatly, yea (may we not ſay?) moſtly concerned about the ſins of men. (1) Gods providence in the conſervation of the entitative act of ſin ſtrongly demonſtrates his predetermination thereof. *Durandus* himſelf grants, *That al real Beings are conſerved by God:* How can God conſerve the material entitative act of ſin, but by predetermining the ſame? Suppoſe the act of ſin be a mere ſimple immanent volition, it is moſt certain, that this act cannot be infallibly and invincibly conſerved by God, unleſſe he predetermine the wil to ſuch a conſervation: and if God predetermine the wil to the conſervation thereof, why not alſo to its production? What is conſervation, as to God, but continued creation or production? (2) Gods providential *Reſtriction*, *Gubernation*, and *Ordination* of ſin unto his own glorie doth potently demonſtrate his predetermination to the material entitative act thereof. Albeit God be not the Author of ſin, yet he is the Orderer thereof: and how can he be the ſoverain Orderer of it, unleſſe he applie the wil to the entitative act thereof? Our Adverſaries the New Methodiſts generally grant, *That God doth regulate, diſpoſe and order al mens ſins unto his own glorie.* Thus *Strangius, lib.* 4. *cap.* 8. *pag.* 832. ſaith, *That God doth rule, moderate, and order the ſins that he permits*, &c. Yea, *Baronius, Metaphyſ. Sect.* 8. *Diſput.* 3. *pag.* 158. ſaith, *That God doth*

doth preſide over mens wicked wils, and rules and governs them, yea, by his Divine providence ordains them to one ſin rather than to another, &c. And ſo much that apocryphous Author, *Wiſd.* 8. 1. teacheth us, namely, *That wiſdome,* [*or Divine providence*] *reacheth from one end to another mightily, and yet ſweetly ordereth althings:* which *Bernard* thus excellently deſcants on: *Mightily for itſelf, but ſweetly for me.* And doth Divine providence order althings moſt *potently* or *mightily?* And muſt not alſo mens ſins be included under this univerſal diſpoſition? And how can God order mens ſins *mightily* or *infallibly* for his own glorie, unleſſe he predetermine the wil to the material entitative act? Take acts moſt intrinſecally evil, even the hatred of God, the commun inſtance given by our Adverſaries, and unleſſe we grant, that God doth infallibly applie and predetermine the wil to the material entitative act, what wil become of the providence of God? would it not ſoon be baniſht out of the world? Doth not the ſacred Pagine aſſure us, that al men by nature before converſion are *Haters of God, Rom.* 1. 30. στυγῆς, and *enemies to God, Rom.* 8. 7? And hence, are not al the human acts of men in ſuch a ſtate ſpirited with hatred and enmitie againſt God? Now if God doth not predetermine, *i. e.* applie the wils of ſuch men to their material entitative acts put forth by them, what room is there left for Divine providence among ſuch? Would not this Antitheſis of our Adverſaries exemt al Pagans that ever were or ſhal be, al unconverted Jews, yea nineteen parts of twenty at leaſt among ſuch as are called Chriſtians from any predetermination or efficacious gubernation of Divine providence? I would fain have our Opponents ſeriouſly to conſider this, and how much their Antitheſis tends to Epicurean Atheiſme, which cuts off the providence of God from intermedling with human affaires: certainly nothing more darkens the glorious beautie and perfection of Providence: would the wiſe Rector ever have ſuffered ſin to have come into the world, had he not known how to have wrought his own ends by it, yea infallibly to have predetermined it to his own ends? Is not the *Lord of Lords* ſerved in his own houſe, this great Univerſe, by the veſſels of diſhonor, 2 *Tim.* 2. 21? Has he not power to let forth the ſins of men, and reſtrain them at his pleaſure? And how can he do this, if he do not predetermine the wils of men to the entitative acts? Doth any thing more directly conduce to the perfection of Divine providence, than that it doth

determi-

determinately wil and predefine althings, and destine them to the ends intended by him? And can God performe this, unlesse he move and applie al second causes to their determinate acts and effects? And can this be perfected, if Divine providence do not predetermine the wils of men and al their acts, even such as are most sinful, considered materially and entitatively, to their certain determinate effects? Doth it not belong to the perfection of Divine providence, not only to ordain means for an end, but also infallibly to attain the end by the means appointed? and can God infallibly attain the end appointed by mens sins, unlesse he infallibly determine the wil to the entitative act of such sins? Should God appoint means for an end, and leave it to the indifference of mans ambulatory wil to execute those means, or not, how could Divine providence reach its end infallibly? Yea how could God ever attain any certain prescience that his end should be attained? Suppose it to be the Crucifixion of our Lord, appointed by God as a means absolutely necessary for the salvation of sinners; I demand, how this end can be infallibly attained by this means, so absolutely necessary, unlesse God predetermine the wils of his bloudy enemies to this entitative act of crucifying the Lord of Glorie, which on their parts was intrinsecally evil? Again, how could the omniscient God infallibly foreknow, that any sinner should ever be saved by this means, if the means were not predefined and predetermined by him? Were the Providence of God about mens sins only general and indifferent, without a particular modification, application and determination of the entitative act, would not the influxe and concurrence of mans free wil be exemted from the influxe, providence, and wil of God? It's a good Aphorisme of *Aquinas, par.* 1. *q.* 22. *That Divine providence extendes itself only to such things, unto which Divine causalitie extendes itself*; and certainly Divine causalitie extendes itself to no second cause, act, or effect, but what it predetermines: For wherein consistes that causalitie of the first cause on the second, but in applying the second to its act? And if God applies the second cause to its act, doth he not predetermine the same? May we not then hence regularly conclude, that if God doth not predetermine the wil to the natural entitative act of sin, he has no prescience of, nor providence about that sinful act, neither can he infallibly reach his intended end thereby? Lastly, what would become of Christs providential Kingdome as Mediator, should he not predeter-

predetermine the wils of wicked men to the entitative act of their sins? Has not Christ as Mediator purchased al the services and actions of the most wicked men, so far as to render them infallibly subservient to the advance of his own Kingdome? and has not God the Father put the government of the world into his hands? Is he not *King of Nations*, as wel as *King of Saints?* Do not al Kings reign by him? has he not power given him over al flesh, as wel sinful as sacred? And doth he not order althings in the wisest manner for the good of his people and his own glorie, as *Rom.* 8. 28? And is it possible, that the sinful actions of wicked men should infallibly subserve the good of the Church and the glorie of Christs mediatory Kingdome, did he not infallibly predetermine them to the substrate mater of their sins? How could *Cyrus*, an hater of God, be his shepherd, to deliver the captive Jews, should not God have predetermined him to al his sinful acts? Can wicked men, whose actions are al intrinsecally evil, because ful of hatred against God, do such service, without the least disservice as to the spiritual state of the people of God, were not their wils predetermined to the entitative acts of their sins? Can we imagine how Christ, into whose hands the administration of althings here below is put, could so wisely, potently, and irresistibly order and dispose of al the sins of men, for the supreme ends he has designed them to, unless he doth predetermine mens wils to al their entitative acts, though never so intrinsecally evil? Certainly the Antithesis of our Adversaries would divest Christ of the principal part of his Government as Mediator in his providential Kingdome. See more of Gods efficacious predeterminative Providence about the substrate mater of sin, in *Zuinglius, de Providentia, pag.* 375, 376, &c. *Rhetor. de Provident.* & *Court Gent. P.4. B.2. C.9. §.2.*

§. 8. Our last Argument for the demonstration of Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin shal be taken from the *essential and absolute dependence of the creature on God.* This argument, albeit *last in execution*, yet is it (as they say the end is) *first in intention, efficace*, and *dignitie*; in so much as that the stoutest of our Adversaries seem to have a venerable estime for it. *Baronius, Metaphys. Sect.* 8. *Disput.* 3. *num.* 58 *pag.* 129. strongly proves against *Durandus*, *That al create Beings depend on God not lesse as Agents, than as Beings.* Yea, *num.* 61. *pag.* 131. he proves, *That dependence on God not only in being, but also in operation is*

8. *Arg. from creatural Dependence.*

is intrinſecal or eſſential to the creature, ſo that it implies a contradiction to be a create being, and not to depend on God in being and operation. *Strangius* in like manner concurs herein, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 11. *p.* 61. as elſewhere. And *Le Blanc*, *de Concord. Libert. par.* 3. *theſ.* 57. *pag.* 438. concurs with *Placeus* in this ſentiment, *That provided God be not made the Author of ſin, we cannot too much eſtabliſh the dependence of the ſecond cauſe on the firſt in acting.* *Lud. Crocius*, (who is alſo a new Methodiſt) *Duodecas Diſſertat. de Volunt. Dei, Diſſert.* 8. *pag.* 415, 416. demonſtrates our Hypotheſis from this very argument, namely, *That God muſt wil and decree*, (which includes predefinition and predetermination) *the material of ſin, becauſe otherwiſe there would be an action independent as to God.* But yet ſome of the Jeſuites tranſcend the New Methodiſts in aſſerting this dependence of the creature on God; as *Compton Carleton*, *Philoſ. Diſput.* 28. *Sect.* 2, 3. & *Suarez*, *Metaph. Diſp.* 31. *Sect.* 14. As for mine own ſentiments of the creatures abſolute and eſſential dependence on God the firſt and only independent Being, they are copioſely explicated and demonſtrated, *Court Gent. P.* 4. *B.* 2. *C.* 9. and I muſt confeſſe, I was the more prolixe, and, according to what capacitie I have, curious herein, in order to the demonſtration of Gods efficacious predeterminative Concurſe, as wel to the ſubſtrate mater of evil as of good acts: and therefore I ſhal now only touch on this argument, referring the inquiſitive Reader to what is there more fully laid down. We have there demonſtrated, (1) *That creatural dependence is involved in the very eſſence of the creature; ſo that to ſuppoſe a creature independent in operation, implies a flat contradiction*, as §. 5, 6. (2) *That creatural dependence importes ſubordination, inferioritie, and poſterioritie*, as §. 7. *pag.* 519. So much alſo is granted by *Strangius*, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 11. *pag.* 61. where he proves, *That Divine concurſe influenceth not only the act and effect, but alſo the ſecond cauſe, which infers dependence of the ſecond cauſe on the effect, and this dependence notes inferioritie and poſterioritie.* Hence we thus argue: *If dependence in operation be thus eſſential to the create wil, and argues ſubordination, inferioritie, and poſterioritie as to Divine concurſe, then it neceſſarily follows, that the human wil be predetermined by the efficacious concurſe of God in al its operations, even ſuch as have ſin annexed to them.* The reaſon of the conſequence is to me very evident, [1] From the ſubordination of the ſecond cauſe, ſuppoſe it be the human wil, to the firſt: For when there is a direct ſubordination of the ſecond cauſe to

Hic influxus [Dei in cauſam ſecundam] infert dependentiam cauſæ ſecundæ, & dependentia cauſæ ſecundæ à Deo præſupponit influxum Dei in eam; dependentia autem innuit aliquid inferius & poſterius eo à quo dependet, *Strang. l.* 1. *c.* 11. *p.* 61.

to the firſt, the ſecond cauſe cannot poſſibly act but as acted by the firſt: this is eſſential to the laws of ſubordination, which notes a ſubjection to, and paſſive reception of the ſubordinate cauſe from that to which it is ſubordinate: ſo that if the human wil be ſubordinate to the efficacious Concurſe of God in the entitative act of ſin, it muſt be efficaciouſly applied to the ſaid act thereby: and what is this but predetermination? [2] The ſame may be demonſtrated from the *inferioritie* of the creatures wil to God the firſt cauſe: For the human wil is by reaſon of its dependence ſo far inferior to the Divine wil and its cauſalitie, as that it is juſtly reputed no more than a *vital inſtrument* thereof: And is it not eſſential to an inſtrument to act only in force and efficace from the principal efficient? *Aquinas* aſſures us, *That al ſecond cauſes act only by virtue received from the firſt cauſe, as mechanic inſtruments act by direction of Art.* Now if the wil be only an inſtrument of Divine efficience, muſt it not neceſſarily be applied to al its acts thereby? [3] We may laſtly demonſtrate the ſame from the *poſterioritie* of the ſecond cauſe: where there is prioritie in a way of ſubordination, there the poſterior cauſe cannot move or act, unleſſe moved and acted by the prior or precedent cauſe: and if the wil be premoved and acted by efficacious concurſe, which *Strangius* and other new Methodiſts grant, as before §. 4. I cannot ſee how it can with any ſhadow of reaſon be denied, that God predetermines the wil to al its natural acts, though ſin be annexed thereto. To me it is an eternal truth, that either the wil of man dependes on the wil of God for al its natural motions, or the wil of God dependes on the wil of man; which to affirme is a degree of blaſphemie.

CHAP. VI.

The Objections against Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin solved.

This Hypothesis of predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin (1) makes not God the Author of sin. [1] Baronius's *objection solved, in that God concurs to the specification of sinful acts not morally, but physically.* [2] Strangius's *objection solved, in that God concurs to the entitative act of sins intrinsecally evil, not only in general, but as determined to their object physically not morally: An indeterminate abstract act a mere Chimera. General Reasons why our Hypothesis makes not God the Author of sin. (2) Our Hypothesis not contrary to the Essence and Attributes of God, his Sincerities, Justice, Mercie, Sanctitie. (3) Gods Precepts and Promisses not made impertinent, by predeterminative Concurse to the entitative act of sin: The use of general Precepts, Promisses, and Invitations. (4) Predetermination to the entitative act of sin doth not overthrow Religion, or open the dore to impieties. (5) Predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin destroys not human Libertie.*

§. 1. HAving copiosely demonstrated our own Hypothesis, and that as wel by artificial as inartificial Arguments, we now come to the solution of such Objections as our Adversaries urge against us: and here indeed what *Lactantius* wittily mentions of *Arcesilas* the Academic, *That when he destroyed the Philosophers, he did also with the same sword destroy himself; so that he had a sword, but not a shield,* is most true of our Adversaries, who whiles they think and endeavor to destroy our Hypothesis by their objections, they do indeed destroy their own; so that whiles they use their *Sword* against us, they want a *shield* for their own defense. This I no way dout but to make apparent in our solutions to their objections. The Adversaries of free grace and efficacious grace have in al ages of the Church turned the edge of their swords and principal forces against the Doctrine of *Reprobation*, and *Gods efficacious Concurse* to and Providence over sinful acts, because in these oppositions they conceit they can most securely concele themselves under a pretexte of vindicating Divine Benignitie,

Mucronem autem habebat, non scutum, *Lactant.*

nitie, Juſtice, and Sanctitie: hence mens corrupt minds have always endeavored to lode this Hypotheſis, of Gods efficacious Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, with al manner of black prejudices and ugly conſequences, as if it made the holy God the Author of ſin, cruel, *&c.* This oppoſition began very early, even by the Gentile Philoſophers, as it appears in the Diſpute between *Celſus* and *Origen*, *Orig. contr. Celſ. lib.* 6. And the Pelagians imputed the ſame to *Auguſtin*, as if *he introduced a fatal neceſſitie, whereby he made God to impel men to ſin*, &c. of which ſee *Janſen. Auguſt. Tom.* 1. *lib.* 5. *cap.* 15. *pag.* 115, 116. and elſewhere. But theſe black and ſcandalous imputations have been in al Ages wiped off by the Orthodox, and we no way dout but wil be ſtil more and more diſpelled into mere ſmoke and vapor, as Evangelic light doth more and more ſhine forth in its meridian glorie, as *Prov.* 4. 18.

1. The principal Objection which our Adverſaries urge againſt Gods predeterminative Concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, is, *That it makes God the Author of ſin, yea, more the Author of it than the ſinner himſelf.* This objection is greatly exaggerated by our Opponents, with many rhetoric flouriſhes and pompoſe triumphs; but with how little weight and force of reaſon wil appear by the following Conſiderations. Object. 1. *That this Hypotheſis makes God the Author of ſin.*

1. This Objection is urged by *Baronius*, *Metaph. Sect.* 8. *Diſp.* 3. *num.* 83. *pag.* 150. where he enforces it with this reaſon: *If God predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, then God is the cauſe why the action is of ſuch a ſpecies or kind*, i. e. *the ſpecification of the ſinful action is from God: But the action as it is of ſuch a ſpecies has vitioſitie neceſſarily attending it: therefore God is the cauſe why that action has vitioſitie adherent to it.* For a more ful ſolution of this argument we are to conſider, (1) that the force it has is from that rotten Pelagian Principe, *That God concurs to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin only by a general indifferent concurſe, as the Sun concurs to the production of Monſters*; which *Baronius* aſſertes, *pag.* 143. And *Le Blanc*, *Concil. Arbitr. par.* 3. *theſ.* 35. *pag.* 434. teſtifies the ſame of him. Now this principe is ſo abſurd, and contradictory to the Scriptures, that moſt of the New Methodiſts renounce it. But (2) we eaſily grant, that God doth not concur to the ſinful action as it is of *ſuch a ſpecies* or *kind morally* conſidered: the *moral ſpecification* of the ſinful act is not from God, but the ſinner. Yea, (3) we further grant, that God doth not concur to the ſpecifica- Baronius's *Argument examined.*

tion of the ſinful act as a particular cauſe: for albeit God concur by a particular concurſe to al acts, yet not as a particular cauſe. Thus *Suarez*, *Metaphyſ. Diſput.* 17. *ſect.* 2. *pag.* 403. 'The firſt 'cauſe is more principal than the ſecond; and yet ſimply and 'properly the effect is not attributed to the firſt, but to the ſe-'cond cauſe: for when a man walkes or ſees, *&c.* God is not ſaid 'to walk, albeit he more principally effectes thoſe motions than 'man— Wherefore thoſe denominations of walking, ſeeing, '*&c.* are not attributed to God, becauſe they are not taken from 'pure efficience, but from the information and reception of the 'motion or of the effect: for he is not ſaid *to ſee*, who is in any 'reſpect ſaid to be the cauſe of *ſeeing*, but he that ſo produceth it, 'as that he is informed thereby; yea from this laſt habitude the 'denomination is chiefly taken, *&c.* An excellent ſolution of this objection urged by *Baronius*, ſhewing us how the proper denomination or ſpecification of particular acts is taken from the particular cauſe, not the prime univerſal cauſe. Whence (4) we anſwer poſitively, that God concurs to the ſpecification of ſinful acts materially or entitatively conſidered as a *phyſic univerſal cauſe*, *i. e.* God doth not only concur by a general indifferent concurſe to the material entitative act of ſin, but he doth by a particular efficacious concurſe ſo modifie and determine the entitative act, as that the natural ſpecification and individuation thereof may be aſcribed to him as the God of Nature. And thus much indeed is granted by *Strangius*, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 3. *pag.* 154. *We ſay not therefore, that God concurs only by a general influxe, as the Sun concurs in the ſame manner to the generation of a man and of an horſe, and mouſe; but we determine the influxe of God to be ſpecial unto ſpecial effects, as they are phyſically diſtinguiſhed* ſpecie *or in kind, and to every kind of entitie, but not to the reaſon of moral vitioſitie, which conſiſtes in privation.* This ingenuous conceſſion of *Strangius* is as much as we contend for, or need by way of anſwer to this objection of *Baronius:* for who among us doth aſſert, that the moral vitioſitie of ſin, which conſiſtes in a privation, is from God, or ſpecified by him: it ſufficeth us, that the phyſic or natural ſpecification and individuation of the material entitative act of ſin be from God as the univerſal Cauſe of al Naturals. (5) If men contend about the terme *ſpecification*, as that which properly belongs to the ſecond particular cauſe, I can eaſily part with it, and ſubſtitute in the room thereof a terme equivalent thereto in point of efficace, namely

namely *modification*, which is uſed by our acute Dr. *Sam. Ward*, in *his Determination of Gods Concurſe, pag.* 117. where he ſtrenuouſly demonſtrates, *That the previous Concurſe of God, as the firſt cauſe, doth according to its mode modifie and determine al the actions of ſecond cauſes.* So that the ſum of our anſwer is this: albeit God doth not as a particular cauſe concur to the ſinful act as of ſuch a ſpecies or kind morally conſidered, yet he doth efficaciouſly concur to, ſpecifie, or rather modifie the ſubſtrate mater or entitative act phyſically conſidered, without the leaſt imputation of being the Author of its moral vitioſitie.

2. We come now to *Strangius*'s argument to prove, that according to our Hypotheſis touching Gods predetermining the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, we make him the Author of ſin. This he urgeth with much warmth, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 11. *pag.* 230. thus: *He that phyſically predetermines the wil of man to ſin, is the cauſe of ſin: But, according to our Hypotheſis, God phyſically predetermines the wil of man to ſin. Ergo*, &c. Now whereas we replie, *That God predetermines the wil not to the ſinful action as ſinful, but as an action or natural being*; he pretendes this reſponſe is a mere evaſion, and wil no way ſerve in actions intrinſecally evil, as the hatred of God, where the ſubſtance of the act cannot be diſtinguiſhed from its deformitie. So *lib.* 2. *cap.* 12. *pag.* 273. he avers, *That God cannot properly predetermine the wil to the entitie of the act, becauſe God is not the cauſe of the entitie and action, but as it is conſidered as not yet determined to the object in which the vitioſitie is: but he grants that God is the cauſe of that hatred, which is in the hatred of God, conſidered in the abſtract, but not as determined to that object: and thence we muſt ſimply denie, that God is the cauſe of the hatred of God.* In this argument the whole of his efforts againſt our Hypotheſis doth center; wherein he is followed by one and another Reverend Divine of name among us: therefore it wil be neceſſary, that we duely examine the ſtrength and validitie of theſe efforts; which we no way dout but wil appear to be very invalid and infirme. Strangius's *Argument.*

And (1) we are here to premit as Principes, what *Strangius* and his ſectators do concede in this mater. He grants, [1] *That God and man do together concur to the ſame ſinful act.* [2] *That Gods concurſe is immediate not only to the act, but alſo to the wil.* [3] *That Gods concurſe is previous, and in order of nature before that of mans wil.* [4] *That Gods concurſe is not only general, but alſo ſpecial to ſpecial effects as diſtinguiſhed* ſpecie, *in kind, not morally but phyſically.*

phyſically. [5] *That the hatred of God as an* Ens *or Being is naturally good.* Theſe conceſſions are alſo mentioned by *Le Blanc, Concil. Arbitr. par.* 3. *theſ.* 36. *pag.* 434. From which conceſſions we are greatly confident to give a ſolid and ſatisfactory ſolution to his objection, and the argument on which it is grounded. For (2) this objection and its reaſon fals with as much force on our Adverſaries as on us, as it is moſt evident by the following Particulars. [1] If, as they affirme, the ſubſtance and ſubſtrate mater in the hatred of God cannot be diſtinguiſhed from its vitioſitie, then are not they guilty of making God the Author of ſin, by allowing an immediate previous ſpecial concurſe to the kind of the action phyſically conſidered, as wel as we who adde predetermination thereto? This we have demonſtrated, *Chap.* 5. §. 4. from Gods immediate previous concurſe. [2] *Strangius, pag.* 235. allows predetermination to acts imperfectly good, yet modally ſinful, which alſo makes God the Author of ſin as wel as our Hypotheſis, as *Chap.* 5. §. 5. But I paſſe on to a more ful ſolution. (3) His negative aſſertion, *That in the hatred of God and other acts intrinſecally evil, we cannot diſtinguiſh the ſubſtance or mater of the act from its vitioſitie,* is a groſſe miſtake: for in that very act of hatred of God the vitioſitie is ſeparable from the act itſelf, as it's evident by this, that were that very act turned againſt ſin, its due object, it would ceaſe to be ſinful. He replies, *p.* 236. *That hatred of God as determined to ſuch an object is ſo far evil, that the vitioſitie cannot be ſeparated from it, either privatively or poſitively: For,* addes he, *we cannot conſider this complexum of a vitious act, without conſidering its vitioſitie; as we cannot conſider a rational animal without conſidering animal and rational.* [1] What he here mentions of the hatred of God and acts intrinſecally evil is as true of al other ſinful acts, though but modally ſuch: for take any ſinful act, though never ſo little, yet if we conſider it as inveſted with al its circumſtances and relations to its object, *&c.* its vitioſitie can never be ſeparated from it; yet this hinders not, but that we may conſider the act materially, without conſidering its vitioſitie: the like in the hatred of God and al other acts intrinſecally evil. [2] His inſtance from a *rational Animal* is very lame and defective, becauſe there is an eſſential connexion between the ſubject and the predicate, ſo that we can no way conceive of *rational* without including *animal* in that conception: but there is no ſuch eſſential connexion between the phyſical act and the vitioſitie

tioſitie in the hatred of God. [3] Yea *Strangius* himſelf ſaith, *pag.* 232. *That hatred of God as it is an action is not ſinful.* The like, *pag.* 234. Yea, *pag.* 236. he confeſſeth, *That good and evil are accidents of hatred of God, if we conſider it phyſically as an action:* which is al we contend for, and ſufficient to free God from being the Author of the vitioſitie. Hence (4) *Strangius* is greatly miſtaken in confounding the moral ſubſtance of the act in relation to its object, with its phyſic or natural conſideration as to an individual act: we utterly denie, that the hatred of God conſidered in its moral relation and determination to its object, is from God as the cauſe thereof, yet it muſt be granted, that the individual act determined to ſuch an object is as to its material entitie from God, as the firſt cauſe of al natural acts. Thus *Alvarez* anſwers, who grants, the ſubſtrate mater of ſin as it relates to its object (I ſuppoſe he means morally) is not from God, yet if we conſider it *abſolutely* as an entitative act, ſo it procedes from the predeterminative Concurſe of God. But (5) *Strangius*'s original and fundamental Error lies here, that he conceits *Gods Concurſe to terminate* on the natural entitie in the hatred of God only as it is *quid indeterminatum & abſtractum, ſomewhat indeterminate and abſtracted from its object*, &c. And herein lies the point of our Controverſie, and the principal ſubterfuge of our Adverſaries; which a learned and pious Divine of ſome note among us expreſſeth thus: *God is the cauſe of the action* in genere, *but not as individually conſidered.* The invaliditie and infirmitie of this evaſion we have already in part demonſtrated, *Chap.* 3. §. 4. But for a more ſatisfactory reviction thereof let us a little examine it according to Rules both of Philoſophie and Theologie. [1] As for a philoſophic Examen, nothing ſeems more repugnant to the Laws and Reaſons thereof: for doth not al Philoſophie both new and old teach us, that al phyſic or natural actions procede from *ſingular ſubſtances*, and ſo are in themſelves ſingular and individual? And are we not alſo taught by true Philoſophie and Reaſon, that al ſingular individual actions are determinate? To talk of an action *in genere* abſtract and indeterminate is ſuch an *individuum vagum*, which reaſon and commun ſenſe teſtifies againſt. Who ever delivered to us ſuch a Philoſopheme, that a human act may be indeterminate and abſtracted from its object? It's true, ſhould our Adverſaries intend only a logic or mental abſtraction we could eaſily fal in with them, yea make good uſe of ſuch a conceſſion

Deus non eſt aliter cauſa entitatis & actionis, quàm quatenus conſideratur nondum determinata ad objectum in quo eſt malitia, *Strang. l.* 2. *c.* 12. *p.* 273.

Actiones ſunt ſuppoſitorum & ſingulares.

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to defend our Hypotheſis; but they muſt intend a phyſical real abſtraction and indetermination, ſuch as includes no relation of the act to its object, which is much more abſurd than thoſe univerſal Ideas, which *Ariſtotle* ignorantly fathered on his Maſter *Plato*. In ſhort, it is moſt evident, that every natural action is ſingular, and determinate; and, if it be an human act of the wil, ſuch as al hatred is, it neceſſarily requires an object unto which it is determined: to conceit, that there ſhould be an act of hatred put forth indeterminately and abſtractly, with relation to an object, is no leſſe than a contradiction. Wherefore this indeterminate abſtract hatred which they plead for is but a mere Chimera, exiſting no where but in their own imagination. [2] It is alſo as repugnant to the Rules of Theologie: For to introduce an indeterminate abſtract general hatred, which has no relation to an object, would open an effectual dore to the ſubverſion of the principal part of Divine Providence, which chiefly if not only regards ſingulars, as clothed with al their determinate circumſtances, as before *Chap.* 5. §. 7. (6) Laſtly, this objection of *Strangius*, and the reaſon he grounds it on neceſſarily ſuppoſeth, that ſin according to its formal reaſon is *poſitive*, which yet he denies: For if the hatred of God, as other intrinſecal evils, when determined to their object, have not a ſubſtrate mater or entitative act diſtinct and ſeparable from their moral vitioſitie accidental thereto, then it hence neceſſarily follows, that there is nothing in the hatred of God and other intrinſecal evils as determined to their object, but moral vitioſitie; ſo that take the hatred of God in the whole *complexum* as determined, and there is nothing of natural entitie in it, but al is moral vitioſitie: what there is of nature or natural entitie, that our Adverſaries grant is from God, the *prime cauſe* of nature; ſo that by denying any thing in the hatred of God, as determined to its object to be from God, they muſt neceſſarily hold, that ſin according to its formal reaſon is a poſitive real Being, which was of old the opinion of the Manichees, and has been of late revived by many of our Adverſaries: and though *Strangius* oppoſeth it, yet his Antitheſis neceſſarily leads him to it; in as much as he cannot denie, but that there is ſomewhat poſitive and real in the hatred of God as determined to its object. Whence I thus further argue: Either this real poſitive entitie in the hatred of God thus determined to its object is from God, or not: if it be from God, then why may not God as wel

wel predetermine the wil to it, as concur immediately by an immediate, previous, ſpecial concurſe granted by *Strangius?* If God doth not concur to this real poſitive entitie in the hatred of God, as thus determined, then what other reaſon can be aſſigned for ſuch a non-concurrence, but becauſe it is part of the vitioſitie or formal reaſon of ſin? And doth it not hence follow, according to *Strangius*'s Hypotheſis, that ſin as to its formal nature is not privative but poſitive? Which ſome of the moſt rational of our Adverſaries now-adays maintain, to preſerve their own Phenomena, which otherwiſe would fal under ſelf-contradiction. So much for *Strangius*'s objection, and the argument he grounds it on, in the ſolution whereof we have been the more prolixe, becauſe it takes in the ſpirit and center of al his voluminous diſcourſe on this ſubject. See more in what precedes, *Chap.* 3. §. 6. & *Chap.* 5. §. 4.

3. I procede now to ſome more general ſolutions for the vindication of Gods ſacred Majeſtie from being, according to our Hypotheſis, the culpable cauſe or Author of ſin. (1) We ſay, *That albeit Gods wil be the effective and predeterminative cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, yet it is no way a defective or moral cauſe of ſin.* Gods concurſe is neither the *efficient*, nor *deficient* cauſe of ſin; becauſe the ſame act which is *defectuoſe* and ſinful in regard of the wil of man, is moſt perfect and regular in regard of the wil of God: man being by his creation bounded by the Law of God, the leaſt defect in point of conformitie thereto is ſin; but God being under no Law, becauſe inferior to none, can break no Law, and therefore be no way defective in his actions. But our Adverſaries here with ſcorne bid defiance to this anſwer, by telling us, *That albeit God be under no Law from any Superior, yet the rectitude of his own nature is a Law to him,* &c. This ſubterfuge was brocht ed by *Bellarmine*, taken up alſo by *Baronius*, *Metaphyſ. pag.* 152. and *Strangius*; and is continued by ſome of note among our ſelves at this day. But alas! what a poor ſhiftleſſe evaſion is this? What do our Opponents in urging this, but beg the Queſtion? Who ever among us denied, that God was bound by the rectitude of his nature not to be the Author of ſin? But may we not ſtil demand of them to prove, *That it is againſt the rectitude of Gods nature to predetermine the wil to the entitative act of that which is ſinful?* Is God obliged by the rectitude of his nature to conforme to the new models and congruities of mans vain imagination?

General ſolutions to free God from being the Author of ſin.
1. Gods wil the effective cauſe of the ſubſtrate mater, not a defective cauſe of ſin.

tion? Are not oft thoſe things moſt congruous to the Divine wiſdome and wil, which ſeem moſt incongruous to our depraved reaſon? Muſt we indeed meaſure the Divine rectitude of God by meaſures taken from poor mortals? Is not the Divine wil the eternal law and meaſure of al Gods actings towards his creatures? And are not al his actings therefore good, becauſe conformed to his eternal Law? Doth he wil any thing becauſe good antecedently to his wil? Are not things therefore good becauſe willed by him? Was it not a great ſaying of *Auguſtin, de Civit. Dei, lib.* 19. *cap.* 22. *That ſin itſelf as it is juſtly permitted by God fals under the eternal Law, i. e.* the Divine wil predefining and predetermining the wil of man to the ſubſtrate mater of it, and permitting the vitioſitie? When therefore our Adverſaries ſhal prove, that Gods predetermining the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin is repugnant to the rectitude of the Divine nature, they wil do ſomething to confirme their Antitheſis; but before that be done, they do but beg the queſtion.

2. *None the Author of ſin but the particular moral cauſe.*

(2) To vindicate the ſacred Majeſtie from being the Author of ſin, we ſay, That ſin being in its formal nature a privation, none properly can be ſaid to be the *Author* or *moral cauſe* thereof, but the particular cauſe, that either *commands, counſels, invites, perſuades, compels* thereto, or *actes* the ſame: But is the holy God culpable in any of theſe reſpects? Is he not ſo far from commanding men to ſin, that he ſeverely prohibits the ſame, and that on pain of death? Doth he not by al manner of affectionate dehortations diſſuade therefrom? Did he ever compel any one perſon to violate his own ſacred Laws? It's true, we affirme, that he neceſſarily predetermines the wil to the entitative act of that which is ſinful, yet do we not as much denie, that he compels or impels any to ſin formally conſidered? Doth not the ſinners wil at that very moment when it is thus predetermined by God to the material entitative act of that which is ſinful, as voluntarily and chearfully elect and embrace the ſinful act, as if there were not the leaſt predetermination? And doth not this ſufficiently clear his ſacred Majeſtie from *impelling or compelling* the wil to ſin?

3. *God concurs only to what is naturally good in ſin.*

(3) Do we affirme any thing in this point, but what the moſt of our Adverſaries do, and al muſt grant, namely that God doth efficaciouſly concur only to what is naturally good in mens ſins, not to the moral vitioſitie therein? If they hold, as *Strangius* and others do, that ſin is as to its formal nature a mere privation,

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muſt they not alſo neceſſarily grant, that al ſin has ſome real, poſitive, natural good for its foundation or ſubject? Was it not a commun Effate among the Greek Philoſophers and Fathers, ὅτι οὐσίαν οὐχὶ τὸ κακὸν, ἀλλὰ παρυπόστασιν, τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἕνεκα, καὶ οὐχ' ἑαυτῷ γινόμενον, *Sin hath no ſubſiſtence of its own, but privation of ſubſiſtence, it being brought about for the ſake of good, not for its own ſake?* Now if al ſin have ſome good as its ſubſtrate mater and ſubject, wil it not neceſſarily follow, that the bleſſed God, who is the fountain of al good both natural and ſupernatural, doth efficaciouſly concur, yea predetermine the wil thereto, without falling under the imputation of being the Author of the ſin appendent thereto? (4) Yea, is not the holy God ſo far remote from being the Author of that ſin which is annexed to natural actions, as that he brings good out of it? Are not the moral evils of men, which are oppoſite to the Creators Laws and the creatures beſt good, ſo wiſely ordered by the skilful hand of the Creator, as that they potently ſubſerve his principal end and ſupreme good? Is there ſo much folie and madneſſe in the hearts of Sinners as to extract evil out of good; and is there not as much wiſdome and bonitie in the great God, as to extract good out of evil? Was not the Crucifixion of our Lord an evil of the moſt crimſon and deep tincture? and yet did not the wiſe Phyſician of Souls bring the greateſt good even the ſalvation of Sinners out of it? And can he not do the ſame out of al other acts, though never ſo intrinſecally evil? But how can this be accompliſht, if he do not predetermine the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of the act? I ſhal conclude our ſolutions of this Objection, with that excellent diſtinction and determination of great *Bradwardine, de Cauſ. lib. 3. cap. 29. pag. 739.* 'Without 'dout God violently impels no man againſt his wil, but ſponta-'neouſly impels and draws al men willing to al their free acts. 'Furthermore it may be probably ſaid, that God doth in ſome 'ſenſe neceſſitate to the act of ſin, as to the ſubſtance of the act; 'yet it doth not thence follow, that he doth neceſſitate to ſin, as 'it is ſin or the deformitie of ſin, *&c.* as before *Chap. 4. §. 2.* So much for the firſt Objection.

§. 2. It is further objected, *That our Hypotheſis touching Gods predeterminative concurſe to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, is contrary to the Eſſence and Attributes of God, namely to his Sinceritie, Fidelitie, Juſtice, Clemence,* or *Mercie* and *Sanctitie.* 1. Our Adverſaries make a great clamor againſt our Hypotheſis, as that which oppoſeth

Object. 2. *From the Eſſence and Attributes of God.*

1. *His Sinceritie and Fidelitie.*

seth *the Sinceritie and Fidelitie of God, in giving Laws with severe Prohibitions against sin, Promises and Invitations unto Sinners to repent*, &c. To this first branch of their Objection we shal answer more distinctly and in its parts in what follows, §. 3, 4, 5. at present let this general Responſe suffice, that the *Sinceritie* and *Faithfulnesse* of God is sufficiently vindicated, in that Gods Commands, Promises, and Invitations unto Sinners, flow from his *complacential, legislative Wil*, which is the Measure, Rule, and Reason of our dutie and actings towards God; but his Predeterminative Concurse flows from his *Beneplacite Decretive Wil*, the Rule and Measure of his own actings towards his Creature: Now these two wils, albeit they are not repugnant each to other, because they are not *ad idem*, yet they are disparate and diverse: the things commanded by God may be repugnant to the things predetermined by him, yet his wil commanding is not repugnant to his wil predetermining. Indeed Gods preceptive wil is only in an analogic, figurative improper sense termed the wil of God, as significative of his soverain pleasure for the Government of his Creature; and therefore Gods predetermining men to the material act of what is sinful, implies not the least shadow of repugnance to his Sinceritie and Fidelitie in giving Laws and Prohibitions against Sin, or Promises to penitent Sinners. Yea, there is nothing that our Adversaries can urge against us for asserting a predeterminative Concurse, but may be retorted against them for asserting an immediate previous Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin: Yea, let them but grant, as they do, Gods certain prescience of sin, and the same black Imputations which they lode us with, wil al fal with as much weight on themselves, as before *Chap.* 5. §. 2.

2. From Divine Justice.

2. As for what they urge from the *Justice of God, that our Hypothesis is contradictory thereto, in that he cannot in Justice punish that Sin, which he predetermines men unto*, we answer, (1) That Gods Predetermination lays no violent force or compulsion on the wil to sin: he doth only as the first cause and God of Nature sweetly though potently applie the wil to its act. (2) The wil doth in the very same moment, wherein it is predetermined by God, voluntarily and freely, as a deficient depraved facultie, elect the very act it is predetermined unto; so that it doth as freely, deliberately, and fully espouse the act, as if there were no Predetermination on Gods part: and what more just than that

that the Sinner ſhould be ſeverely puniſhed for that ſinful act which he doth deliberately and voluntarily exert? (3) Here is in this objection a poor Sophiſme, which they cal *No-cauſe for a cauſe:* For Gods predeterminative Concurſe is not the cauſe of mens ſins, albeit mens ſins be a neceſſary conſequent thereof. (4) The ſame difficulties, which our Adverſaries urge us with in point of Divine Juſtice, return on them, who aſſert an immediate previous Concurſe to the Mater of Sin; neither can they without apparent violence to their own Reaſon impute this objection to us, which their own Hypotheſis is as much obnoxious unto.

3. They urge us with an Imputation on the *Clemence* and *Mercie* of God, in that predeterminative Concurſe to the entitative Act of Sin, makes the bleſſed God to be cruel towards his poor Creature; and this two ways: As (1) *In that it makes God abſolutely to predeſtine or reprobate men to eternal Puniſhment, without regard to their Sins.* (2) *In that it ſuppoſeth the bleſſed God to threaten and puniſh Sin with eternal Torments, and yet irreſiſtibly to predetermine yea impel men thereto,* as *Baron. Metaph.* p. 151. This Objection our Adverſaries adorne and exaggerate with many ſpecious and plauſible pretextes for the Vindication of Divine Clemence and Mercy, as they pretend, and for our confuſion; Yet we no way dout but to make it appear, that al is but as emty vapor before the Meridian Sun. Therefore to anſwer, (1) to the firſt branch of the Objection, *That our Hypotheſis makes God abſolutely to predeſtine or reprobate men to eternal Puniſhment, without regard to their ſins,* [1] We grant, that the Decree of Reprobation is, and muſt be according to our Hypotheſis, *abſolute,* becauſe there is an adequate commenſuration between abſolute Predefinition and Predetermination, as our Adverſaries alſo maintain; of which before *Chap.* 5. §. 3. [2] Yet we peremtorily denie, that God reprobates or predeſtines men to eternal puniſhment without any regard to their ſins. Divines ſay, that albeit ſin be not the motive or ground moving God to reprobate men, yet it is conſidered in the Decree of Reprobation as that for which God wil at laſt condemn men. It's true, the *Supralapſarian Divines,* who make man as *labile* the object of Reprobation, differ ſomewhat from thoſe of the *ſublapſarian* perſwaſion, who make the *corrupt maſſe,* or *lapſed man* the object of Election and Reprobation; yet they both take in the conſideration.

3. *From Gods Clemence and Mercie.*

deration of sin in the Decree of Reprobation; and they both make the Decree of Reprobation in it self absolute: for the Sublapsarians make sin only a commun condition of the corrupt Masse, not *distinctive* or *discriminative* of Reprobates from the Elect; as *Davenant*, *Animadvers. on Gods Love*, p. 84. proves, *That the Supralapsarians charge not Gods Reprobation with mans destruction*; Though he himself goes the Sublapsarian way. But, [3] Here lies the bitter root of this forged Imputation affixed on us by our Adversaries, that they consider the Decree of Reprobation as an act of Divine Justice, which regards the object as already constituted, and not the constitution thereof. This is incomparably wel observed by judicious *Davenant* in his answer to *Hoard*, *Animadvers.* p. 229. 'For those Inferences there-'fore, *That if absolute Reprobation be granted, God may be properly* '*called a Father of Crueltie*, ἀπολλύων, I marvel how *he trembled* '*to thinke of them*, and how he never trembled to utter them. 'That wherein he perpetually is mistaken, is, the making of 'Non-election or Negative Reprobation a *Vindicative act*, the 'confounding it with the judicial Sentence of Damnation, the 'conceiving it to worke in the Non-elect an invincible necessitie 'of committing Sin, with such like monstrous fansies, which he 'takes for Principles needing no proof, whereas they are such 'grosse errors as need no confutation. (2) The second part of the Objection, which supposeth *the blessed God to threaten and punish Sin with eternal torments, and yet irresistibly to predetermine and impel men thereunto*, has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes, §. 1. and indeed throughout this whole Discourse, and wil also come under consideration in what follows.

4. From Divine Sanctitie. 4. Our Adversaries charge also our Hypothesis with a Repugnance to the *Sanctitie* and *Puritie* of the Divine Nature, in that, by asserting *Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of Sin, we make the act of sin to be wel-pleasing to God.* This objection is greatly aggravated by a Reverend Divine among our selves, who in the confutation of *Twisse*, argues thus: *If God willeth that sin existe by his Permission*, (1) *He willeth Sin.* Yea, (2) *God wils sin as much as man.* Yea, (3) *This makes God equally to wil Sin and Holiness.* Yea, (4) *Then God takes complacence in Sin. Answer.* These are high charges indeed, and if they could be made good against us, we should not deserve protection from any wel-governed Kingdome or State: for what more inconsistent

ſiſtent with civil Government, than to make the Supreme Rector and Governor of Mankind equally to wil Sin and Holineſſe? But theſe Calumnies and Reproches are not of yeſterday, but have been time out of mind imputed to the aſſertors of Efficacious Concurſe, and therefore we have been more large in the refuting of them, §. 1. of this Chapter. Thus *Bradwardine, De Cauſ. l. 2. c. 28. p. 572.* 'When it is argued, ſaith he, *that the ſinful* 'act doth pleaſe God Wel, (1) The Adverbe *Wel* may determine 'the Verbe *to pleaſe God*, in regard of the Divine complacence, 'and ſo there is no dout, but that as the evil Act [entitatively 'conſidered] doth pleaſe him, ſo it is highly wel-pleaſing to him: 'or (2) in regard of the Act that is wel-pleaſing; and that either 'in regard of the *ſubſtance* of the act, or in regard of its *vitio-* 'ſitie: [1] If we regard the act *naturally*, ſo it's true, that it is 'wel-pleaſing to God, but if we regard it *morally*, ſo it's falſe. '[2] If we regard the *vitioſitie* of the act, ſo it is not properly 'effected by man, nor yet by God, it being not properly an 'effect, but pure Privation only. An acute and excellent Deciſion of this Controverſie, were not the minds of men eaten out with Prejudices; the ſum whereof is this, The Act of ſin entitatively and ſubſtantially conſidered is naturally good, and ſo wel-pleaſing unto God, the Author of Nature; yet if we conſider it morally in regard of its Vitioſitie, ſo it is infinitely diſpleaſing to God. This is as a Key to open the dore to a more ful ſolution to al objections againſt us: ſo that at preſent we need ſay no more than this, that our Hypotheſis is no more obnoxious to theſe aſperſions, than that of our Adverſaries. Is not the Divine Sanctitie as illuſtrious in Gods predetermining to the ſubſtrate mater of Sin, as if we held only with our Adverſaries an immediate previous concurſe thereto? Are not thoſe very Acts, which are morally evil as to the Sinner, both naturally and morally good as to God? Suppoſe he predetermine to the entitative act of ſin, yet muſt we thence neceſſarily conclude, that he predetermines men to ſin formally conſidered? Muſt not the ſinful qualities of al moral effects be imputed to the ſecond particular cauſe, and not to the firſt univerſal cauſe? It's true, the Sinner comes ſhort of the Divine Law, and therefore ſins, but doth God come ſhort of any Law? Has not his Wil the ſame Rectitude which his Nature is inveſted with, and therefore whatever he wils muſt be right and holy, even becauſe he wils it? The ſin which he governs,

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is it not only ſin in regard of the Creatures wil, not in regard of his wil? It is confeſt, that God and the Sinner concur to the ſame ſinful act materially conſidered; but yet is their Concurſe the ſame? Yea is there not morally an infinite diſtance between the one and the other? Doth Sin as to Gods Concurſe, include any more than a natural act, which is in regard of God and the conducibilitie it has to his glorie morally good? but doth it not, as to mans Concurſe, ſpeake moral vitioſitie? Again, what doth Gods permiſſion of ſin implie, but a natural or judiciary Negation of that Grace he is no way obliged to give? But doth not ſin as to the ſinner denote a moral privation or deficience of that rectitude which ought to be in his act? Is there any thing in the world purely, ſimply, and of it ſelf ſinful, without ſome ſubſtrate mater naturally good? What reaſon therefore can our Adverſaries allege, why God may not predetermine the wil to the ſaid ſubſtrate mater, without prejudice to his Sanctitie?

Object. 3. *From Gods Word.*

§. 3. We deſcend now to a third objection taken from the Word of God, both *Preceptive* and *Promiſſive*, which divine Predetermination of the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, doth, according to the Antitheſis of our Adverſaries, render *uſeleſſe*, *impoſſible*, yea *colluſive* and *unſincere*. For ſay they, *Gods Precepts, Promiſes and Comminations, whereof mans Nature is capable, ſhould be al made Impertinences, through his conſtant overpowering thoſe that ſhould neglect them.*

1. *Preceptive.*

1. As to Gods Laws and Prohibitions they urge, *That our Hypotheſis renders them altogether uſeleſſe, yea naturally and ſimply impoſſible.* This they exaggerate with many fine words and rhetoric flouriſhes, which are the beſt armes they have to defend their declining cauſe with. But having God and Truth, though naked and ſimple, on our ſide, we no way dout but to ſtand our ground againſt al their fiery, or venimous darts. And in anſwer to the firſt part of their Objection from the Impoſſibilitie of divine Precepts and Prohibitions, we anſwer, (1) That our Adverſaries greatly pleaſe themſelves in their falſe ſophiſtic Ideas and Notions of what is *poſſible*, or *impoſſible*; which we have endeavoured to clear from that ambiguitie and confuſion, *Chap.* 1. §. 4. with endeavors to explicate what is poſſible and what impoſſible to corrupt Nature, as to divine Commands. (2) We are to know, that the Laws of God in their Second Edition were primarily intended to ſubſerve the ends of the Goſpel

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as to the heirs of Salvation, to whom they are by Grace in an Evangelic way made possible. The Law is said to be given in and by the hands of the Mediator, *i. e.* to subserve his ends, which principally regard the Elect. (3) Yet we grant, that the Law is also of great use even unto Reprobates, [1] In that it lays a great restraint on them, not only as to wicked actions, but also as to lusts in some measure, as *Exod.* 34. 24. The Autoritie and Majestie of Divine Precepts, backed with many severe Curses, leaves a great awe and restraint sometimes on the most debaucht spirits, and so keeps their lusts from open violences. [2] The Precepts are so far useful to Reprobates, albeit they have no power to observe them, in that they are thereby instructed, how much obedience is wel-pleasing to God, and how ungrateful they are in not performing of it: whereby they are left without al Apologie or Excuse. The Precept shews us what we ought to do, not what we can do: it is always *imperative*, albeit not always *operative*: and may not the Soverain Lord require of man the payment of his debts, although by reason of his profligate bankrupt humor he hath disabled himself from the payment of them? What excuse is it for the Sinner to say, it is impossible for him to obey the Precept, whenas the impossibilitie lies in his own wil, not in any force or defect on Gods part? Doth he not in that very moment, wherein he is predetermined by God to the entitative act of Sin, voluntarily espouse and wil that act? And doth not this leave him without al shadow of Excuse? Where can he loge the blame of his Sin but on his own crooked depraved wil, which electively and freely determines it self to the Sin, in the same moment of time, though not of nature, that it is predetermined by God to the entitative act? (4) We affirme, that Gods certain Prescience of Mens sins, with the conditional Decree of Reprobation, Gods immediate previous Concurse to the entitative act of sin, and mans universal impotence to perform what is spiritually good, which are al granted by our Adversaries, bring sinners under as great impossibilitie of obeying Gods Commands, as absolute Reprobation and predeterminative Concurse to the mater of Sin asserted by us. This is wel demonstrated by a judicious and awakened Author in his late Letter touching Gods Providence about sinful Acts, *&c.* from *p.* 67. to 74. But because he is a party, I shal mention only the Response of *Davenant*, *Animadv.* p. 341. 'As

'for Gods Law, *which cannot be kept without supernatural Grace*, 'we say, that men are as capable of any supernatural Grace, 'considered under the absolute Decrees maintained by S. *Au*'*gustine*, and by the Church of *England*, as considered under the 'conditional Decrees of late framed by *Arminius*. And *p.* 418. he strongly proves, *That Divine eternal Prescience of future Actions or Events infers as absolute a necessitie of such events and impossibilitie of the contrary, as the Decrees of absolute Predestination and Reprobation do*, of which hereafter, §. 8.

2. *From Gods Promisses and Invitations.*

2. As for the later part of our Opponents Objection, *From the Promisses and Invitations of God, which are made useless and collusive by our supposed divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of Sin*, we answer,

(1) *Al Promisses primarily intended for the Elect.*

(1) That al Gods Promisses and evangelic Invitations, which are but branches of the Covenant of Grace, are primarily intended for the elect Heirs of Salvation, to whom they are many ways useful, notwithstanding Divine Predetermination: For the blessed God promiseth life and happinesse on the condition of Repentance and Believing, not as if there were any potence or abilitie in corrupt nature, by its own free-wil, to accept of these offers, or performe the Condition on which the offers depend, but thereby convincing the Soul of its extreme impotence, he doth together with the offer and invitation made conveigh Grace into the elect Soul, for the inabling of it to performe the Condition: So that these general and conditional Promisses are in reference to the Elect, for whom they are primarily designed, *operative* of Grace, albeit as to others they are only *exactive* of dutie: whence the impossibilitie which attends corrupt Nature is taken off as to the Elect by Divine Grace.

(2) *The use of evangelic Promisses as to Reprobates.*

(2) Neither are those general evangelic Promisses and Invitations useless as to Reprobates: for, [1] They declare the infallible and essential connexion which there is between the condition and the thing promised therein, namely, Life and Salvation. And to make this more clear, we are to remember, that both Logic and rectified Reason assures us, that a conditional enunciation doth not always note a possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent, but only their necessary connexion: that in al conditional Propositions, on which evangelic Exhortations and Invitations are founded, there cannot be supposed an indifferent and indeterminate possibilitie of the Antecedent and Consequent, but

but only the connexion of the Antecedent with the Conſequent, is evident from that of our Lord, *John* 15. 6. *If a man abide not in me he is caſt forth*, &c. Whence it is apparent, that a ſolid and ſerious Invitation unto Sinners may be built on a Condition in ſome mode impoſſible: The God of al grace has, by his evangelic Conſtitution and Covenant, eſtabliſhed an inviolable connexion between Faith and Salvation, ſo that this Propoſition is infallibly true, *If thou believeſt, thou ſhalt be ſaved:* and the holy God has given his Miniſters Commiſſion to preach it to al Mankind, neither is there the leaſt colluſion or fraudulent intention on Gods part, albeit he doth predetermine the Moſt of men to the ſubſtrate mater of Unbelief: for the ſinceritie of Gods intention appears in the realitie of the offer, which conſiſtes in the infallible connexion of the Conſequent with the Antecedent, grounded on the evangelic *Pactum* or Ordination, as *Davenant* wel obſerves, *Animadverſ. on Gods Love*, p. 377. where he ſhews, 'That the Decree of God, permitting *Pharaoh* to abuſe the gifts 'of God to his own deſtruction, was not contrary unto the end 'or uſe whereunto thoſe gifts and actions of God had a fitting 'ordination in their own nature. So *p.* 387, 388. he demonſtrates, 'That Divine eternal Decrees, whereupon may infallibly be in-'ferred the abuſe of Grace temporally offered, do not croſſe the 'end for which ſuch Grace is adminiſtred to perſons not elected. And he gives this reaſon for it, *p.* 352. 'Gods meaning muſt be 'always interpreted according to the known nature of the Means, 'and not according to the unknown Wil of God concerning the 'infallible event or ſucceſſe of the Means. Gods meaning, 'when he offers any Grace unto men, is that they ſhould per-'forme ſuch actions whereunto ſuch grace conduceth: and his 'meaning when he promiſeth glory unto any man, *if he believe* '*and perſevere*, is truely to performe it if he ſo do. But it is not 'always Gods abſolute wil to cauſe men to uſe his Grace to 'their own good.— If the Remonſtrants wil have nothing term-'ed *Gods meaning* but his abſolute Wil, in their opinion as wel as 'in ours it wil follow, that God had no meaning to give *Cain* or '*Judas* ſaving Grace or Glorie. Laſtly, *p.* 392, 393, 394. he proves, *That God doth by his wil of Approbation and Complacence unfeignedly wil what he commands and exhorts men to, albeit he decree the contrary event.* Hence, [2] Theſe general Promiſſes and Invitations have this uſe alſo as to Reprobates, that it leaves

them without the leaſt ſhadow of pretence or Excuſe for their unbelief: for if God doth by ſuch Promiſſes and Invitations declare his real intention to ſave men if they believe, and withal an expectation that they accept his offers, yea, his complacence in ſuch an acceptation in order to life, with a proviſion of al means neceſſary thereto, what excuſe can men have for unbelief? Wil they ſay, that Gods predetermining men to the entitative act of unbelief contradicts ſuch a real intention? Take the Replie of *Davenant*, *Animadv.* p. 271. 'We anſwer, that God is 'no otherwiſe ſaid to intend outward events, than by providing 'orderly means for the producing ſuch events. Non-election 'provideth no means of making men ſin, and therefore it in-'cludeth no intention of God to make men ſin, though it in-'clude a proviſion of ſinful Events, and a Decree to permit 'them, *&c.*

(3) *The Antitheſis of Antipredeterminants deſtroyeth the uſe of Promiſſes, &c. as much as our Hypotheſis.*

(3) The Hypotheſis of our Adverſaries in granting Predetermination to what is good, and Divine Preſcience of ſinful acts, doth as much diſpirit and deſtroy the uſe of Divine Promiſſes and Invitations as ours. For, [1] In that they aſſert none can performe the condition required, and ſo embrace the evangelic offer made, without efficacious predeterminative grace, do they not leave al Reprobates under as great an impoſſibilitie of Believing as we do? Are not al offers, for want of this predeterminative Grace, altogether uſeleſſe to them, for whom it never was intended? [2] So alſo as to Gods certain Preſcience of their Sins, did not God, according to their Conceſſions, certainly foreknow, that they would never, yea never could accept of the offers made to them, without predeterminative Grace, which he decreed never to give them? Hence doth not this certain Preſcience infer as natural and abſolute impoſſibilitie, as our predeterminative Concurſe to the entitative act of Sin? This is wel argued by *Davenant*, *Animadv.* p. 242. 'His [*Hoard*'s] nibbling 'at the *Synod of Dort*, and charging them with mantaining *a fa-'tal Decree*, is to little purpoſe. If he cal that *fatal*, which is 'certain and immutable, we are not afraid to affirm, that al 'Gods eternal Decrees are certain and immutable; and that very 'eternal Decree of Reprobation, which he imagines to follow 'upon the foreſight of mens final impenitence, is as abſolute and 'immutable, and in this ſenſe as fatal as that which we defend. Thus alſo p. 332. 'The Remonſtrants (we adde alſo the New

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'Methodists) dare not promise Salvation to any persons repro-
'bated, according to their decree founded upon the prevision of
'their final Infidelitie and Impenitence, but under these Con-
'ditions, *Si crediderint & pœnituerint, if they shal believe and re-*
'*pent:* we assure them of Salvation under the same conditions,
'notwithstanding the absolute Decree of their Non-election,
we adde, and Gods Predetermination to the entitative act of
Sin.

(4) To put a period to the vain Cavils of our Adversaries, we grant, that even Reprobates, notwithstanding Gods absolute Reprobation, and Predetermination unto the entitative act of sin, stil retain a remote radical power and Indifference of wil to embrace the good things offered in the Gospel. For neither doth the natural corruption of the wil, nor yet Divine Predetermination to the substrate mater of sin take away the *radical Indifference* or *Flexibilitie* of the Wil, or the *passive, natural remote* power it is naturally invested with, as a rational elective facultie, to embrace whatever good, whether natural or spiritual, that is absolutely or conditionally tendered to it: and this sufficeth to ground divine Exhortations and Invitations on; for the Propositions and Offers being made to rational Creatures, they might, were they but willing, embrace the things that belong to their peace tendered to them; but here lies the Plague of their hearts, *Joh.* 5. 40. *They wil not, &c.* So that the blessed God making such gracious offers, so suitable to the needs of a rational creature, and having given him a remote, passive, natural power of understanding and wil suited thereto, doth not this suffice to leave him without al excuse for his wilful Impenitence and Infidelitie, notwithstanding the predeterminative Concurse of God to the entitative act of his Sin? And that this is the Doctrine of the Calvinists and Church of *England*, we are assured by *Davenant*, *Animadv.* p. 257. 'They confesse, that un-
'der the Evangelical Covenant, *Si credideris, salvus eris, If thou*
'*believe, thou shalt be saved*, every man hath a true claim to Eter-
'nal Life: They confesse, that wheresoever is Christs Church,
'there is such a sufficient administration of Grace as would have
'saved the Non-elect, had they not opposed a malignant volun-
'tary act of their own wil against the motions and operations of
'Divine Grace; according to those words of our Saviour, *Joh.*
'3. 17. & 12. 47, 48. & *Act.* 13. 46. *Calvin* saith as much, *in*

4. *What Power we allow to Reprobates.*

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'Joh. 3. *Mundi nomen iterum iterumq; repetit, ne quis omnino arceri 'se putet, modò fidei viam teneat.* He therefore, as wel as the Re- 'monstrants, grants a conditional possibilitie of Grace and Salva- 'tion to al men; but we say, the non-elect are always permitted 'to fail in the performance of the condition. And doth not this sufficiently vindicate the finceritie of God in al his Evangelic pro- misses, invitations, and tenders of grace and happinesse, yea every way as much as the new Method of our Adversaries, who grant certain prescience and predetermination to what is good?

Object. 4. *From the overthrow of Religion.*

§. 4. Another Objection urged by our Opponents against pre- determination to the substrate mater of sin, is, *that it overthrows al Religion, and makes mens faculties, whereby they are capable of mo- ral government, remisse, sluggish, useless and vain*; yea they stick not to avouch, *that this our Hypothesis opens the dore to Familisme, Enthu- siasme, and the most prodigious impieties and anormities*: This they ag- gravate with many rhetoric aggravations. Answer, This Objection is grounded on the same false Hypothesis with the precedent, namely, *that the wil predetermined by God is moved only by an inward violent impulse, which makes al Gods precepts, promisses, and commina- tions mere impertinencies, and mens faculties useless and vain.* What a grosse Sophisme this is, and how much the Hypothesis of our Ad- versaries fals under the force of it, as wel as ours, we have alrea- dy, in what precedes, sufficiently demonstrated, and shal do again in what follows. We shal only adde at present an excellent de- monstration and solution given by judicious *Davenant, Animadv.* pag. 418. 'For the second branch of this reason, whereby he goeth 'about to prove that absolute predestination and reprobation de- 'stroy both *Hope* and *Fear*; it is grounded upon an error confuted 'and rejected by the commun consent of al Divines, namely that 'the eternal Decrees of God concerning future events make 'the contrary events impossible, do make the temporal and im- 'mediate Agents to do al they do out of an absolute necessitie, ha- 'ving no libertie *in modo agendi* to abstain from so doing, or to do 'the contrary. Were this true, the Remonstrants, who acknow- 'lege eternal and absolute Decrees, upon a presupposal of an eter- 'nal absolute prescience, should by their Doctrine destroy hope 'and fear (the nerves of Religion) as wel as we. But more of this in answer to the next Objection.

Object. 5. *From the libertie of the Wil.*

§. 5. The last Objection we shal mention, (which is indeed first in order of nature) is, *that our Hypothesis overthrows the libertie of*

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the wil, introduceth a fatal neceſſitie, and is the darling of Hobbes, with the like unjuſt and ſcandalous reproches. This is much urged by *Strangius*, *Baronius*, and ſome of name among our ſelves. Anſwer, (1) In this I confeſſe the ſpirits and principal forces of al their Objections centre, and that which the Defendents of efficacious concurſe have been in al Ages urged with by the Pelagians and Patrones of free-wil. Thus *Auguſtin* was ever and anon upbraided by the Pelagians with a deſigne to introduce a *fatal neceſſitie*: the like the Synod of *Dort* has been reproched with by the Arminians: and now, becauſe the name of *Hobbes* ſounds very harſh in Chriſtians ears, therefore that is faſtened on us. But this is no new method, but long ſince invented by the *Accuſer of the Brethren*, for the oppreſſing of this ſuffering truth. (2) What the true Idea and notion of *Libertie* includes, and thence how little our Hypotheſis doth infringe the ſame, we have ſufficiently demonſtrated in the explication of the libertie of the wil, *Chap.* 1. §. 3. (3) We anſwer with *Bradwardine*, *lib.* 3. *cap.* 29. *pag.* 739. that God violently impels no man to ſin, albeit he ſpontaneouſly impels or draws the wil voluntarily to the ſubſtance of that act which has ſin annexed to it; of which ſee what precedes *Chap.* 4. §. 2. (4) Our Adverſaries ſeem herein very unjuſt, in that they faſten their falſe Ideas of predeterminative concurſe and libertie on us, and ſo make us to hold what follows upon their ſentiments. For they placing the wils libertie in an actual indifference and indetermination; as alſo making al predeterminative concurſe to acte by violent impulſes on the wil, which being ſo impelled remains no longer free, but is acted as a machine, *&c.* it's no wonder, if from ſuch falſe principes their forged conſequence and concluſion follows naturally. Thus *Strangius*, *lib.* 2. *cap.* 11. *p.* 243. makes Gods predetermination to the entitative act of ſin, to be an impulſion to ſin. The like is urged by one and another Divine of name among us, who wil allow no predetermination to the entitative act of ſin, but what is violent impulſion. It's true *Bradwardine*, *lib.* 9. *cap.* 29. *pag.* 739. uſeth the word *impel* for Gods predetermining concurſe, and the like *Twiſſe*; but then they limit it to ſuch a ſpontaneous voluntary impulſion, as is no way prejudicial to the wils libertie: But our Adverſaries make al predeterminative concurſe, even in the ſupernatural acts of Grace, to be by violent impulſes, ſuch as leave the wil no more power to acte in a contrary way, than a mere Machine, which is impelled by

The injuſtice of the New Methodiſts in urging this objection, and its inconſiſtence with their own ſentiments.

by a *vis impreſſa*, *a force impreſſed* from ſome extrinſec efficient: for thus they expreſſe themſelves, that to be predetermined even in the ſupernatural acts of Grace, *is to be conſtantly managed as mere Machines that know not their own uſe.* I muſt confeſs had we ſuch Ideas of predeterminative concurſe, it would neceſſarily follow, that the human wil is thereby diveſted of al its libertie; neither can I ſee how our Adverſaries wil be ever able to defend themſelves againſt the Pelagians and Arminians on their principes, which ſuppoſe al predetermination to be a violent impulſion like that of *Machines*. I ever diſliked the Carteſian Hypotheſis, which makes the ſouls of Brutes to be but *Machines*; but to make the human ſoul and wil of man to be but a *Machine* in the reception of predeterminative grace or concurſe introduceth that *fatal neceſſitie the darling of* Hobbes, which is injuſtly fathered on us. We ſay, that predeterminative concurſe is as to its principe and mode of working the ſame as to natural and ſupernatural acts; neither doth it in the one or t'other at al infringe the libertie of the wil, but fortifie and confirme the ſame, in that it workes ſweetly according to the indigence of the wil. And this I ſhal with much confidence aſſert, that we can with as much reaſon defend the conciliation of human libertie with Divine predetermination of the wil to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin, as our Adverſaries the New Methodiſts can defend the conciliation of human libertie with Divine predetermination to the ſupernatural acts of Grace: for albeit the termes produced be different, the one a ſupernatural, the other only natural good; yet predetermination as to its principe the Divine wil, as alſo as to its manner of working, which is agreable to the condition and libertie of the wil, admits no difference. And this *Baronius* was ſufficiently apprehenſive of, and therefore denied al predetermination; and I no way dout but that in the iſſue our Adverſaries wil be forced to denie al predetermination, or to grant us what we contend for as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin. Yea, (5) we ſhal yet aſcend a degree higher and affirme, *That Gods certain preſcience of ſin*, which our Adverſaries generally allow, infers as much a neceſſitie on the wil, as predeterminative concurſe to the entitative act of ſin. This we have ſufficiently demonſtrated, *Chap.* 5. §. 2. and therefore ſhal here only ſuperadde an excellent demonſtration of judicious *Davenant*, *Animadv. pag.* 418, 419. 'For the Divine eternal preſcience of 'future actions or events inferreth as abſolute a certaintie, im-

'mutabilitie,

'mutabilitie, neceſſitie of ſuch events, as the Decrees of abſolute 'Predeſtination and Reprobation do; (we may adde, by a paritie of reaſon, predetermination which is adequate to abſolute Decrees) 'And therefore the Schole-men are as much troubled in an-'ſwering the Queſtion, *Whether the Divine preſcience, or providence 'brings a neceſſitie to the things foreknowen?* as in the other, *Whe-'ther Divine predeſtination impoſeth a neceſſitie on things?* And the 'Philoſophers, who never dreamed of Predeſtination or Reproba-'tion, were yet much troubled to ſhew, how any thing could be '*fortuitous* or *contingent*, admitting an eternal and infallible pre-'ſcience of al future events in God— So that if this Author, or 'any other Remonſtrant, wil but take the pains to conſider, how 'the Schole-Divines clear the eternal and infallible preſcience, 'wil, and providence of God from impoſing fatal neceſſitie upon 'events foreſeen, willed, provided, he may with the ſame facilitie 'know how to clear the eternal abſolute Decrees of Predeſtina-'tion and Reprobation from impoſing on mens actions any fatal 'irreſiſtible neceſſitie. As Gods abſolute preſcience doth not 'take away the poſſibilitie of the contrary action or event, no 'more doth his abſolute Decree. Thus our judicious *Davenant*, in vindication of the abſolute Decree of Reprobation, which holds moſt true alſo of Divine predetermination as to the ſubſtrate mater of ſin: for according to the confeſſion of our Adverſaries, *Strangius* and others, abſolute Reprobation neceſſarily infers Divine predetermination as to the entitative act of ſin.

CHAP. VII.

The genuine Hypotheſes of the Predeterminants, with the Antitheſes of their Adverſaries, particularly the New Methodiſts.

(1) The genuine Hypotheſes of the Predeterminants, with the falſe Hypotheſes and conſequents impoſed on them by the Moliniſts, Arminians, and New Methodiſts. (2) The Antitheſes of the New Methodiſts, with their dangerous conſequents.

§. 1. IT has been the practice of our Adverſaries in al Ages to clothe our *Hypotheſis* of efficacious predeterminative Concurſe with the *Bears skin* of many falſe Ideas and black ugly con-

sequences, but their own *Antitheſis* with the *sheeps clothing* of many fair and colorable pretextes; wherefore to vindicate our ſelves and unmaſque them, we ſhal adde, as a *Coronis* to this Diſcourſe, the genuine ſentiments of ſuch as defend Divine predetermination, *&c.* as alſo the proper Antitheſes of their Adverſaries.

The genuine Hypotheſes of of the Predeterminants.

1. THere is nothing future but dependently on ſome abſolute Decree of God, either effective or permiſſive.

2. The Futurition of the entitative act of that which is ſinful, is from the effective wil of God.

3. The Futurition of ſin is from the permiſſive wil of God, efficaciouſly decreeing to leave men unto ſin.

4. The actual exiſtence of ſin is the conſequent, but not the effect of Reprobation.

5. God abſolutely decreed to permit *Adams* Fal, *Strang.* 858. *Davenant, Animadv. p.* 322, 323.

6. Gods Decree to permit ſin is not otioſe, but efficacious.

7. God efficaciouſly decrees to permit ſin for the manifeſtation of his own Glorie.

The falſe Hypotheſes and Conſequents impoſed on the Predeterminants, by Moliniſts, Arminians, and New Methodiſts.

1. *GOds abſolute Decrees, which give futurition to things, take away al power from the creature of acting contrarily, yea make the contrary naturally, and ſimply impoſſible.*

2. *The futurition of ſin is from the effective wil of God, yea very God,* Str. 631, 632, 635. Le Bl. Concord. Libert. par. 1. Theſ. 55, &c. p. 454. *as before, c.* 5. §. 1.

3. *The Decree of God giving futurition to ſin neceſſitates men to ſin.*

4. *The exiſtence of ſin is from Reprobation as the proper cauſe thereof.*

5. *God impelled and neceſſiated* Adam *to fal,* Baron. Metaphyſ. 150, 151.

6. *Gods efficacious Decree to permit ſin makes him the Author of ſin.*

7. *God wils and decrees ſin as ſin, yea ſimply wils and intendes the damnation of Sinners.*

8. Gods

8. Gods abſolute Decree of Reprobation impels no man to ſin, *Ward, pag.* 132.

9. There is no act ſo ſubſtantially and intrinſecally evil, but the vitioſitie thereof may be ſeparated from the entitative act.

10. God doth not predetermine, much leſſe impel any man to the leaſt ſin.

11. God doth not predetermine the wil to any ſinful act, as it morally refers to its object, but only phyſically, *Alvarez, refer. Strang.* 240. 242.

12. Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act, whereunto ſin is annexed, doth not beſpeak him the Author of Sin.

13. God, by his efficacious wil and actuoſe providence permits the wil to ſin, but is no moral efficient thereof.

14. God, by predetermining the wil to the entitative act of ſin, doth not temt men to ſin, *Jam.* 1. 13.

15. In ſinful acts God predetermines the wil only to the entitative act, not to its ſinfulneſſe; but in good acts, God predetermines the wil not only to the act, but alſo to the goodneſſe thereof.

16. Sin is committed againſt Gods wil of complacence and approbation, but not againſt his wil of natural permiſſion.

8. *Gods abſolute Decree of Reprobation impels men to ſin.*

9. *In acts intrinſecally evil the vitioſitie cannot be ſeparated from the entitative act conſidered in its individual nature.*

10. *Predeterminative concurſe brings men under a fatal and Hobbian neceſſitie of ſinning.*

11. *In acts intrinſecally evil God predetermines the wil to the act as ſinfully relating to its object*, Strangius, pag. 206, 234, 240, &c.

12. *Gods predetermining the wil to the material entitative act of ſin makes him the cauſe of ſin*, Strang. pag. 341, 342. Baron. Metaph. 150, 151.

13. *The Sinner doth not determine himſelf to any ſinful act any other way than God*, Strang. pag. 242, 243.

14. *God doth more than temt men to ſin, in that he predetermines the wil thereto*, Strang. pag. 269.

15. *Predeterminative concurſe to the entitative act of ſin maketh God to afford as much influence and concurrence to the worſt of actions as to the beſt*, Strang. pag. 277.

16. *God doth not only permit ſin, but approve of it, yea take complacence in it.*

17. Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin is very wel consistent with the natural libertie of the wil, and its *natural, passive, remote* power of receiving Laws, and obeying the same.

17. *Predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin, destroys the libertie of the wil, introduceth a fatal necessitie, and makes the mater of al Gods Laws to Adam and his posteritie, a natural, simple, and absolute impossibilitie,* Strang. 567. Bar. Metaph. 150.

18. Gods predetermination to the natural entitative act of sin may very wel be reconciled with his wisdome, veracitie, and sinceritie in the prohibition and punishment of sin.

18. *Gods predetermination to the entitative act of sin is irreconcileable with his wisdome and sinceritie in prohibiting and punishing sin*, Baron. Metaphys. pag. 151.

19. God punisheth one sin by leaving men to another, yet without being guilty of the least sin.

19. *God, in punishing sin by efficacious dereliction or leaving men to sin, becomes guilty of sin.*

20. Sin by Divine wisdome is made a means accidentally utile and subservient to Divine glorie, albeit it hath no moral bonitie in it.

20. *God wils sin and approves of it as a means naturally and morally conducing to his glorie.*

21. Al Gods invitations, comminations, exhortations, and promisses argue in God a real wil of approbation, and Evangelic intention that Sinners repent and live, albeit they never repent.

21. *That Gods predeterminative Concurse to the substrate mater of sin makes him not really to intend what he pretends to by al his invitations, promisses, comminations, and exhortations to repent.*

22. Gods physic complacence is towards the entitative natural act of sin, and yet his moral displicence is against its obliquitie and vitiositie.

22. *God takes not only physic complacence in the entitative act, but moral complacence in sin, by predetermining the wil to the entitative act thereof.*

The Antitheses of the New Methodists and Antipredeterminants, with their consequents.

§. 2. Having given the proper Hypotheses of the Predeterminants, with the false Hypotheses and consequences imposed on them by their Adversaries, we now procede to lay down the proper Antitheses of the Antipredeterminants, and more particularly of the New Methodists, and the dangerous consequences which naturally result therefrom.

The

The Antitheſes of the New Methodiſts and Antipredeterminants.

1. THE Futurition of althings is not from the Divine wil and decree, *Strang.* 628, 631.

2. The futurition of althings is not ſimple, but complexe, *Strang.* 640.

3. The futurition of althings is not eternal.

4. The ſame particular cauſe that gives exiſtence to any thing gives futurition to it.

5. The futurition of the entitative act of ſin is not from the wil of God, but the wil of man, *Strang.* 585, 628, 631, 632. *Le Blanc*, 454.

6. Whatever God wils he approves: or complacence is eſſential to al acts of Gods wil, *Strang.* 546, 548.

7. God decrees not the entitative act unto which ſin is intrinſecally appendent, *Strang.* 562, 587.

8. There is a twofold Decree in God, one abſolute, the other reſpective, conditionate, and conſequent, *Strang.* 546.

9. Al Gods Decrees are not particular, but ſome general only, *Strang.* 558.

The dangerous Conſequents of thoſe Antitheſes.

1. *NOthing is certainly and infallibly future.*

2. *Complexe Propoſitions are in order of Nature before their ſimple termes.*

3. *God did not from al Eternitie foreſee althings future.*

4. *Nothing is future before it is exiſtent, at leaſt in its particular cauſes.*

5. *The futurition of ſinful acts is a mere contingense to God.*

6. *There is in God a velleitie, or imperfect conditional volition which never takes effect.*

7. *There is ſomething in Nature which was never decreed by the God of Nature.*

8. *God hath a general antecedent conditional love and deſire of the Salvation of al men.*

9. *Some Decrees of God may be fruſtrated and never come to paſſe.*

10. Repro-

10. Reprobation is not absolute, but conditional, dependent on the prevision of mens actual sins.

11. Gods prescience of mens sins is conditional, and dependent on mens free-wil, not on the Decree of God, *Strang.* 642, 647.

12. Gods permission of sin is only privative and inefficacious, *Baron. Metaphys.* 157, 158.

13. God wils only his own permission of sin, not the existence of sin by his permission, *Arminius.*

14. There is a twofold Concurse of God, the one predeterminative, the other only general.

15. It doth not belong to the perfection of Gods Providence absolutely to predefine and predetermine al free acts of the human wil, *Baron. Metaphys.* 147. *Strang.* 568, 584.

16. Al positive real Beings and acts are not from God as the first cause of Nature, *Strang.* 584, 630.

17. God predetermines to what is good, but not to the material entitative act of that which is intrinsecally evil.

10. *The reason why God hated* Esau *and loved* Jacob *must not be resolved into the secret or good pleasure of God, but unto his prescience of* Esau's *actual and final disobedience and* Jacobs *obedience.*

11. *There is* Scientia media, *or* middle Science *in God, dependent on mans ambulatory wil, and so only conjectural and uncertain.*

12. *God as an idle Spectator looks on the wicked world, but doth not, neither can omnipotently rule, dispose and order their sinful acts for his glorie.*

13. *When it's said, that God wils the permission of sin, it must be understood only of the effect.*

14. *Al Divine Concurse is not particular, total, immediate and efficacious.*

15. *The creature is in some natural acts independent and the first cause of its own acts: or, the second cause can act without being applied and actuated by the first cause.*

16. *God can make a creature, which by having its capacitie preserved and made habile, can of itself act without immediate efficacious concurse,* Baron. 131.

17. *Supernatural good is from God, but not al natural good.*

18. What

18. What is predetermined is naturally and ſimply impoſſible.

19. Man in his lapſed ſtate has a moral power to cloſe with Divine exhortations and offers.

20. Unregenerate men may prepare themſelves for the entertainment of Grace.

21. To predetermine the wil to the entitative act of ſin is to impel men to ſin.

22. Divine predetermination to the entitative act of ſin puts an end to human libertie.

23. Some human acts are indifferent *in individuo*, and ſo neither good nor evil.

24. Some human acts are ſo intrinſecally evil, that the vitioſitie cannot be ſeparated from the entitative act.

18. *Efficacious grace in Converſion deſtroyeth human libertie.*

19. *Gods efficacious Concurſe is in the power of mens natural free wil, either to uſe or refuſe the ſame.*

20. *God vouchſafeth to al men ſufficient grace, which if wel improved, he wil reward with efficacious grace,* Strang. 229.

21. *Al Predetermination impels the wil, and acts it as a mere Machine.*

22. *There is a twofold libertie, one eſſential to the wil, but leſſe proper, the other accidental, conſiſting in indifference, which is moſt proper.*

23. *Al human acts ought not to be performed for Gods glorie.*

24. *The vitioſitie of ſin is eſſential to ſome human natural acts, as natural.*

We do not produce the conſequents here drawen from the Antitheſes of Antipredeterminants, as their proper ſentiments, at leaſt not of al that eſpouſe thoſe Antitheſes, but only as ſuch as may be naturally and logically deduced from their Antitheſes, albeit they do not formally aſſent to al of them.

FINIS.

ERRATES.

BOOK II.

Page 489. l. 31. for *God* read *us*.

BOOK III.

Page 10. l. 33. for *drive* r. *denie*.
p. 22. l. 26. after *elſwhere* put a period.
Item l. 36. dele *by*.
p. 23. l. 32. r. גבל.
p. 24. l. 39. dele *and*.
p. 28. l. 2. dele *and ſtating*.
p. 42. l. 36. r. *that God only*.
p. 76. l. 19. r. *ſame*.
p. 79. l. 38. r. *to Gods*.
p. 80. l. 31. for *like*, r. *agreable*.
p. 86. l. 7. r. *Tarnovius*.
p. 89. l. 3. for *is he*, r. *he is*.
p. 111. l. 18. for *Baronius* r. *Bellarmine*.
p. 119. l. 16. r. *c.* 34.
p. 129. l. 23. r. *This he*.
p. 142. l. 5. dele *who*.
p. 145. l. 2. r. *ſo not*.
p. 166. l. 26. r. *Compton*.
p. 170. l. 9. r. *it works*.